Summary: Bail denied---Background:Muhammad Arshad filed a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 04.04.2017. The petitioner was convicted under sections 302 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) for his involvement in a murder case registered with Police Station Malakwal, District M.B Din. The incident involved the petitioner allegedly inflicting fatal blows with a hatchet, resulting in the death of Saee Muhammad, and causing injuries to Mst. Rasulan Bibi & Mst. Sardaran Bibi. The motive behind the occurrence was a dispute over the possession of a plot.---Issues:Whether the petitioner's conviction and sentencing under sections 302 and 324 of the PPC were justified.Whether there was a failure to consider evidence and evaluate it according to the principles of "appreciation of evidence".---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. It affirmed the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the PPC but altered the sentence from death to imprisonment for life. The Court found that the prosecution had presented substantial evidence, including medical reports, eyewitness testimonies, and the recovery of the hatchet used in the crime. The petitioner's claim of self-injury was deemed unsubstantiated due to the lack of evidence supporting it. The Court concluded that there was no basis for interference with the lower court's decision.

Summary: (a) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)- -Ss. 270 & 271-When probate or administration may be granted by District Judge-Disposal of application made to District Judge in which deceased had no fixed abode-Scope-Where it was claimed that the deceased had a fixed abode within jurisdiction of the lower court, High Court observed that the order of returning the petition by the District Judge did not appear to be justified when the same was not backed with reasons that how the just disposal of the application would be convenient at another place-Order whereby petition for probate was returned was set aside with direction to the District Judge to proceed further. (b) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)- -S. 270-When probate or administration may be granted by District Judge-Scope-Bare reading of S. 270 of Succession Act, 1925, makes it clear and obvious that such application can competently be filed by the applicant either at the place where the testator/intestate, at the time of his death, had a fixed place of abode or where any property is situated-Competent court of such both places shall have the competence and jurisdiction to grant such letter of administration or probate-Such discretion, provided by law itself for convenience of the parties, legally cannot be prejudiced; any other view would frustrate the provision. PLD 2016 Bal. 39 ref. (c) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)- -Ss. 271 & 270-Disposal of application made to Judge of District in which deceased had no fixed abode-When probate or administration may be granted by District Judge-Scope-Section 271 speaks about a situation where the deceased had no fixed abode, therefore, it would not prejudice the scope and application of S. 270-Section 271 does not prejudice the competence of the court but the discretion may be exercised by such court when such court itself is of the view that convenience for disposal of such application is with another district-Prima facie, S. 271, is also to advance convenience without prejudicing the jurisdiction and competence of the court so provided in the earlier provision i.e. S. 270. (d) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)- -Ss. 273 & 381-Conclusiveness of probate or letters of administration-Effect of succession certificate-Scope-Issuance of letter of probate or succession certificate cannot be treated as declaration with regard to legal heirship or title of the parties but purpose and scope thereof is always limited for specified purpose.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Secretary Law seeks indulgence of this Hon'ble court in arranging a counsel for and on behlaf of Commendar Kulboshan Yadue to file review under "Review & Reconsidertion Ordiance 2020 " in line with ICJ Judgement. Per the petition, the refered spy has refused to file review

Summary: Conviction upheld----In the case of Farooq Shah vs. State, heard at the Multan Bench of the Lahore High Court (PLJ 2021 Cr.C. 713 DB), the appellant, was convicted under Section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code, along with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The charges were related to the appellant throwing acid on the victim, Mst. Shaista Bibi, causing severe burn injuries. The court noted that both the complainant, Ashiq Hussain, and the victim, Shaista Bibi, sustained acid burn injuries, supporting their presence at the crime scene. The prosecution argued that Farooq Shah had a motive, as he had previously demanded Shaista Bibi's hand in marriage, which was refused by the complainant. The court considered the medical evidence, including the detailed examination by Dr. Allah Bakhsh and Lady Dr. Madiha Wasim, who highlighted the extensive burns on both victims. The judgment also discussed the legal aspects, emphasizing that the term "corrosive substance" in Section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code has a broad interpretation, encompassing any substance that may cause harm to the human body. The court rejected the appellant's defense of false implication and affirmed the trial court's decision. Farooq Shah was sentenced to life imprisonment, along with fines and compensation, under concurrent sentences. Additionally, the court touched upon the significance of the site plan, considering it as not a substantive piece of evidence, but a tool that could be challenged if proved to be prepared on the pointation of witnesses. The injuries were deemed to fall under the third schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, justifying the application of the Act in this case. Overall, the court upheld the conviction and sentence of Farooq Shah based on the evidence presented, including medical reports and witness testimonies.

Summary: A petition related to notifications issued by the Federal Government of Pakistan, specifically SRO 656(I)/2006 and the subsequent amendment introduced by SRO 483(I)/2016. The focus was on the exemption of customs duties for vehicle components imported in Kit form. The petitioner does not contest the original notification but challenges the condition imposed by the amendment, which mandates the installation of immobilizers in vehicles benefiting from reduced customs duty. The petition argued that the two-day timeframe for compliance with the immobilizer requirement, as per the amendment, is impractical. It emphasizes the complex nature of immobilizer systems, involving advanced hardware and software, as well as the need for coordination with foreign vendors. The petitioner contended that imposing such a condition within a short period is unreasonable and disproportionate to the objectives of the original notification (SRO 656). The document highlighted the intricacies of the automotive manufacturing process, the importance of pre-ordering components, and the impossibility of implementing the immobilizer condition within the specified timeframe. The petitioner also references a court order that temporarily stayed the operation of the relevant clause in the amendment. In the end, the court allows the petition, declaring the immobilizer condition null and void, as it was issued without lawful authority.

Summary: This writ petition challenged an order in which the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, canceled a sale deed for land allotted to the petitioner by the Chief Minister for establishing an Art Academy. The petitioner argued that the Chief Minister had the authority to sell state land through private treaty, making the cancellation illegal. However, the court noted that the Chief Minister, as the custodian of state assets, cannot sell state land through private treaty. Referring to legal precedents, the court emphasized that state land must be disposed of through fair and transparent means, such as public auction, to prevent favoritism and nepotism. Additionally, the court highlighted that actions beyond legal jurisdiction, against public policy, or involving fraud are considered void. The writ petition was dismissed, affirming the cancellation of the sale deed by the Board of Revenue.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)------S.9(c)---Possession of forty kilograms of charas---Appreciation of evidence---Prosecutioncase was that on spy information vehicle driven by accused was checked and 40 packets ofcharas were recovered from secret cavities of the vehicle, each packet weighing onekilogram, total 40 kilograms---Prosecution produced recovery witness and complainant toprove the charge---Said witnesses remained consistent and firm regarding the recoveryeffected from the accused, they were tested through lengthy cross-examination but theirevidence could not be shattered---Apparently, sufficient evidence was available on record toprove the guilt of the accused and he being a driver of the vehicle was in charge of thevehicle and his culpability was established beyond the shadow of doubt---Accused had takenthe stance in his statement recorded under S.342, Cr.P.C, that he was innocent and hadfalsely been involved into the case due to exchange of hot words with the SHO, but despitethat he neither opted to record his statement under S.340(2), Cr.P.C, nor any evidence wasproduced by him in his defence---Mere bald and general assertions were not sufficient todiscard the overwhelming prosecution evidence---Accused was admittedly driving the carfrom which the alleged narcotic was recovered---Accused being the driver was well withinthe knowledge about the concealment of narcotic in the vehicle---Police Officials werecompetent witnesses, and their evidence could not be discarded only for the reason that theywere Police Officials---Police Officials had furnished straightforward and confidenceinspiring evidence---Circumstances established that prosecution had proved its case againstthe accused beyond any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, incircumstances.Kashif Amir v. The State PLD 2010 SC 1052; Ghulam Qadir v. The State PLD 2006SC 61 and Riaz Mian v. The State 2014 SCMR 1165 rel.(b) Criminal trial-------Witness---Police witness---Scope---Prosecution witness being Police Official by itselfcould not be considered as a valid reason to discard his statement/evidence. Zaffar v. The State 2008 SCMR 1254 rel.(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------S.9(c)---Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, Rr.4 & 5---Possession of forty kilograms of charas---Appreciation of evidence---Delay in sendingsamples of contraband for chemical analysis---Effect---In the present case, alleged recoverywas effected on 09.11.2019, whereas the sample parcel was sent to the Chemical Examineron 11.12.2019---However, the delay was explained by the Investigating Officer and he statedin his statement that on 10.11.2019 he wrote a letter to the high-ups of the police departmentfor permission for sending the case property to Chemical Examiner's report, meaning therebythat the Investigating Officer had taken the initiative on the very next day of recovery fromthe accused for depositing the case property to the office of the Chemical Examiner---Evenotherwise, there was nothing on record to establish that the said parcel was even tamperedwith, instead the evidence led by the prosecution established that the parcel received by theagency remained intact---Circumstances established that prosecution had proved its caseagainst the accused beyond any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was dismissed,in circumstances.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 324, 109, 506(2) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attemptto commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, criminal intimidation, common intention---Pre-arrest bail,grant of---Rule of consistency---Scope---Allegation against accused was that he was presentalong with his brother and father when they murdered one member of the complainant partyand injured another---Allegation in the FIR as well as in the statements recorded underS.161, Cr.P.C., was that the co-accused persons had made firing---Accused had neithercaused any injury to the deceased or for that matter to the injured eye-witness---Accusedpersons had made firing---Case against accused came within the ambit of further inquiry---One of the co-accused persons had already been granted bail, therefore, the rule ofconsistency applied to the case of accused which entitled him to the same relief---Petition forgrant of pre-arrest bail was allowed.Abdul Ghafoor v. The State and another 2020 SCMR 961 and Babar v. The State2020 SCMR 761 ref.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.498---Pre-arrest bail---Direct approach to High Court---Scope---Accused, inexceptional circumstances where his life is under threat in case of directly approaching theTrial Court, can approach High Court for seeking pre-arrest bail.Rais Wazir Ahmed v. The State 2004 SCMR 1167 rel.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.498---Pre-arrest bail---Purpose---Scope---Extra-ordinary relief of pre-arrest bail ismeant for innocent persons to save them from humiliation and disgrace at the hands ofpolice---Purpose of this remedy is to protect liberty and reputation of the citizens particularlyin a case where the circumstances reflect that it is a case to be that of further inquiry on thebasis of material on record---Power to grant bail under S.498, Cr.P.C., is not additional to or independent to S.497, Cr.P.C., and even while granting pre-arrest bail the provisionscontained under S.497, Cr.P.C., are also to be kept in mind---Grant of bail or its refusal isessentially a matter of discretion to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, and the factsof each and every case are to be considered separately and independently---Reasonable andplausible grounds must exist for grant of bail before arrest---Concept of pre-arrest bail wasdeveloped on three presumptions; firstly the accused is presumed to be innocent till he isfound guilty; secondly, the accused should have a right to prepare his defence and prove hisinnocence before the Trial Court and thirdly, the accused should not be punished before thefindings of his conviction are rendered by the Court.Muhammad Jahangir Khan and others v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 1270 rel.

Summary: Background:The appellant, Sardar Abdul Rehman, won the election in PB-08 Barkhan, Balochistan, by a narrow margin of 65 votes. Dissatisfied with the outcome, one of the contestants, Abdul Kareem Kethran, filed an election petition alleging irregularities, including the inclusion of invalid votes in the appellant's count. The Election Tribunal ruled in favor of Abdul Kareem Kethran, setting aside the notification declaring Sardar Abdul Rehman as the returned candidate and ordering re-polling in the entire constituency.---Issues:Whether the election petition filed by Abdul Kareem Kethran is maintainable.Whether there were grounds to examine the validity of 312 postal ballots.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The appellant argued that the election petition was not maintainable due to flaws in its verification and the manner of its presentation. The Court found that the petitioner, Abdul Kareem Kethran, designated an attorney, Sanaullah, to present and verify the petition. However, the law mandates that the petitioner personally undertake verification, which was not done. Additionally, affidavits submitted by the attorney were not sworn by the petitioner as required by law. This non-compliance rendered the election petition fatally flawed.The Court emphasized that examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination are essential parts of witness testimony, and the affidavit submitted by the attorney could not substitute for the petitioner's deposition. Therefore, the Court refused to consider the validity of the 312 postal ballots or other issues raised in the petition.Based on the above, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and ordered the parties to bear their own costs.---Citations/Precedents:North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987Legal principle: Immediate demand for pre-emptionLegal principle: Consequences of delay in pre-emption demandLegal precedent: Abdul Latif v Dil Mir (2010 SCMR 1087)