Summary: (a) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-------Ss.42, 45 & 53---Constitutional petition---Mutation---Petitioners contended thatpetitioners were recorded owners of the properties; they also owned possession of shamilatland; that father of respondents taking benefit of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitionersgot the properties recorded in his name as lathband buzgars at the time of settlementregarding unsettled lands---Senior Member Board of Revenue accepted Revision petition ofrespondents (impugned order) and directed the Deputy Commissioner/Collector for disposal---Validity---Order sheet revealed that neither any summons was served upon petitioner, norex-parte proceeding had been initiated, and petitioner was not heard---Senior Member Boardof Revenue had no jurisdiction to directly entertain any revision after lapse of longstandingentries i.e. 34 years---No order was passed by subordinate Commissioner/DeputyCommissioner---Respondents jumped over more than two lower forums---Respondentsthemselves disputed the title of the properties and Revenue Court lacked jurisdiction inmatter whereby title was to be determined---Respondents concealed the civil suit and appealbefore High Court from the Senior Member, hence, did not go before Revenue hierarchy withclean hands---Impugned order was in derogation of Ss.45 & 53 of the Balochistan LandRevenue Act, 1967---High Court set aside the impugned order and quashed the proceedingbefore Deputy Commissioner---Constitutional petition was accepted accordingly.(b) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-------Ss.42, 43, 45 & 53---No disputed entry in Record of Rights or periodical record could bealtered, either on the ground of mistake or fraud, except on the basis of obvious clerical erroror patent facts, requiring no elaborate inquiry for their establishment---Disputed entrieshaving been incorporated in the Revenue Record could only be corrected through decree ofCourt and not by order of any of the official in the hierarchy of revenue authorities,particularly after the lapse of more than five decades.Waris Khan v. Col. Humayun Shah PLD 1994 SC 336; Rasta Mal Khan v. NabiSarwar Khan 1996 SCMR 78 and Nemat Ali v. Malik Habibullah 2004 SCMR 604 rel.(c) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)-------S.42---Mutation---Dispute pertaining to the title of property---Only civil court hadjurisdiction to make decision to the effect---Disputed question of fact regarding title couldnot be decided by the Revenue Officer/Revenue Court by way of mutation proceedingswhich were summary in nature.

Summary: Background:In Criminal Petition No. 958 of 2020, Muhammad Irfan, the petitioner, and Dilshad Khan, the co-accused, were intercepted by the Anti Narcotic Force in Dera Ismail Khan on January 17, 2020. Upon search, a significant amount of cannabis was found concealed in the vehicle they were driving. While Dilshad Khan was granted bail by the High Court, Muhammad Irfan's bail application was rejected. Muhammad Irfan challenged this decision before the Supreme Court of Pakistan.---Issues:Whether the bail granted to Dilshad Khan, the co-accused, should be cancelled.Whether Muhammad Irfan, the petitioner, should be granted bail on the principle of consistency.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that bail, once granted, can be cancelled if there are compelling reasons to do so, particularly if there are inconsistencies in the granting of bail to co-accused. In this case, the Court found that Dilshad Khan was granted bail despite overwhelming evidence against both him and Muhammad Irfan. The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the offense, the substantial evidence against the accused, and the absence of any mitigating factors warranted the cancellation of Dilshad Khan's bail. Consequently, Muhammad Irfan's petition for bail was also dismissed.---Citations/Precedents:Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2019

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 22-A-Ex-officio Justice of Peace, powers of-Registration of FIR-Reasons to be furnished for passing an order contrary to the police report-Scope-Ex-officio Justice of Peace on application of the respondent under S.22-A, Cr.P.C. containing allegations that the Assistant Commissioner along with Levies Officials came to his house, beaten two persons, detained them for three hours, set his residential hut on fire as a result of which his educational documents were burnt into ashes not only that an amount of rupees seven million and four hundred thousand were found missing, in view of such circumstances, Tehsildar be directed to register FIR against the nominated persons-Ex-officio Justice of Peace had obtained report from the concerned Tehsildar which had elaborated that no such offence took place, however, despite such report Ex-officio Justice of Peace had ordered for registration of FIR without any corroborative material from the complainant-Ex-officio Justice of Peace was not required to blindly allow a request of the complainant and to believe the averments of the complaint as gospel truth-Ex-officio Justice of Peace was supposed to furnish tangible reasons for not relying upon the solicited report-Constitutional petitions were allowed and the order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace was set aside. Nazim Hussain v. Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-officio Justice of the Peace, Nankana Sahib 2017 PCr.LJ Note 35 rel. Mian Muhammad Khalid v. Station House Officer Police Station Manawan 2017 PCr.LJ Note 9 fol. Abdul Wahab, Assistant Commissioner Jhal Magsi Petitioner No.1 present in person (in Constitution Petition No. 21 of 2020).

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S. 151 & O. XXIII, R. 1-Inherent powers of High Court-Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim-Restoration petition-Scope-Petitioner sought recalling of order whereby his application seeking unconditional withdrawal of constitutional petition was allowed-Contention of petitioner was that respondent had assured him that his post-retirement benefits would be disbursed in his favour immediately upon withdrawal of the petition whereas respondent denied the alleged settlement-Validity-Petitioner had categorically stated in his application that the prayer was premised on the fact that the respondent had assured that all retirement benefits shall be disbursed upon withdrawal of the proceedings-Such application was supported by his personal affidavit duly sworn on oath-Respondent had not filed any counter affidavit or objections to the application, thus, the reason stated by the petitioner in his application remained un-rebutted-Stance taken by petitioner appeared to be correct as no prudent person, at the end of his professional career, would think of withdrawing a case for abandoning the claim vigorously pursued by him for his post-retirement benefits-Court, under its inherent powers, could allow restoration of the petition so that the petitioner could be granted a fair opportunity of decision of case on merits-Application was allowed, in circumstances and the petition was restored to its original position (b) Administration of justice- -Matters should be decided on merits rather than depriving a party on technical grounds. (c) Administration of justice- -Court is to ensure dispensation of justice by setting the controversy before it at rest. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S. 151 & O. XXIII, R. 1-Inherent powers of High Court-Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim-Restoration petition-Scope-Court, under its inherent powers, can allow restoration so that the petitioner may get a fair opportunity of decision of his case on merits. (e) Administration of justice- -Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for-Court was to proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers administration of justice is permissible even if there is no express provision permitting the same. H. M. Saya & Co. Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi and another PLD 1969 SC 65 ref. (f) Administration of justice- -Proper place of procedure in any system of administration of justice is to help and not to thwart the grant to the people of their rights. Imtiaz Ahmed v. Ghulam Ali and others PLD 1963 SC 382 ref. (g) Administration of justice- -Technicalities have to be avoided unless it be essential to comply with them on grounds of public policy. (h) Administration of justice- -Ideal system was one that gave to every person what was theirs'. (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S. 151-Inherent powers of High Court-Scope-Inherent powers of the Courts as affirmed by S.151, C.P.C are undoubtedly wide and varied and are meant to advance the cause of justice and to redress a wrong; to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court-Such power was to be exercised unhesitatingly so long as same did not conflict with or was contrary to any provision of law. Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Messrs Awami Cotton Ginners and 7 others PLD 1995 Kar. 282 ref.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: No doubt, the executing Court would follow the decree and in no circumstance the learnedexecuting Court could go beyond the decree,likewise, decree cannot be interpreted as per the whims and wishes of the decree holder or judgment debtor.

Summary: The FTO had issued a notice to Unilever Pakistan Ltd based on a complaint from another party alleging non-payment or short payment of pension. Unilever Pakistan Ltd challenged the jurisdiction of the FTO to entertain the complaint and filed a petition against the notice. The petitioner's argument was that the FTO's jurisdiction did not cover the resolution of labor or service-related disputes, as demonstrated by the Establishment of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2001. The Assistant Attorney General and the Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue also supported the petitioner's case, asserting that the FTO lacked jurisdiction and any labor dispute should be resolved by the labor court. The court considered the arguments and legal precedents. It clarified that disputed factual matters are generally not addressed in writ jurisdiction. The main question was whether the FTO's notice suffered from any jurisdictional issues that warranted the court's interference. The court referred to Section 9 of the Establishment of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2001, which grants the FTO jurisdiction to investigate maladministration by the Revenue Division or Tax Employees. However, the court noted that the definition of these terms did not extend to the petitioner, and Section 9(3) explicitly excluded matters related to personal grievances about service. Therefore, the court concluded that the FTO's notice and proceedings exceeded its jurisdiction, and it could not be sustained. .

Summary: The appellant contested the maintainability of the appeal in view of the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The Writ Petition, allowed by the learned Single Judge, directed the registration of a charge by Respondent No.2 SECP. The appellant's objection to the writ petition's maintainability, as highlighted in the impugned judgment, was based on the availability of the remedy of appeal under Section 480 of the Companies Act, 2017. The court observed that the appellant is displeased with the judgment, challenging the order by Respondent No.2. This order, made under the Companies Act, 2017, is appealable under Section 480 of the Act. The appellant had also filed an objection petition under Section 13 of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The court relied on legal precedents, including "SME Bank Limited v. Izharul Haq" and "Muhammad Aslam Sukhera v. Collector Land Acquisition (2019 SCMR 939), " to underscore the principle that an Intra Court Appeal is not maintainable when an alternative remedy such as appeal, revision, or review is provided by the relevant law. The court emphasizes that the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, bars an ICA when such a statutory remedy exists. "Muhammad Aslam Sukhera and others Versus Collector Land Acquisition, Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore" (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 45)The Honíble Supreme Court of Pakistan in this case emphasized that the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 bars the remedy of Intra Court Appeal in those cases in which the relevant law provides the remedies of appeal, revision, or review. Consequently, the court dismissed the Intra Court Appeal, noting that the appellant had an available alternative remedy of appeal under Section 480 of the Companies Act, 2017.