Summary: Background: This case involves a dispute over the ownership and possession of a property in Rawalpindi, which was originally allotted to the petitioners' predecessors in 1964. After rebuilding the property and later purchasing it through a sale deed in 1992, the petitioners claimed ownership. The respondent-department contested the sale, arguing that it was an evacuee trust property under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, and initiated legal action to cancel the sale deed. The trial and appellate courts initially ruled in favor of the petitioners, but a civil revision overturned these decisions. Subsequent appeals by the petitioners to the Supreme Court and civil review were also dismissed. -----Issues: 1- Whether the sale of the property to the petitioners' predecessors was valid or void ab initio. -----2- Whether the respondent-department can invoke the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, instead of the execution provisions under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). -----3- Whether the petitioners have any legal rights over the superstructure built on the evacuee trust property. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the property is evacuee trust property and that the sale to the petitioners' predecessors was void ab initio as it lacked the necessary approvals from the Federal Government. As such, the property never lost its status as evacuee trust property. The court rejected the petitioners' arguments that the respondent-department was precluded from invoking the provisions of the Evacuee Trust Act due to the doctrine of election, as the sale was void from the outset. The court further ruled that the petitioners had no legal claim to the superstructure on the property, as it vests in the Evacuee Trust Board under the relevant scheme. The constitutional petition was dismissed with costs, and the court noted that the petitioners had no rights to the property and had been unlawfully profiting from rents. -----Citations/Precedents: TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN vs. DEVAN SUGAR MILLS LIMITED and others (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 828) LIAQAT ALI KHAN and others vs. CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (2021 YLR 349) IRFAN ULLAH KHAN vs. PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB (2020 CLC 594) ARSHAD ALI and others vs. SARTAJ and others (2016 YLR 127) ATIF RIAZ vs. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN (PLD 2023 Lahore 536) ALI AHMAD AND ANOTHER vs. MUHAMMAD FAZAL AND ANOTHER (1972 SCMR 322) Mst. HUSSAIN BIBI vs. SIRAJ DIN (PLD 1998 Lahore 548) MUHAMMAD LATIF vs. BASHIR AHMAD (2004 CLC 1010) SHER MUHAMMAD vs. MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE (2010 MLD 187)

Summary: Background: The respondent, LF Logistics Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., filed a return for the tax year 2018, declaring a taxable income of Rs. 6,994,058. This return was initially accepted as per Section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, but later found to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) amended the assessment, levying a turnover tax of 1.25%. This decision was upheld by the CIR (Appeals) but was reversed by the Appellate Tribunal, leading to the filing of this reference by the department. ---Issues: 1) Whether the Appellate Tribunal erred in law by not including freight charges, terminal charges, shipment handling charges, duties, and taxes in the definition of "turnover" as per Section 113(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Holding: The court held that the Appellate Tribunal did not err in law by excluding freight charges, terminal charges, shipment handling charges, and duties from the calculation of "turnover." Reasoning: The court examined Section 113(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and concluded that "turnover" for service providers refers specifically to "gross fees" for rendering services. Reimbursable expenses, such as freight charges, terminal charges, shipment handling charges, duties, and taxes, do not constitute gross receipts and must be excluded from the turnover calculation. Outcome: The court upheld the Appellate Tribunal's decision, rejecting the department’s reference application and ruling in favor of the respondent, LF Logistics Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. ----Citations/Precedents: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001: Section 113(3) (Definition of "turnover") Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue's decision dated 22.02.2022

Summary: Pending

Summary: Department impugns order of full bench of NIRC and single Member wherein certain class of employees of IESCO were declared as permanent workman.

Summary: Background:In the Lahore High Court case of Fayyaz Ahmad vs. Subay Deen (C.R. No. 66481 of 2023), the petitioner, Fayyaz Ahmad, challenged the decisions made by both a Civil Judge and an Additional District Judge regarding a property dispute that originated from an agreement made in 2014. The dispute specifically involved the petitioner's attempt to secure possession of property through specific performance of the said agreement. During the course of the trial, a special oath was administered, leading to the dismissal of the suit, which was subsequently upheld by the appellate court.---Issues:The primary issue in this revision petition was whether the lower courts were correct in their rulings based on the administration of a special oath under the Oaths Act, 1873, which conclusively settled the matter against the petitioner. The petitioner argued that the application of the oath was mishandled, and that the findings of the courts below were contrary to the facts and applicable law.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court, presided over by Judge Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, dismissed the revision petition in limine (at the threshold without further hearing). The court found that the special oath administered was done appropriately and in accordance with legal provisions. The court emphasized that once the special oath was accepted and administered, it bound the parties to its outcome as conclusive proof under Sections 9 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873. The court ruled that the petitioner, having voluntarily participated in the oath-taking process, could not later dispute its validity or outcome, especially when the oath was administered without haste and with full awareness of its implications by all parties involved.---Citations/Precedents:Oaths Act, 1873 (Sections 9, 10, 11)Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. vs. Mst. Nazira Bibi and 4 others (2007 CLC 1874)Muhammad Ali vs. Major Muhammad Aslam and others (PLD 1990 SC 841)Ahmad Khan and others vs. Jewan (PLD 2002 SC 655)Saleem Ahmad vs. Khushi Muhammad (1974 SCMR 224)Sajid Mehmood vs. Mst. Shazia Azad and others (2023 SCMR 153)Muhammad Rafique vs. Nasir Mehmood (PLD 2016 Lahore 428)

Summary: Background: In this family appeal, the appellant sought to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge/Judge Family Court Bhimber on 30.09.2021. The suit filed by Nusrat Noreen, the respondent, for recovery of maintenance allowance was decreed in her favor. Nusrat Noreen married Allah Ditta on 28.09.2015. She and her minor daughter, Haleema Sadia, were allegedly compelled to leave their marital home by her father-in-law and brothers-in-law and had not received any maintenance allowance since then. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Court below properly assessed the evidence and law in decreeing the maintenance allowance in favor of the respondent. 2- Whether the appellant had sufficiently provided maintenance allowance during and after the alleged desertion. 3- Whether the maintenance allowance decreed by the Court below was justifiable given the circumstances. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Assessment of Evidence and Law: The court found that the evidence presented by Nusrat Noreen was sufficient to prove that she was not provided with any maintenance allowance and was forcibly compelled to leave her marital home. The Court below properly assessed the evidence and applied the law correctly in decreeing the maintenance allowance in favor of the respondent. ---Provision of Maintenance: The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to refute the claims of non-payment of maintenance allowance. The Court found that the appellant, despite having the financial capacity, did not provide maintenance to his wife and daughter. ---Justifiability of Maintenance Allowance: The maintenance allowance decreed by the Court below, Rs.7,000 per head per month along with a 10% annual increment, was found to be reasonable and justifiable. The Court emphasized that the demand for maintenance by the wife was legitimate, especially given the circumstances of desertion and inhuman treatment. The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment and decree of the Court below were upheld. The Court found no misreading or non-reading of evidence and determined that the maintenance allowance was decreed in a legal and just manner. ----Citations/Precedents: Order XVII Rule 3 of CPC Section 114 Order 47 of CPC Section 151 of CPC Order IX Rule 9 of CPC The decision reinforced the principle that maintenance allowance must be provided by the husband, especially in cases of desertion and inhuman treatment, and highlighted the importance of properly assessing evidence and applying relevant laws in family court matters.

Summary: Pre-emption---limitation for filing execution petition.

Summary: Where detenu was detained in the police station without formal arrest in two out of three cases, and he was not nominated in FIR and his arrest was shown as well as his physical remand was obtained subsequently after passing the order of this court and raid of bailiff. SI took the case file with him without mentioning the same in register Roznamcha. Nothing is mentioned on application for physical remand that who wrote the said application. There was no proof regarding handing over police file to other person from I.O. The only proof against the detenu is his alleged confessional statement before police which is not admissible in evidence. Both Case diaries do not bear dates in the respective columns as well as the bottom of case diaries and learned magistrate had not taken care of it, resultantly order granting physical remand was set aside while exercising powers under section 561-A Cr.P.C read with Rule 3 Part-F Chapter-4 High Court Rule and Orders Volume 5 and detenu was discharged. It has been held that arrest of accused cannot be made if some sufficient incriminating material is not available against him. Following directions were issued, i) using the term that the complainant has come to know through reliable source or land lord's clue (Zamindara Gavair) is not a legal evidence and arrest cannot be made solely on this ground. ii) No police officer shall investigate any criminal case until and unless investigation is entrusted to him by the competent authority with written order and said factum be entered in register roznamcha (iii) While seeking remand, the Investigating Officers shall briefly describe the evidence against the accused in the remand applications and the learned Area Magistrates shall apply their judicial minds and then pass speaking orders for grant of physical or judicial remand. iv) remand application shall be prepared in the light of Police Rules, 1934 and Rapat No. date as well as time of arrest of accused must be mentioned therein, in case of failure, the learned Magistrate concerned, should refuse to entertain the remand application.

Summary: For proving common intention, there should be evidence to prove pre-concert/consultation between accused persons for committing the offence and in absence of the same, attending circumstances can also be taken into consideration for deciding existence of common intention.

Summary: If the tenancy agreement introduced by the petitioner in his defence in the application for leave to contest was not registered or it was not conforming to the provisions of the "Act, 2009", the Rent Tribunal can, at the most, halt further proceedings in the matter and direct the petitioner to pay the penalty in terms of section 9 of the "Act, 2009" within specified period of time. If such amount was deposited by the petitioner within specified period, his application for leave to contest should be proceeded with further and in case of failure, it should have been dismissed. Section 9 of the "Act, 2009" is not restricted only to the application filed by the landlord, more particularly the ejectment petition. In other words, any application either by the landlord or tenant, as the case may be, when brought before the Rent Tribunal under the "Act, 2009" for enforcement of his rights under the tenancy agreement not conforming to the provisions of the "Act, 2009", can be proceeded after having a recourse to section 9 of the "Act, 2009" by directing the landlord or the tenant to deposit the penalty.