Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977: ----S. 7(3)(d)---Eligibility for promotion---Requirement of regular service---Misrepresentation regarding length of service---Effect. The appellant challenged the rejection of his candidature for the Section Officers Promotional Examination, 2016 (SOPE-2016) by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), arguing that he had completed the required eight years of regular service. However, the FPSC rejected his application due to the non-issuance of a valid Departmental Permission Certificate (DPC) and misrepresentation of his service record. The appellant had been dismissed from service from 10.10.2012 to 08.11.2017, a period that was only later converted into “on-duty” through an office order dated 06.06.2023. The court held that the appellant did not meet the eligibility criteria at the time of applying for SOPE-2016 and had concealed material facts in his application. (b) Service Law: ----Dismissal from service---Concealment of material facts in FPSC application---Validity of candidature. The appellant was dismissed from service on 10.10.2012 due to misconduct, and his appeal was dismissed at various stages until the Supreme Court set aside his dismissal on procedural grounds. After reinstatement, he faced fresh disciplinary proceedings, culminating in a penalty of stoppage of increments for two years. The court observed that at the time of applying for SOPE-2016, the appellant was not in service but misrepresented his service record, stating that he had continuously served from 2008 to 2016. The court held that misrepresentation in an application for a competitive examination is a serious offense and disqualifies the candidate from consideration. (c) Administrative Law: ----FPSC discretion in evaluating candidate eligibility---Misstatement in application---Judicial review. The FPSC has the authority to assess the eligibility of candidates based on the criteria set in the advertisement and rules governing the examination. The court found that the appellant's application contained material misstatements regarding his length of service, and the FPSC was justified in rejecting his candidature. Since the appellant failed to disclose his dismissal, the FPSC’s decision to reject his review petition was neither arbitrary nor illegal. The court ruled that judicial interference in FPSC decisions is unwarranted unless there is a clear violation of law or due process, which was not established in the present case. (d) Civil Service Rules & Conduct: ----Requirement of Departmental Permission Certificate (DPC)---Withdrawal of DPC and its legal consequences. The appellant initially failed to obtain a DPC due to his ineligibility and later secured one from NH&MP, West Zone, Quetta, without disclosing his prior dismissal and the FPSC’s previous rejection of his candidature. Upon discovering this misrepresentation, NH&MP withdrew the DPC. The court held that without a valid DPC, the appellant was not eligible for SOPE-2016, and FPSC was correct in rejecting his application. The withdrawal of the DPC further reinforced the appellant’s ineligibility, rendering his claim baseless. (e) Judicial Review of FPSC Decisions: ----Scope of interference in recruitment and promotion decisions---Principles of fairness and good faith. The court reiterated that judicial review in service matters is limited to ensuring that decisions are made in accordance with law and due process. The appellant's misrepresentation and lack of required service at the relevant time justified the FPSC’s decision. The court dismissed the appeal with costs, holding that the appellant’s actions resulted in unnecessary litigation that could have been avoided with truthful disclosure. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed with costs. FPSC’s decision upheld.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 234, 239 & 222(2)---Joinder of charges---Multiple FIRs for offenses of the same kind within one year---Consolidation of trial---Effect. Petitioners were charged under three separate FIRs arising from the same transaction involving misappropriation of government funds in a reconstruction project. The petitioners sought consolidation of charges under Ss. 234 and 239, Cr.P.C., arguing that the offenses were committed within a twelve-month period, stemmed from a single inquiry, and involved the same accused and complainant. The trial court rejected their application. The High Court held that when multiple offenses of the same kind occur within a year and involve continuity of intention and action, a joint trial is permissible under the law. It was further held that splitting up the prosecution into separate cases prejudices the accused and contradicts the legislative intent behind S. 222(2), Cr.P.C. The revision was allowed, and the trial court was directed to consolidate the charges and proceed accordingly. ----Cited Cases: • Nadir Shah v. State (1980 SCMR 402) • Shah Nawaz v. State (1992 SCMR 1583) • Negendra Nath Sen v. Emperor (AIR 1932 Calcutta 486) (b) Anti-Corruption Laws: ----S. 409, P.P.C. & S. 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947---Misappropriation of public funds---Multiple FIRs for the same inquiry---Legality of bifurcated prosecution. The petitioners, officials of the C&W Department, were implicated in multiple FIRs related to allegations of corruption in a government-funded project. The High Court observed that the entire inquiry, technical report, and prosecution were based on a single transaction, making it improper to split the case into separate FIRs. The court reiterated that criminal breach of trust cases involving multiple transactions within a year should be treated as a single offense under S. 222(2), Cr.P.C. The prosecution’s attempt to divide the case into separate trials was held to be against legal principles, and the petitioners' request for joinder of charges was granted. (c) Fair Trial and Due Process: ----Multiplicity of proceedings---Prejudice to accused---Right to a fair defense. The court emphasized that charging an accused in multiple separate trials for the same transaction is prejudicial and contrary to fair trial principles. It held that joinder of charges under Ss. 234 and 239, Cr.P.C., ensures procedural fairness, reduces undue burden on the accused, and prevents unnecessary delay in proceedings. The court ruled that fragmenting the prosecution into multiple cases based on the same set of facts results in injustice and contradicts the established principles of criminal jurisprudence. (d) Revisional Jurisdiction: ----S. 439, Cr.P.C.---Intervention by High Court in improper charge-framing---Correction of trial court errors. The High Court exercised its revisional jurisdiction to correct the trial court’s error in denying the consolidation of charges. It held that misapplication of procedural laws affecting the fundamental rights of the accused warrants interference under S. 439, Cr.P.C. The trial court’s refusal to consolidate charges was set aside, and directions were issued to conduct a joint trial in accordance with Ss. 234 and 239, Cr.P.C. ----Disposition: Revision allowed. Trial court directed to consolidate charges and proceed with a joint trial.

Summary: (a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968: ----Standing Order 1(b) & 1(e)---Permanent Workman---Temporary Workman---Nature of Work as Determinant for Permanent Status. Respondent No.3, employed as casual labor by IESCO, claimed entitlement to the status and benefits of a permanent workman under Standing Order 1(b) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The court emphasized that the nature of work rather than the designation determines whether an employee is permanent or temporary. Despite being initially employed on a temporary basis, Respondent No.3 had been continuously employed for over six and a half years on work of a permanent nature, which met the legal criteria for permanent status. Held: Continuous employment beyond nine months on permanent work entitles a worker to permanent status, regardless of contractual labels. ----Cited Cases: Executive Engineer v. Abdul Aziz PLD 1996 SC 610 Izhar Ahmed Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1999 SCMR 2557 Pakistan Railways v. Sajid Hussain 2020 SCMR 1664 (b) Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA): ----S. 33(1)---Grievance Petition---Premature Filing---Effect of Reply by Employer. Respondent No.3 filed a grievance petition under Section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 just three days after issuing a grievance notice to IESCO, without waiting for the statutory fifteen-day period. The court held that while the law prescribes a 15-day waiting period, early filing does not automatically render the grievance petition invalid, especially if the employer’s stance indicates no intention of redressing the grievance. Held: A premature grievance petition is not fatal if the employer remains adamant in denying the rights sought by the employee. ----Cited Cases: Mukhtiar Shah v. Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court 2008 PLC 12 (c) Labour Rights---Executive Instructions v. Statutory Rights: ----Ban on Recruitment by Executive Order---Statutory Rights of Permanent Workman. IESCO argued that a government-imposed ban on recruitment through an office memorandum barred the regularization of casual laborers. The court rejected this argument, holding that executive instructions cannot override statutory rights conferred under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and Industrial Relations Act, 2012. Held: Statutory rights of workers, including permanent status benefits, cannot be denied by executive orders. ----Cited Cases: Government of Punjab v. Punjab Appellate Tribunal 2002 SCMR 878 Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education v. Muhammad Sajid 2019 SCMR 233 (d) Labour Law---Burden of Proof: ----Permanent Nature of Work---Burden on Employer to Prove Temporary Nature. The burden of proving that the work was not of a permanent nature rested on IESCO. However, IESCO failed to provide evidence demonstrating that Respondent No.3's work was temporary or unlikely to last beyond nine months. Held: In the absence of sufficient evidence from the employer, the presumption favors the employee's claim of permanent status. ----Cited Cases: Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. v. Azeem Kibria Bhatti 2016 PLC 491 Disposition: Petition dismissed with costs. Concurrent findings of the NIRC upheld.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending