Summary: If any person has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in more than one case and it is not mentioned in the judgments of the cases about running of sentences concurrently, then High Court can pass order for running of sentences in all the cases "concurrently".

Summary: Prosecutors should summon police record through WhatsApp one day prior to fixation of case.

Summary: If any person has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in more than one case and it is not mentioned in the judgments of the cases about running of sentences concurrently, then High Court can pass order for running of sentences in all the cases "concurrently". 320Misc. Writ 42046/25 Arshad Iqbal Rana Vs Salman Sajjad etc Mr. Justice Malik Waqar Haider Awan 08- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 4850 PLJ 2025 Lahore 832, 2026 CLC 168 (Lahore)

Summary: Prosecutors should summon police record through WhatsApp one day prior to fixation of case. 319Criminal Proceedings 2760/25 Muhammad Gulzar Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 10- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 4983

Summary: (Against order dated 12.07.2010 passed in W.P. No. 1631 of 2008 by Lahore High Court, Lahore). (a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 52---Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991), S. 13---Pre-emption suit---Dispute over actual sale consideration---Suit dismissed for non-prosecution---Restoration of suit---Alienation of property during interregnum---Effect and legality---Lis pendens---Principle---Applicability---Alienation of suit property after dismissal of suit for non-prosecution and before its restoration falls within the sphere of lis pendens---Factual background of present case was that appellants / plaintiffs (pre-emptors) filed a suit for possession through pre-emption against respondent No. 5 (vendor) regarding the suit land claiming the sale price was Rs.200,000, while respondent No.5 asserted that it was Rs.250,000---Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and was later on restored---After dismissal of suit and before its restoration, respondent No.5 (vendor) sold the property to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees)---During pendency of the suit, respondent No. 5 (vendor) made a statement before the trial court that the original vendor could be summoned to confirm the actual sale consideration and that whatever amount the vendor admitted to have received could be treated as the sale price for decreeing the suit---The only question before the Trial Court requiring determination was the price of the suit land and respondent No.5 had no objection if the original vendor was summoned for ascertaining the actual amount of sale, but the Trial Court did not accede to the request of the appellant and proceeded to frame the issues---Trial Court dismissed the said request but the revisional court accepted it, decreeing the suit---Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees) challenged the revisional court verdict before the High Court, whereby, the decree was set aside and the matter was remanded for decision on merits, prompting the present appeal by the preemptor concerning the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens---Primary question warranting determination before the Supreme Court was as to "whether the Respondents Nos. 2 to 4, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of the pre-emption suit despite a stay order, were bound by the statement of their predecessor-in-interest under the rule of lis pendens, and whether the appellant (pre-emptor), who had already deposited the amount of Rs.250,000/- in compliance with that statement, could claim that the transaction was struck by lis pendens and was entitled to have the suit decreed?"---Held: So far as the argument that the property was purchased during the period when the suit was dismissed, therefore, the principle of lis pendens did not apply to the case of the subsequent buyers, the said argument had no force, because if a suit was dismissed and then restored, the restoration order related to back period and a transfer/sale after dismissal and before restoration was subjected to the principle of lis pendens embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---However, in the present case, the petitioners purchased the disputed property through a mutation when the proceedings in the suit were in progress after its restoration after dismissal for non-prosecution---Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 had acquired the title to the suit property subject to the final outcome of the lis and as such were bound by the result of the suit stricto sensu in all respects, as their transferor i.e. respondent No.5 was bound---High Court erred in law while passing the impugned order, which suffered from material illegality, therefore, same could not be allowed to sustain further---Resultantly, the impugned order was set aside and appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali 2016 SCMR 1773 rel. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 52---Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991), S. 13---Preemption suit---Doctrine of lis pendens---Applicability---Exception stated---The doctrine of lis pendens is fully applicable to suits for pre-emption---Validity of a pre-emption decree is not affected by any sale made during litigation and is binding on the purchaser---The only exception to the doctrine of lis pendens applicable to pre-emption claims is in one situation, where the sale by the vendee is to one who has a superior right of pre_emption provided that the sale is within the period of limitation when such right can be exercised. Basit Sibtain v. Muhammad Sharif 2004 SCMR 578 and Sawar Muhammad Sharif v. Makhmool 1991 SCMR 1419 rel. (c) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----Ss.41 & 52---Lis pendens---Principle---Defence against lis pendens---Being bona fide purchaser, plea of---A transfer by ostensible owner does not automatically become void simply because it was made pendente lite but such transfer cannot affect the rights of the other parties in the suit, thereby making the sale subject to the outcome of the decree---In other words, a bona fide purchaser, who retains title, remains bound by the final decree and bears the risk that any rights declared in the suit will prevail over their purchase---Even a bona fide purchaser without notice of litigation is bound by the result of the suit---Where a suit land is alienated during pendency of proceedings before the Supreme Court any person who purchases the land or raised construction thereon would be doing so at his own risk and cost. Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan 2002 SCMR 2003; Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti PLD 2011 SC 905; Sheikh Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad v. Faiz Ahmad 2023 SCMR 2158; Tabassum Shaheen v. Uzma Rahat 2012 SCMR 983 and Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali 2016 SCMR 1773 rel. Ch. Muhammad Maqsood Buttar, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Mian Muhammad Athar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 10th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Circulars and administrative directives--- Effect--- Executive clarifications in the form of circulars and administrative directives cannot override, amend or curtail scope of statute itself or rules framed thereunder. (b) West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963--- ----R. 4.10 (3)(a)---Circular No. FD (PCDC) 3 (225)/2022, dated 05-12-2022, issued by Government of Sindh, Finance Department---Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 2(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 25---Family pension---Divorced daughter, entitlement of---Determining factor---Dispute between parties was with regard to release of family pension to respondent who was daughter of deceased civil servant and was divorced after the death of civil servant---Validity---Dependency is not a metric for financial stability rather it is an assumption that disregards actual economic need and lived experiences of many women---Claim of surviving daughters should be based on need and individual assessment rather than a legal framework built on patriarchal assumptions as to what is stereotypically believed to constitute dependency---This presumptive exclusion based solely on marital status is unconstitutional , discriminatory and a violation of Articles 14, 25, and 27 of the Constitution ---Concept of tying a daughter's eligibility to family pension solely to her marital status results in an unjustifiable distinction---Women are independent right-holders, autonomous and should be entitled to family pension where financial need is established---Pakistan's obligations under international law reinforce the principle that women cannot be denied access to economic entitlements based on marital status alone---As a party to Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Pakistan is required to abolish discriminatory laws and practices that impair women's enjoyment of rights on an equal footing with men---Provision of Article 13 of the Constitution thereof guarantees women equal rights in family benefits, while Article 2(f) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),obliges States to repeal existing laws and regulations that constitute discrimination---Circular, which imposes restrictions unsupported by the Act or the Rules, is void ab initio, unconstitutional, and of no legal effect---Timing of death of civil servant could not lawfully be used to extinguish a surviving daughter's right to claim pension---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Secretary, Government of Punjab v. M. Ismail Tayer 2014 SCMR 1336; Muhammad Ismail Memon: In the matter of Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 226 of 2006 PLD 2007 SC 35; Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Mohammad Said Khan PLD 1973 SC 514; I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041; Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Khajani Devi v. Union of India and others 2016 (4) RCR (Civil) 158; Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971) 2 SCC 330; Bhagwanti v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 2088; Poonamal v. Union AIR 1985 SC 1196 and Carson and others v. The United Kingdom [20 10] ECHR 338 ref. Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General, Sindh for Petitioners (via video link, Karachi). Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th July, 2025.

Summary: Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Maintenance allowance for minor daughters---Quantum, enhancement of---Family Court entertaining enhancement application instead of fresh suit for maintenance enhancement---Powers, scope and legality---For consideration of enhancement of maintenance allowance separate suit need not be filed and instead Family Court may entertain application under section 151, C.P.C. for enhancement---Supreme Court remanding the matter to the Trial Court to reconsider the enhancement application under section 151, C.P.C.---Facts in brevity were that the daughters of petitioner filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance through their mother which was decreed at Rs.800 per month for each daughter with a 10% annual increment---Their application for enhancement was initially dismissed by the Family Court but the District Court increased it to Rs.1,500 per month, later further enhanced by the High Court to Rs.2,500 per month for each daughter with the same annual increment, considering their day to day and educational expenses---Dissatisfied, the daughters sought further enhancement, while the petitioner challenged the increase before the Supreme Court---Held: Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction relating to maintenance allowance and the matters connected therewith---Once the decree by the Family Court in a suit for maintenance (for minors) was granted, thereafter, if the granted rate for monthly allowance was insufficient and inadequate, in that case, institution of fresh suit was not necessary rather the Family Court could entertain any such application (under section 151, C.P.C.) and if necessary make alteration in the rate of maintenance allowance---In the present matter when the High Court fixed the maintenance allowance of respondents Nos.4 and 5 at Rs.2,500/- per month each, the monthly take home salary (earning) of the petitioner was Rs.33,026/-, however, as per computer generated salary slip submitted by the respondents' side and not denied by the petitioner, the take home salary of the petitioner was Rs.161,148/-, which would have further increased after increment---Therefore, to keep the door open for the parties to further challenge and agitate, if aggrieved of the order of enhancement or otherwise, it was deemed appropriate that in view of the above development, the matter be remanded to the Trial Court to consider the request of the respondents for enhancement of the maintenance allowance, treating the same as an application under section 151 of C.P.C.---Present matter was remitted to the Trial Court to consider the application of the respondents Nos. 4 & 5 for enhancement of the maintenance allowance , obviously, after obtaining reply from the petitioner and dilating upon the evidence, so produced by the parties and decide the matter treating the same as an application under section 151, C.P.C., within a period of not more than one month, even if it had to fix the case on day to day basis, under intimation to the Deputy Registrar, Lahore Registry Branch of the Supreme Court---Present petitions were disposed of, in circumstances. Lt. Col. Nasir Malik v. Additional District Judge Lahore 2016 SCMR 1821 rel. Asif Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A. No. 919-L of 2016) and Rana Rashid Akram Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A. No. 1056-L of 2016) for Petitioners. Rana Rashid Akram Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A No. 919-L of 2016) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th June, 2025.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----Ss. 497(2), 22-A & 22-B---Pre-arrest bail---Further inquiry---Cross versions---Where FIR and cross version recorded at same date and time arising out of same incident---Conflicting versions made it impossible at bail stage to determine aggressor and victim---Case required further inquiry to ascertain culpability---Benefit of doubt at bail stage extended to accused---Pre-arrest bail confirmed. (b) Criminal trial ----Cross version---Effect---In cases of cross versions, roles of complainant and accused may be reversible---Court required to tentatively assess whether reasonable grounds exist to believe commission of offence---Where such assessment created reasonable doubt regarding guilt, accused entitled to bail under S.497(2), Cr.P.C. (c) Bail jurisprudence ----Principles governing grant of bail---Tentative assessment---At bail stage, deeper appreciation of evidence not permissible---Object of bail is to secure attendance of accused at trial, not to punish under-trial prisoner---Detention unjustified where material does not prima facie establish guilt---Case falling within ambit of further inquiry. (d) Procedural fairness ----Condemnation unheard---Ad-interim bail recalled by High Court---Supreme Court emphasized fair hearing---Where cross version and circumstances required further inquiry, recall of ad-interim bail not justified. (e) Conduct of trial ----Expeditious trial---Where challan already submitted---Trial Court directed to frame charge and conclude trial expeditiously---Misuse or abuse of concession of bail to entail cancellation upon application by prosecution or complainant. Cited cases: • (No specific case law cited in judgment) Disposition: Criminal Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal; appeal allowed; ad-interim pre-arrest bail confirmed on same terms and conditions; observations held to be tentative and not to prejudice merits of trial; liberty granted to prosecution/complainant to seek cancellation of bail in case of misuse.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 — S. 428 — Additional evidence at appellate stage — Scope, pre-conditions, and procedure — High Court, while allowing jail appeal, set aside conviction and remanded to the trial court to record additional evidence and decide the case — Held: This course is beyond S. 428 Cr.P.C. — If an appellate court (including High Court) finds additional evidence “necessary,” it must (i) record it itself or (ii) direct a Magistrate/Court of Session to record it and certify it back to the appellate court, which must then dispose of the appeal itself; remand to trial court for decision on such additional evidence is impermissible under S. 428. (Text of S. 428 explained; distinction drawn from S. 423 Cr.P.C. on remand powers.) (b) Appellate powers — Additional evidence not to cure prosecution lapses — Principles reaffirmed: power under S. 428 is exceptional; to be exercised sparingly “when necessary for a just decision,” not to fill lacunae or repair negligence/omissions of investigation/prosecution; must not prejudice fair trial rights; reasons must be recorded. Shahadat Khan v. Home Secy., WP (PLD 1969 SC 158); Nadir Shah v. State (1980 SCMR 402); Dildar v. State (PLD 2001 SC 384); Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation (PLD 2019 SC 675) — followed. (c) Comparative guidance — S. 428 Cr.P.C. vis-à-vis O.XLI r.27 CPC — In both regimes, appellate court may take/commission additional evidence but must itself decide the appeal after receipt; remand for decision is outside O.XLI r.27 CPC (remand lies, if at all, under O.XLI r.23). Indian Cr.P.C. s.391 cases applied: Rajeswar Prasad Misra (AIR 1965 SC 1887), State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal (1987 2 SCC 364), Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra (2001 4 SCC 759). (d) Practice & procedure — Motu proprio invocation of S. 428 — Even when no party applies, appellate court may invoke S. 428 on its own perception of necessity, after hearing parties and recording reasons; additional evidence must comply with Ch. XXV Cr.P.C. (mode of taking/recording evidence) and the accused must have opportunity to meet it, including confrontation under S. 342 Cr.P.C. Held: Criminal petition converted to appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of the Islamabad High Court set aside. Case remanded to the High Court to decide the jail appeal afresh in accordance with law — the High Court may, if “necessary,” record additional evidence itself or have it recorded by Sessions/Magistrate and certified back under S. 428, then itself dispose of the appeal — preferably within three months.

Summary: Selection Board or Selection Committee constituted for the purpose of recruitment for a certain post has the prerogative at its credit to select a candidate it thinks fit and suitable or reject whom it considers unsuitable and unsatisfactory. The purpose of the constitution of a board or committee and its intent is to search for the best amongst the contenders and when a board or committee consider none amongst the candidates to be the one it is searching for, then cancelling the whole process in the best interest of an institution is the vested authority and powers conferred on it which cannot be questioned before a court of law. The members of the board / committee at the relevant time are the best judges for a person before them during the process of interview and the court is not presumed to interfere in it.