Summary: A pivotal point raised in the arguments is how Suit No. 70/1 was decreed on the very date of its institution. The record reflects that the suit was filed and disposed of through a compromise decree on 20.02.1970. In this regard, Order V Rule 1 of the C.P.C. is explicit: issuance of summons is not mandatory if the defendant appears at the time of filing and admits the plaintiff’s claim. Hence, the decree passed on the same date is legally permissible under the said provision. The petitioners did not deny that their father passed away in 2022, shortly before filing the application under Section 12(2) C.P.C. Therefore, it raises the question as to why he did not challenge the decrees during his lifetime. Petitioners lack locus-standi to assail the decrees unchallenged by their deceased father himself during his life span. Now, so far as the contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the trial court has dismissed the application without framing of issues and recording of evidence, suffice it to say that in every application filed U/S 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it is not requirement of law for the court to frame issue and record evidence unless it appears that the application does require recording of evidence.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199 & Art. 185(3) Constitutional jurisdiction—Scope—Factual inquiry—High Court converted civil miscellaneous appeal into a constitutional petition and proceeded to conduct a factual inquiry into whether the security amount was paid to the contractor—Held, High Court exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 by deciding disputed questions of fact without recording evidence—Such matters fall within domain of civil courts with plenary jurisdiction—Exercise of writ jurisdiction in such context was impermissible—Impugned judgment set aside. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----Execution of decree—Scope—Suit and execution confined to reliefs specifically decreed Contractor’s original suit decreed only to the extent of declaratory reliefs regarding blacklisting and interference with contractual rights—No relief for release of security amount was granted—Executing court rightly dismissed execution application as decree did not include direction for release of funds—High Court erred in going beyond trial court decree while exercising writ jurisdiction. (c) Public Contract—Blacklisting of contractor—Legal heirs' entitlement—Limitation of remedy: Father of petitioners was blacklisted in 1991 and filed suit in 2004, which was partly decreed in 2006—After death of contractor, legal heirs were substituted—Held, their claim for recovery of security amount beyond what was decreed could only be pursued through appropriate civil forum—not through writ jurisdiction—Petition for release of remaining amount dismissed. (d) Jurisdiction—Factual controversies—Remedy before competent court: Disputed factual matters such as whether amount was already released by department, and extent of liability, require evidence and cannot be adjudicated summarily in constitutional proceedings—Reference made to Waqar Ahmed v. Federation (2024 SCMR 1877) and Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed (PLD 2025 SC 11), affirming that courts cannot expand jurisdictional bounds to conduct factual inquiry in writ jurisdiction. ----Disposition: Civil Petition No. 191-Q/2017 filed by the Province of Balochistan was converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned judgment of High Court dated 07.09.2017 set aside.

Summary: The respondent filed application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ("the Act"), inter alia, on the basis of an unregistered arbitration agreement, which was treated as application under Section 8 of the Act and the arbitrator was appointed with direction to pass an award to be later on submitted before the Trial Court. This Court, inter alia, held that the Trial Court erred in converting the application under Section 20 into the application under Section 8 of the Act inasmuch as both the provisions form part of different procedural regimes under the Act. In case of application under Section 8 of the Act, once an arbitrator is appointed, the Court becomes functus officio whereas in contrast, under Section 20 of the Act, the role of the Court is not limited to the appointment of an arbitrator; rather, the Court first determines whether there exists an arbitration agreement and then, under sub-Section (4), orders the filing of the agreement and makes the reference. Section 20 of the Act, provides a procedural mechanism for initiating arbitration through judicial intervention where no arbitration proceedings have commenced independently. The structure of Section 20 is sequential and substantive. Sub-Section (1) permits any party to an arbitration agreement to apply to the Court for filing the agreement. Sub-Section (3) provides that the Court, if satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists, shall order the agreement to be filed. Most critically, under Section 20(4), it is only after such filing that the Court becomes competent to refer the dispute to arbitration by appointing an arbitrator. This staged progression is not a ceremonial formality; it reflects a deliberate legislative intent to ensure that the existence and authenticity of the arbitration agreement is first judicially scrutinized, and the document is formally brought onto the Court's record, before the arbitral process is triggered. The act of filing, accompanied by judicial satisfaction under Section 20(3), constitutes a jurisdictional condition precedent to the making of any reference or the appointment of an arbitrator. The necessity of this filing becomes all the more pronounced when the opposing party has specifically objected to the very existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, as was done by the appellant in the present case. The appeal was allowed and the impugned order of appointment of arbitrator was set aside with direction to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after adhering to the mandatory requirements of sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 20 of the Act, including proper judicial satisfaction as to the existence and filing of the arbitration agreement dated 01.07.2006, in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations of this Court.

Summary: If contents of F.I.R. (Crime Report) regarding place of recording statement of complainant as well as place from where injured persons were sent to hospital, are denied and negated by the complainant as well as other cited eyewitnesses in their statements before the Court, then it is fatal for the prosecution.

Summary: The respondent filed application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ("the Act"), inter alia, on the basis of an unregistered arbitration agreement, which was treated as application under Section 8 of the Act and the arbitrator was appointed with direction to pass an award to be later on submitted before the Trial Court. This Court, inter alia, held that the Trial Court erred in converting the application under Section 20 into the application under Section 8 of the Act inasmuch as both the provisions form part of different procedural regimes under the Act. In case of application under Section 8 of the Act, once an arbitrator is appointed, the Court becomes functus officio whereas in contrast, under Section 20 of the Act, the role of the Court is not limited to the appointment of an arbitrator; rather, the Court first determines whether there exists an arbitration agreement and then, under sub-Section (4), orders the filing of the agreement and makes the reference. Section 20 of the Act, provides a procedural mechanism for initiating arbitration through judicial intervention where no arbitration proceedings have commenced independently. The structure of Section 20 is sequential and substantive. Sub- Section (1) permits any party to an arbitration agreement to apply to the Court for filing the agreement. Sub- Section (3) provides that the Court, if satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists, shall order the agreement to be filed. Most critically, under Section 20(4), it is only after such filing that the Court becomes competent to refer the dispute to arbitration by appointing an arbitrator. This staged progression is not a ceremonial formality; it reflects a deliberate legislative intent to ensure that the existence and authenticity of the arbitration agreement is first judicially scrutinized, and the document is formally brought onto the Court's record, before the arbitral process is triggered. The act of filing, accompanied by judicial satisfaction under Section 20(3), constitutes a jurisdictional condition precedent to the making of any reference or the appointment of an arbitrator. The necessity of this filing becomes all the more pronounced when the opposing party has specifically objected to the very existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, as was done by the appellant in the present case. The appeal was allowed and the impugned order of appointment of arbitrator was set aside with direction to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after adhering to the mandatory requirements of sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 20 of the Act, including proper judicial satisfaction as to the existence and filing of the arbitration agreement dated 01.07.2006, in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations of this Court. 318Crl. Misc. 33508/25 Sunny Hakim Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq 10- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 5113 2026 PCr.LJ 7 (Lahore)

Summary: If contents of F.I.R. (Crime Report) regarding place of recording statement of complainant as well as place from where injured persons were sent to hospital, are denied and negated by the complainant as well as other cited eyewitnesses in their statements before the Court, then it is fatal for the prosecution. 317First Appeal Against Order(F.A.O.) 46205/24 Mr. Bilal Siddique Vs Muhammad Naeem Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 11- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 5028 PLJ 2025 Lahore 848

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 154---First Information Report---Scope---First Information Report is always considered as foundational element and cornerstone of the case of prosecution for the reason that it contains first hand detail of the occurrence presumably free from any adulteration/manipulation, addition or omission and if it is not so and there is no explanation in that regard, then superstructure raised on the basis of that FIR i.e. case of prosecution is bound to fall like house of cards. Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64; Ghulam Abbas and another v. The State and another 2021 SCMR 23; Pervaiz Khan and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 393 and Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 1527 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, jurhghayr-jaifahmunaqqilah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---No justification for the presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence---Chance witnesses, evidence of---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing injuries to his son---In this case, ocular account produced by the prosecution comprised of statements of complainant, injured son of complainant and two eye-witnesses---As per site plan of the place of occurrence, neither house of eye-witnesses including complainant and injured witness nor their job/work place was at or adjacent to the place of occurrence---Draftsman categorically stated that he had not mentioned the house of complainant in the site plan---Therefore, said witnesses were chance witnesses and thus were required to explain and establish plausible as well as valid reason regarding their presence at the "time and place" of occurrence---Circumstances established that prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, jurhghayr-jaifahmunaqqilah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing injuries to his son---Cricket bat, ball, wicket, gloves or pads which were used for playing cricket were neither secured during investigation from the spot nor shown at the spot in the site plans of the place of occurrence---Clothes of the complainant or any cited eye-witness stained with blood of the then injured/now deceased of the case were neither taken into possession during investigation nor produced during trial of the case---Any earth/soil stained with blood of injured was not secured from the spot---Name of complainant or any other cited eye-witness including injured was not mentioned as accompanying person in the medico-legal certificate of deceased rather name of his son was mentioned in said medico-legal certificate but name of son of deceased was neither mentioned in FIR nor in the statements of complainant as well as other cited eye-witnesses got recorded by them in the Court---Circumstances established that prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, jurhghayr-jaifahmunaqqilah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt--- Contradictions in the prosecution case--- Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing injuries to his son---As per ocular version, appellant fired straight shot with rifle which hit at the abdomen of deceased whereas perusal of medico-legal examination certificate revealed that there was a lacerated entry wound with "inverted and blackened margins" on the right flank of abdomen whereas an exit wound with everted margin was on the front and left side of abdomen 10cm above from umbilicus---As per ocular account, after the occurrence, complainant and eye-witnesses brought the then injured/now deceased of the case to THQ Hospital, but it was clearly negated by FIR and statement of Investigating Officer---Though Investigating Officer prepared injury statements of both injured persons and sent them through Constable to THQ Hospital for their medical examination as well as obtaining result from the Medical Officer on 25.06.2018, yet injured was not medically examined on said date i.e. 25.06.2018 and his Medico-Legal Examination Certificate was not obtained on that day---Furthermore, if injured was not sent to hospital by Investigating Officer through Constable rather he was directly brought from the place of occurrence by the complainant and other cited eye-witnesses to the hospital, even then he was not medically examined on 25.06.2018---Prosecution was absolutely silent and remained unable to give an iota of valid/plausible, convincing and acceptable reason in that regard, which was a big blow as well as a question mark on the veracity of case of prosecution---If son of complainant was injured and he came to the hospital along with complainant and eye-witnesses, then why he did not get himself medically examined then and there on the day of occurrence but the prosecution was mum and unable to reply that aspect rather injured himself smashed the case of prosecution on the vital aspect when he categorically stated before the Court that he went to THQ Hospital after eight days of the occurrence for his medical examination---Thus, it was also a question mark that as per case of prosecution, at least five accused persons gave beating to injured with sticks and hunters but any blood or mud or dust-stained clothes of injured were not produced during investigation or trial---Furthermore, any sign of flouncing or struggling made by injured when he was being tortured with sticks and hunters was also not available at the relevant place in the site plans of place of occurrence--- As per case of prosecution, injured was given beating with sticks and hunters by so many persons, then why his clothes were not stained with any drop of blood and furthermore, why he went to THQ hospital, after eight days of the occurrence for medical examination according to his own statement recorded before the Court---These factors had created reasonable doubt regarding truthfulness of his testimony---Injured had not specified kind of weapon possessed by the accused persons at the time of occurrence and he had also not specified the injuries received by him in his statement recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C.---Similarly, complainant in his statement before the police did not specify kind of weapon possessed by the accused persons at the time of occurrence---Complainant did not specify that who was having stick or having hunter at the time of occurrence---When all said factors were taken into consideration in totality, then the High Court had come to the definite conclusion that ocular account was full of major contradictions, neither supported/ confirmed in stricto sensu by the medical evidence nor confidence inspiring/truthful, hence, same could not be relied and was discarded---Circumstances established that prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Hayat and another v. The State 1996 SCMR 1411; Muhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631 and Khalid Mehmood and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 810 rel. (e) Criminal trial--- ----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence is mere supportive/ confirmatory type of evidence, it can tell about locale, nature, magnitude of injury, duration of the injury and kind of weapon used for causing injury but it cannot tell about identity of the assailant who caused the injury; therefore, same can neither provide any corroboration nor is of any help to the prosecution in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Muhammad Ramzan v. The State 2025 SCMR 762 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, jurhghayr-jaifahmunaqqilah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence---No cartridges recovered---Effect---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing injuries to his son---As per record, .44 bore rifle was recovered at the pointing out of the appellant---No cartridge case of .44 bore rifle was found from the place of occurrence and as per report of Forensic Science Agency, said rifle was only found in mechanical operation condition; hence said report was inconsequential and recovery of the rifle 44 bore was of no help to the case of prosecution---Circumstances established that prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Manzoor Ahmed Shah and others v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 2000; Imtiaz alias Taji and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 287; Liaqat Ali and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 780 and Khalid Mehmood alias Khaloo v. The State 2022 SCMR 1148 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing shajjah-i-khafifah, jurhghayr-jaifahmunaqqilah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and also causing injuries to his son---Record showed that it had been categorically mentioned in statement that accused persons were having old grudge with deceased brother of the complainant and due to that grudge, all accused persons with the intention to kill, made straight firing---However, any evidence could not come on the record to establish motive---So, in this case, motive could not be proved through any independent and cogent evidence/material---Furthermore, motive is a double edged weapon, it cuts both the ways, it can also be a reason for false implication---Even otherwise, when substantive evidence has been discarded, then motive loses its significance and becomes immaterial for conviction---Circumstances established that prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Hamza Nadeem Tarrar for Appellant. Haroon Rasheed, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Nemo for the Complainant {though name of learned counsel for the complainant reflects in the Daily Cause List issued for today as apprised by Additional Registrar (Court)}. Date of hearing: 11th July, 2025. Judgment Farooq Haider, J .--- This appeal has been filed by Muhammad Qasim (appellant) against the judgment dated: 10.01.2022 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kotmomin/ trial court whereby in case arising out of FIR No.314/2018 dated: 25.06.2018 registered under Sections: 324 148, 149 P.P.C (during investigation, offences under Sections: 302, 337-F(i), 337-F(vi) P.P.C were added subsequently) at Police Station: Kotmomin, District: Sargodha, appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section: 302(b) P.P.C "Rigorous Imprisonment for Life" for committing Qatl-i-Amd of Ghulam Shabbir along with payment of compensation Rs.5,00,000/- under Section 544-A Cr.P.C. to the legal heirs of deceased and in default thereof to further suffer S.I. for six months. In further default, the amount of compensation was ordered to be recovered from the convict as arrears of land revenue. Benefit of Section: 382-B Cr.P.C. was also extended to the appellant/convict. 2. Brief facts of the case in hand are that machinery of law was brought into motion on the statement/ (Ex.PG) of Iftikhar Ahmad (complainant/PW-3), which he got recorded to Muhammad Shahzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10) at Rangla Chowk, Moazzamabad Sargodha Road at 07:15 p.m. on 25.06.2018, which was sent to Police Station: Kot Momin and on the basis of the same, FIR (Ex.PG/1) was recorded at 07:45 p.m. on 25.06.2018 by Mohsin Javed S.I. (PW-9). As per aforementioned statement/ (Ex.PG), complainant/ PW-3 is resident of Chak 67- Janoobi and a labourer; on 25.06.2018, at about 06:30 p.m., his son namely Amir Shehzad went to the ground of Government Girls Middle School, Chak 67-Janoobi for playing cricket where (1) Riaz (2) Amir Shehzad (3) Khalid (4) Muhammad Qasim (5) Muhammad Saif were already present while armed with sticks and hunters and they captured him (Amir Shehzad), got him laid on the ground and started beating with sticks and hunters ; other persons present in the school came to the complainant and told him upon which, the complainant along with Ghulam Shabbir (now deceased of the case), Muhammad Ali and Shoukat at once reached in the ground of the school; Riaz Gondal raised lalkara that they may not let alive upon which aforementioned accused persons armed with rifles started straight firing upon complainant party; Muhammad Qasim fired straight shot with rifle which hit at the abdomen of Ghulam Shabbir due to which he became injured and fell; all accused persons while making firing fled away and complainant and his companions while lying on the ground saved their lives. Motive behind the occurrence as per aforementioned (Ex.PG) is that accused persons were having old grudge with Ghulam Shabbir (brother of the complainant) and due to this grudge, all accused persons with the intention to kill, made straight firing. On the basis of said statement/ (Ex.PG) of Iftikhar Ahmad (complainant/PW-3), case vide FIR No.314/2018 (Ex.PG/1) dated: 25.06.2018 under Sections: 324, 148, 149 P.P.C was registered at Police Station: Kot Momin, District: Sargodha. Thereafter, Ghulam Shabbir expired on 29.06.2018 and offence under Section: 302 P.P.C was added by the investigating officer. After investigation, report under Section: 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted in the Court; Muhammad Qasim (appellant) and his co-accused persons were formally charge sheeted to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution during trial examined twelve witnesses whereas giving up Muhammad Irfan being unnecessary and after tendering reports of Punjab Forensic Science Agency (Ex.PS and Ex.PT), closed its evidence. Thereafter statements of the appellant and his co-accused persons under Section: 342 Cr.P.C. were recorded wherein they refuted allegations levelled against them; the appellant neither opted to record his statement under Section: 340(2) Cr.P.C. nor produced any evidence in his defence. Trial court after conclusion of trial while acquitting all other co-accused persons has convicted and sentenced Sarfraz under Section: 337-F(vi) P.P.C whereas convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above through impugned judgment dated: 10.01.2022. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that conviction recorded against and sentence awarded to the appellant through impugned judgment are against the 'law and facts' and result of non-reading/ misreading of evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant finally prayed for acquittal of the appellant. 4. Conversely, learned Deputy Prosecutor General has supported the impugned judgment and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 5. Arguments heard. Record perused. 6. As per First Information Report (Ex.PG/1), occurrence took place at 06:30 p.m. on 25.06.2018, Iftikhar Ahmad (complainant/PW-3) along with Ghulam Shabbir (the then injured/now deceased of the case) and Amir Shehzad (PW-4) came and met to Muhammad Shehzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10) at Rangla Chowk, Moazzamabad Sargodha Road where he recorded statement (Ex.PG) of Iftikhar Ahmad (complainant/PW-3) regarding the occurrence, prepared separate injury statements of both aforementioned injured persons i.e. Ghulam Shabbir, Amir Shehzad, sent through Samee Ullah 2421/C to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital for medical treatment of both aforementioned injured persons as well as result to be issued by the doctor i.e. Medicolegal Examination Certificates and he sent aforementioned statement (EX.PG) to the police station for registration of case; in this regard, relevant portion from Ex.PG is hereby scanned below: - Furthermore, in this regard, relevant portion of statement of Muhammad Shahzad Munawar ASI (PW-10) is also hereby reproduced as under: - "Stated that on 25.06.2018, I was posted at P.S Kotmomin. On the same day, I along with other police officials was present at Rangla Chowk where complainant Ifthkar Ahmad and got recorded the oral statement EX.PG which read over to him. He made his thumb impression and signature over the same as a token of its correctness. I wrote police proceedings over it and sent the same. through Ansar Iqbal 1364/C for registration of FIR which bears my signatures. I also prepared injury statements of injured Ghulam Shabbir as EX.PN and injured Amir Shahzad as EX.PJ under the escort of Sami Ullah 2421/C both the injured were sent to THQ, Kotmomin for their medical examination." (emphasis added) So, perusal of aforementioned prosecution document i.e. (Ex.PG) as well as statement of Muhammad Shahzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10) clearly reveals without any shadow of doubt that after the occurrence, complainant along with both injured persons i.e. Ghulam Shabbir and Amir Shahzad (PW-4) met to Muhammad Shahzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10) at Rangla Cowk, Moazamabad Sargodha Road, got recorded their statements over there at 07:15 p.m., Muhammad Shahzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10) prepared injury statements of both injured persons and sent them through Samee Ullah 2421/C to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital, Kot Momin for their medical examination as well as issuance of their medicolegal examination certificates and on the basis of said statement/ (Ex.PG), subsequently, First Information Report (Ex.PG/1) was recorded at 07:45 p.m. on 25.06.2018. It is relevant to mention here that Iftikhar Ahmad (complainant) while appearing as PW-3 during trial of the case categorically stated that after the occurrence, he along with witnesses namely Muhammad Ali, Shoukat and Amir saw Ghulam Shabbir and took him to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital, Kotmomin, police came at THQ Hospital, Kotmomin and got recorded his written statement (Ex.PG); in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is hereby reproduced below: - "I along with PWs Muhammad Ali, Shoukat and Amir see the Ghulam Shabbir and took the THQ hospital Kotmomin. After receiving information, police came at THQ Hospital Kotmomin and got recorded his written statement Ex.P.G." So, complainant (PW-3) clearly negated version recorded by Muhammad Shahzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10) in Ex.PG and Ex.PG/1 as well as in his statement before this Court in this regard i.e. about the place where statement of the complainant was recorded as well as the place from where the injured persons were sent to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital. Furthermore, Iftikhar Ahmad (complainant/ PW-3) also stated before the Court that he got recorded his statement at about 06:00/06:30 p.m. at Police Station: Kotmomin and relevant portion of his statement in this regard is hereby reproduced as under: - "I got recorded my statement at about 06:00/06:30 PM at P.S Kotmomin." If as per above statement of the complainant, occurrence initiated at about 06:30 p.m. on 25.06.2018, then recording of statement of the complainant at the police station at 06:00/06:30 p.m. is a question mark. The complainant further stated in his statement before the Court that PWs Shoukat, Muhammad Ali and Amir Shahzad accompanied him at the police station when he got recorded his statement at the police station and after that he along with injured Ghulam Shabbir went to the hospital; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is hereby reproduced as under: - "PW Shoukat, Muhammad Ali and PW Amir Shahzad were accompanied me at P.S when I got recorded my statement at P.S. After that I along with injured Ghulam Shabir went to the Hospital." He (complainant/PW-3) also stated that statements of Shoukat Ali, Muhammad Ali and Amir Shahzad under Section: 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded at the police station by the Investigating Officer in the same meeting in which he recorded his statement to the Investigating Officer; relevant portion of his statement in this regard is reproduced below: - "I.O recorded the statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. of PWs Shoukat Ali, Muhammad Ali and Amir Shahzad at P.S. PWs recorded their statements to the I.O in the same meeting in which I recorded my statement to the I.O." When all aforementioned versions are taken into consideration in totality, then on the one hand "time and place" of recording statement of the complainant for registration of case and taking of injured persons to the hospital by constable mentioned in Ex.PG have clearly been denied by the complainant whereas on the other hand it can be safely held that prosecution could not establish "time and place" of recording statement of the complainant for registration of case as well as bringing of injured persons to the hospital by the police or by the complainant party with exactness and this important as well as fundamental component has become doubtful and ultimately vitiated the legal efficacy and sanctity of the most vital document of the prosecution i.e. First Information Report, which is always considered as foundational element and cornerstone of the case of prosecution for the reason that it contains first hand detail of the occurrence presumably free from any adulteration/manipulation, addition or omission and if it is not so as in this case is and there is no explanation in this regard, then superstructure raised on the basis of this FIR i.e. case of prosecution is bound to fall like house of cards; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the cases of "Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others" (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 64), "Ghulam Abbas and another v. The State and another" (2021 SCMR 23), "Pervaiz Khan and another v. The State" (2022 SCMR 393) and "Abdul Ghafoor v. The State" (2022 SCMR 1527). In this case, ocular account produced by the prosecution comprises of statements of Iftikhar Ahmad {complainant/brother of Ghulam Shabbir (deceased of the case)/PW-3}, Amir Shahzad {injured/son of complainant/ (PW-4)}, Shoukat Hayat (eye-witness/PW-5) and Muhammad Ali (eye-witness/PW-6); as per site plan (Ex.PR) of the place of occurrence, neither house of aforementioned PWs including complainant and injured witness nor their job/work place is at or adjacent to the place of occurrence; Muhammad Hafeez Draftsman while appearing before the Court as PW-8 categorically stated that he has not mentioned the house of complainant in the site plan; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is reproduced as under: - "I have not mentioned the house of complainant in site plan." Therefore, they all are chance witnesses and thus required to explain and establish plausible as well as valid reason regarding their presence at the "time and place" of occurrence. Cricket Bat, Ball, Wicket, Gloves or Pads which are used for playing cricket were neither secured during investigation from the spot nor shown at the spot in the site plans of the place of occurrence; clothes of the complainant or any cited eye-witness stained with blood of Ghulam Shabbir (the then injured/now deceased of the case) were neither taken into possession during investigation nor produced during trial of the case; any earth/soil stained with blood of Amir Shehzad (injured/PW-4) was not secured from the spot; name of complainant or any other cited eye-witness including Amir Shehzad is not mentioned as accompanying person in the MLC (Ex.PL) of Ghulam Shabbir rather name of his son i.e. Ali Raza is mentioned in said MLC but name of Al Raza is neither mentioned in FIR (Ex.PG/1) nor in the statements of complainant as well as other cited eye-witnesses got recorded by them in the Court. As per ocular version, Qasim (appellant) fired straight shot with rifle which hit at the abdomen of Ghulam Shabbir whereas perusal of Medicolegal Examination Certificate (Ex.PL) reveals that there was a lacerated entry wound with "inverted and blackened margins" on the right flank of abdomen whereas an exit wound with everted margin was on the front and left side of abdomen 10 cm above from umbilicus; in this regard, relevant portion of statement of Dr. Ahmed Raza (PW-7) is hereby reproduced as under: - "1. A lacerated entry wound rounded shape with inverted and blackened margins 0.75 x 0.75 cm on the right flank of abdomen. (firearm wound) going deep into abdomen. 2. A lacerated exit wound oval shape with everted margin 1.5 x 1 cm on the front and left side of abdomen 10 cm above from umbilicus. It is the continuation of injury No.1." (emphasis added) Relevant portion of MLC (Ex.PL) showing pictorial diagram of wounds (available at Page No.189 of the Paperbook) is scanned below: - So, ocular version regarding locale of injury i.e. the appellant fired shot with rifle which hit at abdomen of Ghulam Shabbir (now deceased of the case) could not find support from MLC (Ex.PL) in strico sensu/exactness because entry wound was on the right flank of abdomen whereas its exit wound was on the front and left side of the abdomen; furthermore, as per site plan (Ex.PS) of the place of occurrence prepared by the Investigating Officer (copy whereof is available at Page No.204-205 of the Paperbook), the appellant fired shot with rifle .44 bore from a distance of 10-Karams at Ghulam Shabbir (now deceased of the case) whereas according to the site plan (Ex.PR) of the place of occurrence prepared with scale by the draftsman ( copy whereof is available at Page Nos. 213 to 217 of the Paperbook), the appellant fired shot with rifle .44 bore upon the deceased from a distance of 60-feet. Meaning thereby that as per own documents of the prosecution i.e. Ex.PS and Ex.PR, appellant fired shot with rifle at the deceased from a distance of 10-Karams or 60-feet but as per Medicolegal Examination Certificate (Ex.PL) of Ghulam Shabbir (the then injured/now deceased of the case) and as per statement of Dr. Ahmed Raza (PW-7), on the entry wound, margins were inverted and blackened. It goes without saying that as per medical jurisprudence, blackening on the margins of entry wound is absolutely not possible if the shot has been fired from 10-Karams or 60-feet and in this regard, Dr. Ahmad Raza (PW-7) categorically stated that according to medical jurisprudence, blackening is occurred when firearm injury is caused from approximately 5 to 6 feet; relevant portion of statement of the doctor (PW-7) in this regard is hereby reproduced: - "According to medical jurisprudence the blackening is occurred when fire injury was caused from approximately from 5 to 6 feet." (emphasis added) Hence, ocular account in this regard has also been clearly negated by the medical evidence. As per ocular account, after the occurrence, complainant (PW-3), Muhammad Ali (PW-6), Shoukat (PW-5) and Amir (PW-4) brought Ghulam Shabbir (the then injured/now deceased of the case) to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital, Kotmomin but it was clearly negated by FIR (Ex.PG/1) and statement of Muhammad Shahzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10). Though Muhammad Shahzad Munawar A.S.I. (PW-10) prepared injury statements of both aforementioned injured persons and sent them through Samee Ullah 2421/C to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital for their medical examination as well as obtaining result from the doctor on 25.06.2018 yet Amir Shehzad (injured/PW-4) was not medically examined on said date i.e. 25.06.2018 and his medicolegal examination certificate was not obtained on that day; furthermore, if Amir Shahzad (injured/PW-4) was not sent to hospital by PW-10 through constable rather he was directly brought from the place of occurrence by the complainant and other cited eye-witnesses to the hospital, even then he was not got medically examined on 25.06.2018. Prosecution is absolutely silent and remained unable to give an iota of valid/plausible, convincing and acceptable reason in this regard, which is a big blow as well as a question mark on the veracity of case of prosecution. It is also relevant to mention here that as per statement of Dr. Ahmad Raza (PW-7), Amir Shahzad was brought before him by the police for medical examination on 26.06.2018 at about 10:30 p.m. and he was medically examined at about 11:00 p.m. i.e. on the next date of the occurrence and as per case of prosecution mentioned in statement/ (Ex.PG), accused persons after getting Amir Shahzad laid down on the ground, gave him beating with sticks and hunters but only four injuries were noted by the doctor on his body which were comprising of abrasions and contused swelling/mark and the doctor (PW-7), who medically examined him, categorically stated that injuries, abrasions and swelling can be caused by falling on the hard surface; relevant portion of his statement in this regard is hereby reproduced as under: - "Injuries abrasion and swelling can been caused by falling over the hard surface." Amir Shehzad (injured/PW-4) in his statement also categorically stated that after the occurrence, he along with PWs Muhammad Ali, Shoukat and Iftikhar saw Ghulam Shabbir and took him to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is hereby reproduced below: - "I along with PWs Muhammad Ali, Shoukat and Iftikhar see the Ghulam Shabir and took the THQ hospital Kotmomin." If Amir Shahzad (PW-4) was injured and he came to the hospital along with complainant, Muhammad Ali and Shoukat, then why he did not get himself medically examined then and there on the day of occurrence but the prosecution is mum and unable to reply this aspect rather Amir Shahzad (PW-4) himself smashed the case of prosecution on the vital aspect when he categorically stated before the Court that he went to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital, Kotmomin after eight days of the occurrence for his medical examination and relevant portion of his statement is reproduced as under: - "I went to the hospital THQ Kotmomin after 08 days of occurrence for my medical examination." (emphasis added) Meaning thereby that he disowned his medical examination conducted on 26.06.2018 and for said reason his MLC (Ex.PH) dated: 26.06.2018 has lost its sanctity as well as legal efficacy and of no avail to the case of prosecution. It is also a question mark that as per case of prosecution, at least five accused persons gave beating to Amir Shahzad (PW-4) with sticks and hunters but any blood or mud or dust-stained clothes of Amir Shahzad were not produced during investigation or trial; furthermore, any sign of flouncing or struggling made by Amir Shahzad when he was being tortured with sticks and hunters, is also not available at the relevant place in the site plans of place of occurrence. Amir Shahzad (injured/PW-4) further stated before the Court that after receiving information, police came to Tehsil Headquarter Hospital, Kotmomin; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is hereby reproduced as under:- "After receiving information, police came at THQ Hospital Kotmomin --------------" which was also falsified by the application for registration of case i.e. Ex.PG. Now on the one hand, as per case of prosecution mentioned in Ex.PG, occurrence started after about 06:30 p.m. whereas on the other hand, Amir Shahzad (PW-4) stated before the Court that his statement was recorded at about 06:30 p.m. on 25.06.2018 at the place of occurrence; relevant portion of his statement in this regard is hereby reproduced: - "My statement was recorded by the police at the place of occurrence at about 06:30 pm on 25.06.2018." So, now again question does arise that if police came at the place of occurrence and recorded statement of Amir Shahzad at 06:30 p.m., then why case was not registered on the basis of said statement and why written statement/ (Ex.PG) was recorded at 07:15 p.m. at Rangla Chowk, Moazzamabad Sargodha Road, Kot Momin and then First Information Report (Ex.PG/1) was recorded at 07:45 p.m. on the basis of said statement/ (Ex.

Summary: (a) A plain reading of Section 489-F, P.P.C. makes it evident that the provision does not apply to every case of dishonour of cheque. To constitute the offence under this section, the following essential ingredients must be established: (i) the cheque was duly issued; (ii) it was issued with dishonest intent; (iii) it was issued in discharge of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation; and (iv) it was dishonoured on presentation. The absence of even a single element takes the case outside the ambit of Section 489-F, P.P.C. (b) Section 84(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 provides that a cheque must be presented for payment within a reasonable time. Under Section 84(2), what constitutes “reasonable time” is to be determined with reference to the nature of the instrument, commercial usage, banking practice, and the facts of each case. Generally, a cheque presented beyond six months from its date is treated as a stale cheque. Section 138 of the Indian Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, though distinct from Section 489-F, P.P.C., is relevant for comparison. It recognizes the concept of a stale cheque and stipulates that a cheque must be valid at the time of presentation. Clause (a) of Section 138 requires that a cheque be presented to the drawee bank within nine months from its date or within its validity period, whichever is earlier, for valid initiation of criminal proceedings. In line with this principle, under banking regulations, no bank is obliged to honour a stale cheque. Consequently, a cheque presented after the validity period is liable to be returned unpaid, even where no other defect exists.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----S. 302(b) Qatl-e-Amd—Benefit of doubt—Acquittal—Prosecution alleged that appellant fired upon the deceased Ghulam Shabbir with a rifle, causing fatal injury—Medical evidence revealed entry wound with blackened margins, inconsistent with prosecution's version of firing from a distance of 60 feet—As per medical jurisprudence, blackening indicates firing from within 5–6 feet—Inconsistency between ocular account and medical evidence raised serious doubt—Held, such contradiction adversely affects prosecution’s case and entitles accused to benefit of doubt. (b) Criminal trial: ----Benefit of doubt—Standard of proof—Major contradictions in ocular testimony Material inconsistencies emerged between complainant’s statement (PW-3), injured witness (PW-4), and police officials (PW-10)—Contradictory versions regarding location and time of FIR recording and shifting of injured to hospital—Complainant and witnesses failed to explain their presence at the scene; classified as chance witnesses—Medical examination of injured PW-4 conducted belatedly after eight days—Held, when presence of witnesses and foundational aspects of the FIR are doubtful, entire prosecution story is rendered untrustworthy—Conviction set aside. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 161 & 342 Witness credibility—Contradictions and dishonest improvements—Statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. omitted key details such as weapons used, injuries attributed, and motive—Several witnesses admitted to not witnessing the occurrence directly—Held, such omissions and dishonest improvements make testimony unreliable—No corroboration through forensic, medical, or physical evidence. (d) Evidence Act (I of 1872): ----Appreciation of evidence—Medical and recovery evidence—Failure to corroborate ocular account Recovered rifle allegedly used by accused was not supported by matching cartridge evidence—Forensic report confirmed mechanical functioning only—No blood-stained clothes of witnesses or recovery from scene—Doctor confirmed injuries could result from accidental fall—Held, recovery and medical evidence failed to support prosecution’s version—No direct linkage with accused established. (e) Criminal trial—Motive—Failure to prove—Adverse effect: Though motive was alleged as prior enmity with deceased, no independent or documentary evidence was produced to establish same—Investigating officer confirmed absence of proof of prior enmity—Trial court rightly discarded motive—Held, motive unproven; in absence of substantive evidence, motive becomes inconsequential and may also be ground for false implication. ---Disposition: Appeal allowed—Conviction and sentence under S. 302(b) PPC set aside—Appellant acquitted of the charge and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. ---Quote: If contents of F.I.R. (Crime Report) regarding place of recording statement of complainant as well as place from where injured persons were sent to hospital, are denied and negated by the complainant as well as other cited eyewitnesses in their statements before the Court, then it is fatal for the prosecution.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940––Ss. 8 & 20––Conversion of application under S.20 into S.8––Preconditions for judicial reference––Statutory obligation to first file arbitration agreement––Scope of Court’s jurisdiction. Trial Court treated an application under S.20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as one under S.8 and appointed an arbitrator, without first directing the filing of the alleged arbitration agreement dated 01.07.2006––Held, S.20 requires that before any reference can be made to arbitration, the Court must direct filing of the agreement and satisfy itself judicially as to its existence––Failure to direct filing and make a reference under S.20(4) amounts to bypassing a mandatory jurisdictional step––Appointment of arbitrator without such filing is legally unsustainable––Judicial function under S.20 cannot be substituted by ministerial act of appending a copy of the agreement without evidentiary foundation––Appeal allowed; impugned order set aside. Cited Cases: • TBEA Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Al’Wasay Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 2020 CLC 106 • A.J. Corporation v. Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Ltd. 2013 CLD 636 • Mujtaba Hussain Siddiqui v. Sultan Ahmed 2005 YLR 2709 (b) Arbitration Act, 1940––Ss. 8 & 20––Structural distinction––Function of Court under each provision––Functus officio principle under S.8. Court distinguished the procedural regimes under Ss. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940––S.8 applies when arbitration is conducted without intervention of the Court and Court’s role is limited to appointment of arbitrator––Once arbitrator is appointed under S.8, Court becomes functus officio and retains no further jurisdiction––Conversely, S.20 applies where parties seek initiation of arbitration through judicial intervention––Held, treating S.20 application as one under S.8 without initiating proper S.20 procedure, including filing and reference, renders order procedurally defective––Trial Court’s simultaneous assumption of S.8 powers while retaining supervisory control over arbitral proceedings violates statutory framework. Cited Cases: • Messrs Tribal Friends Co. v. Province of Balochistan 2002 SCMR 1903 • Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad PLD 1990 SC 859 (c) Arbitration Act, 1940––S. 39(1)(iv)––Appeal––Maintainability––Order refusing to file arbitration agreement and instead appointing arbitrator––Whether appealable. Trial Court, instead of issuing direction to file arbitration agreement under S.20, proceeded to appoint arbitrator under S.8––Held, such order is appealable under S.39(1)(iv) of the Act, 1940, as it amounts to refusal to file arbitration agreement––Even if impugned order were treated as one under S.8, remedy by way of revision would be competent under S.115 CPC in view of S.41 of the Act––Objection as to maintainability of appeal found to be misconceived. Cited Cases: • Karamat Hussain v. Muhammad Zaman PLD 1987 SC 139 • Ali Muhammad v. Mahbub Ahmad 1987 SCMR 1263 (d) Partnership Act, 1932––S. 69(3)––Unregistered partnership agreement––Reference to arbitration––Bar under S.69(3)––Scope. Appellant challenged maintainability of arbitration based on unregistered partnership agreement in light of S.69(3) of the Partnership Act, 1932––Held, arbitration is not a “suit” nor an “other proceeding” ejusdem generis with “set-off” as contemplated in S.69(3)––Therefore, arbitration proceedings are not barred on basis of non-registration of partnership––Judicial consensus affirms that arbitration clauses in unregistered deeds remain enforceable. Cited Cases: • Sqn. Ldr. (R.) Khurram Zaman v. Afia Zafar 2008 CLD 662 • Ram Lal Harnam Dass v. Bal Krishen AIR 1957 Punjab 159 (e) Arbitration Act, 1940––Filing of arbitration agreement––Judicial satisfaction required––Appended copy not sufficient––Evidentiary threshold. Held, mere attachment of photocopy of arbitration agreement with application under S.20 does not amount to judicial “filing” as required under S.20(4)––Court must satisfy itself as to the existence and facial enforceability of the agreement––Absence of original or unexplained failure to summon it renders proceedings invalid––Statutory safeguard against fraudulent invocation of arbitration clause cannot be diluted. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned order set aside. Trial Court directed to decide application under Section 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940 afresh after ensuring compliance with Sections 20(3) and 20(4). ------- "The respondent filed application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ("the Act"), inter alia, on the basis of an unregistered arbitration agreement, which was treated as application under Section 8 of the Act and the arbitrator was appointed with direction to pass an award to be later on submitted before the Trial Court. This Court, inter alia, held that the Trial Court erred in converting the application under Section 20 into the application under Section 8 of the Act inasmuch as both the provisions form part of different procedural regimes under the Act. In case of application under Section 8 of the Act, once an arbitrator is appointed, the Court becomes functus officio whereas in contrast, under Section 20 of the Act, the role of the Court is not limited to the appointment of an arbitrator; rather, the Court first determines whether there exists an arbitration agreement and then, under sub-Section (4), orders the filing of the agreement and makes the reference. Section 20 of the Act, provides a procedural mechanism for initiating arbitration through judicial intervention where no arbitration proceedings have commenced independently. The structure of Section 20 is sequential and substantive. Sub-Section (1) permits any party to an arbitration agreement to apply to the Court for filing the agreement. Sub-Section (3) provides that the Court, if satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists, shall order the agreement to be filed. Most critically, under Section 20(4), it is only after such filing that the Court becomes competent to refer the dispute to arbitration by appointing an arbitrator. This staged progression is not a ceremonial formality; it reflects a deliberate legislative intent to ensure that the existence and authenticity of the arbitration agreement is first judicially scrutinized, and the document is formally brought onto the Court's record, before the arbitral process is triggered. The act of filing, accompanied by judicial satisfaction under Section 20(3), constitutes a jurisdictional condition precedent to the making of any reference or the appointment of an arbitrator. The necessity of this filing becomes all the more pronounced when the opposing party has specifically objected to the very existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, as was done by the appellant in the present case. The appeal was allowed and the impugned order of appointment of arbitrator was set aside with direction to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after adhering to the mandatory requirements of sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 20 of the Act, including proper judicial satisfaction as to the existence and filing of the arbitration agreement dated 01.07.2006, in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations of this Court."