Summary: Writ petition filed by Dawood Khan, setting aside the orders of the lower courts that denied him the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The court held that the petitioner was denied a fundamental right to a fair trial, as the waiver by his counsel was unauthorized and premature. The petitioner had filed a declaratory suit asserting his statutory and sharia- based right of inheritance in his deceased father`s estate. The lower courts had denied his request to cross-examine witnesses, citing an endorsement made by his counsel on the order sheet. However, the High Court found that the waiver was not intentional, or informed, and that the petitioner had promptly disowned it. The court emphasized that cross-examination is a cornerstone of adversarial adjudication and a fundamental right under Article 10-A of the Constitution. It also noted that Article 133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, allows the court to recall witnesses for further examination. The court directed the trial court to recall the respondents' witnesses, record their examination-in-chief, and afford the petitioner a fair opportunity to cross-examine them, ensuring a just and fair trial.

Summary: I. These glaring contradictions regarding the complainant’s presence or absence, the duration of stay, and the circumstances of recovery strongly suggest that the prosecution witnesses were not speaking the truth. II. If indeed the accused was operating such a business, as alleged, one would expect substantial recovery from the premises as well. This inconsistency further undermines the prosecution’s narrative. III. The contradictions are not minor or peripheral; rather, they go to the root of the matter and demonstrate that the conduct of the complainant and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses cannot be relied upon. IV. It was argued that once, in prosecutions under the Act, the safe custody of the recovered contraband and its safe transmission to the office of the Chemical Examiner is proved, the role of the witnesses becomes secondary, and the documentary evidence would prevail. We are constrained to express surprise at such a submission. Under no circumstances can the principle of appreciation of evidence in cases under the Act be distinguished from that in ordinary criminal cases. To accept such a proposition would be to apply a principle alien to criminal jurisprudence. In our considered view, the credibility of the witnesses, whether in ordinary cases or under the Act, remains of foremost importance.

Summary: a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 ---- Murder trial ---- Ocular account, delayed FIR, and chance witnesses ---- Benefit of doubt. Appellants were convicted under S.302(b), P.P.C. and sentenced to death by the Trial Court, which sentence was reduced to life imprisonment by the High Court. Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s case suffered from fatal infirmities. The complainant reported the occurrence to police at 12 p.m. on the day of the incident, yet no accused was named until the following evening—FIR being lodged after 29 hours without plausible explanation. Such unexplained delay created serious doubt of consultation, deliberation, and false implication. The alleged eye-witnesses were residents of Sukkur, far from the crime scene at Shikarpur, and offered no credible reason for being present there. Their statements conflicted with that of Pathan Khan (PW-4) and lacked corroboration from medical and circumstantial evidence. Held, that prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; benefit of doubt must go to accused as of right, not as concession. Conviction and sentence set aside; appellants acquitted. Cited Cases: Zafar Ali Abbasi v. Zafar Ali Abbasi (2024 SCMR 1773); Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (2024 SCMR 1731); Muhammad Bashir v. SHO, Okara Cantt (PLD 2007 SC 539); Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh (2024 SCMR 1123). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- S. 154 ---- Delay or refusal in registration of FIR ---- Statutory duty of police ---- Consequences. Supreme Court expressed grave concern over systemic dereliction by police officials in registering FIRs promptly as mandated by S.154, Cr.P.C. Delay or refusal to record information of a cognizable offence violates mandatory statutory duty and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system. It facilitates manipulation of evidence and false implication of accused, eroding public trust and the rule of law. No officer in charge has discretion to refuse or delay registration or to verify correctness before recording; any inquiry prior to registration is hit by S.162, Cr.P.C. Provincial governments are constitutionally obliged to ensure strict compliance with S.154 and to impose accountability and deterrence against violations. Reference made to Muhammad Bashir v. SHO, Okara Cantt (PLD 2007 SC 539) and Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh (2024 SCMR 1123). (c) Evidence ---- Testimony of chance witnesses ---- Caution in reliance. Eye-witnesses who were residents of a distant city were categorized as “chance witnesses.” Court reiterated settled principles: evidence of chance witnesses requires convincing explanation for presence at the scene, must be confidence-inspiring, and demands strong corroboration. In absence of plausible justification, such evidence is unsafe for conviction, particularly in capital offences. Reliance placed on Mst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez (2015 SCMR 1142); Umar Hayat v. The State (1998 SCMR 1101); The State v. Ghulam Rasool (2007 SCMR 1944); Inayat Ali v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 77); Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain (2017 SCMR 1710). (d) Criminal law ---- Recovery of weapon and forensic report ---- Doubtful recovery. Weapons allegedly recovered on joint pointation 17 days after arrest were sent to FSL along with empties on same date, raising suspicion of fabrication. Held, that such recovery was not free from doubt and positive FSL report could not cure defective prosecution evidence. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Convictions and sentences of appellants set aside; they were acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No.25-K of 2021 (complainant’s appeal for enhancement) dismissed as infructuous. Direction: Copies of judgment to be sent to Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan, and Chief Secretaries of all provinces for policy action ensuring enforcement of mandatory duties under S.154, Cr.P.C., and accountability of delinquent officials.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 20.09.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 191 of 2014 and Murder Reference No. 57 of 2014). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Throwing a wider net---False implication---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that for the single deceased of this case, the complainant party implicated total ten (10) accused persons in this case (eight accused with the allegation that they were present at the spot at the relevant time and participated in the occurrence, whereas two accused were implicated with the allegation of abetment)---Said fact showed that a wider-net was used by the complainant party against different innocent persons---Most of the accused were declared innocent during the police investigation and all the remaining accused except the petitioner had also been acquitted by the Court---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Motive behind the occurrence was that earlier, son of complainant had injured petitioner by making fire shots, therefore, due to the said grudge, the occurrence of that case was committed by the petitioner and his co-accused---Motive was disbelieved by the High Court because the son of the complainant was the best witness to prove the alleged motive but he was not produced in the witness box---No other tangible evidence was produced to prove the alleged motive, hence the same was rightly disbelieved by the High Court---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties---Inconsequential---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that 30-bore pistol was recovered at the pointing out of the petitioner---However, as per Forensic Science Laboratory Report, the empties recovered from the spot did not match with the said pistol, hence the alleged recovery of pistol at the pointing out of the petitioner was inconsequential for the prosecution case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---No justification for the presence of witnesses at the time and place of occurrence---Chance witnesses, evidence of---Scope---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Occurrence took place near the graveyard of village “MB”, whereas the prosecution eye-witnesses, complainant and an eye-witness, both were residents of village “MJ”---Said eye-witnesses were not residents of village, where the occurrence took place, therefore, they were bound to prove the reason of their presence at the relevant time at the spot, which was situated in a different village---In order to justify the presence of witnesses at the spot at the relevant time, it was stated by the eye-witnesses that they came to village “MB” to offer funeral prayer of one “FK” and the occurrence took place near the graveyard immediately after the funeral prayer but no resident of the village “MB” was produced in the witness box to support the claim of the eye-witnesses, that they participated in the funeral prayer of “FK” and the said witnesses were present in his village at the time of occurrence---Claim of the prosecution that the eye-witnesses were present in the village “MB” to offer funeral prayer of one “FK”, showed that the complainant party had close ties with the family of said “FK” but even no member of the family of the “FK” was produced in the witness box to support the prosecution case---As the prosecution eye-witnesses were chance witnesses and they could not prove the reason of their presence in a different village at the time of occurrence through any cogent evidence, therefore, they were chance witnesses and as such their evidence was not free from doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142 and Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others 2017 SCMR 142 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Chance witnesses, evidence of---Doubtful testimony---Unnatural conduct of chance witnesses---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---In the present case, eye-witnesses stated that after offering the funeral prayer only deceased had proceeded towards his village on a motorcycle and witnesses proceeded towards their village by foot---Said fact did not appeal to a prudent mind that when deceased was going alone on his motorcycle to his village from a different village then as to why none from the eye-witnesses, who being real brother and son were closely related to the deceased, did not accompany him on his motorcycle---Thus, it appeared that the eye-witnesses had consciously stated that they proceeded by foot towards their village because as per postmortem report there were four (04) entry and four (04) exit wounds on the body of the deceased, therefore, it was difficult for the said witnesses to justify their presence on the motorcycle of the deceased at the time of occurrence because in that case, they should have also received injuries if they were sitting on the pillion seat of the motorcycle of the deceased due to the bullets which went through and through from four (04) exit wounds on the back side of the body of the deceased---In order to cover the such situation, eyewitnesses stated that they were going by foot to their village, at the time of occurrence, otherwise, their natural conduct would have been to accompany the deceased on his motorcycle---Said fact showed that none from the prosecution's eye-witnesses was present at the spot at the time of occurrence and the story of going by foot towards their village was concocted by said witnesses to justify their presence at the spot at the relevant time---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Ocular account and medical evidence---Conflictions---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that there was glaring conflict between the ocular account and medical evidence of the prosecution---Prosecution eye-witnesses stated that the fire shot made by co-accused since acquitted, landed on the back of left thigh of deceased, whereas, the fire shot made by co-accused landed on the back of the deceased---However, according to the medical evidence furnished by Medical Officer, the injuries on the back and on the back of thigh, both were exit wounds---Said conflict between the ocular account and the medical evidence of the prosecution also showed that the said witnesses were not present at the time of occurrence and their evidence was doubtful, hence not reliable---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Bashir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2022 SCMR 986; Tajamal Hussain Shah v. The State and another 2022 SCMR 1567 and Mansab Ali v. The State 2019 SCMR 1306 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Presence of eyewitnesses at the spot not proved---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---According to the prosecution case, it was son of the complainant, who had earlier injured petitioner by making fire shots, therefore, under the circumstances, the complainant himself should have been the prime target of the petitioner but the complainant who himself was present at the spot at the time of occurrence did not receive a single injury during the occurrence, whereas there was no motive with the petitioner to commit the murder of deceased---Therefore, the prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time---Said fact had also created another dent in the prosecution story---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Zaman Mangat v. Muhammad Akhtar and others 2004 SCMR 757; Saleem Khan v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 1472 and Rohtas Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 566 rel. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 427, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Co-accused acquitted on same set of evidence---Accused-petitioner was charged that he along with his co-accused persons committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that two co-accused, since acquitted, were also assigned one firearm injury each on the left thigh and left side of penis of deceased---As per postmortem report of deceased, the said injuries were available on the body of the deceased but the said co-accused had already been acquitted by the Trial Court---No appeal was filed by the complainant party before the High Court, against the acquittal of the said acquitted co-accused and as such their acquittal had attained finality---Under the circumstances, this Court had to see as to whether or not there was any independent corroboration against petitioner of the same prosecution evidence, which had already been disbelieved against the said acquitted co-accused---Moreover, the recovery of pistol 30-bore and motive part of the prosecution case had already been disbelieved---There was no other independent corroboration of the prosecution case against petitioner, hence the prosecution evidence which had already been disbelieved against the acquitted co-accused, could not be believed against the petitioner without independent corroboration, which was very much lacking in the case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Akhtar Ali and others v. The State 2008 SCMR 6; Muhammad Pervaiz v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 592; Liaqat Ali and others v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 455 and Shaukat Hussain v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 929 rel. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in the prosecution case then the same would be sufficient to acquit the accused. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel. Muhammad Farhan Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State. Nemo for the Complainant. Assisated by: Ghulam Muhammad Adnan, Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 19th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss. 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.6 & 8---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Family Court granting khula to wife without her asking for it---Legality---Cruelty as a ground, proving of---Standard of proof to be adopted by courts in family cases highlighted---Husband contracting second marriage without wife’s permission constituting cruelty and such ground alone sufficing for seeking dissolution of marriage---Scope---Brief facts were that the petitioner/wife filed a suit against respondent/husband seeking dissolution of marriage, during which the family court granted khula and ordered her to return her dower comprising a plot, gold, and money---Petitioner’s (wife's) appeal and constitutional petition were dismissed---During the marriage, the respondent/husband contracted a second marriage without the petitioner’s (wife) consent or permission from the arbitration council---The legal issue for determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the family court could lawfully convert a suit for dissolution into khula without the wife’s consent, and whether the correct legal standard was applied in assessing the statutory grounds for dissolution, particularly cruelty, non-payment of maintenance, and contracting a second marriage in violation of law”?-- -Held: Family Court dismissed the petitioner’s (wife's) evidence because it was unsupported by documents establishing cruelty---Family court failed to consider the evidence as a whole on the balance of probabilities, to determine whether the petitioner (wife)was entitled to dissolve the marriage---It was the duty of the family court and the appellate court to give weightage to the petitioner’s story on the balance of probabilities rather than treat the absence of documentary proof as conclusive to the fact that cruelty was not established---Both the family court and the appellate court readily accepted the respondent’s (husband) evidence even though he did not produce a single witness to corroborate his stance of good behavior or to corroborate his stance that he did not cause her any form of mental or emotional trauma---In doing so, the family court and the appellate court fell into grave error by not conforming to the standard of proof and by ignoring the principle of balance of probabilities---Hence, it failed to assess the evidence as per the required standard of proof to establish whether the petitioner (wife) was entitled to dissolution on the ground of cruelty---As to the High Court and the impugned judgement, it ignored the issues in totality---The second marriage was contracted by respondent (husband) in clear violation of Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), thereby attracting clause (ii-a) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (DMMA), which alone was sufficient for the family court to dissolve the marriage---The family court, instead of dissolving the marriage granted a khula to the petitioner without her asking for it---The question was whether the family court could of its own accord grant khula---Khula was a distinct cause of action grounded in the wife’s consent and autonomy, and it could not be judicially imposed to replace a failed statutory ground under the DMMA---The practice of converting a suit for dissolution of marriage into one of khula without the consent of the wife was totally in contravention to the law, as khula being an alternate mode of dissolution required the wife’s voluntary decision to end the marriage and pay compensation in exchange for release from the marital bond---In consequence of the family court granting a decree for khula instead of the dissolution as prayed for, the petitioner (wife) was wrongly disentitled from her maintenance and dower despite these being legal obligations of the respondent (wife)---Judgments and decrees of the family court and the appellate court as well as the order of the High Court were set aside to the extent of khula, dower, and maintenance---The marriage was dissolved on the ground that the respondent (husband) contracted a second marriage in violation of the law---Consequently, the petitioner (wife) was not required to return her dower and was to keep the gold, money, and plot given to her---She was also entitled to maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month for the period during which the marriage subsisted, to be calculated and paid according to law---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan PLD 2024 SC 645 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Family court granting khula to wife without her asking for it---Legality---Filing of a suit for dissolution does not in itself amount to seeking khula---The practice of converting a suit for dissolution of marriage into one of khula without the consent of the wife is totally in contravention to the law, as khula being an alternate mode of dissolution requires the wife’s voluntary decision to end the marriage and pay compensation in exchange for release from the marital bond. Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan PLD 2024 SC 645 rel. (c) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss. 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.6 & 8---Statutory grounds empowering women to seek dissolution of marriage---Scope---Legal framework---Dissolution of marriage means that the marriage can be brought to an end at the instance of the woman if she is able to successfully establish one or more of the statutory grounds provided within the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA)---Section 2 of the DMMA lists the grounds, which include the husband’s disappearance, failure to provide maintenance, imprisonment, impotence, insanity, cruelty and, by virtue of clause(ii-a) of the DMMA inserted through the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), the taking of an additional wife---Each of these grounds reflects a recognition that the marital bond may become so impaired by the husband’s conduct or circumstances that its continuation would cause injustice to the wife---Among the grounds outlined in the DMMA, Section 2 (ii) lists out the ground for failure to provide maintenance, Section 2 (ii-a) lists out the ground for taking an additional wife and Section 2 (viii) presents the ground of cruelty. (d) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----S. 2(viii)---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.6---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Grounds for decree---‘Cruelty’ explained---Factors assessing/determining ‘cruelty’---Where the impact of behavior renders marital life unsafe or intolerable then it is termed as cruelty---Cruelty can range from physical assault, to mental or emotional abuse, to interference with property or religion, to inequitable treatment in the context of a second marriage---Cruelty is related to the conduct of the husband such that his behavior or treatment towards the wife involves physical abuse in the form of assault as well as emotional and mental abuse such that his conduct is so reprehensive for her that she is miserable and unable to live with him---This means that cruelty can be physical, mental as well as emotional---The examples listed in Section 2 (viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA) are not exhaustive but illustrative, ensuring that courts remain flexible in recognizing cruelty in its many different forms---Accordingly, cruelty is not limited to physical harm rather it includes any conduct, which results in mental and emotional harm, that makes it impossible for the wife to live with dignity and security within the marital home and relationship---Courts in Pakistan have defined cruelty as being behavior which is not limited to physical abuse but involves behavior which can result in mental and emotional abuse---Therefore, cruelty encompasses physical harm; such as slaps, beatings or assault, as well as mental cruelty, such as humiliation, verbal abuse, or unfounded allegations of unfaithfulness in a marriage; emotional cruelty, such as neglect or indifference; and, at times, the broader environment of the marriage, such as hostility in the home or oppressive behavior by in-laws tolerated or encouraged by the husband---Cruelty can involve a series of acts, disconnected but collectively causing harm which renders it intolerable for the wife to remain in the marriage bond---Courts have also expanded on what constitutes cruelty by holding that cruelty includes the intentional or malicious infliction of mental suffering, abusive treatment, or false accusations---This means that physical injury is not a prerequisite and cruelty may consist entirely of conduct that causes anguish, loss of confidence, or injury to self-respect and may even encompass violent or non-violent acts, gestures, words, and even silence or neglect---Cruelty may be physical or mental, intentional or unintentional, pre-meditated or not---Essentially, it is behavior, the impact of which is so painful, so severe, and so harsh that it would be impossible to live in the marriage---The relevant and decisive factor is the impact of the husband’s conduct on the woman such that she no longer deems it possible to live with him---Accordingly, for a court examining whether a case of cruelty is made out to dissolve the marriage, cruelty must be assessed in all its forms in the context of its impact whether physical, mental, emotional, and even environmental---Cruelty is a subjective test, to be assessed in light of the effect of the behavior on the aggrieved woman, rather than by reference to strict categories or technical rules of proof. Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani 2023 SCMR 246 rel. Muhammad Shariful Islam v. Suraya Begum PLD 1963 Dacca 947; Shahana Bibi v. Nadeem Shah 2015 MLD 1623; Rabia Rasheed v. Faisal Mir 2013 CLC 1203; Evans v. Evans 1 Hag. Con. 35 and 161 E.R. 466; Russell v. Russell [1897] AC 395 (HL); Horton v. Horton [1940] p. 187; Gollins v. Gollins [1964] AC 644 (HL); Williams v. Williams [1964] AC 698 (HL) and Lvingstone-Stallard v. Livingstone-Stallard [1974] Fam 47 ref. (e) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss.2, 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Cruelty---Proof--- Correct standard of proof while assessing evidence---Dispute under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA) being governed by family law is essentially a civil dispute pertaining to the dissolution of the marriage and same is to be assessed on civil standards of evidence---Woman can obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage provided she can establish one or more of the grounds stipulated in section 2 of DMMA on the balance of probabilities---Where a woman invokes the ground of cruelty, it becomes a factual matter to be determined on the basis of evidence to be assessed according to the civil standard of proof being the balance of probabilities meaning that there must be sufficient evidence to show that a fact is more likely to be true than not---Therefore, the family court is required to look at the woman’s testimony narrated in her own words and supported by surrounding circumstances---The standard of proof applied under the DMMA being the balance of probabilities means that the Court must decide whose side of the story is more likely to be true, that is more probable than the other, while examining the evidence and testimony of the woman, the circumstances she describes, and the impact of the conduct on her ability to continue marital life in the context of the defense he sets out by way of evidence---The law does not condition woman’s entitlement on being able to demonstrate injuries or police reports or bring medical reports to support every slap or instance of emotional or mental trauma---In considering the evidence, the court must remember that there is no single definition of cruelty---What may be cruelty in one marriage may not be cruelty in another---The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon the upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system---The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances on the balance of probabilities---The essential factor being the impact of the behavior termed as cruelty on the life of the woman. Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353; Nazeeran v. Ali Bux 2024 SCMR 1271; Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad 2021 SCMR 1986; Muhammad Amir v. Khan Bahadur PLD 1996 SC 267 and Begum Hamid Mehmood v. Muhammad Masood 1995 SCMR 955 rel. Meezan Bank Limited v. WAPDA First Sukuk Company Limited 2022 CLC 974 ref. (f) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 6---Husband contracting second marriage during subsistence of first marriage---Process and pre-requisites---A husband may contract another marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage only after seeking the consent of his existing wife---If such consent is refused, he must then apply to the Chairman of the Union Council, stating his reasons for the proposed marriage---The Chairman is then required to constitute an arbitration council which may grant permission only if it is satisfied that the proposed marriage is “necessary and just”---Non-compliance with this process attracts penal consequences under Section 6(5) of the MFLO, including the immediate payment of the entire dower to the first wife and criminal liability punishable with imprisonment or fine. (g) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 6---Family court justifying the second marriage of husband on the presumption that wife was disobedient and self-deserting---Legality and permissibility---No one can be compelled to contract a second marriage and similarly a husband cannot be forced to contract a second marriage by blaming the woman for her behavior. Faryal Maqsood v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani PLD 2025 SC 262 rel. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 30---Admitted facts---Facts admitted require no further proof. Rehmat v. Zubaida Begum 2021 SCMR 1534 and Nazir Ahmad v. M. Muzaffar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1639 rel. (i) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----S. 2---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Wife’s right to pursue her career or education---Scope---Husband alleging disobedience against wife on that account---Legality---Wife’s desire to pursue her career or education abroad is not disobedience and is not to be equated to misconduct rather it is an exercise of her personal autonomy. (j) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S. 2---Patriarchal/male-centric language used by family courts---Correcting gendered mischaracterizations that undermine women’s dignity, autonomy, and fundamental rights---Language used by the family courts reflecting patriarchal mindset would require courts attention---Mischaracterization of a woman as a “disobedient wife” and a “self-deserted lady”, or the assumption that she “created such circumstances which compelled the husband to contract a second marriage,” shifts the discussion from, cruelty of husband, towards the woman and the exercise of her autonomy to her obedience and disobedience---This reasoning shields the cruel behavior and unlawful acts of a husband while portraying him as a dutiful and “good husband”---These are social judgments disguised as findings of law---Family court’s presumption that only an “obedient wife” is entitled to maintenance must be replaced with the legally correct position as maintenance is a husband’s statutory obligation during the subsistence of the marriage---It is therefore necessary to address and correct such language as a matter of substantive justice---Family courts must consciously move away from such words like “disobedient,” “self-deserting,” “mummed,” “served the husband’s family by heart” and “compelled the husband to contract second marriage” as they reinforce a moral hierarchy that measures women by servitude and compliance in total disregard of her fundamental rights especially to have life with dignity and to exercise her right to choice. Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 rel. Sher Afzal Khan Marwat, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Sh. Muhammad Suleman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 19th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.54---Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.52---Dispute over land recorded as part of Pinyari Canal since 1953---Plaintiff instituted suit for mandatory and permanent injunction claiming ownership on the basis of gift deed from his mother---Onus to prove---Plaintiff failing to demonstrate title of his mother on the date of gift deed in his favor---Brief facts were that the petitioner instituted a suit for mandatory and permanent injunction in respect of suit land claiming ownership on the basis of a registered gift deed executed by his mother in 1999 and mutation made in his favour in 1999---In 2001, upon seeking certified copies from the Settlement Department, he discovered that parts of his land were recorded as part of the Pinyari Canal since 1953, which he contended was incorrect as his land was never used for canal purposes---The respondent authority maintained that the land had been part of the Pinyari Canal alignment since 1953 and was government property not capable of transfer or gift---Held: Firstly, it was incumbent upon the petitioner/plaintiff to have established the title of the alleged donor as well as the genuineness and validity of the purported gift deed, obligations which he had failed to discharge---Petitioner/plaintiff admittedly had not produced the alleged gift deed and the witnesses---Moreover, he had not approached revenue authorities for correction of record prior to instituting the civil suit---Such admissions were fatal for the petitioner's case---Mere reliance on a mutation as conclusive proof of title was legally untenable---Moreover, it was fatal to petitioner's case, as he failed to demonstrate what title, if any, his mother possessed at the time of execution of the alleged gift deed in his favor---No illegality or material irregularity was found in the impugned judgments and decrees---Present civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276 and Rehmat Noor v. Zulqarnain 2023 SCMR 1645 rel. (b) Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.52---Mutation---Mutation entries are maintained solely for fiscal purposes and by themselves neither confer nor extinguish ownership rights---Ownership of immoveable property cannot be established merely by a mutation entry. (c) Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.52---Presumption of correctness being attached to official record---Scope---Original field-book of settlement department, Ghat Wadh Form and Deh Form, being prepared by public functionaries in discharge of their statutory duties, enjoy a presumption of correctness, which cannot be displaced except by cogent, reliable and independent evidence. (d) Maxim--- ----"Acta publica praesumuntur rite esse acta"---Meaning---Official acts are presumed to have been rightly done. (e) Qanun-e- Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.117---Decree, grant of---Proving of facts---Onus to prove---Defendant being proceeded against ex parte, plea of---Plaintiff's contentions that defendants have been proceeded against ex parte would be of no legal consequence---A decree cannot be granted merely on account of the absence of some parties when the documentary record itself negates plaintiff's claim. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---This jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is not to be exercised as if it were a second appeal---Revisional court is not to reappraise the entire evidence or substitute its own conclusions for those of the courts below merely because another view is possible---Interference is justified only in three eventualities; (i) when a subordinate court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; (ii) when it has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested; or, (iii) when in exercising jurisdiction it has acted illegally or with material irregularity and such illegality has occasioned failure of justice---Moreover, concurrent findings of fact, if supported by the record and not shown to be perverse, cannot be disturbed in revision---The scope is confined to examining jurisdictional defects or material irregularities; it does not extend to reassessing oral and documentary evidence already considered by the courts below. Muhammad Sarwar v. Hashmal Khan PLD 2022 SC 13 rel. M. Saleem Hashmi Qureshi and Zaman Zaib for Applicant. Wali Muhammad Jamari, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th August, 2025.

Summary: Crossing out entry in the nomination papers would mean that said entry is not applicable and cannot be treated that said entry had been left blank.