Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 10-A & Art. 212—Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, Rr. 3 & 4—Service Tribunal Act (XL of 1973)—Right to fair trial—Departmental inquiry—Denial of right to cross-examine witnesses—Effect—Scope and object of departmental inquiry— Where a civil servant is subjected to departmental proceedings under the E&D Rules, 1973, the right to cross-examine witnesses is not merely procedural but a vested right and an integral component of the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution. In the present case, the petitioner, a PSP officer, was charged with inefficiency, misconduct, and corruption, and although 138 witnesses were examined during the inquiry, he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine any of them. The Supreme Court held that cross-examination is the most effective and indispensable test for ascertaining truth and ensuring due process in both civil and criminal proceedings, including departmental inquiries. Failure to afford this right amounted to a serious violation of natural justice and rendered the inquiry proceedings legally infirm. Cited Cases: Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik (2023 SCMR 603) Usman Ghani v. Chief Post Master, GPO, Karachi (2022 SCMR 745) (b) Civil service—Departmental proceedings—Distinction between fact-finding and regular inquiry—Obligation of inquiry officer and Service Tribunal— A regular inquiry commences after a show cause notice and statement of allegations are issued and replied to; if the reply is unsatisfactory, an inquiry officer is appointed. In such inquiry, it is obligatory that the accused be provided a fair and evenhanded opportunity to defend, including cross-examination of any witness examined against him. In contrast, a fact-finding inquiry is a preliminary internal exercise to assess whether a formal case of misconduct exists. The Supreme Court held that both the inquiry officer and the Service Tribunal must distinguish between these types of inquiries and ensure due process is fully observed when disciplinary action is taken. (c) Service Tribunal—Jurisdiction and responsibility—Failure to examine denial of cross-examination—Effect— The Service Tribunal, acting as a civil court under Art. 212 of the Constitution, is obligated to deliver substantive justice and assess whether departmental proceedings comply with the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal’s failure to address the denial of cross-examination and its legal consequences amounted to a jurisdictional error and failure to protect the petitioner’s constitutional rights. Disposition: Petition allowed. Judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal set aside. Case remanded to Secretary Establishment for de novo inquiry within two months, ensuring full compliance with due process, including the petitioner’s right to cross-examine witnesses.

Summary: (a) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974--- ----R. 5(1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Service matter---Appointment / recruitment---High Court, jurisdiction of---Authorities were aggrieved of directions issued by High Court to adjust respondents / candidates against posts in question---Plea raised by authorities was that in the matter of appointments, there were disputed questions of facts which could not be decided by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction---Validity---When a controversy regarding appoint or recruitment process is triggered, High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction cannot record evidence and cannot be involved deeply in factual controversy, which cannot be thrashed out without leading evidence by parties---Available record and comments filed by concerned department can be vetted and scanned in order to arrive at a just conclusion on whether the matter can be adjudicated upon based on available and admitted documents without dilating upon factual controversy--- Supreme Court remanded the matter to High Court for deciding it afresh on merits, after providing ample opportunity of hearing to parties and set aside order passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed. Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442; 2023 SCP 199 and Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813 rel. (b) Words and phrases--- ----'Mutatis mutandis'---Connotation---Expression mutatis mutandis generally applies for making certain adjustments of features in a new situation of framework, as a shortcut (an alternate route that is shorter than the one usually taken) in order to avoid reiterating or retelling the same provisions with minor variations---Expression mutatis mutandis applies from one case to another with required alterations or modifications within the different set of circumstances of cases to avoid repetition by signifying that primary criterions have to apply with certain vicissitudes. Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th Edition, 1968; West Publishing Co.); Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (1st Edition, 1959; Sweet and Maxwell); Oxford Dictionary of Law (5th Edition, 2003; Oxford University Press); Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3rd Revision, 1914; Boston); Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edition, 2003; Oxford University Press); Cambridge English Dictionary (Cambridge University Press); Collins English Dictionary (via Dictionary.com, 2012 Edition); Muhammad Sharif v. The State PLD 1999 SC 1063; Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer 1995 ACJ 97; Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa 1983 2 SCR 363 and R. v. Gauthier [1977] 1 SCR 441 rel. For Petitioners: Jawad Dero, Advocate General, Sindh, Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General, Ms. Lubna Pervez, Advocate-on-Record, Ghulam Ali Brahmani, Secretary SGA&CD. For Respondents: Mirza Sarfaraz Ahmed, Mehfooz Ahmed Awan, Rukhsar Ahmed Junejo, Manzoor Hussain Larik, Advocates Supreme Court, Sajid Ali Channa, Badaruddin Memon, Syed Tanveer Abbas Shah, Abdul Naeem Pirzada, M. Yaseen Khaskheli, Advocates High Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Abdul Sattar Khan and Abdul Qadir Khan, Advocates-on-Record for Respondents. Date of hearing: 5th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199, Art. 10-A, & Art. 2010 --- High Court’s disposal of service-related Constitution Petitions by applying earlier decision mutatis mutandis without affording opportunity of hearing to the Government—Maintainability—Petitioners (Province of Sindh and others) assailed the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Sukkur Bench, which had disposed of multiple Constitution Petitions by extending the benefit of an earlier order passed in C.P. No.D-1435 of 2023 without hearing the petitioners or allowing them to file comments—Petitioners contended that the recruitment processes were based on different advertisements with distinct terms and conditions issued by various departments across different time periods and could not be treated identically—Supreme Court held that before applying the doctrine of mutatis mutandis, the Court must examine whether the earlier order is factually and legally compatible with the case in hand—Observed that each case must be decided on its own merits and the impugned order, based solely on factual grounds of an earlier decision and devoid of legal enunciation, was not binding under Art. 201 of the Constitution—Violation of due process and fair hearing as envisaged under Art. 10-A was also noted—High Court had failed to appreciate the differences in advertisements, departmental procedures, and lack of codal formalities, and passed the order in a “slipshod” manner. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction ---- Art. 199---- Limitations of High Court under writ jurisdiction in adjudicating disputed factual controversies in recruitment matters—Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction is not mandated to conduct an elaborate inquiry into disputed facts or record evidence—However, a just decision can be reached where admitted or available documents suffice to assess legality of executive actions—Court referred to principle laid down in Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Home & Tribal Affairs Department v. Fayyaz Dawar (2023 SCMR 1442) and Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib (2011 SCMR 1813), emphasizing that writ remedy is reserved for situations where illegality of executive action is demonstrable without complex fact-finding—High Court, in the present case, overstepped its bounds by conclusively determining the respondents’ entitlement without examining competing documentary evidence or giving a chance for rebuttal. (c) Service Law ---- Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 ---- R. 5(1) ---- Recommendations of District Recruitment Committee (DRC)—Whether confer vested right of appointment—Held, recommendation or issuance of offer letter by DRC does not in itself create a legally enforceable or vested right in favour of applicants unless codal formalities are completed and recruitment is duly approved by competent authority—Legitimate expectancy cannot override statutory requirements—Contention that appointments were made based on DRC recommendations and subsequently terminated without due process, to be examined by High Court on merits. (d) Latin Legal Maxims ---- Meaning, application, and scope of “mutatis mutandis” ---- Expression “mutatis mutandis”—Scope and applicability—Held, expression denotes “with necessary changes having been made”—Refers to application of a legal rule or judicial decision to a different factual matrix after suitable modifications—Court explained that it is not to be confused with “ceteris paribus” and requires case-by-case evaluation—Relied on definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, Jowitt’s Dictionary, Oxford Law Dictionary, Bouvier’s Dictionary, Cambridge Dictionary, and Collins Dictionary—Reiterated Pakistani and foreign case law on the term including Muhammad Sharif v. The State (PLD 1999 SC 1063), Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer (1995 ACJ 97), Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa (1983 2 SCR 363), and R. v. Gauthier ([1977] 1 SCR 441)—Held that High Court erred in applying earlier order blindly without determining its contextual fit with the facts of each petition. (e) Practice and Procedure ---- Remand for decision on merits ---- Remand of petitions for fresh adjudication—Supreme Court converted all Civil Petitions into appeals and set aside the impugned orders—Directed High Court to decide all Constitution Petitions afresh on merits, after affording full opportunity of hearing to both sides—Ordered parties to exchange documents and file necessary pleadings in advance—High Court to consider, inter alia, differences in advertisements, departments, recruitment procedures, and compliance with codal formalities without being influenced by the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023. (f) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 184(3) ---- Effect of absence of legal principle in earlier High Court ruling on its binding nature—Held, the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 was fact-specific, contained no principle of law or ratio decidendi, and thus could not operate as a binding precedent—Mere administrative convenience or factual similarity does not justify universal application of a past order—Judicial comity under Art. 201 applies only where legal principles have been laid down. (g) Disposition ---- Petitions barred by limitation—Condonation allowed—Delay in certain petitions condoned in view of connected matters being within time. Petition in CPLA No. 182-K/2025 dismissed as not pressed—Province of Sindh had no grievance against order in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 regarding recruitment in Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. All remaining Civil Petitions converted into appeals, allowed, and remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. Cited Cases: Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Govt. of KPK v. Fayyaz Dawar, 2023 SCMR 1442 = 2023 SCP 199 Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib & others, 2011 SCMR 1813 Muhammad Sharif v. The State, PLD 1999 SC 1063 Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer, 1995 ACJ 97 (India) Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa, 1983 2 SCR 363 (India) R. v. Gauthier, [1977] 1 SCR 441 (Canada)

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 10-A & 212---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, Rr. 3(a) & 4(b)(i)---Departmental inquiry against government servant, conducting of---Right of cross-examination, denial of---Right of defence---Scope---Services Tribunal---Powers and responsibilities---The aim of conducting inquiries is not only to determine the responsibility of the individual in question with regard to the charges outlined in the Show Cause Notice(SCN) or statement of allegations, but also to help identify and uncover the true culprit or delinquent---In the present case, it was quite strange that admittedly 138 witnesses were examined but the inquiry officer failed to provide any opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine them---Pertinently, under the civil and criminal law, the examination-in-chief or mere statement of any witness has no legal value or sanctity unless he appears for cross-examination by the other side, which is a most effective device invented to unearth the truth---It is a vested right, which should be safeguarded and made available being fundamental limb of natural justice---Right of proper defence and cross-examination of witnesses by the accused is a vested right---Cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth---Indeed, the reliability of evidence can only be judged through cross-examination, which is essential to reveal the truth and test the credibility of allegations, especially when possibility cannot be ruled out in the inquiry that a witness may raise untrue and dishonest allegations due to some animosity against the accused, which cannot be accepted unless he undergoes the test of cross-examination, which indeed helps to expose the truth and veracity of allegations---Denying the opportunity of cross-examination of witness is violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial---Main objective of cross-examination is to rigorously scrutinize the witness's testimony, reveal any inconsistencies, uncover potential biases and critically assess the reliability of the evidence presented---Primary purpose of conducting a departmental inquiry is to thoroughly investigate alleged misconduct, ensure accountability, uphold organizational standards and protect the integrity of the institution; it aims to gather relevant facts, assess the situation fairly and determine appropriate actions based on the findings---Primary purpose of a departmental inquiry is to determine whether there is a preliminary case of misconduct against the delinquent officer to justify further action---Question of guilt or innocence depends on the inquiry's findings---Thus, Service Tribunal must assess whether the inquiry was conducted in accordance with due process and the right to a fair trial, which is a fundamental right---Pertinently, the establishment of the Service Tribunal (Tribunal) under Article 212 of the Constitution serves the purpose of adjudicating matters related to the terms and conditions of civil servants---In deciding appeals, the Tribunal functions as a civil court with equivalent powers and bears the responsibility to deliver fair and substantial justice through sound fact-finding---All judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies must exercise their authority impartially and in accordance with the law, respecting the principles of natural justice---Denial of the right to cross-examine during an inquiry is not a minor procedural flaw but a serious error that undermines the foundation of the case of misconduct---In the present case it was the Tribunal’s legal obligation to thoroughly examine the inquiry report, including the consequences of denying cross-examination to fairly decide the appeals on their merits---Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal while remanding the case to the Secretary Establishment to conduct a de-novo inquiry, ensuring that all requirements of a fair trial were met, including providing the petitioner a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses---Petition for leave to appeal was allowed and converted into an appeal and was disposed of accordingly. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 and Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO, Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 ref. Malik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Khaleeq Ahmed, D.A.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th June, 2025.

Summary: Employment--- ----Quota based appointments---Supreme Court’s view on rendering such appointments as unconstitutional---Quota reserved for children---Termination from service, challenge to---Briefly, petitioner’s father was serving as a postal clerk in the postal services department and was invalidated and prematurely retired on medical grounds---Following his retirement, the petitioner applied for appointment under the quota reserved for children of employees who retired on medical grounds and was appointed as a postal clerk on a contract basis---Subsequently, the respondent-department cancelled the petitioner’s appointment through the impugned order, prompting the petitioner to file a constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution seeking reinstatement---Held: In view of the Supreme Court’s judgment, dated 18-10-2024 in Civil Petition No.3390 of 2021, all rules, policies, memorandums, etc., which provided for the appointment, without open advertisement, competition, and merit, of children and/or family members of employees who retired or died during service, were declared as discriminatory and ultra vires to Arts. 3, 4, 5(2), 18, 25(1), and 27 of the Constitution---In the present case, the petitioner had unequivocally admitted in the petition that he was appointed under the son’s quota---However, at the time of his appointment on 01.11.2024, the said quota had already been declared unconstitutional and unlawful by both the High Court and the Supreme Court---Therefore, the petitioner’s appointment was patently illegal, void ab initio, and coram non judice---Impugned order did not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction---The petition, being devoid of any merit, was dismissed in limine. Civil Petition No.3390 of 2021 and Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Agriculture, Peshawar and others v. Tahir Mushtaq and others 2025 PLC (C.S.) 34 rel. Muhammad Rashid Khan Wazir for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 4th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Unani, Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Practitioners Act (II of 1965)--- ----Ss.2(c), 2(k), 17 & 21(1)&(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 18, 25 & 199---Admission to recognized institution of Unani or Ayurvedic system of medicine and Homoeopathy---Minimum qualification requirement---Candidates having bachelor or higher education with science given preference---Discrimination, plea of---Vires of law, challenge to---The issue in the present case revolved around the constitutional validity of S.21(2) of the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965, as amended by the 2021 amendment---The amendment raised the minimum qualification for admission to recognized institutions of Homeopathy from Matriculation with Science to Intermediate (F.Sc. Pre-Medical) or equivalent, giving preference to candidates with higher science education---The petitioner, a homoeopathic medical college, challenged this provision as being discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights under the Constitution, particularly in comparison to the qualifications prescribed for Unani and Ayurvedic institutions---Held: Determination of qualifications for admission to institutions in any field was within the legislative competence of the Government---The Act, 2021 was placed before the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and after approval, it received assent of the President on 1st December, 2021---The amendment in Subsection (2) of the Act, 1965 in no way offended any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners, moreso, Art.18 of the Constitution as it in no way abridged the right of trade or profession of the petitioners embodied therein---The qualification so enhanced through the amendment was though directly related to the candidates willing to apply for admission in the institutions but none had come forward to challenge the vires of the same---There was a clear distinction between qualifications for homeopathy and unani or ayurvedic system of medicine---Therefore, there was no case of discrimination with the students seeking admission in homeopathy as compared to the unani or ayurvedic system of medicine---Both the fields were not similar and akin---Article 25 of the Constitution ordained that all citizens were equal before law and entitled to equal protection of law and also guaranteed that there would be no discrimination on the basis of sex but by now it is well entrenched principle that equality does not prohibit classification for differently placed persons---Petitioners failed to demonstrate that subsection (2) of S.21 of the Act, 1965, in any manner, offended any of the provisions of the Constitutionor it abridged any of the fundamental right guaranteed therein, as such the present as well as connected petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Vires of law, challenge to---Pre-requisite---Necessity to demonstrate violation of fundamental rights---Scope---There is no cavil that judiciary can examine the vires of legislation on the touchstone of the Constitution but the person throwing any challenge to the provisions of a statute is obliged to demonstrate that it either offends any of the fundamental rights or abrogates the provisions of the Constitution. Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802 and Abdullah Jumani and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1258 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ---Arts. 25 & 199---Equality of citizens---Reasonable classification, doctrine of---Intelligible differential as basis for permissible distinction---Equality principle does not necessitate identical treatment in all circumstances---Scope---The doctrine of reasonable classification is founded on the assumption that the State has to perform multifarious activities and deal with a vast number of problems---Right of equality of citizens is always founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those, who have been left out---Right of equality is always to be weighed amongst equal in all respects and it is not necessary that every citizen shall be treated alike in all eventualities. Secretary Economic Affairs Division, Islamabad and others v. Anwarul Haq Ahmed and others 2013 SCMR 1687; Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary and another v. Samuel Bhatti and others 2009 SCMR 1034 and Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others v. Ch. Abdul Sattar Hans and 29 others 2015 SCMR 915 rel. M. Salman Idrees and Malik Jamal Tariq for Petitioner. Hunble Murad Siddique and Zulqarnain Tariq Qureshi for Petitioner (in Writ Petition No. 1917 of 2024). Mansoor Usman Awan, Attorney General for Pakistan. Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan. Ms. Rahat Farooq Raja, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab. Date of hearing: 4th June, 2025. Mirza Viqas Rauf, J.--- This single judgment shall decide subject petition as well as Writ Petition No.1917 of 2024, being raising similar questions of law and facts, more specifically challenging the vires of Section 21(2) of The Unani, Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965 (II of 1965) (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1965”). The petitioners, herein, are homoeopathic medical colleges imparting education to the pupils and they are aggrieved of Subsection (2) of Section 21 of the Act, 1965 as amended through The Unani, Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Practitioners (Amendment), Act, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2021”).

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 3, 4, 9, 10A, 14, 18 & 25 ---- Government employment in BPS-01 to BPS-04 ---- Appointment letters issued after completion of codal formalities ---- Non-payment of salaries without cancellation of appointments ---- Held, violative of fundamental rights Petitioners, appointed as Driver, Chowkidar, and Ward Boy in the Health Department, District Tharparkar, after due process including advertisement, interview, verification, and medical fitness, were denied salary payments despite joining duties. Their names were excluded from the salary processing list without cancellation of appointment letters or show cause notice. Held, non-payment of salaries in the absence of any lawful withdrawal of appointments constitutes a violation of fundamental rights under Arts. 3, 4, 9, 10A, 14, 18 and 25 of the Constitution. Appointment letters vested legal rights, and deprivation of salary without due process was unlawful. (b) Constitutional petition under Art. 199 ---- Scope ---- Disputed facts as a bar to writ jurisdiction ---- When not applicable ---- Duty of High Court to direct verification instead of non-suiting poor employees High Court dismissed petition on the ground of disputed facts, holding that petitioners' names were not in the final list of DRC-approved appointments. Supreme Court held that no factual controversy existed requiring elaborate inquiry, as appointment letters were admitted and not denied by department in comments. Held, when the right asserted is complete and supported by official documents, the constitutional jurisdiction is not ousted merely by raising belated factual objections. The High Court erred by not directing departmental verification and remedying administrative injustice. Dismissal of petition without such inquiry amounts to non-performance of constitutional duty. (c) Civil service ---- Recruitment irregularity ---- Appointments not revoked through lawful process ---- Employees cannot be penalized without inquiry ---- Departmental malfeasance must be addressed Held, if the appointment letters were issued without compliance of codal formalities, the Department was obligated to (i) conduct proper inquiry, (ii) identify responsible officials, and (iii) take appropriate action. Without such inquiry, recalling appointments or withholding salaries of low-paid employees constitutes administrative highhandedness. Poor appointees often become scapegoats, while departmental wrongdoers escape accountability. Held further, any withdrawal of appointments without show cause or hearing is void ab initio. (d) Administrative law ---- Direction for inquiry and verification ---- Supreme Court remand to Secretary Health Sindh ---- Time-bound compliance Supreme Court remanded matter to Secretary Health, Government of Sindh, directing that a hearing be granted to petitioners and the record examined. If the appointments were made on DRC/Selection Committee recommendation, petitioners must be allowed to resume service with prompt release of salaries. Exercise to be concluded within two months of receipt of judgment. Disposition: Civil Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; judgment of High Court set aside; matter remanded for verification and regularization of petitioners upon fulfillment of codal formalities.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 18 & 25 --- Civil Servants Act, 1973 --- Fundamental Rule 17 --- Promotion to BPS-22 --- Supersession without reasons --- Denial of fair consideration --- Proforma promotion --- Doctrine of legitimate expectation --- Remand to High-Powered Selection Board. Petitioner, a BS-21 officer of the Police Service of Pakistan, challenged his repeated supersession for promotion to BS-22 without being afforded any reasons or fair opportunity. Despite having an unblemished service record with outstanding Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) from 2013 to 2018 and being senior to others who were promoted, the petitioner was overlooked by the High-Powered Selection Board (HPSB) in multiple meetings. No adverse material was found in the official record, yet the HPSB minutes included negative remarks not grounded in any documented performance review. The Supreme Court held that while promotion is not a vested right, the right to fair and lawful consideration for promotion is enforceable. Where a civil servant attains the age of superannuation without being justly considered for promotion, the case must be assessed under the framework of proforma promotion as envisaged in Fundamental Rule 17. The Court observed that delay or omission in considering eligible officers due to administrative lapses entitles them to proforma promotion with consequential benefits. The High Court’s dismissal was found to have overlooked the factual record and was influenced by unverified notings in HPSB proceedings. The judgment was set aside and the matter remanded to the HPSB to re-evaluate the petitioner’s case for proforma promotion in a fair, impartial, and timely manner, with specific instructions for decision within two months. Cited Cases: • Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb 2022 SCMR 2020 • Alam Chand v. Jamil Ahmad 2008 SCMR 980 • Abid Hussain Sherazi v. Secretary, M/O Industries & Production 2005 SCMR 1742 • Secretary Health Department, Punjab v. Dr. Abida Iqbal 2009 SCMR 61 • Federal Public Service Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087 ----Disposition: Appeal allowed; High Court judgment set aside; matter remanded to HPSB for fresh consideration within two months.

Summary: (a) Civil service- -Removal from service-Petitioners were appointed by following due process but were subsequently removed from service-Constitution of a committee by the Supreme Court to resolve the factual controversy-The controversy arose from the petitioners' removal from service despite being appointed through a formal recruitment process and allegedly fulfilling all codal formalities-It was contended that although a list of 166 similarly appointed employees had been accepted and their salaries released pursuant to a consent order, the petitioners claimed they were also covered in that list but were not reinstated that two scrutiny reports were compiled indicating that the petitioners were not at fault and the responsibility lay with the ex-director, however, the department still issued show-cause notices and removed the petitioners from service; that the service tribunal failed to properly consider these facts and previous judgments/orders, including the verification of their credentials already deemed genuine-Held: The grievance, rather the contention, of the petitioners that they were not fully covered in the list of the 166 employees and their credentials were already scrutinized by the competent authority, was not considered properly before dismissing the service appeals-In order to thrash out and reconcile the controversy to some logical end, it was deemed most advantageous and expedient to constitute a three-member committee to scrutinize the cases of the present petitioners to assess whether they fell within the category of the aforesaid 166 employees and were thus entitled for restoration/appointment in service or not-The law officer along with officials present in court also assured that the committee would consider the credentials/antecedents of all the petitioners as well as the reports and the list of employees compiled earlier, with an independent application of mind, for reaching a just and proper conclusion in the matter-All civil petitions were converted into appeals by ordering certain directions to be followed in the matter-Appeals were disposed of, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 212-Sindh Service Tribunals Act (XV of 1973), Ss. 4 & 5-Service Tribunal-Jurisdiction, powers and scope-The factual controversy with regard to the recruitment process and verification of documents germane to the appointments are required to be resolved by the Service Tribunal, being the first fact-finding forum in service matters-The Service Tribunal exercised exclusive jurisdiction in the matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants and for the matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto-The fundamental philosophy of the appellate jurisdiction is to ensure checks and balances by means of re-evaluation and re-examination of the orders passed by the lower fora or authority-The wisdom of setting up a Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution was to deal with and decide matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants-The Service Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against and for the purpose of deciding any appeal it is deemed to be a civil court-The astuteness of discretion in judicial power is meant to serve and advance the cause of justice in a judicious manner in aid of justice. Petitioners in person (in C.Ps. Nos. 915-K, 916-K, 917-K, 946-K, 995-K to 1004-K, 1019-K to 1025-K, 1028-K to 1034-K, 1037-K, 1065-K of 2024 and 2-K of 2025).

Summary: (Against the Judgment dated 27.08.2024 passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal at Karachi in Appeals Nos. 1267/2021, 1305/2021, 634/2019, 1200/2021, 144/2022, 125/2019, 1011/2019, 11/2020, 30/2020, 92/2020, 94/2020, 95/2020, 96/2020, 97/2020, 98/2020, 102/2020, 104/2020, 126/2019, 705/2021, 950/2019, 951/2019, 952/2019, 1097/2021, 1100/2021, 1101/2021, 1115/2021, 1116/2021, 1149/2021, 1150/2021, 1153/2021, 1154/2021, 1155/2021, 1156/2021, 1158/2021, 1161/2021, 1166/2021, 1169/2021, 1172/2021, 1173/2021, 1174/2021, 1177/2021, 1178/2021, 1179/2021, 1199/2021, 1202/2021, 1212/2021, 1219/2021, 1221/2021, 1265/2021, 1302/2021, 29/2022, 1182/2021, 1170/2021, 1152/2021, 1090/2021, 636/2019, 635/2019, 1167/2021, 1157/2021, 1270/2021, 1129/2021, 1271/2021, 637/2019, 1304/2021, 93/2020, 1168/2021, 1293/2021, 1269/2021, 1294/2021, 1230/2021, 1229/2021, 1272/2021, 1275/2021, 1196/2021, 1277/2021, 1279/2021, 1117/2021, 1195/2021, 1266/2021, 1151/2021, 1245/2021, 1218/2021, 96/2022, 1309/2021, 1220/2021, 1092/2021, 1198/2021, 1183/2021, 1246/2021). (a) Civil service--- ----Removal from service---Petitioners were appointed by following due process but were subsequently removed from service---Constitution of a committee by the Supreme Court to resolve the factual controversy---The controversy arose from the petitioners' removal from service despite being appointed through a formal recruitment process and allegedly fulfilling all codal formalities---It was contended that although a list of 166 similarly appointed employees had been accepted and their salaries released pursuant to a consent order, the petitioners claimed they were also covered in that list but were not reinstated that two scrutiny reports were compiled indicating that the petitioners were not at fault and the responsibility lay with the ex-director, however, the department still issued show-cause notices and removed the petitioners from service; that the service tribunal failed to properly consider these facts and previous judgments/orders, including the verification of their credentials already deemed genuine---Held: The grievance, rather the contention, of the petitioners that they were not fully covered in the list of the 166 employees and their credentials were already scrutinized by the competent authority, was not considered properly before dismissing the service appeals---In order to thrash out and reconcile the controversy to some logical end, it was deemed most advantageous and expedient to constitute a three-member committee to scrutinize the cases of the present petitioners to assess whether they fell within the category of the aforesaid 166 employees and were thus entitled for restoration/appointment in service or not---The law officer along with officials present in court also assured that the committee would consider the credentials/antecedents of all the petitioners as well as the reports and the list of employees compiled earlier, with an independent application of mind, for reaching a just and proper conclusion in the matter---All civil petitions were converted into appeals by ordering certain directions to be followed in the matter---Appeals were disposed of, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 212---Sindh Service Tribunals Act (XV of 1973), Ss. 4 & 5---Service Tribunal---Jurisdiction, powers and scope---The factual controversy with regard to the recruitment process and verification of documents germane to the appointments are required to be resolved by the Service Tribunal, being the first fact-finding forum in service matters---The Service Tribunal exercised exclusive jurisdiction in the matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants and for the matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto---The fundamental philosophy of the appellate jurisdiction is to ensure checks and balances by means of re-evaluation and re-examination of the orders passed by the lower fora or authority---The wisdom of setting up a Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution was to deal with and decide matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants---The Service Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against and for the purpose of deciding any appeal it is deemed to be a civil court---The astuteness of discretion in judicial power is meant to serve and advance the cause of justice in a judicious manner in aid of justice. Malik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos. 948-K to 994-K of 2024). Petitioners in person (in C.Ps. Nos. 915-K, 916-K, 917-K, 946-K, 995-K to 1004-K, 1019-K to 1025-K, 1028-K to 1034-K, 1037-K, 1065-K of 2024 and 2-K of 2025). Nemo for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos. 944-K, 1035-K, 1036-K, 1066-K to 1071-K, 1088-K and 1089-K of 2024). Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General, Sindh, Shahab Qamar Ansari, Secretary Colleges Education and Iqbal Ahmed, Additional Secretary for Respondents. Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2025.