Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss.15 & 16---Tentative rent-depositing order, non-compliance of---Effect---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Eviction order was passed after the tenant failed to comply with tentative rent-depositing order passed by the Rent Controller allowing Rent Application filed by the landlord---Petitioner / tenant filed constitutional petition as District Court maintained eviction order made by the Rent Controller---Contention of the petitioner was that there was no underlying relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent in respect of the subject premises as his wife had purchased the same through a sale agreement regarding which suit for specific performance was pending adjudication--- Validity---Contention of the petitioner was patently misconceived in view of the fact /record that earlier the petitioner filed constitutional petition against very tentative rent-depositing order passed by the Rent Controller, which was disposed of with the directions to him (petitioner) to comply with rent depositing order---Petitioner was bound to comply with the said order previously made by the (High) Court but he willfully failed to comply with rent-depositing order made by the Rent Controller---It is incumbent on a party to comply with a tentative rent order that has attained finality---Other defense taken by the petitioner in the matter that a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement was pending along with another suit for cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the landlord was also repelled---No illegality or irregularity was noticed in the approach of the fora below warranting correction in exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Constitutional petition, filed by tenant, was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Iqbal Haider v. 1st ADJ, Karachi Central and others PLD 2018 SC 35 ref. Bashir Ahmed Almani for Petitioner. Sikandar Ali Shah for Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 29th April, 2024. Order Yousuf Ali Sayeed, J .--- The Petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, impugning the Judgment rendered by the Model Civil Appellate Court-II/VIth Additional District Judge- Hyderabad on 04.11.2023, dismissing 1st Rent Appeal No. 37 of 2023 filed by him against the Order made by the VIIIth Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller Hyderabad on 08.07.2023, allowing Rent Application No. 172 of 2021 filed by the Respondent No.1 under Section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (the "SRPO"). 2. The facts and circumstances underpinning the proceedings and giving rise to the aforementioned Order have been recorded in the impugned Judgment of the Appellate Court, with the relevant excerpt thereof reading as follows: "10. The perusal of record shows that the learned Rent Controller passed an order on the application under section 16(1) SRPO, 1979, whereby dismissed the same application vide order dated 20.08.2021. The applicant being aggrieved and dissatisfied with that order preferred a First Rent Appeal through FRA No.35 of 2021 against the order dated: 20.08.2021 which was also dismissed. The record further transpires that the applicant challenged both the impugned orders by filing C.P. No. S-585 of 2021 before Honorable High Court of Sindh Circuit Court Hyderabad which was disposed of vide order 28.04.2023 whereby the opponent was directed to pay monthly rent before learned Rent Controller within one week. For convenience the operative paragraphs of the order passed by Honourable High Court of Sindh Circuit Court, Hyderabad are reproduced as under; "3. Both the parties after arguing the matter at some length, agreed for disposal of the captioned petition on the premise that opponent/respondent, shall deposit the monthly rent before the learned Rent Controller within one week as directed and then the learned Rent Controller shall decide the matter within one month from today in accordance with law. 4. In view of consent of the parties, this petition stands disposed of in the above terms. Consequently, opponent/ respondent is directed to deposit monthly rent before learned Rent Controller till final adjudication of rent proceedings and learned Rent Controller shall expedite conclusion of the Proceedings within one month after receipt of this Order" 11. Further perusal of record clearly transpires that the tentative rent order was passed on 28.04.2023 by the Honorable High Court of Sindh Circuit Court Hyderabad and the report called from Nazir of the Court dated: 08.07.2023 shows that the opponent had not deposited the rent amount in due compliance of order dated: 28.04.2023, which shows that opponent/appellant did not comply the directions. Therefore, the learned rent controller had rightly relied upon the case laws and also rightly held that non submission of a single penny towards payment of rent after clear directions in the order passed by the Honourable High Court of Sindh Circuit Court, Hyderabad is a negative element. 12. In this regard I find no illegality or irregularity in the observations made in the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, therefore, such cannot be disturbed hence required no interference of this court. The point under discussion is answered in "Negative". 3. On query posed to learned counsel for the Petitioner as to whether the rent had been deposited by way of compliance, he conceded that the same had not been done, but sought to argue that the impugned Order of the Rent Controller and Judgment of the ADJ were bad in law as there was no underlying relationship of landlord and tenant between the Petitioner and Respondent No.1 in respect of the subject premises in as much as his wife had purchased the same through a Sale Agreement. 4. Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 submitted that said Respondent had acquired the premises through a registered Sale Deed and thereafter had served a notice under Section 18 of the SRPO on the Petitioner, who had nonetheless failed to tender payment of rent, necessitating filing of the Rent Case, with the course of events narrated in the Judgment dated 04.11.2023 having ensued during the course of that proceeding. 5. Having examined considered the submissions made by learned counsel in light of the record, it is apparent that the principal ground raised in the Memo. of Petition and the main thrust of the Petitioner's case during the course of arguments gravitates around the denial on the part of the Petitioner as to the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the Respondent No.1, and the contention that the for a below had failed to appreciate that, in the face of such a denial, a specific issue was required to be framed in that regard after which evidence was required to be produced by the Respondent No.1 to conclusively establish the relationship. 6. Such a contention is patently misconceived in view of the fact that the Petitioner was bound to comply with the Order made by this Court on 28.04.2023 in C.P. No. S- 585 of 2021, but willfully failed to do so, with the Order made by the Rent Controller on 08.07.2023 then logically following as a consequence. That assessment is fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case reported as Muhammad Iqbal Haider v. 1st ADJ, Karachi Central and others PLD 2018 SC 35, where it was held that it was incumbent on a party to comply with a tentative rent order that has attained finality. The defense taken in the matter that a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement was pending along with another suit for cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the landlord was also repelled. 7. Under the given circumstances, it is apparent that there is no illegality or irregularity in the approach of the for-a below that warrants correction in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 8. In view of the foregoing, the Petition is dismissed along with the pending miscellaneous application, with no order as to costs. The office is directed to return the R and P of the Rent Case to the concerned Court. MQ/A-83/Sindh Petition dismissed.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115--- Suit for declaration and injunction--- Revisional jurisdiction--- Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below--- Effect--- Respondents / plaintiffs claimed to be owners in possession of suit land on the basis of inheritance--- Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of respondents / plaintiffs and appeal filed by petitioners / defendants was dismissed by Lower Appellate Court, as they could not establish authenticity and legality of sale deeds in their favour--- Validity---Petitioners / defendants were unable to demonstrate any misreading/non-reading of evidence or perversity in findings of fora below falling within the scope of S.115, C.P.C.--- High Court declined to interfere in judgments passed by two Courts below as view taken through concurrent findings was reasonable and sustainable on the basis of evidence on record--- Revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Sardar Muhammad Kamal-ud-Din Khan v. Syed Munir Syed and others 2022 SCMR 806 rel. Sunder Das for Applicants. Abdul Ghafoor Hakro for Respondents Nos. 1 to 8. Allah Bachayo Soomro, A.A.G. for Respondents Nos. 9 to 14. Dates of hearing: 6th and 14th May, 2024. Judgment Yousuf Ali Sayeed, J .--- The captioned Revision assails the concurrent findings of the fora below, commencing with the Judgment and Decree dated 14.12.2010 of the learned Senior Civil Judge Tando Muhammad Khan in F.C Suit No.72 of 2008 instituted by the Respondents Nos. 1 to 8 and culminating in the Judgment and Decree of the Additional District Judge, Tando Muhammad Khan, dated 21.01.2015, dismissing Civil Appeal No.21 of 2011 preferred by the Applicant. 2. The backdrop to the matter is that the Respondents Nos. 1 to 8 had filed the Suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the Appellants, claiming ownership and possession of certain lands on the basis that the same had been owned by their father, Yar Muhammad Shah, who had remained the owner and in possession thereof until his death on 17.03.2002, whereupon they had inherited the same as his legal heirs with the foti khata badal entry being made in their favour, whereas an Appeal was later filed by the Appellants under Section 161 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967, claiming that the lands had been purchased by them from Yar Muhammad Shah through sale deeds purportedly executed on 15.09.1998 but registered on 18.12.2004. The Suit was thus brought by the Respondents Nos. 1 to 8, eliciting a declaration of their ownership as well as the invalidity of the sale deeds and to restrain the Appellants from interfering with their possession. 3. While the Suit proceeded ex parte as against the official Respondents, the Appellants contested the matter and took the plea through their joint written statement that the registration of the sale deeds was held in abeyance as Yar Muhammad Shah had obtained a loan against the lands from the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, with the loan clearance certificate being issued and received in December 2004 and the registration of the sale deeds following shortly thereafter. 4. The trial Court examined the evidence presented by both parties and observed that the Appellant's claim regarding the loan obtained by Yar Muhammad Shah was not supported by evidence as the clearance certificate produced in the matter showed that Yar Muhammad Shah had obtained a loan against the suit lands on 26.03.1999, which was after the alleged execution of the sale deeds on September 15.09.1998, hence the discrepancy raised doubts about the Appellants claim as to the reason for registration of the sale deeds being held in abeyance at the time. 5. The Court considered this discrepancy to be crucial and concluded that the Appellants could not establish the authenticity and legality of the sale deeds. Therefore, while the Respondents Nos. 1 to 8 were held to have proved their ownership and possession of the suit lands, the sale deeds presented by the Appellants were found and declared to be illegal, forged, and manipulated documents. 6. In terms of the underlying Judgment of the trial Court, the Respondents Nos. 1 to 8 were thus declared to be the legal owners and in possession of the suit lands, and the Appellants were ordered not to interfere with their possession. The relevant excerpt from the judgment of the trial Court on that score reads as follows: "The clearance certificate available with Ex: 65/C show that Syed Yar Muhammad Shah obtained loan on suit lands vide loan case No. 138243 dated 26.03.1999 but defendants deposed that on 15.09.1998 the registration of suit sale deeds were deferred as no clearance certificate was available from Bank. This show that on 15.09.1998 the lands of Syed Yar Muhammad Shah were not under any Bank Loan as the Bank Clearance Certificates show that he obtained loan on 26.03.1999. Therefore the evidence of defendants is falsified by the Bank clearance certificate that on 15.09.1998 Bank clearance certificate was not available hence registration was deferred. But in fact the loan was not obtained in year, 1998 and the sale deeds could be registered. Therefore this show that the sale deeds were not actually presented on 15.09.1998 before Sub-Registrar for registration and the same were not deferred for want of Bank clearance certificate. If the registration of suit sale deeds was deferred due to correction of sale certificate then why these suit sale deeds were registered after Six years of presentation on same sale certificate. The sale deeds show that the same were registered on old and same sale certificate. This all creates doubts in the genuineness of the suit sale deeds. In these circumstances it is also quite unnatural that when Yar Muhammad Shah executed sale deeds on 15.9.1998 then why he obtained loan subsequently on the same suit lands. It means that he did not appear and presented or executed the suit sale deeds on 15.9.1998 before Sub-Registrar or Stamp Vendor. Moreover the defendants also failed to examine the Stamp vendor or the then Sub-Registrar before whom Syed Yar Muhammad Shah appeared and executed the suit sale deeds. In support of the execution of suit sale deeds the defendants only examined their brother Abdul Wahid Shah who was one of attesting witnesses in all suit sale deeds. This witness has deposed that one day before execution of sale deeds he was asked by his brother Yar Muhammad Shah to come at office of Stamp vendor Umar Abro. On next day he reached office of Stamp vendor where Yar Muhammad Shah along with other attesting witness Abbas Chhelgari came in Taxi Car. He further deposed that he was asked by Yar Muhammad Shah to sign sale deeds executed by him in favour of defendants Nos.1 to 5. Regarding sale consideration though he deposed that same was paid to Yar Muhammad Shah but he did not depose that the same was paid in his presence. He further deposed that after signing the sale deeds, he went away, as parties went to office of Sub-Registrar. It means this attesting witness did not appear before Sub-Registrar, when Yar Muhammad Shah signed registers before Sub-Registrar. The other attesting witness has not been produced by defendants with explanation that he is under influence of plaintiff as per statement of their advocate as Ex: 60. During cross-examination defendant Abdullah Shah admitted that the attesting witness Abbas Chhelgari is brother of his wife. Therefore in view of this admission the statement of defendants that attesting witness Abbas Chhelgari is under influence of plaintiff is surprising. The defendants who are beneficiary of sale deeds also failed to examine Stamp vendor in this suit who had scribed the sale deeds." 7. Furthermore, in the Appellate Judgment it was also observed that while the Appellants claimed that they had paid the sale consideration for the lands to Yar Muhammad Shah, and that the relevant payments were made to him separately by each Appellant in a room adjacent to the office of the stamp vendor and were witnessed by Abbas Ali Chelghari and Abdul Wahid Shah, during the cross-examination of the attesting witness Abdul Wahid Shah, it was revealed that he could not provide specific details of the respective payments made by each Appellant to Yar Muhammad Shah, but mentioned that the payments were made in the presence of the stamp vendor. 8. In the matter reported as Sardar Muhammad Kamal-ud-Din-Khan v. Syed Munir Syed and others 2022 SCMR 806, the Supreme Court explained the scope of jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. as follows: "The exercise of revisional powers is circumscribed by section 115 of the Code. Clauses (a) and (b) are attracted when jurisdiction, which is vested in a court, is not exercised or when jurisdiction is not vested in a court yet the court assumes jurisdiction. And, clause (c) is with regard to a court exercising jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Conversely, when the order of a subordinate court is within its jurisdiction and such court has not exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised. 3 The power of revision cannot be used by a higher court to substitute its own discretion or authority. 4 A revision also does not lie when the law provides for an appeal. And this Court has held 5 that, 'The words "no appeal lies thereto" are words of general input and there is nothing in the section to confine their operation only to first appeals.' However, it does not follow that whenever an appeal is not provided for a revision would lie. A revision can only be filed if the order/judgment which has been impugned comes within clauses (a), (b) and/or (c) of subsection (1) of section 115 of the Code. The Privy Council explained when section 115 would apply and when it would not: Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial Court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters (a) That the order of the Subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction (b) That the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction and (c) That in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the Subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law.' 6 " 9. In the matter at hand, learned counsel for the Appellant was unable to demonstrate any misreading/non-reading of evidence or perversity in the findings of the fora below falling within the scope of Section 115, C.P.C., and on the contrary, the view taken through the concurrent findings at hand appears a reasonable and sustainable one on the basis of the evidence, as referred. 10. In view of the foregoing, no case for interference stands made and the Revision Application stands dismissed accordingly, with no order as to costs. MH/A-8/Sindh Revision dismissed.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Property, identification of---Describing land with reference to boundaries---Significance---Dispute between the parties was with regard to ownership and possession of plot in question when both the parties had referred to two different numbers of one plot in registered documents in their favour---Suit filed by respondent/plaintiff was concurrently decreed in his favour---Validity---In Schedule to lease deed, plot number mentioned was 74/C, with specific boundaries---Describing land with reference to boundaries was significant because it provided a clear and specific identification of the property, as the boundaries serve as physical markers that define the extent and limits of a particular piece of land---Mentioning boundaries in legal document such as a lease helps to avoid ambiguity and ensures that there is no confusion or dispute regarding exact location and extent of the property---Such information provides a precise and objective way to identify and distinguish one property from another and is crucial for determining ownership, resolving boundary disputes, and establishing rights and responsibilities related to the land---Appellant/defendant was unable to demonstrate any misreading/non-reading of evidence or perversity in the findings of fora below falling within the scope of a Second Appeal---High Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings passed by two Courts below as the same were reasonable and sustainable one on the basis of the evidence on record---Second Appeal was dismissed accordingly. Zafar Iqbal Seenharo, for Appellant. Barrister Jawad Ahmed Qureshi for Respondent No.1. Anwar Ali Solangi, for Respondent No.2. Dates of hearing: 29th April, 2024 and 7th May, 2024.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 100---Suit for declaration and injunction---Thirty years old document---Presumption---Respondent / plaintiff claimed to be owner of suit property on the basis of sale deeds registered more than thirty years ago---Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court decreed the suit and appeal in favour of respondent / plaintiff---Validity---Sale deeds over 30 years old carried presumption of correctness under Art. 100 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Sub stantial evidence was required to cast aspersion on genuineness of such sale deeds and a presumption of truth was attached to documents registered under Registration Act, 1908---Applicants / defendants were required to rebut such presumption at the trial, which they had failed to do conclusively---Both the Courts below had appropriately and lawfully evaluated the evidence available on record and correctly decreed suit of respondent / plaintiff to the extent of his entitlement of possession---Such conclusion was based on a comprehensive analysis of evidence---Legal heirs of deceased owner of suit property were bereft of any further right to claim any share in suit property---High Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Mirza Muhammad Sharif and 2 others v. Mst. Nawab Bibi and 4 others 1993 SCMR 462; Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others 2002 SCMR 1330 and Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 ref. Syed Jaffar Ali Shah for Applicants (in Civil Revision Application No. S-30 of 2015). Asif Hyder K. Phulpoto for Respondents Nos. 1, 5 to 20 (in Civil Revision Application No. S-30 of 2015). Zameer Ahmed for Respondent No. 4 (in Civil Revision Application No. S-30 of 2015). Ahmed Ali Shahani, Additional Advocate General for Province of Sindh and others (in Civil Revision Application No. S-30 of 2015). Sarfraz A. Akhud for Applicants (in Civil Revision Application No. S-32 of 2015). Asif Hyder K. Phulpoto for Respondents Nos. 16 to 26 (in Civil Revision Application No. S-32 of 2015). Zameer Ahmed for Respondent No. 10 (in Civil Revision Application No. S-32 of 2015). Ahmed Ali Shahani, Additional Advocate General for Province of Sindh and others (in Civil Revision Application No. S-32 of 2015). Asif Hyder K. Phulpto for Applicants (in Civil Revision Application No. S-33 of 2015). Sarfraz A. Akhund for Respondents Nos. 1, 4 to 10 and 12 to 15 (in Civil Revision Application No. S-33 of 2015). Zameer Ahmed for Respondent No. 11 (in Civil Revision Application No. S-33 of 2015). Ahmed Ali Shahani, Additional Advocate General for Province of Sindh and others (in Civil Revision Application No. S-33 of 2015). Date of hearing: 21st May, 2024.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ----Ss. 4 & 11 Acquisition of land for defence purposes by a strategic organization---Requirement of NOC from Capital Development Authority (CDA)---Validity---Petitioner, a strategic organization under the National Command Authority Act, 2010, acquired land under notification issued by Land Acquisition Collector for defence purposes, a public purpose under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894---Land Acquisition Collector later required the petitioner to obtain a NOC from CDA prior to proceeding with the acquisition---Held, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not authorize the Land Acquisition Collector to demand a NOC from any beneficiary organization---Reference to earlier judgment in Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Federation of Pakistan was held to be distinguishable on facts---Requirement of NOC under CDA by-laws arises, if at all, only after construction on acquired land---Impugned direction was without lawful authority---Letter dated 25.08.2021 issued by the Land Acquisition Collector was declared to be ultra vires and set aside. Petition allowed. (b) Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 ----Ss. 11, 12, 15, 22 to 34 Scope and applicability---Planning and development authority of CDA---Held, CDA's jurisdiction relates to planning, zoning, and regulation of land within the Islamabad Capital Territory under the master plan---While CDA retains authority over land use and development, such authority does not extend to obstruct or override acquisitions conducted for defence purposes by strategic organizations empowered under separate statutory framework---Any construction on such acquired land remains subject to CDA by-laws post-acquisition. (c) National Command Authority Act, 2010 ----Ss. 7(b), 7(q) & 21 Strategic organizations---Acquisition of land---Overriding effect---Petitioner being a strategic organization under the NCA Act, 2010, was empowered to acquire immovable property in its own name or that of a designated officer---In case of conflict between CDA Ordinance and NCA Act, 2010, the latter shall prevail due to overriding clause in S.21---Held, defence purposes being explicitly recognized as a public purpose under land acquisition laws, fall within the domain of strategic necessity and are protected under the special mandate of the NCA Act---Requirement of prior NOC from CDA for land acquisition by a strategic organization held to be legally unsustainable. Cited Case: • Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (FGEHF) Islamabad v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa and others 2021 SCMR 201 • Mst. Kaniz Fatima and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (W.P. No. 2016 of 2021)

Summary: (a) Competition Act, 2010 ----Ss. 10(1), 10(2)(a) & 10(2)(b) Deceptive marketing—Unauthorized use of CE Mark and QMS Certification on product packaging—Violation of competition law—Respondent pharmaceutical company affixed Conformité Européenne (CE) Mark and Quality Management System (QMS) Certification on haemodialysis concentrate products without undergoing any conformity assessment or obtaining valid accreditation from authorized bodies—Certifications were procured from a non-accredited entity (SMIS-AGS) lacking EU or IAF recognition—Held, Respondent engaged in deceptive marketing by disseminating false or misleading information to consumers and procuring authorities regarding the quality and character of its product—Such representation misled procurement authorities, gave Respondent an undue advantage in public tenders, and caused harm to business interests of compliant competitors—Violation of Ss. 10(1) read with 10(2)(a) and 10(2)(b) of the Competition Act, 2010 established. (b) Competition Act, 2010 ----S. 59 Jurisdiction of Competition Commission vis-à-vis sectoral regulators—Contention raised that Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP) had exclusive jurisdiction over pharmaceutical matters—Held, DRAP governs quality and safety of therapeutic goods under DRAP Act, 2012, whereas Competition Commission regulates deceptive marketing and anti-competitive practices—S.59 of Competition Act, 2010 contains a non-obstante clause giving it overriding effect over conflicting provisions in other laws—Complaint regarding false certifications thus maintainable before Competition Commission—Lex specialis principle applied. (c) Competition Act, 2010 ----S. 10(2)(a) Harm to business interests of competitor—Evidence on record demonstrated that Respondent gained commercial advantage in tenders based on fake certifications, while Complainant incurred significant costs to obtain genuine certifications—Respondent’s acts resulted in unfair competition and undermined Complainant’s market standing—Held, such deceptive conduct amounts to violation of S.10(2)(a) read with S.10(1)—Harm to competitor need not be conclusively quantified; potential harm established. (d) Competition Act, 2010 ----S. 10(2)(b) Dissemination of misleading information—Misrepresentation of product compliance with international standards—Held, certifications lacked reasonable basis and were presented to create a false impression of legitimacy—Intent not necessary to establish violation under S.10(2)(b); likelihood of misleading consumers sufficient—Respondent’s failure to exercise due diligence, use of personal accounts for payment, and lack of verification further negated claim of bona fide conduct—Violation of S.10(2)(b) read with S.10(1) held proved. (e) Imposition of Penalty ----S. 38 Quantum of penalty—Respondent found liable for deceptive marketing for a period of 22 months, earning approximately Rs.20 million during violation period—Considering nature of product (used in kidney dialysis), gravity of offense, and cost borne by compliant competitors, Commission imposed cumulative penalty of Rs.20 million (Rs.10 million under S.10(2)(a) and Rs.10 million under S.10(2)(b))—Respondent directed to cease use of unauthorized certifications and submit compliance report within 30 days—Failure to comply to attract additional daily penalty—Matter referred to DRAP and FIA for further investigation into unrebutted allegations regarding use of non-pharma grade chemicals. Cited Cases / References: • Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 SCMR 1218 • Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa 2021 SCMR 201 • S.D.O/A.M., Hasht Nagri PESCO v. Khawazan Zad PLD 2023 SC 174 • Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. TVS Motor Company Ltd. AIR 2009 SCW 6018 (India) • FTC v. Wellness Support Network, Inc., United States, 2014 • CCP's Zong Order: China Mobile Ltd. v. Pak Telecom Mobile Ltd., 2010 CLD 1478 • Procter & Gamble Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., 2010 CLD 1685 • In the matter of M/s. DHL Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Order dated 21.12.2012 Disposition: Complaint allowed—Respondent found guilty of deceptive marketing under Sections 10(1), 10(2)(a), and 10(2)(b) of the Competition Act, 2010—Cumulative penalty of Rs. 20 million imposed—Respondent directed to cease unauthorized certifications and file compliance report—Matter referred to DRAP and FIA for further action.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199 Protection against police harassment—Marriage contracted by free will—Petitioners, a legally married couple, alleged harassment by private respondents in connivance with local police due to familial opposition—Held, protection under constitutional jurisdiction is available against unlawful interference in personal liberty and harassment—Police officials directed not to harass petitioners—Court reaffirmed that such matrimonial issues fall outside the scope of writ jurisdiction and should be resolved before competent forums if disputed. (b) Police Order, 2002 / General Law ----Police functions—Obligation to act fairly—Power to arrest without warrant—Held, police is under constitutional duty to protect citizens’ rights and ensure fair investigation—Use of police powers must be in accordance with law and cannot be employed to harass individuals in private matrimonial matters—Court deprecated misuse of authority and emphasized that police are required to protect, not abduct. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ----S. 496-A Second marriage without dissolution of first marriage—Allegation by private respondent of “marriage over marriage”—FIR lodged during pendency of court’s restraining order—Held, lodging of FIR during operation of interim order amounted to violation of court’s directions—Court barred further action on FIR No.1109/2024 pending fact-finding inquiry—Directed DIG East to examine alleged police highhandedness if approached. (d) Civil / Matrimonial Disputes Private disputes—Jurisdiction—Held, questions relating to subsistence or legality of first marriage and civil consequences thereof are to be resolved by appropriate legal forums—High Court declined to interfere in disputed questions of fact regarding subsistence of earlier marriage or validity of subsequent marriage. Disposition: Petition disposed of in terms of SHO and private respondents’ statements—Court restrained further harassment—FIR proceedings stayed pending inquiry—Private respondents furnished bonds—DIG East directed to conduct inquiry upon complaint.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----Ss. 7, 10 & 66—Input tax adjustment—Loss of goods due to fire—Right to refund—Scope and interpretation— Respondent-taxpayer purchased raw cotton on which input tax was paid during the tax period, but the stock was subsequently destroyed in a fire—Claimed refund of unadjusted input tax—Department rejected refund on the ground that destroyed goods were not used for making taxable supplies—Held, S.7 allows input tax adjustment based on the purpose of taxable supplies “made or to be made” during the tax period—Actual consumption of inputs not mandatory if intent to use in taxable activity is established—Loss of raw material due to fire does not negate entitlement to adjustment or refund—S.10 permits refund of excess input tax not adjustable against output tax during the same tax period—S.66 not applicable as case does not involve payment by inadvertence or error—Claim held valid under S.10—Department's restrictive interpretation rejected. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 8—Disallowance of input tax—Scope—Goods destroyed by accident—Applicability— Department invoked S.8(1)(a) to deny refund, arguing destroyed goods were not used in production—Held, S.8 applies only when goods are used for non-taxable supplies or other purposes—Loss by fire does not amount to “use” for non-taxable purpose—No government notification excluding such loss under S.8(1)(b)—Thus, S.8 has no application where goods were intended for taxable use but perished before consumption—Objection of tax authority dismissed. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 7—Adjustment of input tax—Requirement of same tax period—Interpretation— Held, S.7 must be read in conjunction with S.6 and S.26 to understand adjustment mechanism—Input tax must be adjusted against output tax of the same tax period, as declared in monthly return—Adjustment dependent on timing and intent, not actual manufacture—Interpretation supported by Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Attock Cement Pakistan Ltd. 2023 SCMR 279. (d) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----Ss. 7, 8 & 36—Retrospective withdrawal of sales tax on pharmaceuticals—Impact on prior input adjustments— Taxpayers in pharmaceutical sector adjusted input tax for June and July 2002—Subsequent exemption from sales tax retrospectively applied from 01.07.2002 through SROs 555(I)/2002 and 869(I)/2002—Tax authority sought reversal of earlier input adjustments—Held, adjustments made before notification date were past and closed transactions—Exemption being beneficial could not retrospectively undo vested rights—SROs being subordinate legislation could not nullify valid actions absent express legislative mandate—Al Samrez Enterprises v. Federation 1986 SCMR 1917 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Ltd. 2024 SCP 316 discussed—Ratio of Mekotex not attracted as it involved primary legislation and withdrawal of benefit, not extension of exemption. Disposition: Appeals dismissed—Lahore and Sindh High Court judgments upheld—Refund of input tax allowed in Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd. case—Subsequent SROs could not invalidate earlier valid input tax adjustments in pharmaceutical cases—Past and closed transactions protected—No illegality found in High Courts’ reasoning. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Attock Cement Pakistan Ltd. 2023 SCMR 279 • Al Samrez Enterprises v. Federation of Pakistan 1986 SCMR 1917 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Ltd. 2024 SCP 316

Summary: Bail granted ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 498—Pre-arrest bail—Concurrent jurisdiction of High Court and Sessions Court—Maintainability of direct petition— Applicant approached High Court directly under S.498, Cr.P.C. for pre-arrest bail, citing compelling circumstances including threats to life and inability to enter Sessions Court premises—Held, while judicial propriety ordinarily requires accused to first approach Sessions Court, such requirement is not absolute—In appropriate cases where direct approach is justified due to threats or obstruction, High Court may entertain application—Reliance placed on Raees Wazir Ahmad v. The State (2004 SCMR 1167) and other precedents—Direct petition found maintainable under exceptional facts. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 498 & 489-F—Pre-arrest bail—Dishonoured cheques—Malafide and ulterior motives—Scope— Accusation against applicant was issuance of two dishonoured cheques for Rs. 200,000 each—FIR lodged several months later—Applicant alleged false implication and prior settlement of liability—Held, offence under S.489-F does not fall within prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.—Bail is a rule and refusal an exception—Allegations of police connivance and complainant’s conduct raised credible apprehension of mala fide—Tentative assessment indicated prima facie case for confirmation of bail—Application allowed. (c) Criminal Law ----Bail before arrest—Extraordinary relief—Principles— Held, grant of pre-arrest bail requires demonstration of mala fide, abuse of process, or ulterior motive—However, where accused establishes strong case on merits akin to one for post-arrest bail, unnecessary incarceration may be avoided—Courts must apply liberal approach where facts suggest abuse of law or poor investigation—Guided by Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 730) and Shahzada Qaiser Arfat v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 708). Disposition: Application allowed—Ad-interim pre-arrest bail confirmed subject to furnishing fresh bail bond and surety—Findings regarding maintainability of direct bail plea not to operate as precedent due to peculiar circumstances of the case. Cited Cases: • Raees Wazir Ahmad v. The State 2004 SCMR 1167 • Muhammad Kashif Iqbal v. The State 2022 SCMR 821 • Naeem Qadir Shaikh v. The State 2022 SCMR 2068 • Abdul Majeed v. The State 2022 SCMR 676 • Khair Muhammad v. The State 2021 SCMR 130 • The State v. Malik Mukhtar Ahmed Awan 1991 SCMR 322 • Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State PLD 2017 SC 730 • Shahzada Qaiser Arfat v. The State PLD 2021 SC 708