Summary: (a) Contract Act, 1872----S.74---Performance guarantee---Forfeiture---Reasonable compensation---Penalty---Trading Corporation of Pakistan opened Tender No.Imp/Urea 24/05 on 18.08.2005 inviting offers for supply of urea---Company offered to supply 50,000 metric tons at US$ 225 per metric ton, accepted on 31.08.2005---Contract required performance guarantee equal to 3% of contractual value within seven days of acceptance; TCP was obliged to open Letter of Credit for full contractual value within ten days of receipt of performance guarantee; total quantity was to be shipped in three consignments, time being of the essence; and performance guarantee was liable to forfeiture upon failure to supply within stipulated period or upon breach of any contractual term---Performance guarantee was furnished on 13.09.2005 (due by 07.09.2005); LC was opened on 21.09.2005; operative LC was received by Company's advising bank on 06.10.2005---TCP, by amendment dated 25.10.2005, extended first shipment up to 10.11.2005 and second shipment up to 15.11.2005, expressly reserving right to forfeit the performance guarantee---Despite indulgences, no shipment was made---Company, by letter dated 15.11.2005, attributed non-performance to increase in global urea prices and shortage of supply and sought further extension of thirty days, which was not accepted---TCP cancelled the LC and encashed the performance guarantee on 02.01.2006---Sole Arbitrator, vide Award dated 18.01.2010, directed TCP to refund the encashed performance guarantee amounting to AED 1,239,000/- and awarded damages of US$ 3,465,000/- to the Company---Single Judge of High Court of Sindh set aside the award of damages while maintaining direction for refund of performance guarantee---Division Bench upheld that conclusion, albeit on different reasoning, holding that since delays in operationalising the LC were attributable to TCP, forfeiture was unjustified---Held, that a performance guarantee is a contractual mechanism intended to secure due and satisfactory performance of obligations---S.74 of the Contract Act does not prohibit stipulations fixing a sum payable upon breach, nor does it require proof of actual loss as a condition precedent to enforcement; it introduces a supervisory standard of reasonableness, limiting recovery to reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount stipulated---Existence of a forfeiture clause or performance guarantee does not, by itself, entitle the beneficiary to retain the stipulated amount irrespective of surrounding circumstances---Courts retain authority under S.74 to interfere where forfeiture is disproportionate or unconscionable, having regard to the nature of the contract, the conduct of the parties, and the context in which the breach occurred---Jurisdiction under S.74 is not one of routine substitution of the opinion of the court for that of the contracting parties---Enquiry is not whether some lesser amount might appear fair in hindsight, but whether the forfeiture is so excessive or harsh as to attract the character of a penalty---Absent such a finding, courts ordinarily give effect to the contractual allocation of risk, particularly in commercial transactions---Forfeiture clauses fall within the expression "other stipulation by way of penalty" under S.74, but the provision does not mandate reduction or refund in every case of forfeiture---Clauses 10 and 11 of the Contract required performance guarantee for due and satisfactory performance, defined to include delivery strictly according to the contract within the stipulated period, and conferred a clear contractual right upon TCP to forfeit the guarantee if the Company failed to supply within the specified period or committed any breach---Form of Performance Bond, annexed to and forming an integral part of the contractual framework, constituted an unconditional undertaking, provided that TCP was the sole judge of whether the Seller had performed the contract, and provided that any grant of time or indulgence to the Seller would not absolve the bank of liability---Extensions or indulgences in performance did not operate as a waiver of TCP's right to invoke and forfeit the performance guarantee upon non-performance---A performance guarantee securing only three percent of the contractual value in a high-value and time-sensitive public procurement transaction of an essential commodity cannot, in ordinary commercial understanding, be regarded as unconscionable---Time was declared to be of the essence, and the Company was afforded repeated extensions without waiver of contractual consequences---Despite this, no shipment was effected within the extended timelines for reasons not attributable to TCP---Forfeiture of the entire amount of the performance guarantee by TCP was justified and reasonable. Province of West Pakistan v. Messrs. Mistri Patel & Co. PLD 1969 SC 80 and Abdul Haq Khan Khattak v. WAPDA 1991 SCMR 436 ref. (b) Arbitration Act, 1940----Judicial interference with arbitral award---Patent error of law---Misreading of contractual framework---Default under performance guarantee---Court does not sit in appeal over an arbitral award and cannot undertake a reappraisal or re-evaluation of the evidence merely because it may have reached a different conclusion on the same material---Findings of fact recorded by an arbitrator are ordinarily final and binding---Interference is justified only where an error or infirmity is demonstrable from the face of the award itself or from the material expressly referred to therein---These principles of restraint do not preclude judicial intervention where the arbitral finding is founded upon a misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or where the conclusion reached is based on an incorrect factual premise that directly vitiates the application of law---In such cases the error ceases to be a mere matter of factual appreciation and assumes the character of a patent error of law---Sole Arbitrator's finding proceeded on the premise that non-supply was attributable to commissions and omissions of TCP, so that the Company was not in default and TCP had no right to forfeit, applying the principle that no party may take advantage of its own wrong---That reasoning proceeded on a legally misdirected premise as to the nature of contractual default---Once the parties, by conduct, extended time for performance, the legal question shifted to whether performance was rendered within that revised framework---Impugned finding reverted to antecedent circumstances already absorbed into the restructured contractual timetable---Company's own stated justification for non-performance rested on unfavourable market conditions and price escalation---A performance guarantee is triggered by non-performance within the governing contractual framework---By treating earlier conduct as determinative of the existence of default itself, the finding substituted a non-contractual standard for the contractual triggering condition---Statutory inquiry under S.74 of the Contract Act is predicated on existence of breach; the Arbitrator never reached that statutory stage in a legally coherent manner---Principle that no party may take advantage of its own wrong is engaged only where wrongful conduct is shown to be the legally operative cause of non-performance within the subsisting contractual obligations---Single Judge identified serious errors in arbitral reasoning but declined to interfere on the ground that no substantial miscarriage of justice would result from permitting refund---Once contractual breach was correctly appreciated and forfeiture tested against S.74 in its proper sequence, allowing refund would relieve a defaulting party of the agreed consequence of non-performance after repeated indulgence, thereby distorting the contractual bargain, which would amount to a miscarriage of justice---Finding on forfeiture could not be sustained in law. Pakistan Railways v. CCRC Ziyang Co. Limited PLD 2025 SC 706 ref. (c) Contract---Damages---Upstream supply arrangement---Privity---Causation---Company, prior to the Contract with TCP, entered into a back-to-back arrangement on 27.08.2005 with Gates Transfercenter International (the Supplier) for procurement of 50,000 metric tons of urea, expressly "in anticipation of" a contract with TCP, and on 05.09.2005 amended that arrangement, making an upfront payment of US$ 3,465,000/- and undertaking to secure the balance 70% through a letter of credit upon receipt of an operative LC from TCP---Company never opened such letter of credit in favour of the Supplier---Supplier cancelled its contract and forfeited US$ 3,465,000/- on 04.10.2005---Held, that the alleged loss arose out of a distinct and independent commercial arrangement voluntarily entered into by the Company with its Supplier, without any contractual involvement, undertaking or assumption of responsibility on the part of TCP---In the absence of any express contractual undertaking by TCP to underwrite such arrangement, commercial consequences flowing therefrom must remain with the Company---Forfeiture of the advance cannot be attributed to TCP when the Company itself failed to open the requisite letter of credit in favour of the Supplier---Company, on the basis of the LC opened on 21.09.2005, issued instructions to the Supplier to proceed with performance, and consequences flowing from the Supplier acting upon those instructions lie within the Company's own responsibility---Forfeiture by the Supplier on 04.10.2005 occurred prior to expiry of the revised shipment timelines extended by TCP on 25.10.2005---Alleged loss was not consequential upon any actionable default by TCP but reflected intervening commercial failure within the independent arrangements of the Company---Upstream arrangements remain entirely at the risk of the contracting party who chooses to enter into them, and cannot be shifted onto the counterparty in the principal contract in the absence of express contractual assumption of liability or indemnity---Supplier's termination and forfeiture constituted an intervening commercial event that broke the chain of legal causation---Both Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court of Sindh were correct in holding that the claim lacked any legally cognisable nexus with the conduct of TCP and in setting aside the award of damages---Company was not entitled to recover damages amounting to US$ 3,465,000/- or any other amount from TCP. Cited Cases: • Province of West Pakistan v. Messrs. Mistri Patel & Co. PLD 1969 SC 80 • Abdul Haq Khan Khattak v. WAPDA 1991 SCMR 436 • Pakistan Railways v. CCRC Ziyang Co. Limited PLD 2025 SC 706 Disposition: Appeal of Trading Corporation of Pakistan (C.A. No.140-K of 2016) allowed; judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court of Sindh at Karachi in H.C.A. Nos.44 and 68 of 2015, insofar as they directed refund of the performance guarantee, set aside; decision on the claim of damages upheld; appeal of the Company (C.A. No.141-K of 2016) dismissed as a whole. (C.A. Nos.140-K and 141-K of 2016, announced in open court at Islamabad on 3rd July, 2026, by Yahya Afridi, C.J. (Naeem Akhter Afghan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ. on the Bench); Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----Ss. 4, 5, 8 & 39---Tax on dividends---Separate block of income---Presumptive/final tax at the rate specified in Division III of Part I of the First Schedule---Whether dividend received by a company is chargeable under S. 5 at 10% or as "income from other sources" under S. 39 at the normal corporate rate of 35%---Department contended that tax deducted on dividend received by a company was not final tax liability in terms of S. 169, and that the proviso to S. 8, inserted by the Finance Act, 2007 (later omitted by the Finance Act, 2013), excluded dividend received by a company from the final tax regime of S. 8, so that such income was assessable under S. 39---Islamabad High Court, answering references, held the Tribunal justified in treating dividend income as assessable under S. 5 at 10% and not at 35%---Held, that S. 5 created a separate charge on every person who receives a dividend from a company, or treated as dividend under cl. (19) of S. 2, at the rate specified in Division III of Part I of the First Schedule, with a separate mechanism for computing tax by applying the relevant rate to the gross amount of the dividend---Charge created under S. 4 in respect of taxable income from different heads, and the mechanism of computing taxable income, was distinct from the charge created under S. 5---Any attempt to bring dividend income covered by S. 5 under S. 4 by treating it as income from other sources under S. 39 would amount to reducing S. 5 to redundancy---Redundancy cannot be attributed to any statutory provision, and in case of discrepancy the rule of harmonious construction must be applied---Under S. 39, only such income is assessable as income from other sources if it is not included in any other head---Legislature, treating dividend as a separate block of income, created a separate charge and provided a separate rate of tax, which was not the case for the residuary head under S. 39---Charging provisions in a taxing statute are substantive and are construed strictly; in case of ambiguity the benefit is extended to the taxpayer, and the burden lies on the tax authorities to bring a particular income within the charging provisions---Where a separate charging provision specifies income to be charged at a particular rate through a separate mechanism, those provisions are given strict construction and preference over other provisions---Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. (2025 SCMR 67), Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/s Gilani Transport (2017 PTD 1540 SC) and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (2009 SCMR 1279) ref. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----S. 5---Presumptive tax regime---Analogy of S. 80C of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979---Held, that the concept of providing a separate charge and mechanism of computation of income and tax thereon, in addition to the normal charging provision, was not new---Under S. 80C of the repealed Ordinance, 1979, a separate charge was created in respect of gross receipts of an importer, supplier and contractor, treated as a separate block of income, and tax paid/deducted thereon was treated as final tax liability, so that other charging provisions and rates were not attracted---Elahi Cotton Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582) held that imposition of presumptive tax under Ss. 80C and 80CC was in substitution of the normal method of levy and recovery of income-tax---S. 5 of the Ordinance, 2001 likewise provided for creation of a separate charge as well as mechanism of computation of tax at 10%, as a separate block of income covered under the presumptive tax regime, distinct from the charge created under S. 4 and heads of income covered under the normal tax regime, wherein tax paid was not considered as final discharge of liability, whereas tax paid/deducted on gross receipts covered under S. 5 was final discharge of liability. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----Ss. 5, 8 & 39---Proviso to S. 8 excluding dividend received by a company [inserted by Finance Act, 2007; omitted by Finance Act, 2013]---Machinery provision vis-a-vis charging provision---Reliance on Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2022 SCMR 426)---Held, that this Court in Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar had already examined Ss. 4, 5, 8 and 39 and held that by virtue of subsections (4) and (5) of S. 4, dividend income constituted a separate block of income solely liable to be taxed under S. 5, and consequently could not be taxed as income from other sources under S. 39 nor charged at the normal corporate rate of 35%---S. 5 was the primary charging provision for all dividends, whereas S. 39 served as a residual provision to which the tax authorities could resort only if a dividend somehow failed to fit within the scope of S. 5---Corporate dividends received by the respondents perfectly fitted the description of dividends under the Ordinance and must be charged under S. 5---Contention that the proviso to S. 8 excluded dividend income of companies from final taxation, and that Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar related to a non-corporate assessee, was misconceived---Prime controversy in both cases related to categorisation of dividend income in respect of which a separate charge, mechanism of computation and different tax rate (10%) had been provided under S. 5---S. 8 was merely a machinery provision and, by settled principles of interpretation, could not replace or dilute the effect of a substantive charging provision---Machinery provisions could not be engineered to deny the taxpayer the benefit of the specific tax charging regime under S. 5. Cited Cases: • Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar and others v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone II), Regional Tax Office, Multan 2022 SCMR 426 • Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2025 SCMR 67 • Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/s Gilani Transport 2017 PTD 1540 SC • Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2009 SCMR 1279 • Elahi Cotton Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582 Disposition: Civil Petitions dismissed and leave refused; question framed in I.T.R. Nos. 84 to 86 of 2015 regarding applicability of S. 5 and the 10% tax rate answered in the affirmative; questions framed in I.T.R. Nos. 190 to 192 of 2015 regarding applicability of 35% normal corporate tax answered in the negative; both questions decided against the petitioner-department and in favour of the respondents-taxpayers. (C.P.L.A. Nos. 5257 to 5265 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad, 03.07.2026, Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J. (Yahya Afridi, CJ on the Bench); Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908----S. 4 & Art. 152---Appeal against order of Trial Court---Period of thirty days expiring during court vacation---First day of re-opening---Benefit of S. 4---Scope---Judgment and decree had been passed on 07.11.1979 in favour of the respondents, who filed an execution petition and the suit land was transferred through a registered document under orders of the Court---Appellants' objection petitions, claiming to be bona fide purchasers, were allowed by the Executing Court vide order dated 03.07.1995---Respondents applied for certified copy on 05.07.1995, which was supplied on 04.09.1995---Civil Courts remained closed due to holidays from 01.08.1995 to 09.09.1995---Respondents did not file the appeals during vacation or on the opening day and filed Civil Appeal No.73/14 and Civil Appeal No.74/16 of 1995/2000 on 12.09.1995 and 13.09.1995 respectively---Under Art. 152 of the Limitation Act, 1908, an appeal can be filed within thirty days from the date of the judgment, decree or order appealed against---Held, that S. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides that where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court re-opens---Where the period of thirty days provided for filing an appeal against a judgment, decree or order of the Civil Court already expired during vacation, an aggrieved party is left with only one option, namely to file the appeal on the first day when the Court re-opens, in order to overcome expiry of limitation during Court holidays---If the appeal is not preferred on the first day when the Court re-opens, the benefit of S. 4 will not be available, as it would cease to exist on the expiry of that first day---10.09.1995 being Sunday, the first opening day of the Court was 11.09.1995---Appeals were admittedly filed on 12.09.1995 and 13.09.1995, after expiry of the period of limitation (first day when the Court re-opened, i.e. 11.09.1995)---No reasonable explanation for condonation of delay was furnished before the appellate court or the High Court. (b) Limitation Act, 1908----S. 12(5)---Exclusion of time requisite for obtaining copy---Applicability---High Court, while deciding both Civil Revisions, focused on S. 12(5) of the Limitation Act, 1908, relating to exclusion of time consumed for obtaining certified copies, which was not relevant to calculate the period of limitation in these cases---Supreme Court, without commenting on the issue of exclusion of time consumed for obtaining certified copies under S. 12(5) as noted in the leave-granting order, examined limitation only in the light of S. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, attracted because the period of thirty days expired during vacation. (c) Limitation Act, 1908----S. 4---Precedent---Misapplication---High Court wrongly applied the ratio of Province of Punjab through Collector Gujrat, etc. v. Muhammad Saleem and others, while setting aside both judgments of the Additional District Judge---Said judgment was not attracted to the facts of the instant appeals---Ratio of that judgment, as reflected in para-5 thereof, was that where District Courts were closed for ordinary and routine work and only urgent matters were entertained by the duty judge, and urgency was pressed by the litigant for securing some interim relief, the suit or appeal shall for all intents and purposes be deemed to have been filed on the date of re-opening of the Court, and the bar of limitation shall not attract, the benefit of S. 4 automatically extending to such litigant---That resolution was not applicable where the appeals were filed after the first opening day. Cited Cases: • Province of Punjab through Collector Gujrat, etc. v. Muhammad Saleem and others PLD 2014 SC 783 (d) Civil appeals----Limitation---Impugned judgments of High Court set aside to the extent of limitation---Orders of Additional District Judge restored---Impugned judgments dated 27.10.2015 passed by the Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in both Civil Revisions were erroneous in law and facts, however, to the extent of limitation only---Impugned judgments were set aside and the orders of the Additional District Judge, Multan dated 15.12.2000 and 16.12.2000 respectively were restored for the reasons recorded. Disposition: Civil Appeals Nos.348 and 349 of 2018 allowed; impugned judgments dated 27.10.2015 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision Nos.481-D and 482-D of 2001 set aside to the extent of limitation; orders of the Additional District Judge, Multan dated 15.12.2000 and 16.12.2000 restored. (Civil Appeals Nos.348 and 349 of 2018 and CMA Nos.797 and 798 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J., Islamabad, 03.07.2026; Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J. Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, R. 3(2)---Sub-Registrar---Amended service rules vide Notification No.LR-IV/DLR/SSRC/2020:17635 dated 23.01.2020---Additional charge of post of Sub-Registrar assigned to Tehsildars, Naib Tehsildars and Kanungos by Inspector General of Registration in 2021/2022---Legality---Rules originally amended by Notification dated 3.4.1993 permitted appointment of Sub-Registrar by temporary transfer from Naib Tehsildars if no suitable person was available for promotion, but pursuant to Notification dated 23.01.2020 post of Sub-Registrar could exclusively be filled by promotion on basis of seniority-cum-fitness from amongst Head Registration Muharrirs with at least five years service in cadre or ten years accumulative service as Head Registration Muharrirs and Registration Muharrirs---Held, that no lawful provision existed for posting of Sub-Registrar from any cadre other than Head Registration Muharrirs and Registration Muharrirs---Rules framed under an Act constitute subordinate legislation, have force of law, are legally binding and cannot be disregarded or contravened---Framing, amending or repealing statutory rules and policies governing public service falls within exclusive domain of Government/Executive, but once promulgated, Government is under corresponding legal obligation to adhere to them in true letter and spirit unless repealed and cannot act contrary to its own rules---Assignment of additional charge of posts of Sub-Registrars to Tehsildars, Naib Tehsildars and Kanungos, who do not constitute prescribed promotional feeder cadre, being in violation of rules in force at the time, was without lawful authority and illegal, and High Court rightly set it aside. (b) Registration Act, 1908----S. 6---Appointment of Registrars and Sub-Registrars by Government---Order of an authority/individual distinguished from decision or order of Government---Contention that Government could appoint Sub-Registrars under S. 6---Held, that legal parameters governing exercise of executive authority by an individual or officeholder cannot be regarded as action of the Government unless approved by the Cabinet, as an action or order of Government must have backing of the Cabinet---Appointments having been made by the Inspector General of Registration without approval of the Cabinet could not be regarded as appointments made by Government under S. 6 and did not fall within ambit of that provision. (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 212 & 199---Bar of jurisdiction---Service matter---Enforcement of statutory rules and legality of executive action---Objection that Art. 212 barred High Court's jurisdiction---Held, that High Court had rightly repelled objection by holding that controversy did not pertain to an individual service grievance but involved enforcement of statutory rules and legality of executive action undertaken in violation thereof---Where dispute involves substantial questions relating to enforcement of mandatory statutory rules or legality of executive action undertaken in disregard of statutory provisions and in excess of or contrary to powers conferred by law, High Court is competent to exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 and bar contained in Art. 212 is not attracted. Disposition: Petition dismissed and leave to appeal refused, no illegality, infirmity, perversity, misreading or non-reading of record or jurisdictional defect being found; judgment dated 10.09.2025 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition No.2470-P of 2022 upheld. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR No.115)----Para. 10---Resumption of surplus land---Finality of orders of competent authorities---Reopening after more than two decades---Benami plea---Land held by Mst. Hashmat Habib ur Rehman was resumed as surplus area by Deputy Land Commissioner on 28.05.1972 after her and her husband's claim to separate ceilings on plea of benami ownership was rejected, and appeal was dismissed on 29.06.1972, neither declarant having challenged those orders before any higher forum---Chairman, Federal Land Commission, by order dated 22.08.1996 on a belated revision, condoned delay, set aside the resumption orders, restored land and directed allotment of 535 kanals 4 marlas in Village Haleem Khichi, Tehsil Mailsi, District Vehari as alternate land to successors of declarants---Held, that where a competent authority decides a matter within its jurisdiction and aggrieved party elects not to pursue the remedies provided by law, the decision attains conclusiveness and binds the parties; doctrine of finality rests on public policy (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium), and concluded matters cannot be reopened except where expressly authorized by statute or where original order is a nullity for want of jurisdiction or tainted by fraud, none of which was shown---Orders of 1972, passed by competent authorities, remained valid, operative and binding---Suo motu proceedings initiated by Federal Land Commission in or about 1975/1977 on report of Inspection Team were confined to ascertaining whether additional land was held in other districts, did not reopen or set aside the 1972 orders, and report of Deputy Land Commissioner dated 24.04.1990 merely closed that inquiry without reviving resumed land or restoring ownership; no power of review can be read into the statute by implication---Prolonged silence of declarants for nearly two decades constituted acquiescence and attracted maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt---Chairman travelled beyond scope of the proceedings, and order in excess of jurisdiction is a nullity---Contention that part of land was held benami for the husband had been specifically rejected in 1972 and attained finality; whether a transaction is benami is a mixed question of law and fact requiring cogent evidence and can be declared only by a court or forum with requisite jurisdiction after opportunity to lead evidence---No competent Civil Court had so declared, and Chairman could not by administrative assumption overturn findings that had attained conclusiveness---Order dated 22.08.1996 was without lawful authority and unsustainable---Resumption of land under land reforms laws having been saved in Qazalbash Waqf's case (while the Shariat Appellate Bench did not authorize reopening of proceedings that had attained finality), original owners have after resumption no concern with the resumed land. Cited Cases: • Qazalbash Waqf v. Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab PLD 1990 SC 99 • Province of Punjab v. Member FLC 2015 SCMR 1000 (b) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR No.115)----Paras. 4-A & 29---Revisional jurisdiction---Limitation---Revision at instance of party time-barred---Chairman, Federal Land Commission acting singly---Competence---Held, that revisional jurisdiction under para. 29 is neither absolute nor unbridled but circumscribed by its three provisos, which are substantive restrictions on jurisdiction and not merely procedural---Third proviso bars revision at instance of a party made after expiry of sixty days from the order or from the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973, whichever is later, excluding time for obtaining copy---Expiry of statutory period extinguishes not merely remedy of aggrieved party but also jurisdiction of revisional authority; where statute creates special forum and prescribes limitation, authority cannot assume powers not conferred, power to condone delay is not inherent and must emanate from the statute, and Regulation, being a self-contained special law, conferred no power on Chairman to condone inordinate delay---Revision filed after nearly two decades against last effective order of 1972 was hopelessly barred and entertained without lawful authority---Further, under para. 4-A, the delegatee of the Federal Government is the Federal Land Commission as a statutory body consisting of the Federal Minister for Law as Chairman with not more than three other members, and not the Chairman alone; powers conferred on a multi-member body must ordinarily be exercised by the body and not by one of its members individually, and Chairman acting singly was incompetent to exercise revisional jurisdiction---Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by consent, waiver, acquiescence or equitable considerations; order passed without temporal jurisdiction and institutional competence is coram non judice, void ab initio and of no legal effect. Cited Cases: • Government of N.W.F.P. v. Federation of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 36 (c) Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR No.115)----Tenants of resumed land---Accrued statutory right to consideration for allotment---Appellants, cultivating land as tenants since before Kharif 1971 as reflected in revenue record, continued in possession as Government tenants after resumption---Held, that once land stood validly resumed and vested in Government, relationship between former owner and tenants ended and tenants' rights flowed exclusively from statutory framework governing resumed land; their entitlement to be considered for allotment was not a matter of executive grace or administrative discretion but a valuable statutory right accruing by virtue of continuous cultivation and recognized tenancy---Allotment of the resumed land or land in substitution in favour of respondents Nos. 3 to 5 under an order without lawful authority could not defeat appellants' preferential entitlement, since when the foundation falls, the superstructure must collapse (sublato fundamento cadit opus), and respondents could not derive better title from such an order. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4, 10-A & 25---Natural justice---Audi alteram partem---Order affecting civil rights passed without notice to affected persons---Federal Land Commission directed allotment of land without impleading or issuing notice to appellants, who were in continuous cultivating possession and had accrued statutory right to be considered for allotment---Held, that right to fair hearing is read into every law unless expressly excluded and applies to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative actions; Art. 10-A guarantees fair trial and due process, Art. 4 secures right to be dealt with in accordance with law, and Art. 25 mandates equality before law, and these guarantees extend to adjudications by statutory tribunals, administrative authorities and quasi-judicial bodies affecting civil rights---Decision rendered in violation of principles of natural justice is no decision in the eye of law and stands vitiated irrespective of merits---Order dated 22.08.1996, passed in disregard of Arts. 4, 10-A and 25 and audi alteram partem, was void and without lawful authority on this ground as well. Cited Cases: • University of Dacca through Vice Chancellor v. Zakir Ahmed PLD 1965 SC 90 • Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. 1994 SCMR 2232 • Caritativo v. California 357 U.S. 549 (1958) • Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (e) Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court----Locus standi---Writ petitions of tenants dismissed by High Court on narrow and technical view that appellants had no enforceable title---Held, that locus standi is not to be determined on narrow or technical formula but with reference to whether impugned action has adversely affected legal rights, lawful interests or legitimate expectations of the person invoking constitutional jurisdiction; where an order divests a person of an accrued statutory right or prejudicially affects his civil consequences, such person cannot be denied judicial review merely because he is not direct addressee or beneficiary of the order---High Court overlooked appellants' cultivating possession since Kharif 1971, their status as Government tenants and accrued statutory rights, and failed to examine jurisdictional infirmities of the Federal Land Commission's order, finality of resumption proceedings, absence of lawful basis for benami plea and absence of notice---High Court misdirected itself on facts and in law and committed manifest error of law. Disposition: Civil appeals allowed; judgments of Lahore High Court dated 09.10.2008 and 28.01.2008 in W.P. Nos. 7799/1996 and 1751/2004, order of Chairman, Federal Land Commission dated 22.08.1996 and consequential Mutation No.590 dated 29.10.1996 set aside; legal position to revert to that existing immediately prior to order dated 22.08.1996; rights of appellants as tenants under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 to remain protected and their entitlement for allotment to be considered strictly in accordance with law by competent authority/forum; pending miscellaneous applications disposed of accordingly; no order as to costs. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----S.74---Performance guarantee---Forfeiture upon breach---Reasonable compensation---Scope---Performance guarantee was a contractual mechanism intended to secure due and satisfactory performance of obligations and could be conditional or unconditional, collateral to parent contract or incorporated within contractual framework---Where guarantee stipulated a financial consequence upon breach or non-performance, its invocation attracted S.74 of Contract Act, 1872---Section 74 did not prohibit stipulation of a fixed sum payable upon breach nor make proof of actual loss a condition precedent to enforcement---Party complaining of breach could recover reasonable compensation not exceeding stipulated amount even where actual loss was not proved---Court nevertheless retained supervisory jurisdiction to determine whether retention of stipulated amount represented reasonable compensation or operated as an unconscionable or disproportionate penalty---Existence of forfeiture clause did not entitle beneficiary to retain stipulated amount irrespective of surrounding circumstances, but judicial power under S.74 was not to be exercised routinely by substituting Court’s view for commercial allocation of risk agreed by parties---Reduction or refund was warranted only where forfeiture was excessive, harsh or unconscionable in context of nature of contract, conduct of parties and circumstances of breach. Cited Cases: • Province of West Pakistan v. Messrs Mistri Patel & Co. PLD 1969 SC 80 • Abdul Haq Khan Khattak v. WAPDA 1991 SCMR 436 (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----S.74---Commercial contract---Performance guarantee equal to three percent of contractual value---Time expressly made essence of contract---Failure to supply goods within extended period---Forfeiture---Reasonableness---Contract required seller to furnish performance guarantee for due and satisfactory performance and empowered buyer to forfeit same upon failure to supply goods within specified period or upon breach of any contractual condition---Form of performance bond expressly provided that buyer would be sole judge of performance and that any grant of time or indulgence would not absolve liability under guarantee---Extensions granted by buyer therefore did not amount to waiver or extinguishment of right to invoke guarantee upon continued non-performance---Seller failed to make any shipment even within extended deadlines and attributed failure to increase in international prices and shortage of supply rather than any actionable default of buyer---Performance guarantee securing only three percent of value of a high-value, time-sensitive public procurement contract for an essential commodity was neither excessive nor unconscionable---Forfeiture of entire guarantee constituted reasonable compensation under S.74 and was legally justified. (c) Contract---Extension of time---Revised contractual framework---Default---Earlier impediments---Legal effect---Once parties by mutual conduct extended timelines for performance, antecedent delays and difficulties stood absorbed into revised contractual schedule---Legally controlling question thereafter was whether seller performed within subsisting extended period and whether any legally cognisable justification existed when performance ultimately became due---Default under performance guarantee regime was triggered by non-performance within operative contractual framework and was not dependent upon abstract attribution of blame for earlier events---Arbitrator erred by treating prior delay in operationalisation of letter of credit as determinative and by failing to consider that no supply was made despite subsequent extensions---Finding conflated fault attribution with contractual default and substituted a non-contractual standard for agreed triggering condition of forfeiture. (d) Contract---Principle that no person may take advantage of his own wrong---Application---Principle could not operate as substitute for express contractual framework governing performance---It became relevant only where wrongful conduct of one party was shown to be legally operative cause of non-performance within subsisting contractual obligations---Where timelines had been revised by mutual conduct, relevant enquiry was legal causation at date performance fell due and not historical attribution of earlier difficulties---Seller’s eventual failure resulted from adverse market conditions and inability to procure goods rather than conduct of buyer---Principle against taking advantage of one’s own wrong was therefore inapplicable. (e) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----Arbitral award---Judicial interference---Misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Patent error of law---Court did not sit in appeal over arbitral award and could not reappraise evidence merely because another view was possible---Findings of arbitrator were ordinarily final where they represented a possible and legally tenable view---Court could not conduct roving enquiry to discover errors and interference was confined to infirmity apparent on face of award or material expressly relied upon therein---However, where finding rested upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence or an incorrect factual premise that directly vitiated application of law, error ceased to be mere factual appreciation and assumed character of patent error of law---Arbitrator ignored revised contractual timeline, extensions expressly granted without waiver, seller’s own stated reasons for non-performance and contractual conditions triggering forfeiture---Such omissions led to legally erroneous application of S.74 of Contract Act and justified judicial interference. Cited Case: • Pakistan Railways v. CCRC Ziyang Co. Limited PLD 2025 SC 706 (f) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----Arbitral award---Miscarriage of justice---Erroneous direction for refund of performance guarantee---Single Judge found serious errors in arbitral reasoning but declined interference on ground that refund would not cause substantial miscarriage of justice because buyer’s counterclaim for damages had failed---Once contractual breach and reasonableness of forfeiture were correctly appreciated, allowing refund would relieve defaulting seller of expressly agreed consequence of non-performance despite repeated indulgence and would distort contractual bargain---Such result itself amounted to miscarriage of justice and could not be sustained merely because separate counterclaim for damages had been rejected. (g) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----Damages---Independent upstream supply arrangement---Commercial risk---Causation and privity---Seller entered into contract with supplier before conclusion of principal contract with buyer and paid advance of US$3,465,000 under independent back-to-back arrangement---Buyer was neither party nor privy to such arrangement and had given no undertaking to indemnify seller against supplier default, market fluctuation or other upstream commercial exposure---Structuring of procurement chain and alignment of upstream obligations with principal contract were matters of seller’s own commercial judgment and risk allocation---Seller failed to open required letter of credit in favour of supplier, resulting in termination and forfeiture of advance---Consequences of independent supply arrangement could not be shifted to buyer in absence of express contractual assumption of liability or indemnity. (h) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----Damages---Legal causation---Intervening commercial event---Seller’s supplier forfeited advance before expiry of revised timelines under principal contract---Buyer continued to act within extended contractual framework while seller’s supply chain had already failed---Termination by supplier and forfeiture of advance constituted intervening commercial event breaking chain of legal causation between conduct of buyer and claimed loss---Claim for US$3,465,000 lacked legally cognisable nexus with any breach by buyer and award of damages would impermissibly convert performance guarantee under sale contract into warranty against seller’s upstream commercial risks---Seller was not entitled to recover said amount or any other damages from buyer. Disposition---Civil Appeal No.140-K of 2016 filed by Trading Corporation of Pakistan allowed---Judgments of learned Single Judge and Division Bench of Sindh High Court, to extent directing refund of performance guarantee, set aside---Forfeiture of entire performance guarantee held justified and reasonable---Decision setting aside award of US$3,465,000 as damages maintained---Civil Appeal No.141-K of 2016 filed by Company dismissed in entirety. Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. M/s Abdulla Mezroei Metal Trading Company and another; and M/s Abdulla Mezroei Metal Trading Company and another v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Civil Appeals Nos.140-K and 141-K of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 05.05.2026 and announced on 03.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope---High Court ordinarily would not sit as Court of appeal to reappraise evidence merely because another view was possible---Interference was nevertheless warranted where judgment of Court below suffered from misreading or non-reading of material evidence, misapplication of settled law, material illegality or irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction resulting in miscarriage of justice---Appellate Court had reversed dismissal of pre-emption suit without properly examining mandatory statutory requirements and material deficiencies in evidence---Findings of Appellate Court were consequently open to correction in revisional jurisdiction. (b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13---Suit for possession through pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat, Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat---Mandatory nature---Right of pre-emption was a special right and operated as restriction upon ordinary right of sale and purchase---Entire foundation of pre-emption suit rested upon due performance of statutory demands in prescribed order---Right stood extinguished unless pre-emptor strictly pleaded and proved Talb-i-Muwathibat, Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat through reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence---Any material defect, omission or doubt regarding performance or proof of Talbs ordinarily operated against pre-emptor. Cited Case: • Ch. Riaz Ahmad v. Munir Sultan Malik 2022 SCMR 667 (c) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(2)---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Proof of Majlis---Non-production of material witness---Plaintiff pleaded that information of sale was received in presence of informer and two named witnesses, but failed to produce one of such witnesses without explanation---Although a Majlis could legally consist only of pre-emptor and informer, once plaintiff himself pleaded a particular gathering and identified persons present therein, he was required to prove that version through best available evidence---Withholding a material witness of alleged Majlis justified adverse presumption under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Appellate Court erred in treating non-production as immaterial merely because presence of more than two persons was not legally necessary. Cited Cases: • Zahid Khan and others v. Muhammad Ahsan and others 2024 MLD 396 Lahore • Muhammad Riaz through Special Attorney v. Ghulam Hussain through Legal Heirs 2016 YLR 56 Lahore • Abdul Qayyum Khan v. Sarfraz Khan and 4 others 2008 YLR 101 Lahore • Syed Waqas Bacha v. Jan Ali Shah and 2 others 2014 MLD 1325 Peshawar • Riaz Ahmad v. Molla Bux 2023 YLR Note 70 Lahore (d) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(2)---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Date of knowledge---Circumstantial evidence---Registered sale had been followed by delivery of possession to vendees, which was a visible occurrence in rural surroundings---Plaintiff, his close relatives and adjoining landowner claimed ignorance of transaction for more than three weeks despite surrounding circumstances indicating otherwise---Assertion regarding first knowledge, being personal and private act of pre-emptor, could be tested and rebutted through circumstantial evidence---Plea that knowledge was acquired only on later date appeared to have been introduced to bring notice of Talb-i-Ishhad within statutory period---Claimed date of knowledge did not inspire confidence. Cited Cases: • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 • Mst. Zohra Khatoon v. Ghulam Farid 2020 SCMR 465 (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984----Art.122---Pre-emption---Date, time, place and source of knowledge---Burden of proof---Facts concerning precise point at which pre-emptor first acquired knowledge of sale were especially within his own knowledge---Burden to establish such facts rested upon pre-emptor and could not be discharged merely through stray answer elicited from vendee during cross-examination---Admission had to be read in context of entire statement and surrounding evidence---Plaintiff was required to establish pleaded date of knowledge through his own reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence. (f) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(2)---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Chain of source of information---Requirement---Informer claimed to have obtained information from another person, but such original source was neither disclosed at alleged Majlis nor produced in evidence---Chain from person having direct knowledge of sale to person ultimately informing pre-emptor was required to be complete---Incomplete and hearsay chain of information created serious doubt regarding time, date and source of first knowledge and immediate declaration of intention---Defect was particularly material where plaintiff also alleged actual sale consideration different from amount recorded in registered deed---Talb-i-Muwathibat was not proved in accordance with law. Cited Case: • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 (g) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(3)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Written notice attested by two truthful witnesses---Nature of attestation---Statutory requirement was not fulfilled merely by dispatch of an envelope---Pre-emptor had to prove that written notice confirming earlier demand was duly prepared, attested by two truthful witnesses and sent under registered cover acknowledgment due to vendee---One attesting witness was illiterate and did not know contents of notice, while other merely signed document without showing that contents were read over or explained---Person signing document without knowledge of contents could not provide meaningful statutory attestation---Purpose of attestation stood defeated where witness could not state what had been attested. Cited Case: • Ijaz Ahmad v. Noor ul Ameen 2022 SCMR 1522 (h) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(3)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Proof of preparation and dispatch of notice---Non-production of scribe and dispatching clerk---Effect---Scribe was material witness to explain who dictated notice, what contents were incorporated, whether attesting witnesses were present and whether contents were read over or made known to them---Clerk who allegedly dispatched notices was likewise material where neither plaintiff nor attesting witnesses claimed personal dispatch---Failure to produce scribe and dispatching clerk left material gaps in proof of preparation, execution, attestation and posting of notices---Evidence regarding Talb-i-Ishhad was incomplete and not confidence-inspiring. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Din Anjum v. Muhammad Latif and others 2015 YLR 1042 Lahore • Abdul Qayyum Khan v. Sheikh Muhammad Azeem through Legal Heirs 2017 CLC Note 99 Lahore • Muhammad Ramzan through L.Rs. v. Atta Muhammad and another 2018 YLR Note 148 Lahore • Ashfaq Ahmad and others v. Mst. Khurshid Begum 2022 YLR 1373 Lahore • Abdul Haq and another v. Haji Muhammad Islam and 3 others 2020 CLC Note 52 Peshawar (i) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(3)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Several vendees---Individual service---Suit property had been jointly purchased by three vendees---Postal evidence showed all notices as delivered only to one vendee---Service upon one co-vendee could not be treated as service upon remaining vendees merely because they were brothers or otherwise related---Each vendee was required to be duly served or shown to have refused service---Failure to prove service upon all vendees rendered Talb-i-Ishhad defective and legally ineffective. Cited Cases: • Munawar Hussain and others v. Afaq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 721 • Dayam Khan and others v. Muslim Khan 2015 SCMR 222 (j) Pre-emption---Preferential right based upon adjoining ownership---Factual foundation---Plaintiff claimed right on basis of ownership of adjoining land but admitted permanent residence in another district, absence of cultivation in locality and lack of familiarity even with suit land---Such circumstances, though not independently decisive, weakened probability of plaintiff’s version regarding sudden discovery of sale and his asserted connection with property---Burden remained upon claimant to establish factual basis of preferential right. Cited Case: • Ghazanfar Ali and others v. Malik Muhammad Ansar 2022 YLR 390 (k) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13---Burden and benefit of doubt---Pre-emptor failed to strictly prove due performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad---Where doubt arose regarding execution or legality of Talbs, benefit was required to go to vendee---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material omissions and defects and its findings suffered from misreading and non-reading of evidence as well as misapplication of settled pre-emption law. Cited Case: • Abdul Majeed and others v. Haji Haq Nawaz 2026 SCMR 138 Disposition---Both civil revisions allowed---Judgment and decree dated 10.02.2018 passed by Additional District Judge, Gujrat, whereby pre-emption suit was decreed, set aside---Judgment and decree dated 11.01.2013 passed by Civil Judge, Gujrat, dismissing suit for possession through pre-emption, restored---Parties left to bear their own costs. Shaukat Ali and another v. Muhammad Shoaib and others, Civil Revision No.174922 of 2018 along with Civil Revision No.212658 of 2018, Lahore High Court, decided on 08.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4, 18, 25 & 199---Pakistan Airports Authority Act, 2023, Ss.2(e), 4 & 13---Airport entry pass and taxi sticker---Nature of permission---Petitioner sought restoration of access permission for operating taxi service within restricted premises of Allama Iqbal International Airport---Issuance of airport entry pass or taxi sticker was not a vested or enforceable entitlement but a regulated permission subject to continuing statutory, administrative and security control---Airport Manager was a statutory functionary responsible for day-to-day administration, operational discipline, passenger facilitation, security and compliance with governing airport framework---Decisions concerning issuance, continuation, suspension or cancellation of access permissions were intrinsically connected with discharge of statutory responsibilities and could not be examined merely as private contractual rights. (b) Pakistan Airports Authority Act, 2023----Ss.4 & 13---Airport Manager---Powers and functions---Scope---Authority was established for better administration, operation and development of airports and related services---Airport Manager was required to oversee administration, secure compliance with Act, rules, regulations, Airport Orders and policies, coordinate security and border-management services, and ensure efficiency, economy and safety of airport operations---Powers exercised by Airport Manager in relation to taxi operators and access to restricted premises were regulatory in character and intended to protect safety, security, passenger interests and orderly functioning of strategically important public infrastructure. (c) Airport taxi services---Concession arrangement---Suitability of drivers---Regulation, suspension and cancellation of access---Tender conditions authorized Airport Manager to determine fitness and suitability of taxi drivers, issue stickers after verification, accept or reject applications and cancel permissions---Overall disciplinary and administrative control remained with airport licensor---Permission to operate within airport premises was conditional upon continuing suitability and compliance with applicable standard operating procedures and could be withdrawn where circumstances warranted. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.18---Freedom of trade, business or profession---Reasonable regulation---Restricted and security-sensitive public facility---Right to pursue lawful occupation was valuable but remained subject to lawful regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed in public interest---Denial of access to restricted airport premises did not prohibit petitioner from carrying on transportation business generally but only prevented continued operation from within controlled airport area---Restriction bore direct and rational nexus with airport security, passenger facilitation and operational discipline and was neither excessive nor disproportionate. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others PLD 2016 SC 692 • Muhammad Imran and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others 2019 SCMR 1753 (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4, 18 & 25---Airport taxi operator---Lawful treatment and equality---Discrimination---Authority exercised by Airport Manager was traceable to statute and governing concession arrangement---Petitioner failed to establish that any other taxi operator with comparable complaints, antecedents or circumstances had been treated more favourably---Mere assertion of preferential treatment, monopoly or favoritism, unsupported by cogent material, did not establish hostile discrimination or violation of equality clause. (f) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Administrative decision---Due process and fair hearing---Scope of inquiry---Petitioner had earlier been afforded hearing pursuant to direction of High Court and competent authority thereafter passed a reasoned order---Relevant inquiry was not whether every complaint stood proved according to standard applicable to formal disciplinary proceedings, but whether authority acted fairly, considered relevant material, afforded opportunity of hearing and reached a decision rationally connected with record---Impugned order addressed petitioner’s grievances and assigned reasons---No denial of hearing or procedural irregularity was demonstrated. (g) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Administrative assessment of suitability---Complaints, vigilance reports, ASF communications and undertaking---Cumulative consideration---Some complaints related to earlier periods and might not independently justify refusal of access, but decision was not founded upon any isolated allegation---Competent authority considered complaints, vigilance communications, Airport Security Force reports, airport management material and petitioner’s written undertaking cumulatively for limited purpose of assessing suitability for continued access to restricted premises---Undertaking was not treated as conclusive proof of misconduct but as one relevant circumstance in administrative assessment---Material furnished rational basis for decision. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Judicial review---Administrative discretion---Scope---Judicial review was concerned with legality of decision-making process and not merits of decision itself---Constitutional Court was to examine whether authority acted within jurisdiction, considered relevant material, excluded irrelevant considerations, observed procedural fairness and avoided mala fides or patent arbitrariness---Court could not reappraise administrative material as appellate forum or substitute its own opinion merely because another conclusion was possible---Where statutory authority acted within lawful sphere, considered relevant material and recorded reasons, interference was not warranted. Cited Cases: • Suo Motu Case No.11 of 2011 PLD 2014 SC 389 • Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2009 PLD 2011 SC 619 (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Allegations of favoritism, monopoly and discriminatory operation of taxi services---Proof---Wide-ranging constitutional directions could not be issued upon general or unsupported allegations---Petitioners failed to place cogent material showing that concession arrangement or regulatory framework was tainted by mala fides, arbitrariness or hostile discrimination---Ancillary reliefs concerning equal business opportunities and alleged monopoly were consequently declined. (j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.152---Accidental slip or clerical error in judgment---Correction after pronouncement---One paragraph substantially repeated reasoning contained in immediately preceding paragraph---Duplication was clerical and accidental in nature and could be corrected under S.152, C.P.C.---Duplicative paragraph was deleted and subsequent paragraphs were deemed renumbered accordingly---Correction order was directed to be uploaded with reported judgment. Disposition---Constitutional petition dismissed---Order dated 27.11.2025 refusing restoration of airport entry pass and taxi sticker maintained---No jurisdictional error, mala fides, procedural impropriety, discrimination or patent arbitrariness established---Petitioner remained at liberty to submit a future application before competent authority in accordance with applicable statutory and administrative framework---Subsequent correction order dated 06.07.2026 deleted duplicative paragraph under S.152, C.P.C. Allah Bakhsh and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Writ Petition No.12742 of 2026, Lahore High Court, judgment dated 02.07.2026; correction order dated 06.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Dismissal of appeal is not an absolute bar to remedy of section 12(2) of CPC but facts and grounds of application are determining factors qua maintainability. --- (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Ss.4, 5 & 29(2), Art.162-A---Civil revision---Condonation of delay---Maintainability of application under S.5---Effect of reintroduction of Art.162-A---Objection that application under S.5 was barred by restrictive operation of S.29(2) was misconceived after reintroduction of Art.162-A---Application for condonation of delay in filing civil revision was maintainable---Earlier precedents concerning exclusion of S.5 in absence of Art.162-A had lost efficacy to that extent. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.4---Civil revision filed on first working day after summer vacation---Computation of limitation---Where prescribed period expired during Court vacation, filing on first day when Court reopened was within limitation---Civil revision instituted on first working day after summer vacation was competent and application for condonation had been filed merely by way of abundant caution---Absence of limitation objection in office objection sheet also supported conclusion that revision was instituted within time. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Suo motu exercise---Limitation objection---Where doubt existed regarding technical bar of limitation but impugned order disclosed jurisdictional illegality, High Court could exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice---Revisional power was available where subordinate Court had committed gross error in exercise of jurisdiction or material irregularity. Cited Case: • Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and others PLD 2012 SC 400 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Fraud, misrepresentation and want of jurisdiction---Prior appeal against decree dismissed---Maintainability of subsequent application under S.12(2)---Dismissal of appeal did not create an absolute embargo against recourse to S.12(2), C.P.C.---Availability of remedy depended upon peculiar facts, nature of allegations and whether statutory requirements of S.12(2) were fulfilled---Court was required to examine contents of application and determine whether grounds of fraud, collusion or misrepresentation were distinct from grounds already adjudicated in appeal---Application could not be dismissed simpliciter merely because appellate remedy had previously been availed and decided. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Application filed after disposal of appeal---Distinct grounds of fraud---Jubilee General Insurance Company case---Distinguished---In cited case, application under S.12(2) had been filed during pendency of appeal and contents of application and grounds of appeal were found verbatim or analogous---Court in that case had examined substance of application rather than rejecting it solely because appeal was pending or had been decided---Where impugned order dismissed application merely on premise that appeal had already been availed, without scrutinizing pleaded fraud and concealment, reliance upon said precedent was erroneous. Distinguished Case: • Jubilee General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Ravi Steel Company through Proprietor 2020 CLC 1440 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Fraud, collusion, deceptive concealment and misrepresentation---Requirement of factual determination---Applicants specifically alleged that earlier suits concerning same grant and orders of withdrawal had been concealed to avoid adjudication of res judicata and that decrees had been obtained deceptively---Respondents disputed institution and ownership of such suits and asserted that proceedings were initiated after death of alleged grantee---Questions whether suits had been instituted by deceased, through alleged attorney or otherwise, and whether concealment thereof amounted to fraud or collusion, were disputed questions of fact---Such controversy could not be decided summarily and required framing of issues and recording of evidence. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Fraud alleged in procurement of judgment and decree---Summary dismissal on maintainability---Legality---Where application contained specific instances of fraud, misrepresentation and deceptive concealment, Court was required to test compliance with S.12(2) and adjudicate allegations on evidence---Dismissal without examining merits of pleaded fraud amounted to gross jurisdictional error and material irregularity warranting interference under S.115, C.P.C. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Forum---Challenge to original decree after appellate judgment---Application to Court passing last judgment---Where appeal had been decided, application under S.12(2) challenging legality of judgment and decree was maintainable before Court which had passed last judgment---Application filed within three years of appellate judgment was competent before Appellate Court. Cited Case: • Shahzadi Maharunisa and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another PLD 2016 SC 358 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Allotment under Tube-Well Scheme---Absence of conclusively executed allotment letter or deed---Factual and legal effect---Whether non-issuance of final allotment document affected rights claimed by alleged grantee was a material question---Court dealing with application under S.12(2) was left to determine whether an additional issue should be framed regarding effect of absence of conclusively executed allotment letter or deed. Disposition---Civil revision allowed---Order dated 24.05.2022 dismissing application under S.12(2), C.P.C. set aside---Application deemed pending before Court concerned---Court directed to frame issues, permit parties to lead evidence and decide application afresh on merits---Observations made by High Court declared tentative and not to prejudice either party or influence final adjudication. Province of Punjab and others v. Mst. Azra Begum and others, Civil Revision No.1845 of 2023, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, heard on 01.07.2026 and announced on 02.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908----O. VI, R. 17---Amendment of pleadings---Principles---Belated amendment seeking to introduce new cause of action---Suit for declaration challenging a Dastbardarnama executed by two sisters in favour of their brother (petitioner); after conclusion of trial and recording of evidence of both parties, plaintiffs filed a second application to amend the plaint, asserting that in February 2023 they learnt that their predecessor-in-interest had purchased certain property through registered Sale Deed No. 1088 dated 09.08.1957 in the name of defendant No. 1, and sought to impugn that sale within the same suit---Trial Court dismissed the application on 31.05.2023 and revision was dismissed on 20.06.2023---Held, O. VI, R. 17 vests the Court with wide discretionary power to permit amendment at any stage, provided it is necessary for determining the real questions in controversy and conducive to the ends of justice; the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary but a judicial discretion to be exercised cautiously, judiciously and in furtherance of justice---Amendment ought not to be permitted where it fundamentally alters the nature and character of the suit, seeks to withdraw or contradict admissions previously made, is actuated by mala fide, causes irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or is intended to overcome evidentiary deficiencies, contradictions or the effect of prior judicial determinations---Court is under a duty to examine bona fides of the applicant, stage at which amendment is sought, explanation for delay and likely impact on rights accrued to the opposite party---Amendment sought after inordinate and unexplained delay, though delay is not by itself conclusive, assumes considerable significance; amendment after completion of pleadings and recording of evidence is ordinarily liable to cause serious prejudice by shifting the nature, scope or focus of the controversy, particularly where the applicant has an efficacious and independent remedy of instituting a separate suit on the newly asserted cause of action---Belated amendment introducing new factual foundation or independent cause of action warrants heightened judicial scrutiny; Court must be slow in permitting amendment that materially changes the complexion of litigation to the detriment of the opposite party who conducted defence on original pleadings---Proposed amendment relating to a registered Sale Deed of 1957, sought after evidence of both parties had concluded, would substantially enlarge the scope of the suit, compel petitioners to meet a fresh and distinct case, cause manifest prejudice and defeat the object of orderly civil procedure. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Writ petition against orders of subordinate courts---Interference with discretionary orders of subordinate courts---Amendment of plaint---High Court allowed writ petition of plaintiffs against concurrent orders of Trial Court and Revisional Court refusing amendment---Held, Trial Court and Revisional Court had dismissed the application after due consideration of the procedure and principles governing amendment of pleadings---High Court fell into patent error by overlooking the settled principle that its constitutional jurisdiction is not intended to substitute its own discretion for that validly exercised by subordinate courts---Foremost question requiring determination was whether orders of Trial Court and Revisional Court suffered from any jurisdictional defect, illegality, material irregularity or patent misreading or non-reading of record warranting interference in constitutional jurisdiction---Impugned judgment was legally unsustainable. Disposition: Leave granted; petition (C.P.L.A. No. 5215/2024) converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment dated 21.10.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 2977-P/2023 set aside. Approved for Reporting.