Summary: Payment under Court-recorded compromise is distinguishable from pre-suit part-payment. Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, held inapplicable.

Summary: Though establishment of a Sahulat Bazar is a welfare-oriented step taken by Government but utilization of a piece of land (reserved for a public park under a "Master Plan") for any other purpose amounts to arbitrary exercise of authority and offends the constitutional mandate. Government is not the "owner" of a park rather it is a "trustee" with a fiduciary duty to protect the public parks for current and future generations

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Land Acquisition Act 1894, Section 30, Apportionment. Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides that where the amount of compensation has been determined under Section 11 and a dispute arises regarding the apportionment of such compensation or as to the persons entitled to receive the same, the Collector may refer the matter to the Court for adjudication. The provision, therefore, presupposes the existence of a determined amount of compensation forming part of the award. Where no compensation has been assessed or incorporated in the award, a reference under Section 30 cannot be maintained, as there would be no amount available for apportionment. In such circumstances, the appropriate course is either to seek correction or supplementary determination of compensation by the Collector, or, where the competent authority fails to include legally assessable compensation, to invoke the Constitutional Law jurisdiction of this Court for redress of the grievance. Admittedly, the process for acquisition of the petitioners’ property was initiated at the request of the acquiring department, namely the Frontier Works Organization, and was carried to its logical conclusion by the acquiring agency i.e., the Collector, on the basis of the arrangement reflected in Award Nos. 150 dated 19.02.2019 and 477 dated 25.06.2019. It is, however, undisputed that despite the issuance of the said awards, the assessment relating to the improvements existing on the acquired land—such as superstructure, trees, tube well and other installations—was not completed prior to the announcement of the awards. Consequently, the compensation payable in respect of such improvements, which admittedly formed part of the petitioners’ property and belonged to them as landowners, was not incorporated in the awards. Both petitioners indisputably fall within the definition of “persons interested” as contemplated under Section 3(b) of the Act. The owners of acquired land are entitled not only to compensation for the land itself but also for the improvements standing thereon, and such compensation ought to have been assessed and reflected in the award announced under Section 11 by the acquiring agency. The omission to include the assessed value of these improvements in the award has thus created an anomalous situation, whereby the petitioners have been deprived of the statutory remedy of seeking a reference regarding apportionment or entitlement under Section 30, owing to the absence of any quantified amount in the award pertaining to those improvements. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 constitutes a comprehensive statutory framework regulating the acquisition of land for public purposes. It prescribes the procedure for identification and classification of the land to be acquired, determination and award of compensation, payment of such compensation to the persons interested, the right of objection to the award, and the mechanism for resolution of disputes arising out of the award between the acquiring department, the acquiring agency, and the landowners through reference to the Court of competent jurisdiction. The real grievance of the petitioners, however, pertains to the improvements existing upon the acquired property, including superstructure, cost of construction, trees, tube well and other installations, which admittedly formed part of the property belonging to the landowners. Although the assessment of these improvements was eventually carried out by the concerned authorities, the same was conducted after the announcement of the awards. Consequently, the assessed value of such improvements was not incorporated in the awards issued under Section 11 of the Act. In these circumstances, the question of apportionment or entitlement in terms of Section 30 of the Act could not arise, nor could any such dispute be transmitted by the Collector to the Reference Court, for the simple reason that no quantified amount in respect of these improvements formed part of the award. In the absence of such inclusion, the Reference Court would lack the jurisdictional basis to examine or adjudicate the controversy, as the statutory mechanism of reference presupposes the existence of a determined amount of compensation in the award.

Summary: Execution of decree through issuance of writ instead of application for execution of decree: It is an admitted position that the petitioners have failed to establish the very existence of the alleged decree passed in Civil Law Suit No. 481/1 dated 20.09.1987, despite instituting a subsequent suit bearing No. 185/1, which too was dismissed by the learned Civil Law Judge on 24.06.2023. Even otherwise, assuming for the sake of argument that such a decree had been passed, the petitioners were under a legal obligation to seek its execution within the period of limitation prescribed by law. There is no cavil to the settled proposition that the first application for execution of a decree is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes a limitation period of three years. Since the alleged decree in Civil Law Suit No. 481/1 is stated to have been passed on 20.09.1987, the petitioners could have moved an execution application within three years from the date of the decree. In such circumstances, the question of the application of section 48 of the Code of Civil Law Procedure would not arise at the initial stage, as the said provision becomes relevant only with respect to subsequent applications for execution after the first execution petition has been filed within the prescribed limitation. The essence of the principle laid down is that the extended limitation contemplated under section 48, C.P.C. becomes available only when the decree- holder has first invoked the execution jurisdiction within the limitation period prescribed by Article 181. If the decree-holder fails to file even the first execution application within the prescribed period, the right to execute the decree itself becomes extinguished. In the present case, the petitioners admittedly did not avail themselves of the remedy provided under the law for execution of the alleged decree, nor did they take any steps for the incorporation of their names in the revenue record on the basis of such decree. The petitioners/decree-holders, therefore, remained dormant for decades without initiating execution proceedings. Such prolonged inaction clearly renders any attempt to enforce the alleged decree hopelessly barred by limitation and legally untenable. The legal position emerging from the above discussion clearly demonstrates that a decree of substitution in a pre-emption suit and a decree for declaration of title operate in entirely different legal fields. A declaratory decree merely recognizes or affirms an existing right and ordinarily requires further proceedings for its enforcement, whereas a decree in a pre-emption suit results in substitution of the decree-holder in place of the vendee upon fulfillment of statutory conditions. Therefore, the precedent relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, being rendered in the context of a pre-emption decree involving the right of substitution, is clearly distinguishable and cannot be pressed into Service Law in the present case, which relates to an alleged declaratory decree. Consequently, the argument that the revenue authorities were under an automatic obligation to incorporate the names of the petitioners in the revenue record on the basis of such alleged decree is devoid of legal substance.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Arts. 17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Proof through attesting witnesses---Mandatory requirement---Suit for specific performance was founded upon alleged agreement to sell dated 22.09.2000 relating to immovable property---Defendants specifically denied execution of said agreement---Held, that where a document is required by law to be attested, its execution must be proved through attesting witnesses in accordance with Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, unless absence of such witnesses is satisfactorily explained---Production of attesting witnesses is mandatory and failure to comply renders document legally unproved. Cited Cases: • Rafaqat Ali and others v. Mst. Jamshed Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 1076 • Ainuddin and others v. Abdullah and another 2019 SCMR 880 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Arts. 17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Non-production of marginal witnesses---Effect---Plaintiff relied upon agreement to sell but failed to produce marginal witnesses of the document---No explanation was furnished for their non-production despite serious denial of execution by defendants---Held, that failure to produce most natural witnesses to the transaction struck at the root of plaintiff’s case---Agreement to sell could not be treated as proved in accordance with law. Cited Case: • Mst. Hajyani Bar Bibi through L.R. v. Mrs. Rehana Afzal Ali Khan and others PLD 2014 SC 794 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 17(2)(a)---Power of attorney and agreement concerning immovable property---Instrument creating financial obligations---Attestation---Requirement---Agreement to sell and powers of attorney relied upon by plaintiff related to immovable property and created financial obligations---Held, that such documents fall within ambit of Art.17(2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and must be attested and proved in accordance with Arts.17 and 79 thereof---A document not proved through prescribed legal mode cannot form basis of decree for specific performance. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad and others v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others PLD 2011 SC 241 (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 129(g)---Withholding of best evidence---Adverse presumption---Agreement to sell denied by defendants---Plaintiff failed to produce marginal witnesses and gave no explanation for such omission---Held, that adverse presumption under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 would arise against plaintiff that had marginal witnesses been produced, they would not have supported his stance---Plaintiff failed to discharge burden of proof. (e) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Specific performance---Equitable and discretionary relief---Proof of contract---Requirement---Relief of specific performance is not granted as a matter of right merely because it is lawful to do so---Court must examine facts, conduct of parties, delay, surrounding circumstances and whether contract has been proved in accordance with law---Held, that where alleged agreement to sell itself remained legally unproved, plaintiff was not entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance. Cited Case: • Liaqat Ali Khan and others v. Falak Sher and others PLD 2014 SC 506 (f) Specific performance--- ----Agreement to sell not proved---Third-party rights---Effect---Plaintiff alleged prior agreement to sell and full payment of consideration, whereas defendants asserted lawful subsequent transfer through chain of title and bona fide purchase without notice---Record reflected that third-party rights had already been created through transfer duly recognized by Capital Development Authority---Held, that in presence of legally unproved agreement and intervening third-party rights, equitable relief of specific performance could not be granted. (g) Civil suit--- ----Specific performance, possession and permanent injunction---Foundation of claim legally unproved---Effect---Entire claim of plaintiff rested upon agreement to sell dated 22.09.2000---Marginal witnesses were not produced, execution was denied, and mandatory evidentiary requirements were not satisfied---Held, that Courts below failed to properly appreciate mandatory requirements of Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and erroneously decreed suit despite fundamental defects in plaintiff’s evidence. (h) Civil proceedings--- ----Concurrent findings below---Interference by Supreme Court---Mandatory evidentiary requirements ignored---Trial Court decreed suit, Appellate Court dismissed appeal, and High Court dismissed civil revision---Supreme Court held that plaintiff failed to prove alleged agreement to sell in accordance with mandatory provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Where Courts below proceed on a document not legally proved, interference by Supreme Court is warranted. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed. Judgments of Trial Court, Appellate Court and Islamabad High Court were set aside. Suit instituted by plaintiff/respondent No.1 for specific performance, possession and permanent injunction stood dismissed. Parties were left to bear their own costs.

Summary: This Court reiterates that decrees awarding maintenance up to Rs.5,000 per month are non-appealable under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (Amendment Act XI of 2015). Holds that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to defeat clear legislative intent. Where the father avoids his obligation, a financially sound grandfather cannot escape responsibility to prevent minors from being left destitute.

Summary: The suit property is a private property which was dedicated for communal benefit of the Araien community. It is not state property and did not belong to TMA, Sharaqpur. Hence, it could not be arbitrarily and unilaterally occupied for establishment of Sahulat Bazar in violation of rights and interests of the Petitioner. Hence, the impugned Order of the Deputy Commissioner directing demolition of the suit property and taking over its possession by TMA, Sharaqpur was unlawful.

Summary: Held that the expression 'dismissed for non-prosecution' and 'consigned to record' are two different legal connotations. Often when the case is dismissed for non-prosecution by the Court, it is followed by direction to the Office to 'consign the case file to record', however, merely directing the Office to 'consign the case file to record' for the reason that no one tendered appearance on behalf of the plaintiff does not have the same effect. Dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution and directing the file to be consigned to record amounts to a judicial determination under Order IX of CPC, whereby the suit stands terminated for default of appearance. The subsequent direction to consign the file to the record room is merely administrative in nature, reflecting that the proceedings have concluded and the file is to be archived. In such a situation, the lis comes to an end unless restoration is sought and allowed in accordance with law.

Summary: The FBR, through Circular No. 05 of 2021, has provided guidelines for the issuance of a consumption certificate, as reproduced above. Paragraph 3 of Circular No. 05, ibid, in our humble view, transcends the scheme of exemption provided under Entry No. 151. Had the legislature intended to make the encashment of a pay order contingent upon the rejection of an application for a consumption certificate, it would have expressly provided so in clear terms. Similarly, the learned counsel for the respondents could not refer to any provision of law authorizing the FBR to supply an intentional omission or to expand the statutory provisions of the law. The settled principle is that rules are subservient to the parent statute. Ordinances and rules, being subordinate or delegated legislation, are framed under the authority of the parent statute and are therefore subservient to the primary legislation. They cannot contradict, override, or add to the clear provisions of the parent statute. Rules are meant to carry out the purpose of the parent statute and cannot be inconsistent with its provisions. 1 The aforesaid scheme of the Act of 1990 places the burden on the Revenue to establish that the economic activities of a person fall within the charging section, and that the person is liable to pay any tax or charge which has not been levied, paid, or has been short-levied. The recovery provisions of any taxing statute can only be triggered once payability has been established through the scheme of adjudication provided under the statute. It is well settled that every word used by the legislature in a statute must be given its true meaning and the provisions construed together in a harmonious manner. 2 If the arguments of the worthy counsel for the Revenue are accepted, that in the event the consumption certificate is denied to the person importing goods under the concessionary regime, the pay order would be payable, it would amount to something which we would read in statute which the lawmaker has never provided. Therefore, the entry No. 151 ibid would as far as relates to securing the payment of sales tax at import stage is to be harmoniously read along with the scheme of payment of tax when it becomes payable. Obviously, the payability of tax arises after the assessment of the tax liability. 1 Farrukh Raza Sheikh v. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others (2022 SCMR 1787); National Electric Power Regulatory Authority vs. Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Limited (2016 SCMR 550); Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and 05 others vs. Aryan Petro Chemical Industries (Pvt) Ltd, Peshawar and others vs. (2003 SCMR 370). 2 Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another vs. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt) Ltd (2005 SCMR 1166).