Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Witness before whom accused makes extra judicial confession, if does not react after hearing the confession, then it raises eyebrows regarding his conduct as well as testimony and in such circumstances story of the prosecution comprising of circumstantial evidence cannot find any buyer; when there is no substantial evidence, then DNA report is of no help being corroboratory piece of evidence, because when there is nothing to be corroborated, then corroboratory piece of evidence loses its efficacy. 643Service 1368142.10380-

Summary: This case presents an intriguing question of whether the competent authority, which initially disagreed with the recommendation of removal from service proposed by the Inquiry Officer and imposed a lesser penalty (demotion), can later on, upon remand of the matter by the Appellate Authority and after holding de-novo inquiry, inflict a more severe punishment (of removal from service). Held: Once a particular penalty of demotion had been imposed by the Competent Authority, and the petitioner had assailed the said findings before the appellate forum, which remanded the matter for de-novo inquiry, the imposition of harsher punishment by the Competent Authority, during post remand proceedings, on the basis of same set of allegations and charges runs contrary to the principle of fairness. Had the petitioner not preferred an appeal, his punishment would have remained demotion. It is untenable and unjust to penalize an individual for exercising his legal right to prefer an appeal by subjecting him to a harsher penalty, on the same set of allegations. 642Crl. Appeal 17977/20 Muhammad Waqas Vs The State etc The Chief Justice 13- 03- 2025 2025 LHC 1052 PLJ 2025 Cr.C

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ----S. 22-A---Registration of cross-version in presence of FIR, registered by Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)---Legality---Petitioners filed constitutional petition against the order passed by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace whereby on the application under S.22-A, Cr.P.C., filed by respondent, the concerned SHO was ordered to record her (respondent's) cross-version---Allegation/assertion of the respondent was that on fateful day, he was at his shop along with his uncle, the petitioners arrived in two vehicles, armed with firearms; that the petitioners allegedly abused and assaulted his uncle, stole Rs. 1,600,000 from the shop, took important documents and forcibly snatched mobile phones and Rs. 5,000 from his pocket and abducted his uncle---Respondent claimed that he reported the incident the same day via daily diary No. 22, but no action was taken---Consequently, respondent approached the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, leading to the issuance of impugned order---Validity---In the instant case, the FIR had already been registered by the FIA against the respondents' party---FIA operated under its special laws, including the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, and was primarily responsible for investigating offenses related to federal statutes, including cybercrimes, financial frauds, human trafficking, and offences under special laws---On the other hand, local police operated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Cr.P.C.) and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, (P.P.C.) for general criminal offenses---Since both agencies function in different spheres, the clubbing of a complaint as a cross-version in a case already registered under FIA's domain raised legal and procedural complications---Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, under S. 22-A(6), Cr.P.C, had the power to direct Police Officials to register FIR if a cognizable offense was made out---However, that power generally applied to local police and did not automatically extend to specialized investigation agencies like FIA, NAB or ANF unless a particular law permitted it---Moreover, cross-version cases were typically entertained where both versions would fall under the same jurisdiction (i.e., within the police domain)---Justice of Peace might have overstepped jurisdiction by directing that FIA-registered FIR be clubbed with another complaint as a cross-version case when the agencies had separate investigative mandates---Legally, FIA case could not be merged with a case investigated by local police since both agencies derived their authority from different legal frameworks---Thus, unless the allegations in the cross-version complaint related to the same federal law under which the FIA's, FIR was registered, the Ex-officio Justice of Peace lacked jurisdiction to order such clubbing---Constitutional petitions were allowed, accordingly. Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595; Ali Raza v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 2020 Lah. 109; Mian Allah Nawaz v. The State 2019 SCMR 2009; Muhammad Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2021 Isl. 16 and State v. Haji Naseer PLD 2022 SC 347 rel. Muhammad Ismail Alizai, Chaudhry Muhammad Javed Akhtar and Haji Muhammad Shakeel for Petitioners (in both the petitions). Ghulam Muhammad Sappal, Addl. A.G. for Respondents Nos. 1 and 4 to 7 (in W.P. No.351-D of 2024) and for Respondents Nos.1 to 4 (in W.P.No. 597-D of 2024). Muhammad Saleem Khan Marwat for Respondent No.3 (in W.P. No.351-D of 2024). Bahadur Khan Marwat for Respondent No.5 (in W.P.No.597-D of 2024). Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025. INAM ULLAH KHAN, J.--- This judgment addresses the aforementioned two writ petitions concerning a common legal and factual issue. The petitions stem from orders issued by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, Dera Ismail Khan, on 07.03.2024 and 19.12.2023. These orders directed the local police to register criminal cases based on applications filed under Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgments dated 17.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 176 of 2015, as well as, Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 2015 and Capital Sentence Reference No. 07-T of 2015 respectively). Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 449---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(i)(a)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 3 & 4---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Qatl-i-amd, loss to property and use of explosive substance---Re-appraisal of evidence---Withholding of best evidence---Benefit of doubt---Failure to produce Medico Legal Report of injured accused---Arrest before occurrence---Proof---Accused persons were alleged to have used explosive substance during their attack on a religious building, causing deaths, injuries to different persons and loss to property---Trial Court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to death---Plea raised by accused persons was that they were already in custody in injured condition when the occurrence took place---Validity---If accused was apprehended on the day of occurrence in injured condition and medical treatment was provided to him at a hospital then why his medico legal report was not produced in evidence---Such fact supported claim of accused that they were earlier apprehended by the police and kept in illegal confinement during which they were physically tortured and they were made scapegoats in the case---Duration of injuries in the medico legal report showed that accused had injuries, which were caused 4/5 days earlier to the date of occurrence---Such fact had created further dent in the prosecution story---Medico Legal Report (MLR) of accused was the best evidence to show presence of accused at the time of occurrence which had not been produced in prosecution evidence---Adverse inference under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 could validly be drawn against prosecution that had that MLR been produced in the evidence, the same would not have supported prosecution case against accused---If there is a single circumstance which creates doubt in the prosecution case then the same is sufficient to acquit the accused---Case against accused persons was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in prosecution story---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the charges---Appeal was allowed. Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Riaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SMCR 846; Abdul Oadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146; Riasat Ali v. The State 2024 SCMR 1224; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka and Adil Aziz Qazi, Advocates Supreme Court for Petitioners. Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab for the State. Nemo for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Appeal No. 674 of 2020 and Criminal Petition No. 241 of 2025, decided on 13th March, 2025. (Against judgment dated 27.09.2016 of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza) Swat passed in Crl. Appeal No. 223-M of 2013 and M.Rs. Nos. 4-M and 4-A of 2013). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Confessional statements of accused---Doubtful---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---In the present case, the appellants had recorded their respective judicial confessions under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.---Statement of one of the appellants was exculpatory because he had alleged that despite restraining the other appellant, the latter had killed the child---Likewise, the confessional statement recorded by the other appellant was partly exculpatory in nature since he had attributed an effective role to first accused in taking the life of the minor victim---Events narrated by both the appellants in their respective confessional statements were distinct and not corroborated---Proceedings till the registration of the case under Section 154, Cr.P.C., and the arrest of an appellant and then the recovery of the dead body, according to the prosecution's case, at his instance were not only shrouded in mystery but they were in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C.---Moreover, it was a mystery as to when and why the appellants were treated as suspects and the arrest of the appellant also became questionable---Said fact definitely must have had serious consequences in the context of the exercise of free will and rational thinking for the purpose of making a confession---Such circumstances raised serious doubts regarding the confessional statements recorded under Section 164,Cr.P.C. being voluntary and given out of free will---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Tariq Mehmood v. State 2002 SCMR 1493 and Javed Iqbal v. State 2023 SCMR 139 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay in recording confessional statements of accused---Consequential---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---Record showed that one accused was arrested on 05.07.2012 while other on 06.07.2012---Accused had remained in the police custody for a considerable time and their confessional statements were recorded on 11.07.2012---Nothing was available on record to explain the delay in recording the judicial confessions---Delayed confessional statement lost its evidentiary value the longer an accused remained in the custody of the police---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595 and Muhammad Parvez v. The State 2007 SCMR 670 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Inquiry conducted before the registration of FIR---Consequential---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---In this case, the initial statement filed by the complainant was only to the extent of informing the officer in charge of a police station that despite a search he could not find his son---Complainant had not expressed any apprehension regarding the commission of a cognizable offence---Thus, the information did not meet the requirements set out in Section 154, Cr.P.C.---In the circumstances, there was no need to seek an order and measures could have been taken for searching the missing child---Nonetheless, the report seemed to have been taken seriously by seeking permission for conducting an 'inquiry' under Section 153(3),Cr.P.C. and it was granted by the concerned Magistrate without appreciating the fact that no power or authority was vested to order an inquiry---Witnesses in their depositions had stated that the Magistrate had ordered an 'inquiry' and that it was marked to SI/witness---In his examination-in-chief Inquiry Officer acknowledged that during the course of inquiry, he interrogated various suspects, but they were released being not involved in the commission of the offence---Station House Officer/witness had also deposed that many persons were interrogated during the inquiry and he claimed to have taken over the inquiry only for a day i.e. on 05.07.2012 and had further stated that the appellant was arrested on the same day---Moreover, it was later in the day that, according to his testimony, the appellant had led him to the recovery of the dead body from the well---No FIR or, in other words, entry was made as required under Section 154,Cr.P.C.,before the recovery of the body---Entire proceedings before the registration of the case under Section 154,Cr.P.C.,were conducted under the garb of an inquiry not even contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.---It was established from the evidence that during the period from 23.04.2012 till 05.07.2012 numerous persons were arrested and interrogated as suspects---They were released without complying with the requirements prescribed under S. 156, Cr.P.C., in the case of suspects who are arrested and released after the registration of a case---It was, therefore, obvious that the officer in charge of the police station had reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence but did not register a case nor complied with the mandatory procedure set out under section 157---By adopting this course, the officer in charge of the police station had steered clear from the external supervisory check otherwise contemplated under the scheme of the Cr.P.C.---Officer in charge of the police station or any other officer associated with the purported 'inquiry' had illegally arrested suspects and then released them---Interrogation without the registration of a case in the circumstances was also illegal---Abuse of the coercive powers in this case, therefore, could not be ruled out---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---Testimonies of the complainant and his brother were not consistent in so far as material facts were concerned---Complainant's brother had deposed that one of the appellants had remained associated with them during the search for the child---According to the testimony of said witness, appellant was suspected because of his inquiries regarding delay in the payment of ransom---Said witness had deposed that on 05.07.2012 both the appellants and the other acquitted accused had come to a grassy ground---In his examination-in-chief said witness had stated that appellant was arrested from the grassy ground but later, in his cross-examination, he had contradicted his own statement by deposing that his arrest was made while he was proceeding towards the complainant's house---Deposition of complainant's brother did not find support from the testimonies of other witnesses, particularly that of the complainant---Latter, in his deposition, did not refer to the communication between appellant and complainant's brother nor the presence of the appellants and the acquitted accused at the grassy ground---Testimony of Inspector further weakened the prosecution's story because, according to his deposition, appellant was one of the suspects during the inquiry conducted under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and that he was interrogated prior to the recovery of the body and registration of the crime report---Testimony of Inquiry Officer further raised doubts since he had contradicted the facts narrated by complainant's brother in material particulars---According to the testimony of Inquiry Officer, the appellant and the acquitted accused were arrested on 06.07.2012---There was no explanation as to why the three accused were not arrested when, according to the testimony of complainant's brother, they come together to the grassy ground to collect the ransom amount---There was no evidence to prove that ransom was demanded or that the child victim was abducted by the appellants---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Arshad Husain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant/Petitioner (in both cases). Danial Khan Chamkani, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (in Crl. A. No. 674 of 2020). Syed Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.