Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 19.10.2016 and 18.02.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, in Crl. Appeals Nos. 156 of 2012 and 347 of 2019, respectively). Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S.302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Delay in FIR---Consultation---Presumption---Benefit of doubt---Accused persons were convicted for Qatl-i-amd by Trial Court and were sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentences of accused persons---Validity---Testimony of Investigating Officer was sufficient to prove that time consumed in consultation and deliberation caused delay in lodging FIR---If complainant and his wife were present at the spot and had witnessed the incident, there was no reason for them to make consultation and deliberation as to who should be the complainant of case, rather on arrival of police they could have straightaway narrated the occurrence and charged the accused---Occurrence had not taken place in the mode and manner as alleged by complainant and prosecution witnesses---Both alleged eye-witnesses were close relatives of deceased and were procured witnesses---False implication of accused person on the basis of motive of previous blood feud could not be ruled out---Motive was a double edged weapon, which could be used either way and by either side i.e. for real or false involvement---Prosecution failed to prove charge against accused persons as there were infirmities, glaring omissions and contradictions in prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt---For giving benefit of doubt it is not necessary that there should be so many circumstances rather a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient for extending its benefit to accused not as a matter of concession but as of right---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed. Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64; Zeeshan alias Shani v. The State 2012 SCMR 428; Muhammad Fiaz Khan v. Ajmer Khan 2010 SCMR 105; Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068; Irshad Ahmad v. The State 2011 SCMR 1190; Ulfat Hussain v. The State 2018 SCMR 313; Muhammad Yaseen v. Muhammad Afzal and another 2018 SCMR 1549; Muhammad Rafique v. The State 2014 SCMR 1698; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2012 SCMR 419; Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State 2012 SCMR 327; Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State 2004 SCMR 1310; PLD 2011 SC 554; 2020 SCMR 1493; 2021 SCMR 387; Noor Elahi v. Zafrul Haque PLD 1976 SC 557; Allah Bakhsh v. The State PLD 1978 SC 171; Khadim Hussain v. The State 2010 SCMR 1090; Tahir Khan v. The State 2011 SCMR 646; Tariq v. The State 2017 SCMR 1672; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 735 rel. Muhammad Amin Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in Crl. Appeal No. 438 of 2023). Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in Crl. Appeal No. 439 of 2023). Ms. Memoona Ihsan-ul-Haq, Deputy Prosecutor-General, Punjab for the State. Nemo for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss.15(2)(vii), 15-A & 21---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Ejectment of tenant---Personal bona fide need---Admission as to relationship of landlord and tenant---Plea of multiple tenements by the tenant---Ejectment application filed by the respondent/landlord was allowed by the Rent Controller and the First Rent Appeal preferred by the petitioner/tenant was dismissed----Validity---Statement of landlord had gone unrebutted, thus, his personal need stood established---Once the landlord steps into the witness box and the plea of personal need is unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under S. 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Act, 1979---In presence of several properties, it is the discretion of the landlord/owner to choose the property he wishes to use and in that respect the tenant cannot dictate how and in what manner the owner utilizes his property---An embargo of one year has been placed on the landlord in case the landlord wishes to rent out the property to another tenant, which protection was also available to the petitioner/tenant---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Naveed Merchant v. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs PLD 2012 Sindh 23 and Muhammad Younus v. Additional District Judge (VII), Karachi (South) 2018 YLR 1284 distinguished. Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh 2010 SCMR 1925; Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhtar C.P. No. S-495 of 2023, Order dated 21.07.2023; Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1296; Wasim Ahmad Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz 1996 SCMR 1055; Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir 1999 MLD 3011 and Mst. Dilshad Bibi v. Ramzan Ali 2006 CLC 1853 rel. Muhammad Khan for Petitioner. Asim Iqbal, for the Respondent No. 1 along with Farmanullah Khan and Syeda Maryam for Respondent. Irshad Ahmed Shaikh, A.A.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 10th March, 2025. Order Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J .--- The instant petition has impugned the Judgment and Decree dated 26.02.2024 ("Impugned Judgment") passed in F.R.A. No.09/2024. Brief facts of the instant petition can be summarised as follows: - 1. The Respondent No.1 filed Rent Application No.844/2022 under Section 15 (2) (vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 ("SRPO") on the sole ground of personal bona fide need. The said Rent Application was allowed vide order dated 30.11.2023. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed F.R.A. No.09/2024 under Section 21 of the SRPO and the same was dismissed vide Impugned Judgment and Decree dated 26.02.2024. It has been contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner has been in possession of the tenement for approximately 40 years and has regularly been paying the rent to the Respondent. It is further stated by the learned counsel that the Tenancy Agreements were mutually renewed from time to time and there is no default on part of the Petitioner and it was only the Respondent who arbitrarily did not receive the rent for which the Petitioner had no option but to file MRC No.464/2022. 2. It was however stated by the learned counsel that rent application filed by Respondent was on the sole ground of personal bona fide need and the aspect highlighted in the paragraph above need not require any further deliberation. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the case against the Petitioner has been filed malafidely and the tenement is not required by the Respondent in good faith. Learned counsel further stated that the Respondents Nos.1 has 14 tenants and has only issued notices to two tenants which reflect that the requirement is not bona fide and the Petitioner for reasons best known to Respondent No.1, is being specifically targeted. It has also been contended by the learned counsel that the requirement of the Respondent No.1 according to his own statement is approximately 6000 sq. ft., whereas, Petitioner is in possession of only 2300 sq. ft., therefore, even if the Petitioner is ejected from the tenement in question, it would still not satisfy the alleged bona fide of the Respondent No.1. 3. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel that the Respondent No.1 already has significant number of properties in which the employees of Respondent No.1 and its subsidiary companies may be accommodated. Lastly, learned counsel has submitted that the Respondent No1 had filed an application under Section 8 of the SRPO for fair rent against other tenants and this ground is enough to extinguish the myth of personal bona fide need. Learned counsel in this regard has relied upon the following judgments: - i. Naveed Merchant v. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs 1 ii. Muhammad Younus v. Additional District Judge (VII), Karachi (South) 2 4. Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has vehemently argued that the relationship of tenant and landlord has been admitted by the parties and the learned counsel to establish the personal bona fide need of the Respondent No.1 has taken me through the following documents. The same were filed along-with the objections to the instant petition and it is admitted that the same were exhibited before the Learned Rent Controller. Sr. Document name Date Annexure 1. Tenancy Agreement 15.07.2019 R/1 2. Memorandum 23.12.2019 R/2 3. Scheme of Amalgamation R/3 4. SECP Letter 08.11.2021 R/4 5. Notification of SECP 15.12.2021 R/5 6. Eviction Notice 20.12.2021 R/6 7. Termination of Tenancy 01.12.2021 R/7 8. List of Employees R/8 5. It has been argued in the light of the documents above identified by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 that the said Respondent has satisfied his requirement for personal bona fide need and, therefore, the Petitioner may be ejected from the premises. The learned counsel has more specifically relied on the list of employees (R/8) which according to him need to be accommodated in the tenement in question. Lastly, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has stated that in the light of the concurrent findings against the Petitioner, the same require no interference by this Court. He relied upon the following judgments: - i. Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh 3 ii. Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhta 4 r 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. I have specifically asked the learned counsel for the Petitioner to identify parts of the cross-examination of Respondent No.1 in which, according to him, the plea of personal bona fide need has been shattered. Learned counsel in response read out the following part of the cross-examination: - "There are 14 tenants in the rented premises building with different areas I do not know the build-up used are of the rented premises building. It is correct that as per Exb. A/8, five industries were approved for merger with applicant. present, National Industrial Park and Furniture Pakistan have been merged with applicant and remaining are under process. It is correct that I have not mentioned the shifting of office of M/s. Furniture Pakistan at Rented Premises Building. I do not know whether the office of said Furniture Pakistan still exists at its previous place. The office of the National Industrial Park was situated at FTC Building. There were about 35 employees of National Industrial Park Company. It is correct that as per Nolice Exb./13, the office premises of NIP was to be vacated on 31.01.2022. It is correct that office of NIP was vacated on 31.01.2022. The employees of the NIP have been given place at second floor of the rented premises. It is correct that as per Exb.A/6, the applicant issued termination notice to Opponent on 20.12.2021 and opponent was required to vacate the premises in three months. It is correct that said three months expired on 20.03.2022 It is correct applicant vacated the office from FTC first and then issued notice to the opponent. It is correct that I have not produced documentary proof of handing over and taking over of the FTC premises. It correct that NIP office at FTC was consisting of an area of about 6112 square feet. It is correct that area of the office of the Gizri Corporation is about 1391 sq. ft. it is correct that area total got to be vacated from Gizri Corporation and Petroleum Packages is about 2300 sq. ft. and whereas the previous office was situated on 6112 square feet. It is correct Exb.A/14 does not show the area under occupation of the tenants mentioned therein. It is correct that applicant has not given vacation notice to other 12 tenants of the rented premises. It is incorrect to suggest that applicant wants to rent out the premises of the opponent to someone else. It is incorrect to suggest that premises of Opponent is not required for personal use of the applicant. It is correct that Exb.A/12 is not upon Letter Head of the Applicant Company. It is correct that Exb.A/12 does not show as to when the employees of NIP shifted to rented premises building. It is incorrect to suggest that strength of the NIP employees is not 35. It is incorrect to suggest that Exb. A/12 is a fake list. I do not know number of other buildings belonging to the Applicant. There is no any other property/office of NIP. It is incorrect to suggest that applicant filed this case on mala fide." 7. I have examined the cross-examination reproduced above and I disagree with the plea taken by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The statement of the Respondent No.1/ landlord has gone unrebutted; therefore, his personal need stands established. It is settled principle of law that once the landlord steps into the witness box and the plea of personal need is unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under Section 15 of the SRPO. The following judgements advance the said proposition. The respective judgments and their relevant parts are reproduced below:- ? Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan 5 "Rule laid down in the cases mentioned above is that on the issue of personal need, assertion or claim on oath by landlord if consistent with his averments in his application and not shaken in cross-examination, or disproved in rebuttal is sufficient to prove that need is bona fide." ? Wasim Ahmad Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz 6 "3. Leave was granted to consider the contention that the plea of personal requirement was not bona fide as a flat was available in the same premises which A the respondent did not occupy. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent is residing in a bugalow in Defence Housing Authority and that it is not imaginable that he would shift in a small house in a dingy and congested locality. He further contended that during the pendency of the case a portion of the house, which was an independent apartment, fell vacant, but the respondent did not occupy it and rented it out to the tenant. On the basis of these facts it is contended that the respondent's need is neither genuine nor bona fide. So far the first contention is concerned the learned counsel for the respondent stated that the respondent is residing in a rented house with his son in the Defence Housing Authority. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant therefore does not hold water because firstly, the respondent is not residing in his own house, but is residing with his son who has rented out a house in that area, and secondly, in these circumstances if a landlord chooses to reside in his own house which may be in a locality which is much inferior and congested than the place where he is residing on rent, it cannot be termed as mala fide. It is the choice of the landlord to choose the house or the place where he wants to reside." (Emphasis added) ? Rabia Jamal (Supra) "22. On the basis of the above decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is apparent that once the landlord has adduced evidence by stating that they require the Said Tenement for their personal use in good faith, thereafter the burden shifts on the tenant to show either that the landlord did not require the Said Tenement for her personal use in good faith or that the Said Tenement could not be used by the landlord for the purpose as indicated in the Application under clause (vii) of Subsection (2) of Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. However, while raising such a contention it is not open to the tenant to allege mala fide on the part of the landlord by adducing evidence to state that the landlord had alternative premises or for that matter that the landlord had alternative premises that were more suitable for the needs of the landlord. This right to choose from amongst a host of properties that are available to a landlord as to which of those properties the landlord requires for their personal use vests solely with the landlord to the exclusion of all others." (Emphasis added) ? Shakeel Ahmed (Supra) "6. For seeking eviction of a tenant from the rented shop, the only requirement of law is the proof of his bona fide need by the landlord, which stands discharged the moment he appears in the witness box and makes such statement on oath or in the form of an affidavit-in-evidence as prescribed by law, if it remains unshattered in cross-examination and un-rebutted in the evidence adduced by the opposite party." 8. The Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 do not advance his case. It is relevant to mention that both the judgment has been passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court and are distinguishable for the following reasons: - ? In the case of Muhammad Younus (supra) the tenement in question was not an industrial plot and the landlord in the case was unable to show how the premises can be utilized for an industrial purpose, which was the plea taken by the landlord in the rent application. ? In the case of Naveed Merchant (supra) it was held that the landlord who is already in occupation of another plot was to show that he requires additional space on the ground of insufficiency. Whilst I concur with the dicta laid down in the said judgement, the facts of the present petition reflect that the Respondent No.1 has established his need for additional space. The said need was specifically stated in the rent application and Affidavit in Evidence. The said plea remained unshattered during cross-examination. 9. The argument of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Respondent No.1 has several other properties in which the employees can be accommodated, does not find favour with me. It is the discretion of the landlord/ owner to choose the property he wishes to use and in that respect the tenant cannot dictate how and in what manner the owner should utilize his property. 10. Any adjudication on Section 15 (2) (vii) would be deficient without referring to the accountability mechanism provided for under Section 15-A of the SRPO. The same is reproduced below: - 3[("15-A"] 4[ Where the land-lord, who has obtained the possession of a building under section 14 or premises under clause (vii) of section 15, relets the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession ?__ (i) he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building of the premises, as the case may be, payable immediately before the possession was so obtained. (ii) The tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building or the premises, as the case may be, and the Controller shall make an order accordingly."] 11. The provision reproduced above was introduced by the legislature through the Sindh Ordinance No. II of 1980 on January 21, 1980, to ensure that ejectment proceedings are not abused and due protection is given to the tenant in cases where the landlord/owner has misused the provisions of the Ordinance. An embargo of one year has been placed on the landlord in case the landlord wishes to rent out the property to another tenant. The protection given, which is also available to the present Petitioner, has been expounded in the following judgments, relevant parts of the same are reproduced: - a) Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir. 7 "Sufficient protection has been postulated in section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which in the event of use of premises other than personal rise not only postulates punishment for the landlord but also provide an effective mechanism for restoration of the possession to the evicted tenant before the Controller who would be entitled to exercise such authority on due consideration of the facts. Since the law provides an alternate and effective remedy to defuse the impression of the respondent, I think the apprehension is not well founded in the present state of circumstances." b) Mst. Dilshad Bibi v. Ramzan Ali. "Keeping in view the only restriction imposed on the personal need by way of section 15-A of the SRPO as well as authorities quoted by the petitioner and the evidence brought on record the petitioner has proved that the shop is required for personal need to be used by her son and no doubt has been created in this respect. The apprehension of the respondent that the petitioner may let out the premises after obtaining the same to other tenant is covered by section 15-A of the SRPO which remove the above apprehension." For the foregoing reasons the instant petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. SA/G-11/Sindh Petition dismissed.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 491---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Habeas corpus---Illegal detention---Petitioner filed a petition for the recovery of his daughter from the alleged illegal and unlawful custody of private respondent---Held: Detenue had been produced by SHO of concerned Police Station in pursuance of a direction issued by the Court---Detenue stated that she contracted marriage with private respondent out of her sweet will, free consent and without any duress and she was living with her husband and she was not abducted by any person, nor she was kept in illegal confinement by anybody---Detenue refused to accompany her father/ petitioner expressing apprehension to her life as well as life of her husband at his hands---Detenue appeared to have attained a person of the age of discretion and was found to have attained puberty, as such she was competent to enter into marriage with any person of her own choice and no consent of any wali or guardian was required for that purpose---Detenue further stated that her father/petitioner had registered FIR for offence under S.365, P.P.C, against unknown persons, wherein she got recorded her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C before the Judicial Magistrate, categorically refuting the story of her abduction---Since detenue happened to be a grownup female and free citizen of this country, hence she could not be forced to reside along with her father/petitioner against her wishes---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Iqbal v. The State PLD 1983 FSC 9; Zarjuma alias Jamna Bibi v. Station House Officer, Police Saddar, District Bhakkar and 4 others PLD 2009 Lah. 546 and Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate and 2 others PLD 2021 Lah. 21 rel. Syed Ali Allow-u-Din along with Petitioner. Hafiz Muhammad Zaheer Nasir, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab along with Sheraz-Inspector and Shahid ASI for the State. Order Tanveer Ahmad Sheikh, J .--- The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with Section 491 Cr.P.C in order to recover his daughter Noor Fatima (minor) from the alleged illegal and unlawful custody of respondent No.5 Amir Ali. 2. It was maintained that on 26.01.2025, her daughter/detenue aged about 16, was abducted away by four male and two female unknown culprits in the presence of his son Hanan Ahmad. 3. Detenue has been produced today by respondent No.4/SHO PS City, Pindi Bhattian in pursuance of a direction issued by this Court. On query she stated that she contracted marriage with respondent No.5/Amir Ali out of her sweet will free consent and without any duress and she was living happy matrimonial life with her husband and she was not abducted by any person, nor she was kept in illegal confinement by anybody. She refused to accompany her father/petitioner expressing apprehension to her life as well as life of her husband at his hands. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner raised the objection that detenue was a minor. She was just 16, as such she was not competent to form free and independent opinion, hence her consent of living with respondent No.5 should not be given any weight. 5. Petitioner was thoroughly examined by me in the open Court. She appears to be a person of the age of discretion. She was found to be puberty, as such in my humble opinion, she was competent to enter into marriage with any person of her own choice and no consent of any 'Wali' or guardian was required for that purpose. The Hon'ble Federal Shariat Court adopted the said view in a detailed judgment 'Muhammad Iqbal v. The State' (PLD 1983 FSC 9). The Honourable Court further held Nikah of a pubert girl was not invalid for the want of permission of 'Wali'. If any further reference in this regard is required, that can be have from 'Zarjuma alias Jamna Bibi v. Station House Officer, Police Station Saddar District Bhakkar and 4 others' (PLD 2009 Lah. 546). I have further placed my relieance upon "Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate and 2 others' (PLD 2021 Lahore 21). Detenue further stated that her father/petitioner had got registered FIR No.353/2025, dated 28.01.2025, for offence under Section 365 P.P.C, registered with Police Station A-Division, District Sheikhupura against unknown persons, wherein she got recorded her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Judicial Magistrate Section 30, Lahore categorically refuting the story of her abduction. 6. Since detenue happens to be a grownup female and free citizen of this Country, hence, cannot be forced to reside along with her father/petitioner against her wishes. 7. Detenue is set at liberty. She is allowed to go along with her husband. 8. In the light of above discussion, the present petition has no force. 9. Security amount of Rs.30,000/- deposited by petitioner on the direction of this Court is ordered to be returned to him by office. 10. Petition dismissed. JK/T-4/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(b)---Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, R.4(2)---Possession of 3000 grams hemp/bhang---Bail, grant of---Non-association of private witnesses during recovery proceedings---Delay in sending samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory---As per the prosecution and memo. of occurrence the recovery was allegedly made from the accused from a densely populated street, but no private persons were cited as witnesses---First Information Report was registered on 27-01-2025, while the contraband sample was sent to the Chemical Examiner on 12-02-2025, resulting in a delay of 15 days without any explanation---Investigation Officer failed to adhere to the strict compliance of the provisions of Control of Narcotics Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001, particularly sending of sample for analysis after more than 03 days---As per R.4 of the Control of Narcotics Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, the recovered contraband needs to besent by Investigation agency within 3 days from the date of recovery to the laboratory, whereas in instant case, such requirement had not been complied with by the investigation agency, which created serious doubt upon prosecution case until and unless it gave cogent reasons for such delay---Witnesses cited in FIR were police officials, hence there was no apprehension of tampering with the evidence---Accused had made out a case for grant of post arrest bail---Accordingly, bail application was allowed and accused was admitted to post arrest bail. Ismail v. The State 2023 MLD 942; Muhammad Amir v. The State 2022 MLD 1538 and Ali Khan v. The State 2022 PCr.LJ 690 ref. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Any doubt, even if it arises at bail stage, should go in favour of accused. Naveed Sattar v. The State 2024 SCMR 205 ref. Manzoor Hussain Larik for Applicant. Syed Sardar Ali Shah Rizvi, Addl: Prosecutor General for the State. Order Ali Haidar ADA, J .--- The applicant seeks his post arrest bail in crime No. 48/2025, registered at Police Station "B" Section Khairpur for offence punishable under section 9(b) of Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act-2022, as his post arrest bail was declined by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge-1/(NCTC)/Special Judge for (CNS) Khairpur vide order dated 10-02-2025, which he has impugned by preferring the instant Crl. Bail Application. 2. The brief facts of the Prosecution Case inter alia are that on 27-1-2025 the police party headed by ASI Bux Ali Shahni during patrolling reached at the street of Nizamani Mohallah, wherein they saw the applicant who tried to escape, so, on his suspicious movement the police party apprehended accused/applicant, as due to non-presence of private mashir the said ASI appointed his subordinate staff as mashir and in their presence recovered hemp/bhang weighing 3000 grams lying in black color shopper from his possession, then after preparing memo. of arrest and recovery and later on, registered the FIR. 3. The Learned Counsel for the applicant argued that applicant is innocent and has falsely been implicated in this case; that property was foisted upon him as neither video recording was taken by police party nor private persons were cited as witness, the offence does not falls under prohibitory clause and there is delay of 15 days for sending the sample to Chemical Examiner, lastly he prays for grant of post arrest bail. 4. Learned Additional Prosecutor General supports the order of trial Court and further added that recovery is effected from physical possession of the applicant; therefore he is not entitled for concession of bail. 5. As per prosecution, the incident occurred at street of Nizamani Mohallah, the place of incident is densely populated as indicated by Memo. of occurrence. Reliance is placed upon the cases of Ismail v. The State reported as 2023 MLD 942, Muhammad Amir v. The State (2022 MLD 1538) and Ali Khan v. The State (2022 PCr.LJ 690). 6. The FIR was registered on 27-01-2025, while the contraband sample was sent to the Chemical Examiner on 12-02-2025, resulting in a delay of 15 days without any explanation. It reveals that Investigation Officer terribly failed to adhere to the strict compliance of the provisions of Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001, after particularly sending of sample for analysis after more than 03 days. In this regard Rule 4 of said Rules is reproduced:- 4. Despatch of Sample for test of analysts (1) Reasonable quantity of samples from the Narcotic drugs psychotropic substances or the controlled substances seized, shall be drawn on the spot of recovery and despatched to be officer-incharge of nearest Federal Narcotic Testing Laboratory, depending upon the availability for test facilities, either by insured post or through special messenger duly authorized for the purpose. (2). Samples may be despatched for analysis under the cover of Test Memorandum specified in Form-1 at the earliest, but not later than seventy-two hours of the seizure. The envelope should be sealed and marked "Secrete Drug Sample/Test Memorandum". 7. It becomes crystal clear that the recovered contraband needs to be sent by Investigation agency within 3 days from the date of recovery to the laboratory, whereas in instant case, such requirement has not been complied with by the investigation agency, which creates serious doubt upon prosecution until and unless it gives cogent reasons for such delay. It is well established law that doubt, if arises then it should go in favour of accused even at bail stage, reliance is placed on the case of Naveed Sattar v. The State 2024 SCMR 205. 8. The witnesses cited in FIR are police officials, hence there is no any apprehension of tampering with the evidence. 9. In view of the foregoing reasons, the applicant has make out a case for grant of post arrest Bail. Accordingly, instant Bail application is allowed and applicant Gulzar Hussain son of Fida Hussain by caste Makrani is admitted to post arrest Bail subject to furnishing his solvent surety in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- and P.R Bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. 10. Needless to mention that the observation made hereinabove are tentative in nature and shall not prejudice the case of either party at the time of trial. MWA/G-15/Sindh Bail granted.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss.15(2)(vii), 15-A & 21---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Ejectment of tenant---Personal bona fide need of landlord---Admission as to relationship of landlord and tenant---Plea of multiple tenements by the tenant---Legality---Ejectment application filed by the respondent/landlord was allowed by the Rent Controller and the First Rent Appeal preferred by the petitioner/tenant was dismissed----Validity---High Court disagreed with the plea taken by the tenant---Statement of landlord had gone unrebutted, thus, his personal need stood established---Once the landlord steps into the witness box and the plea of personal need is unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under S. 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Act, 1979---In presence of several properties, it is the discretion of the landlord/owner to choose the property he wishes to use and in that respect the tenant cannot dictate how and in what manner the owner utilize his property---An embargo of one year has been placed on the landlord in case the landlord wishes to rent out the property to another tenant, which protection was also available to the petitioner/tenant---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Naveed Merchant v. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs PLD 2012 Sindh 23 and Muhammad Younus v. Additional District Judge (VII), Karachi (South) 2018 YLR 1284 distinguished. Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh 2010 SCMR 1925; Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhtar C.P. No. S-495 of 2023; Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1296; Wasim Ahmed Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz 1996 SCMR 1055 and Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir 1999 MLD 3011 rel. Muhammad Khan for Petitioner. Asim Iqbal for Respondent No. 1 along with Farmanullah Khan and Syeda Maryam for Respondent. Irshad Ahmed Shaikh, A.A.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 10th March, 2025. Order Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J .---The instant petition has impugned the Judgment and Decree dated 26.02.2024 ("Impugned Judgment") passed in F.R.A. No.10/2024. Brief facts of the instant petition can be summarised as follows: - 1. The Respondent No.1 filed Rent Application No.845/2022 under Section 15 (2) (vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 ("SRPO") on the sole ground of personal bona fide need. The said Rent Application was allowed vide order dated 30.11.2023. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed FRA No.10/2024 under Section 21 of the SRPO and the same was dismissed vide Impugned Judgment and Decree dated 26.02.2024. It has been contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner has been in possession of the tenement for approximately 40 years and has regularly been paying the rent to the Respondent. It is further stated by the learned counsel that the Tenancy Agreements were mutually renewed from time to time and there is no default on part of the Petitioner and it was only the Respondent who arbitrarily did not receive the rent for which the Petitioner had no option but to file MRC No.463/2022. 2. It was however stated by the learned counsel that rent application filed by Respondent was on the sole ground of personal bona fide need and the aspect highlighted in the paragraph above need not require any further deliberation. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the case against the Petitioner has been filed malafidely and the tenement is not required by the Respondent in good faith. Learned counsel further stated that the Respondent No.1 has 14 tenants and has only issued notices to two tenants which reflect that the requirement is not bona fide and the Petitioner for reasons best known to Respondent No.1, is being specifically targeted. It has also been contended by the learned counsel that the requirement of the Respondent No.1 according to his own statement is approximately 6000 sq. ft., whereas, Petitioner is in possession of only 2300 sq. ft., therefore, even if the Petitioner is ejected from the tenement in question, it would still not satisfy the alleged bona fide of the Respondent No.1. 3. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel that the Respondent No.1 already has significant number of properties in which the employees of Respondent No.1 and its subsidiary companies may be accommodated. Lastly, learned counsel has submitted that the Respondent No1 had filed an application under Section 8 of the SRPO for fair rent against other tenants and this ground is enough to extinguish the myth of personal bona fide need. Learned counsel in this regard has relied upon the following judgments: - i. Naveed Merchant v. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs ii. Muhammad Younus v. Additional District Judge (VII), Karachi (South) 4. Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has vehemently argued that the relationship of tenant and landlord has been admitted by the parties and the learned counsel to establish the personal bona fide need of the Respondent No.1 has taken me through the following documents. The same were filed along-with the objections to the instant petition and it is admitted that the same were exhibited before the Learned Rent Controller. Sr. Document name Date Annexure 1. Tenancy Agreement 15.07.20198 (sic) R/1 2. Memorandum 23.12.2019 R/2 3. Scheme of Amalgamation R/3 4. SECP Letter 08.11.2021 R/4 5. Notification of SECP 15.12.2021 R/5 6. Eviction Notice 20.12.2021 R/6 7. Termination of Tenancy 01.12.2021 R/7 8. List of Employees R/8 5. It has been argued in the light of the documents above identified by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 that the said Respondent has satisfied his requirement for personal bona fide need and, therefore, the Petitioner may be ejected from the premises. The learned counsel has more specifically relied on the list of employees (R/8) which according to him need to be accommodated in the tenement in question. Lastly, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has stated that in the light of the concurrent findings against the Petitioner, the same require no interference by this Court. He relied upon the following judgments: - i. Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh ii. Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhtar 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. I have specifically asked the learned counsel for the Petitioner to identify parts of the cross-examination of Respondent No.1 in which, according to him, the plea of personal bona fide need has been shattered. Learned counsel in response read out the following part of the cross-examination: - "There are 14 tenants in the rented premises building with different areas I do not know the build-up used are of the rented premises building. It is correct that as per Exb. A/8, five industries were approved for merger with applicant, present, National Industrial Park and Furniture Pakistan have been merged with applicant and remaining are under process. It is correct that I have not mentioned the shifting of office of M/s. Furniture Pakistan at Rented Premises Building. I do not know whether the office of said Furniture Pakistan still exists at its previous place. The office of the National Industrial Park was situated at FTC Building. There were about 35 employees of National Industrial Park Company. It is correct that as per Nolice Exb./13, the office premises of NIP was to be vacated on 31.01.2022. It is correct that office of NIP was vacated on 31.01.2022. The employees of the NIP have been given place at second floor of the rented premises. It is correct that as per Exb.A/6, the applicant issued termination notice to Opponent on 20.12.2021 and opponent was required to vacate the premises in three months. It is correct that said three months expired on 20.03.2022. It is correct applicant vacated the office from FTC first and then issued notice to the opponent. It is correct that I have not produced documentary proof of handing over and taking over of the FTC premises. It correct that NIP office at FTC was consisting of an area of about 6112 square feet. It is correct that area of the office of the Gizri Corporation is about 1391 sq. ft. it is correct that area total got to be vacated from Gizri Corporation and Petroleum Packages is about 2300 sq. ft. and whereas the previous office was situated on 6112 square feet. It is correct Exb.A/14 does not show the area under occupation of the tenants mentioned therein. It is correct that applicant has not given vacation notice to other 12 tenants of the rented premises. It is incorrect to suggest that applicant wants to rent out the premises of the opponent to someone else. It is incorrect to suggest that premises of Opponent is not required for personal use of the applicant. It is correct that Exb.A/12 is not upon Letter Head of the Applicant Company. It is correct that Exb.A/12 does not show as to when the employees of NIP shifted to rented premises building. It is incorrect to suggest that strength of the NIP employees is not 35. It is incorrect to suggest that Exb. A/12 is a fake list. I do not know number of other buildings belonging to the Applicant. There is no any other property/office of NIP. It is incorrect to suggest that applicant filed this case on mala fide." 7. I have examined the cross-examination reproduced above and I disagree with the plea taken by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The statement of the Respondent No.1/ landlord has gone unrebutted; therefore, his personal need stands established. It is settled principle of law that once the landlord steps into the witness box and the plea of personal need is unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under Section 15 of the SRPO. The following judgements advance the said proposition. The respective judgments and their relevant parts are reproduced below:- ? Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan "Rule laid down in the cases mentioned above is that on the issue of personal need, assertion or claim on oath by landlord if consistent with his averments in his application and not shaken in cross-examination, or disproved in rebuttal is sufficient to prove that need is bona fide." ? Wasim Ahmad Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz "3. Leave was granted to consider the contention that the plea of personal requirement was not bona fide as a flat was available in the same premises which A the respondent did not occupy. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent is residing in a bugalow in Defence Housing Authority and that it is not imaginable that he would shift in a small house in a dingy and congested locality. He further contended that during the pendency of the case a portion of the house, which was an independent apartment, fell vacant, but the respondent did not occupy it and rented it out to the tenant. On the basis of these facts it is contended that the respondent's need is neither genuine nor bona fide. So far the first contention is concerned the learned counsel for the respondent stated that the respondent is residing in a rented house with his son in the Defence Housing Authority. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant therefore does not hold water because firstly, the respondent is not residing in his own house, but is residing with his son who has rented out a house in that area, and secondly, in these circumstances if a landlord chooses to reside in his own house which may be in a locality which is much inferior and congested than the place where he is residing on rent, it cannot be termed as mala fide. It is the choice of the landlord to choose the house or the place where he wants to reside." (Emphasis added) ? Rabia Jamal (Supra) "22. On the basis of the above decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is apparent that once the landlord has adduced evidence by stating that they require the Said Tenement for their personal use in good faith, thereafter the burden shifts on the tenant to show either that the landlord did not require the Said Tenement for her personal use in good faith or that the Said Tenement could not be used by the landlord for the purpose as indicated in the Application under clause (vii) of Subsection (2) of Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. However, while raising such a contention it is not open to the tenant to allege mala fide on the part of the landlord by adducing evidence to state that the landlord had alternative premises or for that matter that the landlord had alternative premises that were more suitable for the needs of the landlord. This right to choose from amongst a host of properties that are available to a landlord as to which of those properties the landlord requires for their personal use vests solely with the landlord to the exclusion of all others." (Emphasis added) ? Shakeel Ahmed (Supra) "6. For seeking eviction of a tenant from the rented shop, the only requirement of law is the proof of his bona fide need by the landlord, which stands discharged the moment he appears in the witness box and makes such statement on oath or in the form of an affidavit-in-evidence as prescribed by law, if it remains unshattered in cross-examination and un-rebutted in the evidence adduced by the opposite party." 8. The Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 do not advance his case. It is relevant to mention that both the judgment has been passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court and are distinguishable for the following reasons: - ? In the case of Muhammad Younus (supra) the tenement in question was not an industrial plot and the landlord in the case was unable to show how the premises can be utilized for an industrial purpose, which was the plea taken by the landlord in the rent application. ? In the case of Naveed Merchant (supra) it was held that the landlord who is already in occupation of another plot was to show that he requires additional space on the ground of insufficiency. Whilst I concur with the dicta laid down in the said judgement, the facts of the present petition reflect that the Respondent No.1 has established his need for additional space. The said need was specifically stated in the rent application and Affidavit in Evidence. The said plea remained unshattered during cross-examination. 9. The argument of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Respondent No.1 has several other properties in which the employees can be accommodated, does not find favour with me. It is the discretion of the landlord/owner to choose the property he wishes to use and in that respect the tenant cannot dictate how and in what manner the owner should utilize his property. 10. Any adjudication on Section 15 (2)(vii) would be deficient without referring to the accountability mechanism provided for under Section 15-A of the SRPO. The same is reproduced below: - 3[("15-A"] 4[ Where the land-lord, who has obtained the possession of a building under section 14 or premises under clause (vii) of section 15, relets the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession--- (i) he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building of the premises, as the case may be, payable immediately before the possession was so obtained. (ii) The tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building or the premises, as the case may be, and the Controller shall make an order accordingly."] 11. The provision reproduced above was introduced by the legislature through the Sind Ordinance No. II of 1980 on January 21, 1980, to ensure that ejectment proceedings are not abused and due protection is given to the tenant in cases where the landlord/owner has misused the provisions of the Ordinance. An embargo of one year has been placed on the landlord in case the landlord wishes to rent out the property to another tenant. The protection given, which is also available to the present Petitioner, has been expounded in the following judgments, relevant parts of the same are reproduced: - a) Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir. "Sufficient protection has been postulated in section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which in the event of use of premises other than personal rise not only postulates punishment for the landlord but also provide an effective mechanism for restoration of the possession to the evicted tenant before the Controller who would be entitled to exercise such authority on due consideration of the facts. Since the law provides an alternate and effective remedy to defuse the impression of the respondent, I think the apprehension is not well founded in the present state of circumstances." b) Mst. Dilshad Bibi v. Ramzan Ali. "Keeping in view the only restriction imposed on the personal need by way of section 15-A of the SRPO as well as authorities quoted by the petitioner and the evidence brought on record the petitioner has proved that the shop is required for personal need to be used by her son and no doubt has been created in this respect. The apprehension of the respondent that the petitioner may let out the premises after obtaining the same to other tenant is covered by section 15-A of the SRPO which remove the above apprehension." For the foregoing reasons the instant petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. SA/P-6/Sindh Petition dismissed.

Summary: ----S.9 [as amended by Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act, 2018]---Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (XIII of 1976), S.29---Suits for declaration and injunction instituted by students seeking correction of date of birth and change of name---Jurisdiction of Civil Courts---Ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court by special law---Extending the ouster clause to all cases covered by a general or special law---Special law in place directly dealing with the correction of date of birth and change of name---Jurisdiction of civil court ousted in such matters---Core issue before the civil court was with regards to its lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate such suits as specific provisions for seeking change in date of birth and change in name were provided under the calendar of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Rawalpindi Volume-I which dealt with Act and Regulations whereas Volume II of the calendar prescribed the Rules---Chapter-III of Volume I provided the general regulations and Regulation 5 dealt with the matter relating to correction in date of birth of a candidate---Chapter-17 of Volume II of the calendar, on the other hand, provided the mode and manner of change in the name or surnames---Held: The amended version of S. 9, C.P.C. was in field but it was not taken into consideration at all---It was an admitted fact that all suits were instituted by the students after the amendment in S. 9, C.P.C.---From bare perusal of S. 9, C.P.C., it was clear that by virtue of amendment introduced through Act No. XIV of 2018 dated 20th March, 2018 to the extent of Province of Punjab, a radical and notable change was introduced by the legislature in the existing S. 9, C.P.C. and ouster clause was extended to the case for which a general or a special law was in force---This material change was undoubtedly not under consideration before the courts at the time of rendering the judgments---High Court allowed the civil revision and remanded the matters to civil court for deciding the question of jurisdiction afresh after keeping in consideration the amendment in S.9 C.P.C. introduced through Punjab Amendment Act No.XIV of 2018. Nestle Pak Limited, Lahore through Authorized Signatory and another v. Shehryar Kureshi and 3 others 2024 CLD 502 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 9 [as amended by Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act, 2018]---Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (XIII of 1976), S. 29---General jurisdiction of civil court---Ouster of civil court jurisdiction---Scope---Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018), 'effect of'---In case of special law directly dealing with the subject-matter the jurisdiction of civil court would be ousted---Section 9 C.P.C., bestows jurisdiction upon the civil court to try all suits of civil nature except the suits for which its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred---Civil courts are, thus, courts of ultimate jurisdiction---It is trite law that even if there is any bar in the statute ousting the jurisdiction of civil court, it cannot operate as absolute---Civil courts are courts of ultimate jurisdiction and unless jurisdiction is either expressly or impliedly barred, the final decision with regard to a civil right, duty or obligation, shall be that of the civil courts---Where allegation of mala fide action has been made in plaint, the civil court despite the bar placed on the relevant statute can examine the acts on account of being tainted with mala fide, coram non judice or void---The civil court, however, cannot jump into the matter, if its jurisdiction is either expressly or impliedly barred unless remedy provided in the relevant statute is exhausted---Due to the specific bar contained under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, which comprehensively provided a statutory framework for addressing matters pertaining to the correction of date of birth and change of name in educational records, the amended provision of S. 9, C.P.C., would be attracted---In light of the express exclusion provided by the special law, the jurisdiction of the civil court stood ousted, as the legislature had entrusted such matters to the exclusive domain of the authorities established under the said Act, thereby precluding adjudication by civil courts---High Court allowed the civil revision and remanded the matters to civil court for deciding the question of jurisdiction afresh after keeping in consideration the amendment in S.9 C.P.C., introduced through Code of Civil Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act (XIV of 2018). Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad v. Muhammad Waleed 2021 MLD 123 ref: (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 9, 151 & O. XIV, Rr. 1, 2---Duty of courts to determine question of jurisdiction at limine stage---Proceedings without jurisdiction are void---Absence of jurisdiction vitiates entire proceedings---Non-framing of material issues---Omission to frame jurisdictional issue---Question of jurisdiction is always pivotal because if a court or tribunal having no jurisdiction proceeds with a matter and decides it, the entire proceedings would be illegal and coram non judice---It is thus obligatory for the court or tribunal to settle the question of jurisdiction at the very outset---In the present case, none of the courts had either framed proper issues to this effect or attended this pivotal question with judicious approach---Civil revision was allowed and matters were remanded to consider "whether the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit in light of S. 9 C.P.C., as amended by Punjab Amendment Act No.XIV of 2018 in light of provisions contained in the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976 as well as the rules and regulations made thereunder". Zahid Zaman Khan and others v. Khan Afsar and others PLD 2016 SC 409 rel. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tahir Edible Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLC 416 ref. Haroon Irshad Janjua for Petitioner. Ms. Nosheen Ashraf for Respondent No.1. Malik Muhammad Khalid, Law Officer, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for Respondent No.2. Date of hearing: 26th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----S. 19---Ejectment of tenant---Striking off defence---Petitioner/ landlord was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court setting aside eviction order passed against respondent/tenant to vacate rented premises---Validity---Oral testimonies and documentary evidence produced by petitioner/landlord remained unchallenged, as right of respondent/tenant to cross-examine petitioner's/landlord's witnesses was struck off and that order attained finality, having remained unchallenged by respondent/tenant---In absence of any rebuttal or cross-examination, evidence led by petitioner/landlord stood uncontro-verted---Material on record conclusively established that petitioner/ landlord was lawful owner of the property---Rent proceedings , by their very nature, are summary in character and are intended to ensure swift and efficient resolution of landlord-tenant disputes, particularly in cases of default, so as to safeguard landlord's Constitutionally protected right to property---Petitioner/landlord remained embroiled in litigation for over seven years merely to recover possession of his property---Course of delay ran counter to the foundational objectives of rent legislation and summary adjudication---Such undue delays not only eroded Constitutional rights of property owners but had also given rise to broader economic and social justice concerns---For landlords, prolonged litigation entails financial strain, loss of rental income, and an inability to utilize their property for productive purposes, which can hinder economic growth---Conversely, tenants facing eviction proceedings often live in uncertainty, which can affect their social and economic stability---A just legal system must, therefore, ensure an equitable balance between rights of landlords and tenants, a balance that is fundamentally disrupted when cases are permitted to stagnate in judicial pipeline---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court and restored that of Lower Appellate Court, which had rightly upheld the claim of petitioner/landlord---Supreme Court directed respondent/tenant to vacate property in question within two months---Appeal was allowed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10A---Right to fair trial and due process of law---Artificial Intelligence (AI), use of---Principle---Right to a fair trial before a competent, independent, and impartial judge is a fundamental principle of due process---AI must not overshadow the core guarantee of judicial autonomy--- While AI has potential to improve consistency and efficiency in legal processes, it also carries risk of introducing biases and limiting judicial discretion---Fairness and transparency must apply equally to AI-assisted rulings---Though AI may enhance efficiency and consistency, it cannot replicate normative judgment, ethical reflection, or contextual sensitivity essential to the act of judging---Dignity of judicial role lies not in mechanical generation of outcomes but in deliberative process of reasoning, listening, and responding a task that remains inherently and irreducibly human---Judicial reasoning involves not only logic but also humanity and it requires attentiveness, moral courage, and the ability to question unjust laws or outdated precedents- --By contrast, AI operates within the constraints of existing data and lacks creative imagination and jurisprudential foresight necessary to develop new legal doctrines or safeguard emergent rights---Comparative jurisdictions have cautiously explored AI-assisted adjudication. Article 10 provides: For the determination of his civil rights and obligations or in any criminal charge against him a person shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process. Article 37(d) provides: The State shall ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. John Varghese, 'Artificial Intelligence Assisted Judicial Processes - A Primer' SSRN accessed 8 April 2025; Adrian Zuckerman, 'Artificial Intelligence in the Administration of Justice' in The Civil Procedure Rules at 20 (Oxford University Press, 2020) and Yadong Cui, Artificial Intelligence and Judicial Modernization (Springer, 2020). J Juan David Guti?rrez, 'ChatGPT in Colombian Courts: Why We Need to Have a Conversation About the Digital Literacy of the Judiciary' (23 February 2023) Verfassungsblog https://verfassungsblog.de/colombian-chatgpt/ accessed 6 April 2025. Janus Rose, 'A Judge Just Used ChatGPT to Make a Court Decision' (3 February 2023) VICE used-chatgpt-to-make-court-decision/ accessed 6 April 2025; 6 Bob Ambrogi, 'Should Courts Use ChatGPT? In This Appellate Opinion, Both the Majority and Dissenting Opinions Did' (10 March 2025) LawNext https://www.lawnext.com/2025/03/should-courts-use-chatgpt- in-this-appellate-opinion-both-the-majority-and-dissenting-opinions-did.html accessed 6 April 2025; District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 'Ross v. United States' (2025) Justia district-of-columbia/court-of-appeals/2025/23-cm-1067.html accessed 6 April 2025; Judge Amir Munir, Additional District and Sessions Judge (Punjab) in a civil appeal (Muhammad Iqbal v. Zayad) judgment dated 28.03.2023 < ..pdf> and a pre-arrest bail (The State v. AM (a juvenile) judgment dated 29.03.2023 < 2023.-Offence-376iii-51 1-P.S-Bhagat..-allowed.-29.03.2023.pdf> accessed 28 March 2025; AI-driven methodologies, including machine learning ("ML") algorithms, generative AI ("GenAI"), predictive modelling and advanced text analytics, e.g., natural language processing ("NLP"); Joely Williamson, 'The Rise of AI in Legal Practice: Opportunities, Challenges, & Ethical Considerations' (21 March 2025) Colo Tech LJ https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=1297 accessed 6 April 2025; LexisNexis, 'The Power of Artificial Intelligence in Legal Research' (6 November 2023) https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/b/thought-leadership/posts/the-power-of-artificialintelligence-in-legal - research accessed 6 April 2025; This includes the NLP, ML, and Large-Scale Data Analytics; Thomson Reuters, 'Westlaw: Legal Research Platforms' https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/westlaw accessed 29 March 2025; Thomson Reuters, 'Westlaw Expert Materials' . thomsonreuters.com/en/products/westlaw/expert-materials accessed 29 March 2025; Thomson Reuters, 'Compare Westlaw Plans' https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/westlaw/plans-andpricing accessed 29 March 2025; Thomson Reuters, 'Westlaw Editorial Enhancements' https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/westlaw/expert - materials accessed 29 March 2025. 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Casetext Help Center https://help.casetext.com/en/articles/7040012-what-is-cocounsel accessed 29 March 2025; vLex, 'Legal Research Platform Overview' https://vlex.com/legal-research accessed 29 March 2025; vLex, 'International Research Tools and Jurisdictions' https://vlex.com/inter-national-research accessed 29 March 2025; vLex Networks Ltd, 'vLex: International Legal Research Platform' https://vlex.com accessed 1 April 2025; Sandeep Singh Sengar and others, 'Generative Artificial Intelligence: A Systematic Review and Applications' (2025) 34 Multimed Tools Appl 913 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-024-20016-1 accessed 29 March 2025; Zarif Bin Akhtar, 'Unveiling the Evolution of Generative AI (GAI): A Comprehensive and Investigative Analysis Toward LLM Models (2021-2024) and Beyond' (2024) 11 J Elec Sys & Info Tech 22 https://doi.org/10.1186/s43067-024-00145-1 accessed 29 March 2025; Leonardo Banh and Gero Strobel, 'Generative Artificial Intelligence' (2023) 33 Electron Mkts 63 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12525-023-00680-1 accessed 29 March 2025; Qihao Zhu and Jianxi Luo, 'Generative Pre-Trained Transformer for Design Concept Generation' (2022) Proceedings of the Design Society https://doi.org/10.1017/pds.2022.185 accessed 2 April, 2025, and Deepti Raj and others, 'Generative Pre-Trained Transformer (GPT) in Research: A Systematic Review' (2023) 15(2) Information 99 https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/15/2/99 accessed 2 April 2025; Judge GPT has been conceptualized and extended to the FJA by Professor Elliott Ash and Professor Christoph Goessmann of ETH Zurich, and Dr. Sultan Mehmood of the New Economic School, Russia. The successful implementation of this AI initiative has been overseen by the Director General of the FJA, Mr. Hayat Ali Shah, along with Judge Shazia Munawar Makhdoom, former Additional Director (Programs and ICT), FJA; Judges using AI must ensure transparency, fairness, and accountability by disclosing AI assistance, avoiding overreliance on automated decisions, and maintaining human oversight. They should audit AI for bias, protect data privacy, and allow parties to challenge AI-generated inputs. Judicial training on AI's risks and limitations is essential, and decisions must remain explainable and contestable to uphold due process. AI should aid, not replace judicial discretion, with continuous monitoring to align with legal and ethical standards, preserving public trust in the justice system; Marcel Kahan and Troy A. McKenzie, 'Judge Shopping' (2021) 13 Journal of Legal Analysis 341 https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laab007 accessed 6 April 2025; Shloke Singh Nair, 'Get in, Litigants: We're Going Judge Shopping!' (2025) 93 George Washington Law Review 159; Alexander Gouzoules, 'Choosing Your Judge' (2024) 77 SMU Law Review 699 (Fall); Paul R. Gugliuzza and J. Jonas Anderson, 'Why Do Judges Compete for Cases?' (2024) 104 Boston University Law Review 1963; Ahmed E. 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(c) Administration of justice--- ----Alternate Dispute Resolution---Mediation---Artificial Intelligence (AI), use of---Principle---AI lacks ability to feel emotional tenor, to de-escalate tension between parties, or to recognize the power of silence in a negotiation---AI also cannot build trust across the table through empathy, qualities essential to successful mediation---This is where human mediators continue to hold the advantage---AI may be able to streamline many facets of legal practice, it cannot replicate deeply human process of mediation, where the emphasis is on understanding, negotiating, and resolving conflicts through human interaction---Mediation is emerging as the future power player in dispute resolution. Muhammad Shahzar Ilahi, 'Most Lawyers I Know Will be Irrelevant in 10 Years' < medium= member_ios&rcm = ACoAABMfGrMBX_wunGlxSCmC6vWI765cPtD D2rI> accessed 9 April 2025; Sir Robert Buckland, 'AI, Judges and Judgment: Setting the Scene' M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 220, Harvard Kennedy School (November, 2023) and PhD Researcher in AI and Law, University of Buckingham (U.K.) rel. Moeen Ahmed, Advocate High Court with special permission for Petitioner (through V.L. Lahore Registry). Khalid Jamil, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (through V.L. Lahore Registry). Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)--- ----S. 13---Suit for possession through pre-emption---Right of pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Delay in making such demand---Effect---Petitioner/vendee was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court whereby suit was decreed in favour of respondent/pre-emptor---Validity---As regards the first Talb i.e. Talb-i-Muwathibat, statement of pre-emptor was relevant wherein he admitted in cross-examination that he had gained knowledge of the sale after filing of the suit---Pre-emptor also admitted that he had filed another suit for pre-emption against the petitioners/defendants--- Said stance of the respondent/plaintiff as to knowledge was corroborated by the informer---According to the statement of informer, the knowledge about the sale was gained about 4.5 years ago---Said statement was made by informer on 16.02.2012---Thus, if time was calculated from the date of statement, it would come around 16.07.2007, which furnished a ground to believe that no meeting was held for Talb-i-Muwathibat and it was not performed---Possession of the suit property was delivered on the date of sale, which was a notice to public at large---Hence, the pre-emptor had, for all practical purposes, gained the knowledge immediately but did not make a jumping demand---Such delay was fatal to a successful claim of pre-emption---Respondent/plaintiff (pre-emptor) had failed to prove performance of the essential conditions attached to the exercise of right of pre-emption---As a result, claim of pre-emption could not hold field for not having qualified the mandate of law under the Act, in terms of making of Talbs---Consequently, civil revision was allowed, accordingly. Arshad Iqbal v. Muhammad Hayat 2017 YLR 2358 and Sher Ayaz Khan alias Sheraz Khana, through LRs and others v. Gul Najeeb Khan 2025 SCMR 380 rel. (b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)--- ----S. 13(3)---Suit for possession through pre-emption---Right of pre-emption---Talb-i-Ishhad, notice of---Proof---Names of witnesses of Talb-i-Ishhad notice not mentioned in the plaint---Fatal defect---Petitioner/vendee was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court whereby suit was decreed in favour of respondent/pre-emptor---Validity---Record reflected that no date of Talb-i-Ishhad was mentioned in the plaint, which made it uncertain whether the same was made within two weeks as required under S.13(3) of the Act---Non-mentioning of exact time of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint was fatal for the cause of the respondent/plaintiff---As borne out from the evidence, the fulfillment of condition of Talb-i-Ishhad, by way of service of notices, got sketchy, inter-alia, in terms of statement made by postman---Talb-i-Ishhad was to be established by way of a solid piece of evidence led by the respondent/plaintiff---Plaint did not disclose any details regarding Talb-i-Ishhad with respect to its performance, which was fatal to the case of the respondent/plaintiff---Admittedly, the petitioners/defendants were minors---Statement of post man did not mention as to where the service was made on the said minors, or it was made on anyone else on their behalf, nor was there any e ndorsement of refusal on the envelope or the acknowledgment due--- Respondent/plaintiff admitted that the original notices were not sent---According to the statements of witnesses, the notices were written by hand---Talb-i-Ishhad or demand by establishing evidence means calling of two witnesses by pre-emptor to attest his making of the first demand/ Talb-i-Muwathibat in order to strengthen his claim of pre-emption---Mandatory upon the pre-emptor to have stated the names of witnesses for Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint and then prove their attestation by producing them in the Court---From the perusal of the plaint, it appeared that no such disclosure had been made by the respondent/plaintiff---Said omission was again fatal to the claim of the respondent/plaintiff---Respondent/plaintiff (pre-emptor) had failed to prove performance of the essential conditions attached to the exercise of right of pre-emption---As a result, claim of pre-emption could not hold field for not having qualified the mandate of law under the Act, in terms of making of Talbs---Consequently, civil revision was allowed, accordingly. Ghafoor Khan (deceased) through LRs v. Israr Ahmed 2011 SCMR 1545; Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through LRs and others PLD 2007 SC 302; Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Akram and others 2024 SCMR 692; Mir Muhammad Khan and 2 others v. Haider and others PLD 2020 SC 233; Kashmali Khan and others v. Mst. Malala 2023 SCMR 1176 ;Khan Afsar v. Afsar Khan and others 2015 SCMR 311; Munawar Hussain and others v. Afaq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 721 and Kashmali Khan and others v. Mst. Malala 2023 SCMR 1176 rel. Malik Muhammad Arshad Awan for Petitioners. Syed Ali Raza Gillani for Respondent. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025. Judgment Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom, J .--- This revision petition assails the judgment and decree dated 07.08.2013 ("impugned judgment") passed by the Additional District Judge, Shorekot ("Appellate Court") whereby Trial Court's judgment and decree dated 18.09.2012 ("Trial Court's Judgment") passed by the Civil Judge 1st Class, Shorkot ("Trial Court") was reversed. 2. This civil revision arises out of a suit for possession through pre-emption ("the suit") under the Punjab Pre-Emption Act, 1991("the Act"). Brief facts of the case are that Muhammad Waris ("respondent/plaintiff") filed the suit against Muhammad Nawaz and two others ("petitioners/defendants") of property measuring 2-Kanals, 04 Marlas, description whereof is given in paragraph-1 of the plaint. The contentions raised in the said suit was that Talib Hussain son of Zulfiqar was owner of the suit property, from whom the petitioners/defendants purchased the same through Mutation No.1333 dated 24.04.2007 ("Mutation") for consideration of Rs.65000/-. However, in order to defeat the pre-emptive right of the respondent/plaintiff an inflated sale price of Rs.100,000/- was recorded in the Mutation, which was kept in secret by the petitioners/defendants. The knowledge of the sale was gathered by the respondent/plaintiff on 06.08.2007 at 9:00 a.m. in presence of Gada Hussain son of Muhammad Nawaz Hussain and Ch. Nazir Ahmed son of Barkat Ali, who were present at Dera situated at Chahianwala where Ghulam Shabir son of Sultan came and told the respondent/plaintiff that the petitioners/defendants had purchased the suit property. The respondent/plaintiff had immediately announced his right of pre-emption and made Talb-i-Muwathibat. Thereafter, the respondent/plaintiff made notice of the Talab-i-Ishhad through registered post to the petitioners/defendants, claiming to have a superior right of pre-emption and upon no reply to the same, the respondent/plaintiff filed the suit. The suit was met by a contesting written statement filed by the petitioners/defendants. Upon divergent pleadings, nine issues were framed and the parties were put to trial. The material and most significant issue for determination of the instant revision petition is: II) Whether the plaintiff has fulfilled the prerequisite of Talbs in accordance with Islamic law of pre-emption? OPP. 3. The parties led their respective evidence in trial whereafter the Trial Court dismissed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff vide judgment dated 18.09.2012. The respondent/plaintiff, being aggrieved by the above judgment, preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("C.P.C."). The said appeal was allowed by the Appellate Court vide impugned judgment dated 07.08.2013. As a result, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff against the petitioners/defendants was decreed. Hence, the instant revision petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants submitted that the respondent/plaintiff has completely failed to prove the Talbs in accordance with Section 13 of the Act. Further submitted that the Trial Court vide judgment dated 18.09.2012 has rightly appreciated the facts, circumstances and evidence of the case and thereby has correctly reached at the conclusion that the respondent/plaintiff failed to prove the required Talbs. In addition, it is submitted that the Appellate Court, while passing the impugned judgment dated 07.08.2013, has fell in complete error of fact and of law, which led the Appellate Court to pass the judgment impugned herein. It is reiterated on behalf of the petitioner that the Appellate Court has completely ignored the fact finding recorded by the Trial Court, relating to performance of Talbs as required under the law. 5. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has supported the judgment passed by the Appellate Court dated 07.08.2013. He added that the performance of Talbs, as required by the law, have clearly been established from the record and the contrary finding, as recorded by the Trial Court is nullity in the eye of law. 6. Arguments heard. Record perused. 7. It is a settled position of law that a pre-emptor must prove the essential ingredients for the exercise of such right in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. It is also imperative that the performance of Talbs must be observed in true and complete letter and spirit. Such right of pre-emption is strictissimi juris (strict rule of law) and even a slightest non-adherence or deviation from the formalities required by law prevents its accrual 1 . At this juncture, it is necessary for this Court to examine and ascertain whether the Talbs, as mandated under Section 13 of the Act, have been made. As regards, the first Talb i.e. Talb-i-Muwathibat, statement of pre-emptor as PW-2 (Muhammad Waris) is relevant wherein he admitted in cross-examination that he had gained knowledge of the sale after filing of the suit. In the next three lines, he also admitted that he had filed another suit for pre-emption against the petitioners/defendants. The above said stance of the respondent/plaintiff as to knowledge is corroborated by the informer, who appeared as PW-3. According to the statement of PW-3, the knowledge about the sale was gained about 4.5 years ago. This statement was made by PW-3 on 16.02.2012. Thus, if time is calculated from the date of statement, it comes around 16.07.2007, which furnishes a ground to believe that no meeting was held for Talb-i-Muwathibat and it was not performed. As per Exh-P7, possession of the suit property was delivered on the date of sale, which is a notice to public at large 2 . Hence, the pre-emptor has, for all practical purposes, gained the knowledge immediately but did not make a jumping demand. Such delay is fatal to a successful claim of pre-emption 3 . Now adverting to Talb-i-Ishhad, with respect to which the position of law is well settled to the effect that if the date of Talb-i-Ishhad and names of witnesses are not mentioned in the plaint, it is fatal for a suit of pre-emption 4 . The record also reflects that no date of Talb-i-Ishhad is mentioned in the plaint, which makes it uncertain whether the same was made within two weeks as required under Section 13(3) of the Act. It is reiterated that non-mentioning of exact time of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint is fatal for the cause of the respondent/plaintiff. As borne out from the evidence, the fulfillment of condition of Talb-i-Ishhad, by way of service of notices, gets sketchy, inter-alia, in terms of statement made by PW-1 (postman). It is noteworthy that Talb-i-Ishhad is to be established by way of a solid piece of evidence led by the respondent/plaintiff. A careful examination of the plaint does not disclose any details regarding Talb-i-Ishhad with respect to its performance. This fact is also fatal to the case of the respondent/ plaintiff. Admittedly, the petitioners/defendants No.2 and 3 are minors. The statement of postman, who appeared as PW-1 did not mention as to where the service was made on the said minors or it was made on anyone else on their behalf, nor is there any endorsement of refusal on the envelope or the acknowledgment due, as reflected by Ex.P1 to Ex.P6. It was necessary for the service to be effected on the parties concerned 5 . As per statement of PW-2 (respondent/plaintiff), available on record, he admitted that the original notices were not sent. According to the statements of PW-2, 3 and 4, the notices were written by hand. After having considered the defects in discharge of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad, now it is important to see the effect of defective performance of Talb-e-Ishhad. Talb-i-Ishhad or demand by establishing evidence means calling of two witnesses by pre-emptor to attest his making of the first demand/Talb-i-Muwathibat in order to strengthen his claim of pre-emption. It is mandatory upon the pre-emptor i.e. respondent/ plaintiff, to have stated the names of witnesses for Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint and then prove their attestation by producing them in the Court. Upon careful perusal of the plaint, it appears that no such disclosure has been made by the respondent/plaintiff of the names of witnesses of Talb-i-Ishhad. This omission is again fatal to the claim of the respondent/plaintiff 6 . 8. In view of the above discussion, it is concluded that the respondent/plaintiff (pre-emptor) has failed to prove performance of the essential conditions attached to the exercise of right of pre-emption. As a result, his claim of pre-emption cannot hold field for not having qualified the mandate of law under Section 13 of the Act, in terms of making of Talbs. Consequently, this civil revision is allowed and impugned judgment and decree dated 07.08.2013 passed by the Appellate Court is set aside. No order as to costs. JK/M-109/L Revision allowed.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)--- ----S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotic substances---Appreciation of evidence---Safe custody and safe dispatch of case property for analysis not established---Prosecution case was that 5000-grams charas was recovered from the possession of the accused---Record demonstrated that after the framing of the charge, the prosecution presented its evidence, beginning with the examination of complainant and recovery witness---Although the opportunity for cross-examination was available, the defense did not avail the same and responded in nil---On the same date, the Investigating Officer was examined and during his testimony, he categorically admitted that he did not produce the original record pertaining to the safe custody and safe dispatch of the case property, a critical procedural lapse in the prosecution's case---Said deficiency alone was sufficient to vitiate the conviction, as proving an unbroken chain of custody was an indispensable requirement in narcotics cases---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Zahir Shah v. State 2019 SCMR 2004; Javed Iqbal v. State 2023 SCMR 139; Asif Ali and another v. State 2024 SCMR 1408 and Qaiser Khan v. State 2021 SCMR 363 rel. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)--- ----S. 9(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Possession of narcotic substances---Appreciation of evidence---Admission of accused not obtained in accordance with law---Prosecution case was that 5000-grams charas was recovered from the possession of the accused--- Admission or confession must be voluntary, unequivocal, and recorded with due compliance to procedural safeguards, including informing the accused of its legal consequences---In the present case, the record did not reflect that the accused was provided such an opportunity, thereby violating his fundamental right to a fair trial under Art.10-A of the Constitution---Furthermore, reliance on an admission of guilt, especially in the absence of a properly documented and secured chain of custody of the case property, was contrary to the settled law---Procedural anomalies indicated that the purported admission of guilt was not obtained in accordance with the law and raised the possibility of deception or coercion practiced upon the accused---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)--- ----S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotic substances---Appreciation of evidence---Safe custody of case property---Chain of safe custody of the recovered substance not proved---Prosecution case was that 5000-grams charas was recovered from the possession of the accused---Record showed that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody and unbroken chain of transmission of the seized contraband from the time of its alleged recovery until its deposit in the chemical laboratory---Record demonstrated that neither the Malkhana Incharge nor the designated carrier of the case property was produced as a witness, nor was any original record, such as roznamcha entries or Form 22.70 from Register No. XIX of the Police Rules, 1934, submitted in evidence---Failure to examine these crucial witnesses constituted a serious legal defect that directly impacted the credibility of the prosecution's case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Farhat Ali Bugti for Appellant. Ali Anwar Kandhro, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025. Judgment Khalid Hussain Shahani, J .--- The appellant, Waqar Ahmed, was convicted for offence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, in Crime No.93/2022 registered at Police Station New Foujdari by the court of learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge (MCTC)/Special Judge for CNSA, Shikarpur, and sentenced to a period equivalent to the time already undergone in custody and imposed a fine of Rs.1,000,000/- (ten lacs), with the stipulation that failure to pay the fine would result in an additional imprisonment of ten years. 2. The genesis of the prosecution's case originates from an incident dated July 06, 2022, at about 03:00 p.m, wherein a police party headed by ASI Manzoor Ali Khokhar of Police Station Foujdari, Shikarpur, allegedly apprehended the appellant, Waqar Ahmed, from a link road near City Gate and effected recovery of 5000 grams Charas from him. Consequently, an FIR was lodged against the appellant. 3. The appellant, Waqar Ahmed, pleaded not guilty. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined ASI Manzoor Ali (complainant), HC Aijaz Ali (the mashir of arrest and seizure), and SIP Mehar Ali Shah (Investigating Officer). However, an essential aspect of the prosecution's case relates to the purported admission of guilt made by the appellant through an application and statement recorded under Section 342, Cr.P.C. 4. At the very outset, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody of the recovered contraband from the moment of its seizure until its deposit at the chemical laboratory. While this fact was acknowledged in the impugned judgment, the learned trial court, without exercising due judicial diligence, summarily accepted an application purportedly containing an admission of guilt by the appellant, marked as Exhibit No.08. The trial court, in doing so, failed to issue any notice or inform the appellant of the legal consequences of such an admission, thereby infringing upon the fundamental right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. 5. The learned Additional Prosecutor General, albeit with some reluctance, conceded that the prosecution failed to establish the crucial legal requirement of proving the safe custody and transmission of the seized contraband from the time of its alleged recovery until its deposit in the chemical laboratory. 6. The record demonstrates that after the framing of the charge on November 11, 2022, the prosecution presented its evidence, beginning with the examination of SIP Manzoor Ali and mashir HC Aijaz Ali on April 15, 2024. Although the opportunity for cross-examination was available, the learned defense counsel did not avail the same and responded in nil. On the same date, the Investigating Officer, SIP Mehar Ali Shah, was examined. During his testimony, he categorically admitted that he did not produce the original record pertaining to the safe custody and safe dispatch of the case property, a critical procedural lapse in the prosecution's case. In paragraph No.06 of the impugned judgment, the learned presiding officer made a crucial observation, acknowledging that the prosecution had failed to produce original documentation concerning the secure transmission and storage of the recovered contraband. This deficiency alone, as per the settled principles laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan, is sufficient to vitiate the conviction, as proving an unbroken chain of custody is an indispensable requirement in narcotics cases. Reliance is placed of Zahir Shah v. State (2019 SCMR 2004), Javed Iqbal v. State (2023 SCMR 139), Asif Ali and another v. State (2024 SCMR 1408) and Qaiser Khan v. State (2021 SCMR 363). However, rather than addressing this evidentiary defect in accordance with the dictates of law, the trial court based its conviction primarily on an alleged written admission of guilt by the accused. It is settled law that an admission or confession must be voluntary, unequivocal, and recorded with due compliance to procedural safeguards, including informing the accused of its legal consequences. In the present case, the record does not reflect that the accused was provided such an opportunity, thereby violating his fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan. Furthermore, reliance on an admission of guilt, especially in the absence of a properly documented and secured chain of custody of the case property, is contrary to the settled law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that when crucial legal requirements such as the safe custody and transmission of contraband remain unproven, the benefit of the doubt must necessarily extend to the accused. The trial court's approach in ignoring this well-established principle and hastily recording a conviction without substantive evidentiary support is legally unsustainable and amounts to a grave miscarriage of justice. 7. From the testimony of the witnesses and the observations recorded by the learned presiding officer, it is evident that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody and unbroken chain of transmission of the seized contraband from the time of its alleged recovery until its deposit in the chemical laboratory. The record demonstrates that neither the Malkhana Incharge nor the designated carrier of the case property was produced as a witness, nor was any original record, such as roznamcha entries or Form 22.70 from Register No. XIX of the Police Rules, 1934, submitted in evidence. As for the alleged admission of guilt relied upon by the trial court, its circumstances raise serious legal concerns for the reasons: ? The learned defense counsel did not cross-examine two key prosecution witnesses (the complainant and the mashir), which deprived the accused of a fair opportunity to contest the evidence. ? The plea of guilt in the form of a written application received from the accused after the examination of witnesses is contrary to the principles of fair trial. ? No notice was issued by the trial court to the accused, informing him of the consequences of a guilty plea, which is a fundamental safeguard under criminal jurisprudence. 8. These procedural anomalies indicate that the purported admission of guilt was not obtained in accordance with the law and raises the possibility of deception or coercion practiced upon the accused. The trial court's approach in convicting the accused in a hasty manner, without ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to established legal standards, constitutes a grave violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, which guarantees the right to a fair trial as an inviolable fundamental right. This constitutional protection requires that the prosecution produce and examine all material witnesses, particularly those responsible for the chain of custody of the case property. The failure to examine these crucial witnesses constitutes a serious legal defect that directly impacts the credibility of the prosecution's case. It is a settled principle of law that the burden of proof always rests upon the prosecution, and the accused is not required to establish his innocence. In the present case, the prosecution's failure to fulfill essential legal requirements regarding the safe custody and transmission of the recovered contraband renders the conviction unsustainable in the eyes of the law. 9. Consequently, the Cr. Revision is allowed, and the appellant acquitted of the charge. The appellant shall be released forthwith unless required in connection with any other case. JK/W-2/Sindh Revision allowed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010 (Revised 2013)---Rr. 31 & 32---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Procurement process---Availability and availing of statutory remedies---Parallel proceedings before High Court---Legality---Judicial review---Scope---Tender of petitioner being Government contractor was accepted along with 03 others contractors with the percentage of 90 and 10 respectively, thus, being aggrieved by such percentage he alleged anomalies in recruitment process and filed a complaint before the Complaint Redressal Committee (CRC) and upon its rejection, he preferred an appeal before Review Committee, and without waiting for its final outcome he filed first constitutional petition and during pendency thereof, when the appeal was rejected, he filed second constitutional petition challenging rejection of his appeal---Held:---Petitioner filed appeal under R. 32 of the Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010, (Rules) before Review Committee and instead of waiting for the result of appeal he adopted parallel proceedings by filing petition before High Court, which practice on the part of petitioner was not be appreciated at all---Petitioner by virtue of filing petition attempted to circumvent the proceedings pending before statutory authority---Equitable writ jurisdiction is available when remedy provided under statutory provisions is exhausted and no other forum exists to challenge orders passed by the statutory authority---Parallel challenge to an order by way of appeal before a statutory forum under the relevant provisions of law and filing of constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution against the same cause are strictly impermissible---Non-supply of documents relating to technical proposals would not render the procurement process nullity, which otherwise was carried in accordance with law---Petitioner had not placed on record any application submitted by him to procuring agency for supply of documents relating to technical evaluation of other companies, thus, his objection was found to be an afterthought effort to pressurize procuring agency for obtaining desired results---Access to information is a guaranteed fundamental right of individuals; subject to law, a citizen cannot be denied access to public documents---Contention of the petitioner that grievances agitated by him before CRC and Review Committee were not properly addressed lost force as memo. of complaint and appeal of the petitioner did not contain any allegation of substantial nature calling for interference, rather the same were vague, bald in nature and without any substantial material, thus, were rightly discarded by the CRC and the Review Committee---Petitioner was granted ample opportunity to prove allegations of malpractices, corruption and favortism in the procurement process but he failed to do so---Legislature in order to place check on performance of procuring agency enacted Sindh Public Procurement Act, 2009, and framed Rules of 2010 thereunder---Under the provisions of the said Act forums had been provided to address the issues relating to the procurement process which being technical work could best be dealt with by the said forum having services of experts of related fields---Given the crucial task of overseeing development works, maintaining self-accountability, discipline, integrity and effective check on executing agencies were essential---Courts of law play a balancing and critical role in ensuring that the discretionary powers exercised by the authority are balanced and commensurate with the objectives sought to be achieved---Judicial review places a check against the exercise of powers in an arbitrary way and beyond the bounds of law---Forums had acted within the parameters prescribed by the law; no actions in excess of authority or acts of arbitrariness were unearthed or even pinpointed by the petitioner in the procurement process---High Court refused to interfere in the matter---Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. OTSUKA Pakistan Limited v. Province of Sindh and others 2020 MLD 185 ref. Messrs Steel Brothers and Company Limited v. Central Board of Revenue Islamabad 1968 SCMR 174 rel. (b) Sindh Public Procurement Rules, 2010 (Revised 2013)--- ----R. 32 (3A)---Appeal before Review Committee---Quorum---Plea of the petitioner was that since one of the Members of the Review Committee was absent, thus, his appeal could not be rejected---Validity---Rule 32(3A) of Rules fixed quorum of 50% of its total Members to decide any appeal, thus, absence of one of the Members of the Review Committee would not affect the fate of decision, which otherwise was found within the bounds of law. Mujtaba Sohail Raja for Petitioner (Petitioner in both Petitions). Ali Safdar Depar, Additional Advocate General along with Qamar Zaman Shah, Assistant Director Legal SPPRA for Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.