Summary: Background:Petitioner filed a declaratory suit claiming co-ownership of certain land.Defendants contested the suit initially but later absented, leading to an ex-parte decree in favor of the petitioner.Defendants subsequently filed an application under section 12(2) of the CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree.Petitioner challenged the validity of the orders passed by the District Judge Kotli and Senior Civil Judge Kotli setting aside the ex-parte decree.---Issues:Whether the application filed by the respondents under section 12(2) CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree was maintainable.Whether the respondents had the authority to file the application without proper sanction.Whether the respondents' absence during trial and subsequent filing of the application constituted fraud or misrepresentation.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court found that the respondents, being government officials, filed the application under section 12(2) CPC without proper sanction, as required by Rule 29 of the Law Department Manual.Citing legal precedent, the court held that government officials cannot file or defend litigation without prior sanction.The court also noted that the respondents had previously filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree without alleging fraud or misrepresentation.Therefore, the application under section 12(2) CPC was deemed incompetent and not maintainable.The court upheld the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 18.04.2005 in favor of the petitioner and set aside the impugned orders of the District Judge Kotli and Senior Civil Judge Kotli.The writ petition was accepted.---Citations/Precedents:2016 SCR 5862017 SCR 12902016 SCR 10042016 SCR 918

Summary: The petitioner, Basharat Amjad Hussain, entered into a sale agreement in 1989 with S.M. Akbar for a property. After S.M. Akbar's death, his legal heirs were involved in the litigation. The petitioner obtained a decree in 2006 for three Kanals of the plot. However, the respondents failed to execute the sale deed, leading to execution proceedings. Respondent No. 2 challenged the 2006 judgment, claiming that the property had been sold to Mst. Shama Khalid, who subsequently sold it to him.The trial court dismissed the challenge, emphasizing the principle of lis pendens. Despite the petitioner's attempt to include Mst. Shama Khalid as a defendant during her purchase, it was rejected due to lis pendens. Respondent No. 2 appealed the decision through a civil revision, leading to the impugned order of March 15, 2017. The revisional court set aside the trial court's order, remanding the case for further proceedings under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.).The petitioner argued that the principle of lis pendens applied, making respondents No. 11 and No. 2 unnecessary parties. The petitioner contended that the application under section 12(2) C.P.C. was not maintainable and should have been dismissed outright. The court highlighted that the respondent No. 2, who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser, was not in the picture when the suit was initiated in 1990. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was deemed applicable, preventing the transfer of property during the pendency of litigation.The court also addressed the misconception that issues must be framed and evidence recorded in all cases under section 12(2) C.P.C. It referenced prior judgments, stating that each case's circumstances dictate the need for such procedures. The court concluded that the revisional court erred in setting aside the trial court's well-reasoned order, which dismissed the application under section 12(2) C.P.C. The constitutional petition was allowed, setting aside the impugned order and restoring the trial court's order of May 6, 2010, with no costs awarded.

Summary: Background:Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Petitioner) filed ejectment proceedings against Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others (Respondents) on the grounds of personal requirement and default in rent payment. The Rent Controller ordered the Respondent to deposit arrears of rent but they failed to comply. Consequently, the Rent Controller struck off the defense and ordered eviction. Despite this, the Respondents filed multiple applications challenging the eviction order, including one under section 47 CPC.---Issues:Whether the Respondent's subsequent application under section 47 CPC, after the dismissal of an earlier application under section 12(2) CPC, was maintainable.Whether the principles of election, res judicata, and constructive res judicata apply to successive remedies against the same impugned order.---Holding/Reasoning:The Supreme Court held that the Respondent's second application under section 47 CPC was not maintainable due to the application of the doctrine of election. The Court explained that once a party chooses and exhausts one remedy against an impugned order, they cannot subsequently pursue another remedy seeking substantially similar relief. This principle prevents the abuse of legal process and the encouragement of multiplicity of proceedings. Since the Respondent had already filed and lost an application under section 12(2) CPC challenging the eviction order, they were precluded from invoking section 47 CPC on substantially the same grounds. Therefore, the impugned judgment remanding the case to the executing Court was set aside, and the Petitioner's appeal was allowed.---Quote:The choice to initiate and pursue one out of host of available concurrent or co-existent proceeding/actions or remedy from a forum of competent jurisdiction vests with the suitor. Once choice is exercised and election is made then a suitor is prohibited from launching another proceeding to seek a relief or remedy contrary to what could be claimed and/or achieved by adopting other proceeding/action and/or remedy, which in legal parlance is recognized as doctrine of election. Fair trial does not envisage recourse to successive remedies one after another against one and the same impugned order on substantially same set of facts and pleadings seeking substantially similar relief as it would be against the doctrine of election.

Summary: Background:Muhammad Aziz, the petitioner, filed a declaratory suit claiming co-ownership of land against multiple respondents. After the respondents absented themselves from the proceedings, the trial court decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner. Subsequently, the respondents filed an application under section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which was accepted, leading to the setting aside of the ex-parte judgment. The petitioner challenged this decision through a writ petition.---Issues:Whether the respondents' application under section 12(2) CPC was maintainable.Whether the respondents had the authority to file the application without proper sanction.Whether the respondents' absence from the trial court proceedings affected the validity of their subsequent application.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Holding: The writ petition was accepted, and the impugned orders setting aside the ex-parte judgment were set aside.Reasoning: The respondents' application under section 12(2) CPC was deemed incompetent because it was filed without proper sanction, as required by the Law Department Manual. The respondents, being public servants, needed authorization to file the application, which they did not obtain.The respondents' absence from the trial court proceedings did not warrant the application under section 12(2) CPC. Furthermore, the application was deemed incompetent as it was filed without alleging fraud or misrepresentation in earlier proceedings, and the jurisdiction invoked under section 12(2) CPC was not applicable in this context.The court cited relevant case law to support its decision, emphasizing the importance of proper authorization for legal actions by public servants and the requirement to raise legal objections at any stage of the proceedings.---Citations/Precedents:2016 SCR 5862017 SCR 12902016 SCR 10042016 SCR 918

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 10-A Fair trial---Right to access justice---Scope---Imposition of condition for deposit of money prior to adjudication of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Validity---Requirement of deposit of Rs.1.00 million by petitioner as a condition for hearing application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was not only devoid of legal sanction but also contrary to Art. 10-A of the Constitution, which ensures fair trial and due process---Trial Court dismissed the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. solely on account of non-deposit of amount without addressing the merits or giving reasons---Held, orders passed by the courts below were violative of the Constitution and principles of natural justice. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): **----S. 12(2), & O. XXI, Rr. 23 & 26---Fraudulent decree---Application for setting aside decree---Requirement to deposit money as condition precedent---Legality---Trial Court erred by treating non-deposit of Rs.1.00 million as grounds for dismissal of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., although deposit was only relevant to stay of execution under O. XXI, R. 26, C.P.C.---Held, application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was not legally contingent upon deposit---Trial Court's approach was contrary to law and amounted to material irregularity. (c) Administration of Justice: **----Judicial order---Requirement of reasons---Scope---Speaking order---Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. dismissed without giving any reasons or discussing serious allegations of fraud including manipulation of legal process and forged appearance on behalf of petitioner---Held, judicial orders must be speaking orders giving clear reasons for decision; failure to do so renders them invalid---Dismissal on technical grounds, without examining merits, amounts to denial of justice. (d) Res judicata---Review petition left undecided---Effect: Trial Court failed to decide pending review petition against conditional deposit order and instead proceeded to dismiss main application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Such conduct was inconsistent with settled judicial precedent requiring adjudication of review petition prior to further proceedings---Held, failure to decide review petition before passing final order was material irregularity vitiating the order. (e) Judicial Precedent: Court relied on established principles from: • Muhammad Umer v. Muhammad Qasim and another (1991 SCMR 1232) • Azra Manzoor Qureshi v. Faysal Bank Ltd. and others (2005 CLD 1417) • Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Abdullah through L.Rs. (2009 SCMR 326) to hold that an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. cannot be dismissed for non-deposit of money unless legally warranted, and that courts must provide reasoned orders especially when serious allegations of fraud are involved. ----Disposition: Petition allowed---Judgment of Revisional Court dated 28.05.2012 and impugned Trial Court orders set aside---Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. restored and directed to be decided afresh by Trial Court within six months.

Summary: The petitioner, had been a defendant in a lawsuit concerning a property dispute. She was debarred from filing a written statement by the High Court of Sindh and subsequently passed away. The legal heirs of Mst. Almas Ismail filed applications under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to recall and set aside the judgment and decree in the case. However, these applications were dismissed by the lower courts.The judgment discusses the legal aspects of the case, including the application of Section 12(2) CPC, the claim of fraud or misrepresentation, and the legal heirs' right to challenge the judgment and decree. The court ultimately upholds the lower court's decision, finding no merit in the petitioner's arguments. It emphasizes that Mst. Almas Ismail's failure to challenge the order debarred her from filing a written statement and that her death did not invalidate the judgment and decree.The court dismissed the constitutional petition, stating that the judgment and decree should have been challenged within the prescribed legal framework and time limits.

Summary: The case revolves around the inheritance of the estate of a deceased individual named Javed, who left behind two widows. Mst. Mehti had agreed to sell her land to Mst. Sakina Bibi through an agreement dated 12.09.1971, but she did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the agreement. Consequently, a suit for specific performance was filed, and a decree was issued on 16.10.2014. Respondent No. 3 attempted to challenge this judgment and decree by filing an application under section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), claiming to be the legal representative of Mst. Mehti, the deceased. However, his claims of being the legal representative were questionable, as he had changed his status multiple times.Respondent No. 3 had previously asserted his status as the heir of Mst. Mehti based on various documents, but these claims were rejected due to lack of evidence. Moreover, an FIR was filed against him for allegedly fabricating a will, which led to his imprisonment until he was granted bail by the Court.In an attempt to thwart the agreement of sale in favor of Mst. Sakina, respondent No. 3 filed several applications, all of which were either rejected on merits or withdrawn, including a writ petition in 2012.At the time of this order, another suit titled "Jan Muhammad v. Province of Punjab and others" was pending before the Civil Judge in Okara, initiated in 2011. In the present case, respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 12(2) C.P.C., leading to a detailed reply by the petitioners' predecessor. The trial Court framed issues in response to this application. The petitioners then challenged this order before the District Judge, which was dismissed on 23.04.2016, leading to the filing of this writ petition.The arguments presented by the petitioners' counsel revolved around the alleged misuse of section 12(2) C.P.C., asserting that this provision was intended to provide relief in cases of fraud and misrepresentation, which was not applicable in this situation. They argued that respondent No. 3 had repeatedly changed his stance and had a history of attempting to claim the estate unlawfully. They also claimed that the application under section 12(2) C.P.C. was incompetent, as a suit for declaration was already pending. The petitioners requested the setting aside of the impugned orders and the direction to decide the application under section 12(2) C.P.C. after hearing arguments.On the other hand, the counsel for respondent No. 3 defended the impugned orders and argued that anyone whose rights were adversely affected by an order, judgment, or decree had the right to challenge it through an application under section 12(2) C.P.C. They contended that the existence of a statutory right of appeal did not preclude other remedies under the law.After hearing arguments and examining the record, the Court found that respondent No. 3's application under section 12(2) C.P.C. was not competent and maintainable. Moreover, they noted that respondent No. 3 had misused the legal process by concealing facts and causing delays in the proceedings. Therefore, the Court allowed the constitutional petition, set aside the impugned orders, and dismissed the application under section 12(2) C.P.C. filed by respondent No. 3, ordering him to bear the costs throughout the legal proceedings. The Court cited previous case law in support of its decision.

Summary: After having exhausted the remedy provided U/O IX rule 13 CPC, could not be permitted to re-agitate the issue by means of fresh petition U/S 12(2) CPC. S12(2) CPC were not intended to be a duplication of proceedings provided for in order IX rules 13 CPC

Summary: Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act provides that the time consumed in obtaining the attested copy of the judgment and decree will be excluded from the time requisite for filling an appeal. Principle elaborated.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 12(2)---Decree, setting aside of---Fraud and misrepresentation---Effect---Contention ofapplicants was that impugned decree was obtained by means of misrepresentation andmaterial points were concealed from the court---Petition for setting aside of decree wasdismissed concurrently---Validity---Computerized National Identity Card of respondentplaintiff had been blocked by NADRA authorities as alien after due process on the report ofFederal Investigation Agency---Respondent-plaintiff was afforded opportunity of being heardby the NADRA authorities---Said information subsequently came to the knowledge ofNADRA after obtaining judgment and decree by the respondent---Serious allegation was onrecord against the respondent plaintiff---Courts below were supposed to decide the case onmerit instead of deciding the same on mere technicalities and thus committed miscarriage ofjustice---Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below were perverse andsuffered from conjunctures and surmises and not sustainable which were set aside---Case wasremanded to the Trial Court with the direction that matter be decided afresh after providingopportunity to the parties---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.