Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----S.12(2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art.181---Challenging the validity of judgment or order on the basis of fraud and misrepresentation by filing an application under S.12(2) CPC--- Maintainability---Essential requirements and necessary ingredients---Consent/compromise decree challenged after a decade---No instance of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction pleaded in the application under S.12(2) C.P.C---Effect---Brief facts of the case were that the a suit for declaration was filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs on 29.06.2001 challenging a mutation which was allegedly attested on 19.11.1991, on the basis of fraud---During the pendency of that suit, a compromise deed dated 25.02.2001 was executed, resulting in the suit's withdrawal--- Subsequently, multiple applications under S.12(2) C.P.C. were filed by different respondents, challenging the withdrawal based on fraud and misrepresentation which were dismissed by the civil court, including the one dismissed on 22.01.2014---However, the respondents'/defendants' revision petition was allowed by the District Court, remanding the case for fresh adjudication after recording pro and contra evidence---The petitioners/plaintiffs contended that the judgment dated of the revisional court was illegal and void ab initio and sought restoration of the 22.01.2014 decision whereby respondents' application under S.12(2) was dismissed---Held: Application under S.12(2) C.P.C. did not contain specific details about the fraud that might have been committed in the proceedings in civil suit which including filing of application for withdrawal, recording of statement of attorney and exhibiting documents of compromise therein---In absence of such details in respect of alleged fraud in the proceedings of the court, the application under S.12(2) C.P.C. was not at all maintainable---There was no explanation as to why the applicants remained silent for more than a decade for challenging the order of withdrawal of suit dated 02.03.2001 on 14.01.2013---The application under S.12(2) C.P.C. was also barred by law of limitation specifically Art.181 of Schedule-I of Limitation Act, 1908---Impugned order of revisional court was set aside and application of respondent Nos.1 to 8 filed under S.12(2) C.P.C. stood dismissed---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----S.12(2)---Application under S.12(2) of C.P.C---Essential requirements and necessary ingredients---Not mentioning the specific details of fraud or misrepresentation---Effect---While moving an application under S.12(2) C.P.C. the basis of fraud or misrepresentation has to be specifically described along with necessary details in the very application under S.12(2) C.P.C.---Vague assertion on crucial facts would not be of any legal avail as a mere bold assertion of fraud or concealment would not legally suffice---Moreover, when a person raises a ground of fraud or concealment to allege his claim or defend his stance the same has to be specifically pleaded with clear particulars, otherwise mere allegation not supported by any material would not invariably warrant inquiry of investigation in each case. Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd and 6 others v. National Development Finance Corporation Karachi PlD 2002 SC 500; Bashir Ahmad through Legal Representative and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others PLD 2019 SC 504 and Hafiz Malik Kamran Akbar and others v. Muhammad Shafi (deceased) through LRs and others PLD 2024 SC 262 rel. Misbahullah for Petitioners. Muhammad Ismail Khalil for Respondents. Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 03.10.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Cr. Appeal No. 375-J of 2014 and Murder Reference No. 318 of 2014). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Complainant's initial application to the police mentioned that after beating the injured than deceased, the petitioner proceeded towards the complainant's house accompanied by his fellows---Interestingly, however, none of the other prosecution witnesses mentioned that the petitioner was accompanied by other persons or that he went towards the complainant's house alongside some accomplices---In that regard, no other person had been implicated or arrested and yet the prosecution had contented itself with the assumption that the petitioner acted alone, despite the complainant's express statement to the contrary---Again, the complainant's subsequent testimony omitted any mention of other persons---Said fact in and of itself created a doubt in the prudent mind regarding the petitioner's guilt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of 13 hours and 25-minutes in lodging the FIR---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Record reflected that in the FIR, it was alleged that on 19.07.2012 at about 1:15 p.m. the petitioner initiated his assault on the deceased and subsequently assaulted the complainant and her daughter---Admittedly, though the FIR was lodged on 20.07.2012 at 2:40 a.m. an alarming thirteen hours and twenty-five minutes after the occurrence---Complainant had sought to explain the delay by stating that she was preoccupied rushing her injured husband from hospital to hospital, however, it was also acknowledged that he was taken by ambulance to RHC shortly after the occurrence---From RHC, the deceased was referred to Civil Hospital, where he arrived at 11:45 p.m. on 19.07.2012 and was administered first aid---Foremost priority of the family members, as complainants, would be to secure treatment for their relative and attending to them during the time between the occurrence and the administration of first aid, the deceased was only shifted from one hospital to the other---After the arrival at the second hospital a further three hours elapsed before the FIR was ultimately lodged---Clearly then, there was ample opportunity to submit the report before the actual time of registration---Despite that fact, no plausible explanation for the delay had been provided by the complainant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Inclusion of witnesses through a supplementary statement---Effect---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Record revealed that in the FIR, two witnesses were not mentioned as eyewitnesses to the alleged occurrence during which the petitioner inflicted fatal harm upon the deceased, rather they were included as witnesses through a supplementary statement submitted by the complainant later on the same day, i.e., 20.07.2012, when the crime was reported---Said subsequent inclusion of the said two witnesses merited special scrutiny since the prosecution "gave up" the other alleged eye-witnesses, as well as the complainant's injured daughter, who were actually mentioned in the FIR, preferring to rely only on the testimony of the former two---Complainant had sought to explain the belated inclusion of alleged eyewitnesses by stating that she was in a panicked and confused state of mind owing to her husband's critical condition---Said plea did not, however, persuade considering that two witnesses were not only alleged eyewitnesses credited with having intervened in an attempt to rescue the deceased but were also mentioned as the complainant's saviours when she and her daughter were being subjected to assault---Moreover, the subsequent witnesses were known to the complainant, one being her deceased husband's cousin, and other her real brother---Moreover, it was indeed alarming that the complainant failed to recall those relatives among the four individuals who intervened on her behalf when she was registering her complaint---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statement of witnesses---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---At one place eyewitness stated that he followed the petitioner and at another that he did not follow the petitioner---Testimonies of the other witnesses revealed that they came to the complainant's rescue only after hearing her hue and cry---There was thus a further contradiction that some witnesses claimed to have followed and responded to the complainant's cries whereas eyewitness stated that they followed the petitioner---Said variance in the statements raised doubt not only about the credibility of the witnesses' account but also their very presence at the scene---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Unnatural conduct of witnesses---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Record demonstrated that the petitioner was first alleged to have assaulted the deceased, whereupon the four witnesses intervened---From there, the petitioner made his way to the complainant's house where he assaulted her and her daughter, where once again the same witnesses intervened to rescue the complainant and her daughter---If the party of four witnesses was able to intervene both times and managed to restrain the petitioner from continuing his assault upon the deceased and complainant, how was it that he slipped through their fingers twice even though he was not armed with any formidable weapon---Conduct of the witnesses in that regard was perplexing, since they were admittedly greater in number and although unarmed, they managed to intervene---Such intervention naturally required the witnesses to subdue the petitioner and yet he managed to escape---Further, the close blood relation the witnesses had to the deceased and complainant naturally would not permit them to let the petitioner escape in that way---Eyewitnesses might have stated that apprehending the petitioner was difficult given the crowd and confusion at the Adda, especially since there were multiple exits but their failure to apprehend the petitioner despite a second chance to do so at the complainant's home confirmed the unnatural manner in which they acted---Thus, evident that the conduct of the witnesses was unnatural and raised serious doubt about their testimonies and presence at the scene especially in light of their belated inclusion as eyewitnesses and the abandonment of the other named eye-witnesses---Therefore, it would be unsafe to rely upon statements furnished by eye-witnesses---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Liaqat Ali v. The State 2008 SCMR 95; Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315 and Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Non-availability of medical evidence---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Although, the prosecution alleged that the petitioner, after attacking the deceased, entered the house of the complainant and assaulted both her and her daughter---No Medico-Legal Report was produced to substantiate the claim of physical assault or the alleged outraging modesty---In cases where bodily harm or indignity was alleged, the securing of medical evidence served as the most objective and reliable proof---Prosecution, however, remained content with oral assertions unsupported by any medical documentation---Such omission assumed particular significance given the seriousness of the allegation and the failure to have either the complainant or her daughter examined medically casted doubt upon whether such an incident occurred at all in the manner alleged---Absence of such evidence, where reasonably it ought to have been scoured, constituted a material lacuna, which further weakened the prosecution's version and detracted from its overall credibility---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence---Inconsequential---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Danda was said to have been recovered from the petitioner's residence upon his pointation and that recovery constituted a foundational part of the prosecution's case---Recovery, in order to carry evidentiary value, must not only be legally secured but also supported by linking it to an accused and the offence, especially where it formed a critical link in the prosecution's case---In the present matter, neither was the recovered Danda found stained with blood nor was it subjected to any chemical or serological examination, so as to connect it with the injuries sustained by the deceased---Police remained content with a mere mechanical assertion of recovery without undertaking the essential step of forensic verification---No report of the Chemical Examiner or Serologist had been brought on the record---In such a situation, the recovery, stripped of scientific support, stand materially weakened and does not advance the prosecution's case in any meaningful way---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Motive alleged by the prosecution was a dispute between the parties over a house---In that regard, no independent evidence was led to substantiate the existence or immediacy of such a dispute, nor was any document, litigation record, or corroborative testimony produced to establish that the petitioner bore such animosity as would propel him to commit a crime of that magnitude---Mere assertion of a vague motive, unsupported by credible material, could not be treated as conclusive proof---In that backdrop, the motive sought to be ascribed to the petitioner appeared to be speculative at best and failed to advance the prosecution's case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Even a single circumstance creating doubt is sufficient to form the basis of an acquittal. Muhammad Hassan v. State 2024 SCMR 1427; Tariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. the State 2009 SCMR 230 and Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 rel. Sh. Ahsan-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 13.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Crl. Misc. No. 1096-B of 2025). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-H(2), 440, 148 & 149---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rash or negligent act to endanger human life or personal safety of others, mischief committed after preparation made for causing death or hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry, case of---Cross version---Allegation against the petitioner-accused was that he along with co-accused committed murder of the deceased and caused injuries to the injured witness---Record showed that another report of the same occurrence had been registered by accused, also including the same place, time and date of occurrence, while involving the same parties inter se---However, that second report was registered on 21.05.2023, with a delay of four days---From one side deceased had lost his life and injured sustained injuries while in the second report two persons sustained injuries---When both versions were placed in juxtaposition, it became apparent that the allegations in both complaints were qua the same incident, as they shared a common nexus in terms of date, time, location, motive and parties involved---Apparent distinction laid in the sequence of reporting---Such factual overlap, prima facie, reflected that the two versions were antithetical claims arising out of one and the same occurrence thus, portraying the current scenario as cross version---Supreme Court observed that it was not in agreement with the High Court on not allowing bail to the petitioner on the basis of cross-version---In cases involving cross-versions of the same occurrence, the prime consideration before the Court is to ascertain which party is the aggressor and which party is aggressed upon---Nature, seat, and number of injuries sustained by each side may undoubtedly be relevant; however, such factors are merely indicative and do not, by themselves, carry an overriding or conclusive effect---Mere extent of injuries caused to one party could not serve as the sole basis for drawing an adverse inference against the other, especially where both versions emanated from the same transaction and each party attributed aggression to the other---In cases of counter versions arising from the same incident, one given by the complainant in the FIR, and the other given by the opposite party, bail in appropriate cases is granted as a rule on the grounds of further inquiry for the reason that the question as to which version is correct is to be decided after the recording of pro and contra evidence during the trial---Refusal of bail in such cases is an exception---Additionally, the petitioner was in custody for the last 23 months and despite the lapse of such a considerable period, there appeared to be no substantial progress in the trial pending before the Trial Court---Such prolonged incarceration, without meaningful advancement in the trial, raised a serious concern regarding the petitioner's right to a fair and expeditious trial---Petition was converted into appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and petitioner was granted bail. Fazal Muhammad v. Ali Ahmed 1976 SCMR 391; Shafiqan v. Hashim Ali 1972 SCMR 682; Khalid Mehmood v. Muhammad Kashif Rasool 2013 SCMR 1415 and Khizar Hayat v. The State 2024 SCMR 1605 rel. Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Basharatullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 16th April, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 109, 114 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, abettor present at the time of occurrence, common intention---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the accused-petitioners were that they committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---First and foremost fact in the case was the absence of the petitioners on the day of occurrence from cement company---Report so furnished by the company was confusing, however separate sheets attached with report reflected that "SA" petitioner was employee and was in attendance in the company office from 7.58 am to 15.58 pm on fateful day, whereas "R" petitioner being employee was absent on that day---Stance of the company was that though attendance of "SA" petitioner was marked in the record yet he was not physically present in the company, but such stance was not supported by any material, documentary or forensic---Role of driving motorcycle was assigned to "R" petitioner, whereas role of firing was assigned to "SA" petitioner but from the circumstances on the record, it became evident that he was in cement company at the time of occurrence, casting a doubt on his involvement in commission of murder--- Though Call Data Record was claimed to show connection of "SA" and "MR" near the place of occurrence, but this was without any voice message/transcript---Thus, it did not connect the petitioners with the commission of offence until and unless such Call Data Record was formalized in accordance with law---Once prosecution opted to make it a case of ocular account, then circumstances highlighted by counsel (s) for the petitioners including press clipping apparently made the case against the petitioners doubtful---While considering material at bail stage, Court always acts inquisitorially to search for avenues of further inquiry into the guilt of accused and thus, could consider any material, that could be transformed into admissible format at a later stage, in order to grant or decline bail to the accused---Press clippings showed that if author or reporter of press clipping appeared in the dock, it could become admissible evidence; however, cogency thereof rested upon the intrinsic value of information, its reliability and source authentication which of course would be determined after recording of all the evidence in the case---Thus, Court could consider such piece of evidence at present stage as well---At present, facts highlighted by counsel for the petitioners clearly showed that implication of present petitioners in this case rested on frail pillars---Said situation provided a premium to the petitioners to seek bail on the touchstone of further inquiry which was very much available in this case---Thus, petitioners had made out a case for further inquiry---Petitioners were behind the bars since 17.10.2024; investigation was complete and persons of the petitioners were not required for further investigation---Keeping the petitioners behind the bars for indefinite period would not serve any useful purpose to the prosecution---Bail petitions were allowed, in circumstances. Anwar Hussain and 2 others v. The State 2019 YLR 1117 and Imran Malik v. The State 2018 MLD 1116 ref. Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State and another PLD 2024 Lah. 522; Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 388; Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad v. Abdul Wali Khan, MNA Former President of Defunct National Awami Party PLD 1976 SC 57; Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others PLD 2004 SC 583; Zahid v. The State PLD 1993 Kar. 337; Banaris Khan v. The State and 2 others 2015 YLR 2076; Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697; Alim-ud-Din v. The State PLD 1982 Lah. 141; Mrs. Mamoona Saeed v. Government of The Punjab and others 2003 YLR 2397; Kh. Ijaz Ahmed v. DRO and others 2001 YLR 448; Manzoor v. The State 2010 YLR 602; Qurban Ali and another v. The State PLD 2014 Sindh 538; Mst Shakila Bano v. Station House Officer, Police Station Model Colony, SIR, Karachi and another PLD 1995 Kar. 555; Ch. Aamir Shahzad v. Muhammad Makki and 5 others 2021 YLR 1641; Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. The State and another 1996 SCMR 1747; Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. The State and others PLD 2016 SC 17; Mazhar Ali v. The State and another 2025 SCMR 318; Zeeshan v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1716; Mst. Ishrat Bibi v. The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 1528; Saeed Ahmed and another v. The State PLD 2024 SC 1241; Salman Zahid v. The State through P.G. Sindh 2023 SCMR 1140; Gul Muhammad v. The State 2023 SCMR 857 and Muhammad Naeem Hassan v. The State through P.G., Punjab and another 2022 SCMR 523 rel. Malik, Nazar Hussain Paunta for Petitioner (in Crl. Misc. No. 699-B of 2025). Mian Muhammad Hanif for Petitioner (in Crl. Misc. No. 1362-B of 2025). Muhammad Ali Shahab, Deputy Prosecutor General with Sajid, SI and Muhammad Abbas, SI for the State. Allah Bakhsh Khan Kulachi and Ms. Raheela Saleem for the Complainant. Order Muhammad Amjad Rafiq, J .--- This single order shall dispose of titled petitions filed under Section 497 of Cr.P.C., by the petitioners seeking post arrest bail in case FIR No.444 dated 15.05.2024 registered under Sections 302/324/109/114/34-P.P.C at Police Station City Muzaffargarh, District Muzaffargarh. 2. It was the story of FIR that on 15.05.2024 at about 10:30 a.m., Muhammad Ishaq complainant along with his elder brother Ashfaq Hussain on their separate motorcycles left for their house from cardboard godown situated near Beehari colony, and at about 10:35 a.m., when they crossed thermal power bypass, Ashfaq Hussain was approximately 100 yards ahead from the complainant, two unknown persons one muffled face and other not muffled riding on a motorcycle crossed the complainant and signaled his brother to stop the motorcycle who acted upon the direction; upon which person not muffled (pillion rider) made three fires with his pistol which hit Ashfaq Hussain at his back; the complainant after stopping his motorcycle came forward, said person made two fires in the air and threatened him not to come near; the witnesses Abdul Ghaffar and Liaqat Hussain emerged there and Ashfaq Hussain was shifted to DHQ hospital, Muzaffargarh who later succumbed to the injuries. 3. Learned counsel (s) for the petitioners contended that primarily, no one was nominated in the FIR and police remained on searching unknown accused for more than five months, and this effort of police was being reported in the daily newspapers because the deceased was a renowned journalist, on whose assassination Chief Minister of the Punjab had also taken a serious notice. However, on the arrest of petitioners in the month of October, 2024, police claimed Samar Abaas petitioner as close relative and neighbour of deceased, whereas Ramzan petitioner was employee of Samar Abass. Both were employed at D.G. Khan Cement Factory, Dera Ghazi Khan. However, police while ignoring above facts, procured an ante-dated supplementary statement of the complainant of 16.05.2024 (next day of occurrence), for nomination of accused/petitioners to show that case was of direct ocular evidence, otherwise it was a blind murder. In support of such contention, some press clippings of "Daily Khabrain Multan" dated 15.05.2024, 20.05.2024, 24.05.2024, 26.06.2024 and 20.10.2024 found appended with the bail petition. Further submitted that by virtue of press clipping dated 20.10.2024, petitioners were shown arrested and, in such press clipping it was reported that after 05 months of the occurrence, for the murder of Ashfaq, his close relatives and neighbour have been arrested; therefore, effort of police to show the existence of supplementary statement of the complainant on the very next day (16.05.2024), is nothing but padding into the evidence. He asserted that such press clippings can be looked into at this stage for relief of bail to the petitioners and in this respect placed his reliance on cases reported as "Anwar Hussain and 2 others v. The State" (2019 YLR 1117) and "Imran Malik v. The State" (2018 MLD 1116). Learned counsel (s) for the petitioners further added that Police Emergency call at 15 was made by one Khurram from the place of occurrence which carries an impression that complainant and PWs were not present at time of occurrence, and initiation of private prosecution through direct complaint after 08 months of the occurrence clearly shows the police and the complainant on different poles. This distrust was either of the complainant on the police investigation, or police was not ready to accept the command of the complainant. 4. Learned counsel (s) for the complainant on the other hand, opposed the bails on the grounds that Muhammad Ishaq, complainant has made first statement before the police with nomination of the petitioners on the same day which was written down by a witness Abdul Ghaffar whose signatures are also mentioned on such application, but police malafidely did not register the FIR correctly. Further stated that petitioners were employees of D.G. Khan Cement Company and prosecution has also obtained a report of their absence from the said company at the relevant time which was received vide letter dated 24.10.2024. Another evidence alleged was the CDR of the accused/petitioners, showing their link on the day of occurrence. 5. Heard; record perused. 6. First and the foremost fact in this case is the absence of the petitioners on the day of occurrence from D.G. Khan Cement Company. Does the report furnished by the company really tag them absent on that day? Let's see what the report speaks; it is as under; Subject: ATTENDANCE RECORD Attendance record of the following employees of the month of May 2024 is attached as desired, please. a. Sammar Abbas Assistant Junior Officer (Electrical) However, he was not present at place of duty on 15 May 2024 during duty hours. b. Muhammad Ramzan, Helper (WHRPP) The above report was confusing; however, separate sheets attached with report reflect that Samar Abass petitioner was Employee No. 3516 and was in attendance in the company office from 7.58 a.m. to 15.58 p.m. on 15.05.2024; whereas Ramazan Petitioner being Employee No. 91459 was absent on that day. It was the stance of the company that though attendance of Samar Abass petitioner is marked in the record yet he was not physically present in the company, but such stance is not supported by any material, documentary or forensic. Role of driving motorcycle was assigned to Muhammad Ramzan petitioner, whereas role of firing was assigned to Samar Abass petitioner but from the circumstances on the record, it becomes evident that he was in D.G. Khan Cement company at the time of occurrence, casting a doubt on his involvement in commission of murder. 7. Though CDR data was claimed showing connection of Samar Abbas and Muhammad Ramzan near the place of occurrence but without any voice message/transcript. Thus, it does not connect the petitioners with the commission of offence until and unless such CDR is formalized in accordance with law as enunciated in judgment of Full Bench of this Court in a case reported as "Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State and another" (PLD 2024 Lah. 522); for reference, relevant paragraph is reproduced; 10. Although any accused or witness can claim or admit possession and use of any SIM "Subscriber Identity Module' by him or anybody else at the time of occurrence or any other relevant time yet mere such claim or admission is not sufficient for relying on CDR "Call Data Record" of said SIM because CDR only shows use of SIM in territorial/geographical jurisdiction of "Cell Phone Tower" installed by telecom operator and does not disclose that who is actually/exactly carrying and using said SIM; however, "Voice Record Transcript" or "End to End Audio Recording" can reflect the detail/identification of the user. Therefore, without "Voice Recording Transcript", mere "Call Data Record" (CDR) alone of the SIM is inconclusive piece of evidence regarding identity of its user/carrier." 8. Learned counsel for the complainant states that pistol recovered on the lead of Samar Abbas, petitioner stood matched with the spent shells C-1 to C-5, therefore, his criminal liability stays. Had it been an occurrence of circumstantial evidence, all the evidence could have easily been looked in the form of a chain well knitted or scrambled, but once prosecution opted to make it a case of ocular account, then circumstances highlighted by learned counsel (s) for the petitioners including press clipping apparently make the case against the petitioners doubtful. 9. However, the repeated reliance of learned counsel (s) for the petitioners upon press clippings and claim of learned Counsel (s) for the complainant that it is inadmissible piece of evidence carrying a status of second-degree hearsay and misleading, a duty somewhat cast upon this court to re-thrash the admissibility or evidentiary value of press clippings. In the backdrop of contention, I have perused the relevant case laws on the subject and found that press clippings have been used by the Courts in following three situations; a) In Constitutional jurisdiction for matters of public importance. b) Presumption by Courts in criminal jurisdiction. c) Evidence of any party in criminal jurisdiction. For the first situation, in the following judgments, while dealing with political statements/speeches against the State published in newspapers attributed to political leaders, Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that such statements if have not been denied or repudiated could be used as evidence against them. Reference is made to cases reported as "Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another v. President of Pakistan and others" (PLD 1998 SC 388), and "Islamic Republic of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry of Interior And Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad v. Abdul Wali Khan, M. N. A., Former President Of Defunct National Awami Party" (PLD 1976 SC 57), wherein it was held as under; "It cannot be denied that so far as newspaper reports of contemporaneous events are concerned, they may be admissible, particularly where they happen to be events of local interest or of such a public nature as would be generally known throughout the community and testimony of an eye-witness is not readily available. The contemporary newspaper account may well be admitted in evidence in such circumstances as has often been done by Courts in the United States of America not because they are `business records' or 'ancient documents' but because they may well be treated as a trustworthy contemporaneous account of events or happenings which took place a long time ago or in a foreign country which cannot easily be proved by direct ocular oral testimony. Thus, if a person does not avail of the opportunity to contradict or question the truthfulness of the statement attributed to him and widely published in newspapers he cannot complain if that publication is used against him. Such a user would not be hit by the rule of hearsay." Whereas in a case reported as "Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others" (PLD 2004 SC 583), it was held as under; "Newspaper reports and articles can only be used in above exceptional circumstances meaning thereby that if on record admissible evidence is available which is not disputed between the parties particularly in the cases where the defendant/respondent himself had brought on record certain documents in proof of his plea then the Court is not, debarred from looking into the same for the purpose of arriving at a just conclusion particularly in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 and Article 184(3) of the Constitution, where the Court had no occasion to record the evidence itself and had to base its decision on the pleadings of the parties who were supported with the documents like the present case petitioners wherein had relied upon the press clippings and articles but the respondents either on their own or under directions of the Court had brought on record material to satisfy the Court that the transaction under challenge is in accordance with law. Therefore, while accepting such request and declining to give relief, it would be incumbent upon the Court to rely upon the documents which are not disputed between the parties and such documents can be considered/treated as evidence on record. 10. Presumption by Courts in criminal jurisdiction, is the subject matter of the Evidence Act 1872 which with certain modifications was also applicable to the different States of India and by virtue of that Court was authorized to presume the genuineness of newspapers or journal as per Section 81 of said Act, which is as under; 81. Presumption as to Gazettes, newspapers, private Acts of Parliament and other documents. The Court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be the London Gazette or [any official Gazette, or the Government Gazette] [Substituted by A.O. 1937, for "the Gazette of India, or the Government Gazette of any L.G., or".] of any colony, dependency or possession of the British Crown, or to be a newspaper or journal, or to be a copy of a private Act of Parliament [of the United Kingdom] [Inserted by A.O. 1950.] printed by the Queen's Printer and of every document purporting to be a document directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such document is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody. With the development of technology and availability of modern devices, above Section was later supplemented through Section 81A as under; Presumption as to Gazettes in electronic forms.[Inserted by Act 21 of 2000, Section 92 and Sch.II (w.e.f. 17.10.2000).]The Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic record purporting to be the Official Gazette, or purporting to be electronic record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic record is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody. These two sections still exist in the law of evidence of India, now titled as "the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023" in the forms of Sections 80 and 81, but by the promulgation of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, Section 81 of the Evidence Act 1872 was not re-enacted rather opted to skip it in the new legislation. Thus, Courts in Pakistan by law cannot presume the genuineness of a newspaper. Same observation has been made by the Court in a case reported as "Zahid v. The State" (PLD 1993 Karachi 337). However, in a case reported as "Banaris Khan v. The State and 2 others" (2015 YLR 2076) Federal Shariat Court while dilating upon the issue of publication of confession of an accused in newspaper 4 days prior to its actual making held that in the light of judgment reported as 'Wattan Party v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 697), Court can take judicial notice of news items. This observation is in line with provisions of Article 111 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 which is as under; "111. Fact Judicially noticeable need not be proved: No fact of which the Court will take judicial notice need be proved." Some misunderstanding in law prevails that Court can take judicial notice of only those facts which are listed in Article 112 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and of course newspaper or journal is not mentioned in such Article. Suffice it to say that such Article says that "Facts of which Court must take judicial notice" the word "must" make it obligatory for the Court to take judicial notice of all such facts listed in Article 112 ibid without asking for a formal proof. Whereas Article 111 ibid gives a discretion to the Court to take judicial notice of any fact not listed in Article 112 ibid, depending upon the circumstances of the case. Thus, Court can take judicial notice of a news clipping subject to the considerations that its admissibility depends on several factors, including the relevance to the case, the authenticity of the clipping, and whether the court deems it reliable. 11. However, as a general principle the Supreme Court of Pakistan has held in case reported as "Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others" (PLD 2006 SC 697) that following parameters must be met for the purpose of taking judicial notice of a newspaper report and articles: - (i) Where direct evidence is not available. (ii) Where it is sought to be proved that a person has notice of the contents of the newspaper report. (iii) Where it is sought to be shown that a person is an author or otherwise responsible for the statement or article published in a newspaper which is to be used against him. (iv) In cases of defamation. (v) If the issue/occurrence is rather old and eye-witnesses are either wanting or less reliable. Keeping in view the above parameters, it was held in a case reported as "Alim-Ud-Din v. The State" (PLD 1982 Lahore 141) that newspaper reports may be admissible in evidence when testimony of a witness is not readily available. In another case reported as "Mrs. Mamoona Saeed v. Government of The Punjab and others" (2003 YLR 2397), it was held that newspaper clippings are admissible in evidence in case the same were not contradicted. 12. The third situation for use of press clippings is in the form of evidence produced by any party in criminal proceedings. It is consensus that press clipping is hearsay evidence and is not admissible under the law unless the author or reporter volunteers to appear as witness to prove the authenticity of the facts stated therein. Reliance in this respect is on cases reported as "Kh. Ijaz Ahmed v. D.R.O. and others" (2001 YLR 448); "Manzoor v. The State" (2010 YLR 602); "Qurban Ali and another v. The State" (PLD 2014 Sindh 538); "Mst. Shakila Bano v. Station House Officer, Police Station Model Colony, Sir, Karachi and another" (PLD 1995 Karachi 555); "Ch. Aamir Shahzad v. Muhammad Makki and 5 others" (2021 YLR 1641); "Muhmmad Ashraf Khan v. The State and another" (1996 SCMR 1747); "Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. The State and others" (PLD 2016 SC 17). 13. Even the rule of hearsay is not absolute, for, it is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is that statements accompanying and explaining facts are not hit by the hearsay rule. Thus, even in the case of hearsay as observed in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol 15, at page 320) in estimating the weight to be attached to a statement "regard must be had to all circumstances from which any inference as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement can reasonably be drawn, and in particular to the questions whether the statement was contemporaneous with the facts stated and whether the maker had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the facts". Explanatory facts are regarded as relevant facts as per Article 22 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 which says that facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact????????, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose. In such situation, of course press clipping could be considered as explanatory evidence, that shall be read in conjunction with other evidence on the record, because press clipping as sole evidence cannot prove a fact beyond reasonable doubt. 14. It is trite that while considering material at bail stage, Court always acts inquisitorially to search for avenues of further inquiry into the guilt of accused, and thus, can consider any material, that can be transformed into admissible format at a later stage, in order to grant or decline bail to the accused. The above highlights on the subject of press clippings show that if author or reporter of press clipping appears in the dock, it could become admissible evidence; however, cogency whereof rests upon the intrinsic value of information, its reliability and source authentication which of course would be determined after recording of all the evidence in the case. Thus, Court can consider this piece of evidence at this stage as well. 15. At present, facts highlighted by learned counsel (s) for the petitioners clearly show that implication of present petitioners in this case rests on frail pillars. The above situation provides a premium to the petitioners to seek bail on the touchstone of further inquiry which is very much available in this case. Thus, petitioners have made out a case for further inquiry. Reliance in this respect is placed on cases reported as "Mazhar Ali v. The State and another" (2025 SCMR 318), "Zeeshan v. The State and another" (2024 SCMR 1716), "Mst. Ishrat Bibi v. The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab and another" (2024 SCMR 1528), "Saeed Ahmed and another v. The State" (PLD 2024 SC 1241), "Salman Zahid v. The State through P.G. Sindh" (2023 SCMR 1140) "Gul Muhammad v. The State" (2023 SCMR 857) and "Muhammad Naeem Hassan v. The State through P.G., Punjab and another" (2022 SCMR 523). Petitioners are behind the bars since 17.10.2024, investigation is complete and persons of the petitioners are not required for further investigation; thus, keeping them behind the bars for indefinite period would not serve any useful purpose to the prosecution. 16. In view of what has been discussed above, titled petitions are allowed and the petitioners are admitted to bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.500,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. However, above assessment of this Court is tentative in nature which shall not prejudice the case of either side during the trial. JK/S-60/L Petitions allowed.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.12-A & 14(3)---Right of cross-examination struck off by Trial Court---Interlocutory order, challenge to---Scope---The petitioners challenged an interlocutory order passed by the Family Court, whereby, their right to cross-examine the respondents' witnesses was struck off---The order was assailed in a Constitutional petition before the High Court, against dismissal of which, the petitioners then sought leave to appeal---Held: Section 12-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 made it obligatory for the Trial Court to decide/dispose of a case/family suit within a period of six months from the date of institution---Indeed, every litigant has a right to cross-examine the witnesses deposing evidence but that cannot be stretch down to an unreasonable desire of the counsel and litigant seeking adjournments one after the other and the reasons which were not found sufficient by the Trial Court, as could be seen that numerous opportunities were provided---Moreover, Family Courts Act, 1964 restricted and prohibited challenge to an interim/interlocutory order in terms of section 14(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964---The impugned order which maintained the order of the Family Court was maintained by the Supreme Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, in circumstances, and leave was refused. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.14(3)---Interim/interlocutory order passed by Family Court, challenge to---Scope---Interim/interlocutory order passed by the Family Court, under the restriction placed in terms of section 14(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, is not allowed to be challenged---Trial under the special law especially the Family Courts Act, 1964 requires strict adherence which ought to be complied with, otherwise the essence and effectiveness of the law will be frustrated---If any right is curtailed by any interim order not appealable, it can well be merged with and into the final order and would then, if required, be available for a challenge along with other grounds. Ch. Hafeez Ullah Yaqub, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. Burhan Latif Khaisori, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd April, 2025.

Summary: Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J; Shakeel Ahmad, J. agreeing; Musarrat Hilali, J. dissenting--- (a) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S. 12---Custody of minor---Remarriage of mother---Effect---Mere fact of mother's remarriage does not ipso facto disentitle her from the custody of minor. (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S.12---Suit for custody of minor daughter---Remarriage of mother---Welfare of minor---Determination---Petitioner/father of minor daughter was aggrieved of concurrent findings of facts by all Courts below disentitling him from the custody of his minor daughter which was with respondent/mother---Plea raised by petitioner was that mother was not entitled to the custody as after divorce she had remarried a person falling in prohibitory degree to the minor---Validity---Petitioner was residing abroad and merely two months after his marriage with respondent, he returned abroad while respondent stayed in Pakistan---Petitioner pronounced divorce upon respondent while residing abroad---Petitioner had neither seen his minor daughter since her birth nor made any effort to meet her---He did not return to Pakistan to pursue custody of minor instead filed application for custody after his arrival in Pakistan due to demise of his father---Petition and subsequent appeal were filed through his attorney, who represented him in the proceedings---Petitioner did not appear personally in either trial or Lower Appellate Court or in Constitutional petition---Application for custody was not motivated by affection or concern for the minor instead it was a retaliatory measure in response to the suit instituted by respondent for recovery of dowry articles and maintenance---There was no evidence on record to suggest that respondent failed in her duty to properly care for the minor or to provide her with proper education and upbringing---Minor was about 13 years of age, she had never seen her father, who had been residing outside Pakistan since before her birth---Throughout her life, she had developed a strong emotional attachment with her mother, who was her sole source of love, care, guidance, and financial support---Petitioner, as the father, had never made any attempt to contribute towards minor's educational expenses, nor had he inquired about her schooling or well-being---Minor was receiving quality education in a reputable private school and had consistently been securing top positions in her class, which reflected her academic excellence, proper upbringing, and stable environment---At such delicate and formative stage of adolescence, when emotional security, proper moral upbringing, and a strong educational foundation are of paramount importance for minor's future growth and development, any unwarranted disturbance or change in environment of minor would likely cause irreversible harm to minor's personality and career---It was imperative for welfare, betterment and best interests of the minor, that her custody remain with her mother---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court which was well-reasoned and had considered all material aspects of the case---Petitioner failed to point out any illegality or infirmity in concurrent findings of the Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. [Majority view] Khan Muhammad v. Mst. Surayya Bibi and others 2008 SCMR 480; Rahimullah Choudhary v. Mrs. Sayeda Helali Begum and others 1974 SCMR 305; Feroze Begum v. Muhammad Hussain 1978 SCMR 299; Mehmood Akhtar v. District Judge, Attock and 2 others 2004 SCMR 1839; Tahira v. Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and others 1990 SCMR 852; Mst. Feroze Begum v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Hussain 1983 SCMR 606; Munawar Bibi v. Muhammad Amin and another 1995 SCMR 1206; Mst. Razia Bibi v. Riaz Ahmad and another 2004 SCMR 821; Mst. Beena v. Raja Muhammad and others PLD 2020 SC 508; Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem 2014 SCMR 343; Raja Muhammad Owais v. Mst. Nazia Jabeen and others 2022 SCMR 2123; Mst. Shahista Naz v. Muhammad Naeem Ahmed and another 2004 SCMR 990; Mst. Firdous Iqbal v. Shifaat Ali and others 2000 SCMR 838 and Sardar Hussain and others v. Mst. Parveen Umer PLD 2004 SC 357 rel. Per Musarrat Hilali, J (dissenting) [Minority view]--- (c) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S. 12---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Suit for custody of minor daughter---Remarriage of mother---Welfare of minor---Determination---Petitioner/father of minor daughter was aggrieved of concurrent findings of facts by all Courts below disentitling him from the custody of his minor daughter which was with respondent/mother---Plea raised by petitioner was that mother was not entitled to the custody as after divorce she had remarried a person falling in prohibitory degree to the minor---Validity---Petitioner was biological father of the minor who had sought custody of his minor daughter residing with her maternal grand-mother---Respondent had already remarried and was settled abroad whereas petitioner had not remarried---Given the sensitive nature of custody matters and paramount importance of welfare of minor, assertions raised by petitioner, though not determinative at present stage of proceedings before Supreme Court, merited issuance of notice, which would have enabled a more comprehensive assessment of the matter---Father holds a position of vital importance in a child's life, offering not only emotional stability but also social identity and support within our societal structure---Petition did not merit dismissal without issuance of notice to respondent. Ch. Afrasiab Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with petitioner in-person. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 200, 202, 204 & 439---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 109, 148 & 149---Private complaint---Issuance of process against accused---Summoning of accused by Trial Court to face trial---Power of revision of High Court---Scope---Respondent No. 2 filed private complaint against the petitioners with the allegation of committing murder of her husband---Trial Court summoned the petitioners to face the trial---Validity---Perusal of the record revealed that regarding the murder of husband of respondent No.2 on 28.04.2024 at about 12:30 a.m., FIR was got registered on the same day at 11:35 a.m. on the complaint of respondent No.2 who did not nominate any accused and categorically mentioned in the body of complaint on the basis of which FIR was registered that three unknown accused took life of deceased---Immediately after the occurrence when the accused fled away from the spot, her brother-in-law/real brother of deceased came at the spot---After registration of FIR, statement of petitioner No.1 was got recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C., in which he implicated respondent No.2 for the commission of murder of his brother along with her son---After the statement of petitioner No.1, respondent No.2 was involved in the case as culprit along with her son---During the course of investigation said accused got recovered the bloodstained clothes of the deceased along with weapon of offence i.e. club and shirt used for strangulating the deceased---When the post arrest bail of accused/respondent No.2 was allowed by the Court, she on the one hand was facing the trial in challan case and on the other hand filed a complaint under S.200, Cr.P.C., on the basis of distorted and twisted facts on 16.09.2024 and impleaded eight respondents including two real brothers of deceased as well as his cousins, who were witnesses in the challan case---In spite of filing of private complaint respondent No. 2 did not allege any overt act to petitioners Nos.1 to 3 and surprisingly at serial No.4 mentioned three unknown accused despite the fact that private complaint could only be filed against accused with nomination and specific role---Not only the petitioners Nos.1 to 3 were impleaded as proposed accused but the Police Officials who investigated the matter in accordance with law were also impleaded as respondents to face the trial under Ss. 302, 109, 148& 149, P.P.C., for recovering case property i.e. articles with which she along with her son took the life of deceased---Admitted fact that respondent No.2/complainant neither challenged the investigation, in which she was implicated as accused and her role was changed from complainant to culprit nor she challenged the recovery of articles affected from her which meant that she was fully satisfied with the investigation---Before issuing process, the Court was under obligation to satisfy itself for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint as to the existence or non-existence of sufficient grounds to issue process against the accused---Main object of dealing with the examination of complaint under S.200, Cr.P.C., was to protect the public from false, frivolous and vexatious complaints filed against them---Court could not proceed to issue process against accused until and unless, it was satisfied that prima facie case had been made out against those who were accused of the alleged criminal offence---In the instant case, the admission of private complaint by the Trial Court clearly amounted to misuse and abuse of process of law and by doing so, the trial Court in fact allowed the alleged principal accused/respondent No.2 to shift her responsibility and criminality on the other side, who prima facie were innocent---In such circumstances, this revision petition was accepted, resultantly the private complaint filed by respondent No.2 was dismissed, in circumstances. Ghulam Hyder v. The Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (P) Hyderabad and 5 others 2020 MLD 634 and Muhammad Rajar v. The State through Prosecutor General Sindh and others PLD 2025 SC 40 rel. Ch. Muhammad Naseer Gujjar for Petitioners. Ms. Asiya Yasin, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Mian Ali Akbar and Qaisar Naseem Awan for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2025. Judgment Abher Gul Khan, J .--- Through the instant criminal revision moved under Sections 435/439, Cr.P.C. petitioners have challenged the vires of order dated 18.02.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, whereby he summoned all of them to face trial in a private complaint titled "Mst. Naseem Rani. v. Muhammad Ashraf etc." instituted under sections 302, 109, 148, 149, P.P.C. 2. The learned law officer left the matter on the discretion of the Court, whereas learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 vehemently opposed instant petition and prayed for its dismissal. 3. Arguments heard, record perused. 4. Perusal of the record reveals that regarding the murder of Muhammad Akram, husband of Mst. Naseem Rani (respondent No.2) on 28.04.2024 at about 12:30 a.m. FIR was got registered on the same day at 11:35 a.m. and admittedly it was got registered on the complaint of Mst. Naseem Rani (respondent No.2) who did not nominate any accused and categorically mentioned in the body of complaint on the basis of which FIR was registered that three unknown accused took life of Muhammad Akram and immediately after the occurrence when the accused fled away from the spot, her brother-in-law/real brother of deceased Muhammad Akram came at the spot. After registration of FIR, statement of Muhammad Ashraf (petitioner No.1) was got recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. in which he implicated Mst. Naseem Rani (respondent No.2) for the commission of murder of his brother along with her son Muhammad Mustaqeem. After the statement of Muhammad Ashraf (petitioner No.1), Mst. Naseem Rani (respondent No.2) was involved in the case as culprit along with her son Muhammad Mustaqeem and during the course of investigation they got recovered the bloodstained clothes of the deceased along with weapon of offence i.e. club and shirt used for strangulating the deceased. When the post arrest bail of accused Mst. Naseem Rani (respondent No.2) was allowed by the court, she on the one hand was facing the trial in challan case and on the other hand filed a complaint under section 200, Cr.P.C on the basis of distorted and twisted facts on 16.09.2024 and impleaded eight respondents including two real brothers of deceased namely Muhammad Ashraf and Muhammad Akbar as well as his cousin Shahid Ali (petitioners Nos.1 to 3), who were witnesses in the challan case. In spite of filing of private complaint she did not allege any overt act to petitioners Nos.1 to 3 and surprisingly at serial No.4 mentioned three unknown accused despite the fact that private complaint can only be filed against accused with nomination and specific role. Not only the petitioners Nos.1 to 3, were impleaded as proposed accused but the police officials who investigated the matter in accordance with law were also impleaded as respondents to face the trial under sections 302, 109, 148, 149, P.P.C. for recovering case property i.e. articles with which she along with her son Muhammad Mustaqeem took the life of deceased. Para No.3 of impugned order passed by learned ASJ is very relevant in which it is categorically mentioned that criminal case FIR No.3063/2024 was registered on the complaint of Mst. Naseem Rani but subsequently she was implicated as accused in the said FIR, however, the learned ASJ summoned respondents Nos.1 to 3 to face the trial in the private complaint, against whom no convincing, cogent and sufficient material is available on record while leaving respondents Nos.5 to 8 being police officials. It is an admitted fact that respondent No.2/complainant neither challenged the investigation, in which she was implicated as accused and her role was changed from complainant to culprit nor she challenged the recovery of articles affected from her which means she was fully satisfied with the investigation. 5. As per law, the complaint is to state the facts to satisfy the Court of the existence of every ingredient of alleged offence, otherwise, complainant would not be entitled to invoke aid of the Court and to foist travails of criminal trial on a person, accused by him. In order to constitute offence, complainant must disclose existence of both basic ingredients namely unlawful act "actus rea" and criminal intent "mens rea" on the part of accused. Before issuing process, the Court is under obligation to satisfy itself for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint as to the existence or non-existence of sufficient grounds to issue process against the accused. Main object of dealing with the examination of complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C. is to protect the public from false, frivolous and vexatious complaints filed against them. Court cannot proceed to issue process against accused until and unless, it is satisfied that prima facie case has been made out against those who are accused of the alleged criminal offence. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the case reported as Ghulam Hyder v. The Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (P) Hyderabad and 5 others (2020 MLD 634). In another case reported as Muhammad Rajar v. The State through Prosecutor General Sindh and others (PLD 2025 Supreme Court 40), the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan observed as under: "The provisions of Sections 202, 203, and 204 of the Cr.P.C. require trial courts to conduct a thorough examination of the evidence supporting allegations made against individuals. In this context, the trial court must consider not only the factual basis for the accusations but also the underlying purpose of bringing those charges forward. This includes evaluating whether there is a legitimate objective behind the allegations or if they serve to unjustly target or harass the accused. Moreover, the trial court should assess the possibility of victimization, ensuring that individuals are not subjected to legal actions that could lead to unnecessary distress or humiliation." In the instant case, the admission of private complaint by the learned trial court clearly amounts to misuse and abuse of process of law and by doing so, the learned Additional Sessions Judge in fact allowed the alleged principal accused/respondent No.2 to shift her responsibility and criminality on the other side, who prima facie are innocent. 6. In the aforementioned circumstances, this revision petition is accepted and the impugned order being nullity in the eye of law is set aside, resultantly the private complaint filed by respondent No.2 is dismissed. JK/M-99/L Revision accepted.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), Ss. 5, 159(3) & 160---Federal government participating in the election of directors of Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL), challenge to---Constitutional petition, maintainability of---Adequate and efficacious remedy---Federal Government being a member of a company does not mean that it will be subject to the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Declaring the elections of directors invalid--- Under S. 160 of Companies Act, 2017---Effect---The matter arose from an election notice dated 02.05.2020 issued by Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL) for electing its Board of Directors---The respondent filed a Constitutional petition challenging the participation of the Federal Government in these elections---The Single Judge in Chambers held that the petition was competently filed under Article 199 of the Constitution because the Federal Government, being an instrumentality of the State, was amenable to the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction---Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) filed the present appeal (ICA) challenging this finding on the point of jurisdiction---Pivotal question for determination in the present appeal was as to "Whether the High Court, in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction was competent to entertain a challenge to the participation of the Federal Government as a shareholder in the election of directors of SNGPL or whether such matters fell exclusively within the domain of the remedies provided under the Companies Act, 2017"---Held: The act in question was of the Federal Government in seeking to contest an election of the Board of Directors of SNGPL---That function was quintessentially a private function being undertaken as an ordinary member of a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2017---By the mere fact that Federal government held a major shareholding in SNGPL did not mean that it became amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution while performing its functions as a member of SNGPL---As a shareholder of SNGPL the Federal government had the same set of rights as other shareholders conferred by the provisions of the Companies Act, 2017---The mere fact that the Federal government had ventured into corporate enterprises and purchased shares of a company did not mean that in such capacity too the Federal government was subject to the jurisdiction of a High Court---The challenge was to the set of exercise of rights, as a member, to contest an election to the office of a director of company---That right emanated from the provision of the Companies Act, 2017---Simply because the Federal government was a member of a company would not clothe it with the right to maintain a Constitutional petition---The second reason as to why the impugned judgment was not sustainable was that as per section 5 of the Companies Act, 2017 it was evident that the jurisdiction had been conferred on a High Court in respect of all matters arising under the Companies Act, 2017---The remedy had been provided by section 160 of the Companies Act, 2017 conferring power on the court to declare elections of directors invalid---That power could not be usurped under Art. 199 of the Constitution as efficacious and adequate remedy had been provided by law and this aspect should have been taken consideration while holding that the Constitutional petition was competently filed---If a challenge of this nature were allowed to succeed then it would mean that in any case where a Federal government was a shareholder, a Constitutional challenge would be maintainable yet no such challenge would be competent in respect of an ordinary member of a company who was neither a Federal government, Provincial government or a local authority---The impugned judgment to the extent that it held that the subject matter of the Constitutional petition was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court, was set aside---Consequently, the challenge to the act of Federal government to contest elections of board of directors could not be brought before the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction---The power to do so lay in the High Court exercising jurisdiction under the Companies Act, 2017 only---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Pakistan International Airlines and others v. Tanveer ur Rehman and others PLD 2010 SC 676 rel. Aown Abbas Bhatti v. Forman Christian College and 2 others PLD 2018 Lah. 435 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199(1)(a)(i)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Functions in connections with the affairs of the Federation, Province or a local authority---The first condition stipulated in Art.199(1)(a)(i) of the Constitution to engage the jurisdiction of a High Court is that the act must not only be performed by a person within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court but also must relate to functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority---Only then can the jurisdiction of a High Court be engaged to make an order directing that person to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do or to do anything he is required by law to do---Thus, the conditions contained therein must be established to exist before any order can be passed under Art. 199(1)(a)(i) of the Constitution---It follows indubitably that if a person is not performing functions in connection with the affairs of Federation, a Province or a local authority, that person cannot be subjected to an order by a High Court---The distinction brought forth in Art. 199(1)(a)(i) is a distinction between public and private acts of a person though he may otherwise be performing functions in connection with the affairs of Federation, a Province or a local authority---If that person is performing public functions then a High Court has the jurisdiction to make an order under Art. 199---On the contrary, if that person is merely performing acts of a private nature and are private functions, then the authority of the High Court to make an order is seriously in doubt---The primary purpose of the engagement of Art. 199 of the Constitution is to confer powers on a High Court in respect of functions of the State involving some exercise of sovereign or public power and not otherwise---The words "functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation" have to be read with "to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do" to ascertain the competence of a constitutional petition---Unless the function under challenge is in connection with the affairs of the Federation, no relief can be granted and the High Court's hands are constricted and restrained---Judicial review is concerned with causes of action against public authorities in the performance of their public duties---The meaning of the phrase 'performing function in connection with the affairs of the Federation' has reference to governmental or State functions involving, in one form or another, an element of exercise of public power. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Adequate and efficacious remedy---Scope---In case where there is an adequate and efficacious remedy provided by law, High Court will not exercise its Constitutional jurisdiction and collateral challenges are not allowed to sustain. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---Federal government being a major shareholder / member of a company---Constitutional petition, maintainability of---The mere fact that the Federal Government has ventured into corporate enterprises and purchased shares of a company does not mean that in such capacity too the Federal Government is subject to the Constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court---Mere fact that Federal government holds a major shareholding in a company does not mean that it becomes amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Pakistan International Airlines and others v. Tanveer ur Rehman and others PLD 2010 SC 676 rel. Aown Abbas Bhatti v. Forman Christian College and 2 others PLD 2018 Lah. 435 ref. (e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S.160---Declaring the election of directors invalid---Scope and criteria---The challenge on the basis of section 160 to declare election of directors invalid may be brought on the application of members holding 10% of the voting power in the company. (f) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S.5---Jurisdiction of the Company Bench of the High Court---Matters arising under the Companies Act, 2017---Jurisdiction of all other courts barred---Scope---The court having jurisdiction under the Companies Act, 2017 shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situated---Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law no civil court as provided in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 or any other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the court is empowered to determine by or under the Companies Act, 2017. Adil Umar Bandial, Zohaib Hashmi and Tamoor Sultan, with Ahmad Arslan, G.M Law and Ahmad Sohail and Imran Javed, Dy. Chief Officers Law, SNGPL for Appellant. Anas Hanif, Asst. Attorney General for Pakistan. Saad Amir, Kumail Ali and Wasi ul Haq for Respondent No.1. Ruman Bilal for SECP. Shahryar Kasuri for Respondent No.14. Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2025.