Summary: Conclusion that the plaint does not disclose any cause ofaction and it is also barred by Section 42 of the SpecificRelief Act and Section 29, 30 and 60 of the Sindh MentalHealth Act 2013 including all enabling provisions of thesame Act. The moved under Order7 Rule 11 C.P.C is allowed and the plaint is rejected.Consequently, the injunction application is also dismissed.

Summary: Background:In Civil Revision Petition No. 47/2020, the petitioner Naseerullah challenged the judgments/orders dated 06-06-2018 and 25-04-2018 passed by the Additional District Judge Diamer and the Civil Judge Chilas, respectively. The petitioner filed a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction, claiming that he was awarded a contract for the improvement and widening of the KKH to Fairy Meadow road, which he completed, but the respondents failed to hand over the project and return the 10% deposit. The petitioner sought a temporary injunction to prevent the respondents from reissuing the contract.----Issues:Whether the petitioner was entitled to a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC.Whether the lower courts erred in dismissing the petitioner's application for a temporary injunction.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the lower courts' decisions. The key points of the judgment are:Lack of Evidence: The petitioner failed to provide any written agreement or document showing that he was awarded the contract for the disputed road. The court found no evidence on record to support the petitioner's claim.Stranger to the Contract: The petitioner was deemed a stranger to the contract, as the actual contract was awarded to one Mohammad Amin in 2007. Mohammad Amin allegedly failed to complete the project within the stipulated time.Legal Standing: The petitioner had no locus standi to file the suit against the respondents since he was not a party to the original contract.Prima Facie Case: The petitioner failed to demonstrate a prima facie arguable case, and the balance of convenience was not in his favor. The court concluded that the petitioner would not suffer irreparable loss if the temporary injunction was not granted.Given these findings, the court held that there was no basis for interference with the lower courts' decisions in revisional jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.----Citations/Precedents:Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC (Grant of temporary injunctions)Lack of locus standi and evidence in support of the petitioner's claims

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908): ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2— Interim Injunction—Essential Requirements—Prima Facie Case, Irreparable Loss, and Balance of Inconvenience—Non-Existence of Justiciable Claim—Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court— Petitioner sought permanent and mandatory injunction against alleged illegal construction by private respondents on the ground that it blocked the free passage adjacent to his residence—Interim relief under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C. was denied by the Civil Judge and affirmed by the Additional District Judge—Both courts relied on report of local commission and written statement of respondent No.7/Cantonment Board, which confirmed that construction was within the old structure and carried out with proper permission—Held, petitioner failed to establish prima facie case, irreparable loss, or balance of inconvenience in his favour—Where factual issues require adjudication through evidence and involve disputed rights, courts are justified in declining injunctive relief—Discretion exercised by lower courts found proper, lawful, and not arbitrary—Petitioner failed to demonstrate grounds warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. Revision dismissed. (b) Administration of Justice: ----Discretion of Civil Courts in Injunctive Matters—Scope of Interference in Revisional Jurisdiction— Where courts of first and appellate instance have exercised discretion after evaluating evidence, pleadings, and commission reports, High Court in revisional jurisdiction will not ordinarily interfere unless the order is perverse, arbitrary, or without jurisdiction—Mere disagreement with conclusions is insufficient ground for revision—Findings based on local commission and official permissions from relevant authorities carry strong evidentiary value. -----Cited Cases: • Irshad Husain v. Province of Punjab PLD 2003 SC 344 • Pervaiz Hussain v. Arabian Sea Enterprises Ltd. 2007 SCMR 1005 • Marghub Siddiqi v. Hamid Ahmad Khan 1974 SCMR 519 • Mst. Hajran Begum v. Kh. Muhammad Yousaf 2005 MLD 592 (Lahore) • Province of Punjab v. Alamgir PLD 2005 Lahore 401 • Sarwar Ali v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies 2016 CLC 1090 -----Disposition: Revision dismissed in limine.

Summary: Background:Residents of Mauza Makhor, Karis, represented by Abdul Aziz, Ghulam Nabi, and Zakir Ahmad, filed a civil suit against various respondents, including the Provincial Government of Gilgit Baltistan and construction contractors, opposing the relocation of a hydel power project construction site from upstream to downstream of the Chanma channel. The petitioners argued that this decision would adversely affect their water rights and agricultural lands.----Issues:Whether the petitioners demonstrated a prima facie arguable case for the grant of a temporary injunction.Whether the balance of convenience favored the petitioners.Whether the petitioners would suffer irreparable loss if the injunction was not granted.Whether the decision to change the construction site violated established water rights and government policy.Whether the court had jurisdiction to interfere with the decision-making process regarding the construction project.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court held that the petitioners failed to establish a prima facie arguable case for the grant of a temporary injunction. It reasoned that the balance of convenience did not favor the petitioners, as they had not demonstrated irreparable loss if the injunction was not granted. Additionally, the court cited Section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act, which prohibits injunctions that interfere with public duties of government departments unless there is an abuse of power. However, the court ordered the respondents to respect the water rights of the petitioners as per local customs after completing the construction. If violations occurred, the petitioners could file a fresh application for injunction or a new suit.---Citations/Precedents:Section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act.Local customs and practices regarding water rights.

Summary: The appeal pertains to a lawsuit filed by the appellant against Orix Leasing Pakistan Limited for declaration, injunction, and damages. The appellant challenges the transaction conducted through an account he maintained with Orix Investment Bank Pakistan Limited. The terms and conditions of the account opening form and the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the respondent are under consideration. The court notes that the appellant's suit was dismissed by the trial court and this dismissal was upheld by the appellate court. However, upon review, the court finds that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent does not fall under the definition of "customer" and "finance" as stated in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Therefore, the court determines that the suit was wrongly dismissed and should be treated as a case for ordinary civil jurisdiction, rather than being governed by the specific provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The court allows the appeal, sets aside the impugned orders of the lower courts, and remands the case back to the trial court for further consideration and to decide the matter on its merits. The trial court is directed to expedite the proceedings and aim to dispose of the case within six months.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 115---Suit for declaration and injunction---Concurrent findings of facts by two courtsbelow---Revisional jurisdiction of High Court---Principles---Plaintiff sought her Sharai share inlegacy/property left by predecessor-in-interest of parties---Suit was decreed by Trial Court infavour of plaintiff and appeal filed by defendants was dismissed by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction was not permitted to reopen ordilate upon merits of case---While exercising jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C. High Court had toconfine itself only to law points involved in the matter or any specific portion of evidence ifomitted by courts below---Concurrent findings of facts and law arrived at by two courts belowcould only be disturbed if High Court would come to conclusion that same were illegal,unlawful, based on misreading and non-reading of evidence, shocking, perverse, artificial andfanciful---High Court maintained judgment and decrees passed by both courts below whichwere, after proper appreciation of entire material/evidence, available on record and taking intoconsideration all legal as well as factual aspects of case passed well-reasoned judgments/decreesand same were not open to any exception---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.2015 SCMR 1091; Civil Appeal No.2688 of 2006 and Ghulam Ali v. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi(Mst.) PLD 1990 SC 1 rel.

Summary: The plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against the defendant, seeking a declaration, permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs related to an electricity bill and metering issues.The plaintiff argued that the defendant had no right to issue supplementary bills for a faulty meter without involving an Electric Inspector and that the impugned bill was illegal. They also claimed damages due to electricity disconnection. The defendant denied the allegations and stated that the bill was issued based on a new meter's consumption after finding discrepancies in the old meter. The court framed several issues for consideration, including whether the defendant had the authority to issue supplementary bills, whether the impugned bill was legal, and whether the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought. After evaluating the evidence and legal arguments, the court concluded that the dispute fell within the scope of Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act, which pertains to issues related to the correctness of meters and measuring apparatus. The court ruled that the dispute was not about dishonest obstruction or consumption of energy, which would have fallen under Section 26-A of the Act. As a result, the court decreed in favor of the plaintiff to the extent that the impugned bill was canceled, and the case was referred to an Electric Inspector for further examination and decision.

Summary: The product was approved for registration after comparing it with similar products registered in India and various other countries. The experts conducted a retrospective study comparing Reditux with another drug called Mabhtera in patients with diffuse large B-cell lymphoma and found no significant differences in terms of response rates, progression-free survival, overall survival, or toxicity.The experts' report emphasized the safety and effectiveness of Reditux, and the Registration Board approved its registration. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for an injunction, and the balance of convenience favored the defendant. As a result, the injunction application was dismissed.

Summary: a) Civil Procedure—Interim Injunctions: ----Order maintaining status quo—Interim injunction granted by the Chief Court in favor of the respondents, restraining the petitioners from dispossessing the respondents from the suit land until the final adjudication of pending civil revisions—Petitioners, contending they were in possession of the land, sought modification of the interim order—Supreme Appellate Court upheld the Chief Court's interim order, finding it well-reasoned and based on the Trial Court's partial decree recognizing the respondent's possession of the land. (b) Possession and Injunctive Relief: ----Protection of possession—Interim relief granted to maintain possession of the suit property pending resolution of the main dispute—Supreme Appellate Court reaffirmed that interference in interim orders is unwarranted unless there is a significant procedural or substantive error—Possession recognized as a critical factor in granting injunctive relief. (c) Appellate Review—Scope of Interim Orders: ----Judicial restraint in interference with interim orders—Supreme Appellate Court declined to modify or overturn the impugned order, emphasizing that interim relief orders, particularly those based on possession, should be preserved to maintain fairness during ongoing litigation. ----Disposition: The petition was converted into an appeal and dismissed. The interim order dated 12.11.2016 passed by the Chief Court was affirmed.

Summary: In the case of Al-Tamash Medical Society versus Dr.Anwar Ye Bin Ju & others, reported in 2017 MLD 785, Ihave held that an injunction is an equitable relief based onwell-known equitable principles. Since the relief is whollyequitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction has toshow that he himself was not at fault. The phrase prima faciecase in its plain language signifies a triable case where somesubstantial question is to be investigated or some seriousquestions are to be tried and this phrase ?prima facie? need notto be confused with ?prima facie title?. Before granting injunction the court is bound to consider probability of theplaintiff succeeding in the suit. All presumptions andambiguities are taken against the party seeking to obtaintemporary injunction. The balance of convenience andinconvenience being in favour of the defendant i.e. greaterdamage would arise to the defendant by granting theinjunction in the event of its turning out afterwards to havebeen wrongly granted, than to the plaintiff from withholding it,in the event of the legal right proving to be in his favour, theinjunction may not be granted. A party seeks the aid of thecourt by way of injunction must as a rule satisfy the court thatthe interference is necessary to protect from the species ofinjury which the court calls irreparable before the legal rightcan be established on trial. In the technical sense with thequestion of granting or withholding preventive equitable aid,an injury is set to be irreparable either because no legalremedy furnishes full compensation or adequate redress orowing to the inherent ineffectiveness of such legal remedy. Inthe case in hand, neither the plaintiffs have made out anyprima facie case nor balance of convenience lies in their favornor any question of irreparable injury arises.