Summary: Section of Law: Article 199 of the Constitution r/w WP Family Court Act, 1964 & Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.a) A decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty passed under clause (a) of item(vii) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 is applicable.b) An appeal against grant or refusal of dower would lie when it is made or refused along with or without dissolution of marriage. A decree for dissolution of marriage simpliciter & without any condition would not be appealable however

Summary: Section of Law: Article 199 of the Constitution r/w WP Family Court Act, 1964 & Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.a) A decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty passed under clause (a) of item(vii) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 is applicable.b) An appeal against grant or refusal of dower would lie when it is made or refused along with or without dissolution of marriage. A decree for dissolution of marriage simpliciter & without any condition would not be appealable however

Summary: The instant petition arises from a legal dispute wherein respondent No.1, along with her minor child (respondent No.2), filed a suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, delivery expenses, and recovery of dowry articles against the petitioner. The petitioner contested the suit through a written statement and subsequently sought permission to submit receipts of dowry articles, which was dismissed. Another application for permission to produce the same receipts and to file an amended schedule of witnesses was also dismissed. The main arguments of the petitioner's counsel were centered around the contention that the documents should have been allowed in the interest of justice, notwithstanding the procedural requirements.The court considered the timeline of events, noting that the trial had been ongoing for approximately five and a half years without conclusion. The petitioner's applications for permission to produce documents were made belatedly, after the conclusion of oral evidence. The court observed that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient reasons for the delay and the relevance of the documents. Furthermore, the nature of the documents (receipts) was vague and unspecific, with no clear relevance to the claims made by respondent No.1. In the judgment, the court emphasized that the discretion of the Family Court to allow the production of documents is subject to certain conditions, including the relevance, materiality, and timing of the documents. The court found that the orders of the Family Court rejecting the petitioner's applications were justified based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the Constitutional petition was dismissed as lacking merit and substance, with the court finding no error of law or jurisdiction in the orders of the Family Court.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------Ss. 5, Sched. & 14---Family Courts Rules, 1965, R. 3---Dastoor-ul-Amal Diwani StateKalat, 1952, S. 24---Suit for dissolution of marriage---Appeal---Scope---Respondent/wifefiled suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, recovery of dower amount,custody of minors and return of educational certificates---Family Court partly decreed thesuit---Petitioner filed appeal before the Member, Majlis-e-Shoora, who returned the appealby holding that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal---Petitioner filed appealbefore the District and Sessions Judge, who dismissed the same being barred by time---Validity---Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, provided that a decision given ordecree passed by a Family Court shall be appealable to High Court, where the Family Courtwas presided over by a District Judge and to the District Court in any other case---To definethe words "District Judge", an Explanation was given in R. 3 of the Family Courts Rules,1965, wherein it was laid down that "for the purpose of this rule and R. 7, the expression'District Judge' shall be deemed to include the President of Majlis-e-Shoora, Kalat"---Section24 of the Dastoor-ul-Amal Diwani State Kalat, 1952, envisaged that there shall be a Majlis-eShoora comprising of two or more members to decide appeals arising out of the judgmentsand decrees of the Qazis working under the hierarchy of Dastoor, thus, for all intents andpurposes, reference to word 'Majlis-e-Shoora' meant a Court constituted with two membersand a President, whereas the reference to words 'President of Majlis-e-Shoora' was limitedonly to President of Majlis-e-Shoora---Provincial Government while defining the territoriallimits of the various courts of Majlis-e-Shoora had simultaneously declared the respectiveDistrict and Sessions Judges as President of different Courts of Majlis-e-Shoora---Intentionof legislature was clear that in family matters either decided by a Civil Judge or Qazi, theappeal would solely lie before the District Judge---Constitutional petition was dismissedaccordingly.(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------S. 14---Family Courts Rules, 1965, R. 22---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---Respondent filed a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty,recovery of dower amount, custody of minors and return of educational certificates---Family Court partly decreed the suit---Petitioner filed an appeal before the Member, Majlis-eShoora, who returned the appeal by holding that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain theappeal---Petitioner filed an appeal before the District and Sessions Judge, who dismissed thesame being barred by time---Validity---Even the appeal filed before the court of Member,Majlis-e-Shoora, was barred by time---Rule 22 of Family Courts Rules, 1965, provided thatan appeal under S.14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, shall be preferred within 30 days of thepassing of the decree or a decision excluding the time required for obtaining the certifiedcopies---Although it was provided in the proviso to R. 22 of Family Courts Rules, 1965, thatthe Appellate Court might for sufficient cause extend the period---Nothing was available onrecord to suggest that any application was filed for extension of time, nor any such groundwas taken in the memorandum of appeal---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------S. 5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S. 2---Suit fordissolution of marriage---Ground for dissolution of marriage---Cruelty---Scope---Respondentfiled a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, recovery of dower amount,custody of minors and return of educational certificates---Family Court partly decreed thesuit---Petitioner filed appeal before the District and Sessions Judge, who dismissed the samebeing barred by time---Validity---Statement of respondent/wife and her witnesses showedthat there was maltreatment both physically and mentally from the side of petitioner, that waswhy the petitioner had to give surety that next time there would be no beatings---Petitioner,on the other hand, had failed to give substantiating evidence to prove that the respondentwillingly left him and refused to rejoin him---Petitioner had also failed to maintain therespondent for several years during her stay with her parents---Cruelty was not limited tophysical bearing rather it could either be mental or even by conduct---Respondent had takenshelter in her parent's house for several years and in such a situation the respondent hadsustained acute mental anguish and suffering by the reckless and careless attitude of thepetitioner, which compelled her to approach the trial court for dissolution of marriage---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.(d) Interpretation of statutes-------Proviso to section---Construction---Proviso is to be restrictively construed.(e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)------S. 14---Appeal---Dissolution of marriage---Scope---Logic behind non-provision of appealin the dissolution of marriage case is to protect the underprivileged and generally oppressedsection of society i.e. wife, from costly and prolonged litigation---Lawmakers have put a clogon the right of a husband to file appeal in case of dissolution of marriage, keeping in viewthe peculiar circumstances prevailing in the society.(f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)-------S. 14---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2(viii)(d)---Appeal---Dissolution of marriage---Scope---Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, contemplatesappeal from the decision of the Judge Family Court to be competent before the District Judgebut with a bar that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by a Family Court dissolving themarriage on any other ground or grounds specified therein except on the ground mentionedin S.2(viii)(d) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which relates to the disposal ofproperty of wife preventing her from exercising her legal right over it.(g) Administration of justice-------No one can claim benefit of his own wrong.(h) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-------S. 14---Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction---Scope---Where a litigant has not acted in a bona fide manner or he has acted without due diligence inprosecuting remedies before a wrong forum, he cannot be benefitted under S.14 of theLimitation Act, 1908.Muhammad Ishaq v. Province of the Punjab 1998 SCMR 9; Abdul Ghani v. GhulamSarwar PLD 1977 SC 102 and Chaudhry Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Ali Khan andothers 1975 SCMR 259 rel.(i) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Laches---Scope---No period of limitation isprescribed for filing a constitutional petition under Art.199 of the Constitution, but it has tobe filed within a reasonable time---Reasonable time means time requisite for filing of appeal/revision, which is normally three months.Khali Khan v. Haji Nazir and 4 others PLD 1997 SC 304 ref.

Summary: Issues:The petitioner contends the divorce certificate was issued without following mandatory conditions of the Ordinance, particularly the lack of notice under Section 7(1), as he resides in the UK and was uninformed of the proceedings.The jurisdiction of the Chairman of the relevant Union Council in Pakistan is questioned, especially in cases involving Pakistani citizens residing abroad, in light of the Ordinance and SRO 1086(K)61 dated November 9, 1961.Arguments:The petitioner, represented by his daughter's power of attorney due to COVID-19 restrictions, argues that the delayed and procedurally flawed issuance of the divorce certificate violates statutory requirements and fundamental rights.Respondents argue the legality of the proceedings and the divorce certificate, citing the petitioner's failure to participate in reconciliation processes and the lack of an Arbitration Council in the UK's Pakistan High Commission.----Court's Analysis:The court examined the SRO's validity and its authority under the Ordinance, concluding it was ultra vires due to improper delegation of power to appoint officers as Chairmen in foreign missions.The court found no legal basis to establish parallel divorce proceedings in Pakistan's foreign missions, emphasizing the need for public record and verification of marriage dissolution within Pakistan.----Conclusion:The SRO 1086(K)61 was declared ultra vires the Ordinance.The absence of an Arbitration Council in the UK's Pakistan High Commission was noted, with no capacity to conduct reconciliation proceedings under Section 7 of the Ordinance or issue a divorce certificate.The petition was dismissed due to the lack of demonstrated illegality in the issuance of the divorce certificate by Islamabad's Arbitration Council.

Summary: Background: Respondent/plaintiff Mst. Riffat Kousar filed two suits: one for recovery of maintenance allowance and the other for dissolution of marriage before the Additional District Judge Dadyal, empowered as Judge Family Court Dudyal. She claimed that the petitioner/defendant, Mohammad Mumtaz, had married her on January 16, 2010, and they had a child on November 4, 2010. Eight days after the child's birth, Mumtaz left her at her parents’ house and neither met her nor paid any maintenance. Mumtaz is alleged to be a contractor earning around 40,000 to 45,000 per month. Mumtaz filed a suit for conjugal rights, claiming they lived a happy life until her mother instigated her to leave him. He sought a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. ----Issues: 1- Whether the dismissal of Mohammad Mumtaz's appeals by the High Court was justified. 2- Whether the petitioner should pay additional maintenance towards the decretal amount for the minor. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --High Court Decision: The High Court dismissed Mumtaz’s appeals against the judgment of the Family Court, which had decided in favor of Riffat Kousar, granting her maintenance allowance and dissolving the marriage. --Supreme Court Decision: The Supreme Court reviewed the petitions for leave to appeal against the consolidated judgment of the High Court. The Court considered the maintenance of the minor and the behavior of both parties during their matrimonial life. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to the petitioner depositing an additional Rs.20,000 out of the decretal amount towards the maintenance of the minor. The petitioner was directed to deposit the security amount of Rs.1000 for each petition within one month, failing which the leave granted order would be rescinded automatically.

Summary: The petitioner and respondent No.3 entered into marriage but their relationship turned tumultuous, leading the petitioner to file for dissolution of marriage. Respondent No.3 later attempted to divorce the petitioner, but the divorce deed was initially declared ineffective, leading to legal proceedings. The current case involves an application by respondent No.3, under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the order. The petitioner contested this application, asserting that the Family Court, not a Civil Judge, should have jurisdiction in the matter. The trial court allowed the application, a decision contested by the petitioner in a revision petition, which was initially allowed but later remanded. The revisional court ultimately dismissed the petition, leading to the current constitutional petition. The petitioner argued that the judgments are flawed and illegal, citing the misapplication of section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, and overlooking amendments to sections 21 and 21-A. However, the court emphasizes that a mere error in citing a section does not oust jurisdiction if the court has the authority to address the matter. The court underscored the Family Court's power to entertain applications related to fraud and misrepresentation, citing legal precedents such as Mst. Safia Bibi v. Mst. Aisha Bibi (1982 SCMR 494), Jane Margrete William v. Abdul Hamid Mian (1994 SCMR 1555), Rauf B Kadir v. State Bank of Pakistan (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 1111), Olas Khan and others v. Chairman Nab through Chairman and others (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 40), Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal (2017 SCMR 321), and Sayed Abbas Taqi Mehdi v. Mst. Sayeda Sabahat Batool and others (PLJ 2010 SC 891), among others. The court concluded that, considering the circumstances and legal precedents, the lower courts judiciously exercised their jurisdiction, and the constitutional petition was dismissed.

Summary: Sections of law; Article 199 of the Constitution(a)A decree for restitution of conjugal rights would not prevent a female from bringing a suit for dissolution of marriage, in changed circumstances.

Summary: Family matter (Decree of dissolution Marriage In Section 10(2) Up held . CP dismissed.) --- Muhammad Aslam challenged the dissolution of his marriage by the Civil & Family Judge-II, Tando Adam, in favor of his wife (Respondent No.2) through Khula, a form of divorce initiated by the wife in Islamic law. The dissolution was granted on July 4, 2020, citing irreconcilable differences and a failure to reconcile. Aslam argued that the pandemic and lockdown restrictions prevented him from attending the pre-trial hearing, claiming the judgment was unfairly based on misinterpreted evidence and a disregard for his right to present his case, referencing Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964.The High Court, led by Judge Adnan-Ul-Karim Memon, reviewed the case and found that Aslam had intentionally avoided the proceedings to delay the case, despite being given multiple opportunities to attend, including a specific adjournment to July 4, 2020, which he also missed. The court emphasized the importance of swift resolutions in family matters and dismissed Aslam's petition for lacking merit, upholding the original decree of dissolution by Khula. The ruling highlighted the court's dedication to procedural fairness and the critical role of personal presence in legal proceedings, especially in family law.

Summary: Constitutional Petition.Held: (i) It is settled position that Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 applies only to Muslims as has been clearly provided in Section 1 Subsection (2) of the said Ordinance which provides that the said Ordinance extends to the whole of Pakistan and applies to Muslim citizens of Pakistan.(ii) There is no provision in the nature of the Khula in the divorce Act, 1869 and as such the mere statement of the petitioner that she was not willing to live as a wife with petitioner, is not sufficient for the purpose of dissolution of Christian marriage. In this regard reference is made to section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869.(iii) The Court can grant a decree for a judicial, separation within the meaning of section 22 of the Divorce Act, 1869 or to dissolve the marriage under section 10 of the same Act.(The writ petition was allowed in the circumstances)