Summary: (a) Civil Procedure—Doctrine of Lis Pendens—Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 52—Sale during pendency of pre-emption suit—Applicability of doctrine to restored suits Respondents No. 2 to 4 purchased suit land during the pendency of a pre-emption suit that had been restored after earlier dismissal for non-prosecution. The Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of lis pendens (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act), such purchasers are bound by the outcome of the ongoing litigation. Held: Restoration of suit relates back to its original filing; thus, any sale during the pendency—even after a temporary dismissal—is subject to lis pendens. Cited Cases: Basit Sibtain v. Muhammad Sharif (2004 SCMR 578) Malik Amanullah v. Haji Muhammad Essa (2024 SCMR 1258) (b) Bona Fide Purchaser—Transfer by ostensible owner—TPA, S. 41—No shield against lis pendens Even a bona fide purchaser without notice is bound by the result of pending litigation. The Court reaffirmed that the doctrine of lis pendens is not based on notice but on the principle of finality in litigation. Held: Transferee steps into shoes of transferor and cannot escape legal consequences of the pending suit. Cited Cases: Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan (2002 SCMR 2003) Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti (PLD 2011 SC 905) Tabassum Shaheen v. Uzma Rahat (2012 SCMR 983) Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali (2016 SCMR 1773) (c) Practice and Procedure—High Court’s remand order set aside—Suit for pre-emption restored The High Court’s decision to remand the case for fresh evidence on merits was held erroneous. The Supreme Court restored the trial court’s decree dated 22.01.2008, which had been passed after the plaintiff deposited the sale consideration in full. Held: High Court committed legal error by disregarding lis pendens and disrupting the finality of the trial court’s decree. Disposition: Appeal allowed. High Court’s impugned order dated 12.07.2010 set aside. Trial court’s decree dated 22.01.2008 restored.

Summary: Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act (XVII of 1996)--- ----Ss. 3, 4 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199 (5)---Quo warranto, writ of---Term ‘person’---Non-statutory post---Appellant was appointed as Assistant Director (Human Resource) with Pakistan Telecommunication Authority on contract basis---Judge in Chambers of High Court declared appointment of appellant as illegal---Validity---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority falls within the ambit of ‘person’ as defined in Art.199 (5) of the Constitution, as it exercises a rule over functions of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited relating to telecommunication pursuant to Ss. 4 and 5 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 which is a subject that pertains to one of the important affairs of Federation, while headed by Chairman who along with its constituting Directors is appointed by Federal Government under S.3 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996---Appellant as Assistant Director (HR) or Deputy Director (HR) was not vested with some portion of sovereign function of government to be exercised by her for the benefit of public---Work undertaken by human resource management officers did not have any nexus with sovereign functions of State nor could it be considered a public duty---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, under S.9 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 may by general or special order delegate any of its powers, functions or duties as it may think fit from time to time to any of its officers with the exception of specific powers, functions or duties as stipulated in proviso to S.9 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996---No sovereign function, power or duty was delegated to appellant by Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, in exercise of powers conferred under S.9 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996---Post of Assistant Director (HR) to which appellant was initially appointed was not a ‘public office’ created by statute nor could it be described as a substantive one which was vested with some portion of sovereign functions of government to be exercised for the benefit of public and no contravention of statute or a statutory instrument had been pointed out---Division Bench of High Court set aside writ of quo warranto as essential conditions for issuance of such writ were not satisfied---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in appointment of appellant, as the respondent had failed to establish his bona fide---Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Dr. Shamim Tariq v. International Islamic University, Islamabad 2020 PLC (C.S.) 499; Muhammad Muneer Malik v. Allama Iqbal Open University 2016 PLC (C.S.) 896; Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244; Sajjad Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan Writ Petition No. 1476 of 2022; Dr. Farzana Bari v. Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights PLD 2018 Islamabad 127; Salman Shahid v. University of Management and Technology 2022 CLC 1328; Anoosha Shaigan v. Lahore University of Management Sciences PLD 2007 Lah. 568; Pakistan International Airline Corporation v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman PLD 2010 SC 676; Muhammad Shahnawaz v. Karachi Electric Supply Company 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1579; Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 Lah. 288; Miss. Summara Nayaz v. FOP through Secretary Establishment Division 2015 PLC (C.S.) 671; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Pakistan Olympic Association v. Nadeem Aftab Sindhu 2019 SCMR 221; Aitchison College, Lahore v. Muhammad Zubair PLD 2002 SC 326; Pakistan Defence Officers’ Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed 2013 SCMR 1707; Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Zahid 2010 SCMR 253; Jawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan, Vice Chancellor, University of Swabi 2023 SCMR 162; Karachi Development Authority v. Wali Ahmed Khan 1991 SCMR 2434; Abdul Haq Kauser v. Alim Akhtar Shah 1989 CLC 1907;Dr. Bushra Ashiq Siddiqui v. Muhammad Aslam 1989 MLD 1351; Masudul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain PLD 1963 SC 203; Shahid Mehmood v. Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1103; Serajul Islam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1956 Sindh 354; Zeaul Huq v. The East Pakistan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. PLD 1969 Dacca 105; Muzammal Ahmed Khan v. Imran Meer 2010 PLC (C.S.) 1023; Shahzado Langah v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 PLC (C.S.) 853; Barrister Sardar Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2013 Lah. 343; Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 301; Project Director, Karkhana Allat-e-Zari v. The Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court PLD 1989 SC 152; Capt. (Retd.) Muhammad Naseem Hijazi v. Province of Punjab 2000 PLC (C.S) 1310 and Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad v. Riaz Hussain 1999 PLC (C.S.) 680 ref. Afnan Karim Kundi, (in I.C.A. No. 227 of 2022 and for the Respondent No.5 (in I.C.A. No. 228/2022 and for the Respondent No. 4 in I.C.A. No.236/2022). Syed Khawar Ameer Bukhari and Muhammad Asif Javed, (in I.C.A. No. 228 of 2022 and for the Respondent No.1 (in I.C.As. Nos. 227 and 236 of 2022). Hafiz S.A. Rehman, Hafiz Hifz Ur Rehman, Muhammad Anwar Mughal and Seikh Rizwan Nawaz (in I.C.A. No. 236 of 2022 and for the Respondent No.3 in I.C.As. Nos. 227 and 228 of 2022). Ms. Kanz-us-Saadat, Deputy Attorney General for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th May, 2025. SAMAN RAFAT IMTIAZ, J.--- This judgment shall decide the captioned I.C.A. No. 227/2022 filed by the Appellant [Rabeeya Pervez]; I.C.A. No. 228/2022 filed by the Respondent No.1 [Usman Zafar]; and I.C.A. No. 236/2022 filed by the Respondent No.3 [Pakistan Telecommunication Authority] under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 against the Judgment dated 16-05-2022 (“Impugned Judgment”) passed by the learned Judge-in-Chambers in Writ Petition No.3426/2018, which was filed in the nature of quo warranto, by the Respondent No.1 to challenge the appointment of the Appellant as Assistant Director, Human Resources (HR) with the Respondent No. 3 on contract basis vide Memorandum dated 9-8-2005 and her subsequent promotion as Deputy Director on 10-02-2009.

Summary: (a) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017) --- ----S.98 --- Election Rules, 2017, R.92(6) --- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.106, proviso---Allocation of reserved seats --- Cut-off date, effect and significance of --- Determination of party strength ---Scope --- Independent candidate joining political party within three days of notification---Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) allocating reserved seats for women and non-Muslims, challenge to --- Legality --- Brief facts of the matter were that in General Elections 2024 the ECP issued notifications under S.98 of the Elections Act, 2017 declaring returned candidates for the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly between 13.02.2024 and 22.02.2024; certain independents were notified as returned candidates and joined PML(N) party within the prescribed three-day period; the ECP then allocated reserved seats for women and non-Muslims through notifications which PML(N) challenged, mainly disputing the ECP’s cut-off date used to determine party strength for reserved seats --- Central question for determination was as to “whether the cut-off date fixed by the ECP i.e. 22.02.2024 as the benchmark for determining the total number of general seats won by a political party for the purposes of allocation and election to reserved seats was legally sustainable”--- Held: In terms of proviso to Article 106 of the Constitution read with R.92 of the Election Rules, 2017, the independent candidate had a constitutional and legal right to join a political party within three days of such notification and he had duly exercised his right and joined PML(N) within the stipulated period --- Nowhere in the Constitution did it stipulate that the process of allocation of reserved seats must be concluded prior to the convening of the Assembly --- Thus, the selection of 22.02.2024 as a determinative cut-off date appeared to be arbitrary and not rooted in any express constitutional or statutory mandate --- By the time ECP proceeded to allocate reserved seats for women and non-Muslims on 04.03.2024, PML(N) had a total of seven general seats to its credit --- In the present case, the independent candidate was notified as a return candidate on 22.02.2024 and on the same day, ECP proceeded with a partial allocation of reserved seats for women, wherein five seats were distributed among political parties --- Independent candidate joined PML(N) within mandated three days --- Undue haste exhibited by ECP in proceeding with allocation of reserved seats prior to final notification of all returned candidates raised serious concerns --- Prescribing an arbitrary cut-off date prior to the completion of this constitutionally recognized process was not grounded in any statutory provision or principle of law --- Cut-off date provided by ECP as 22.02.2024 for election/allocation of reserved sears for woman and non-Muslims was illegal --- Present Constitutional petition was partly allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan --- ----Art.106, ‘proviso’---Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S.98---Election Rules, 2017, R.92(6)---Reserved seats---Independent candidate joining a political party---Effect---Election and allocation of reserved seats---Framework and scheme---Reserved seats are allocated to political parties in proportion to the general seats won, following the declaration of final results by ECP under S.98 of the Elections Act, 2017 --- Furthermore, in view of the proviso to Art.106 of the Constitution and sub-rule (6) of R.92 of Election Rules, 2017 any independent candidate who has won a general seat and whose name has been notified as such under S.98, but joins a political party within three days of such notification, shall be counted towards the credit of that political party for the purpose of allocation of reserved seats. (c) Interpretation of statutes --- ----Constitution is a living and evolving document; its provisions must be interpreted dynamically and purposively so as to give effect to the constitutional intent --- An interpretation that renders any part of the Constitution otiose or redundant cannot be presumed to have the intention of its framers. Aam Log Itehad and another v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 39 and Suo Motu Case No. 8 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No. 649-L of 2018 PLD 2019 SC 201 rel. Amir Javed, Barrister Sadiq Raza and Syed Inayat Shah Bacha for Petitioner. Mohsin Kamran Siddiq, along with Zafar Iqbal, Special Secretary, Muhammad Arshad, Special Secretary (Law), Saima Tariq Janjua, Deputy Director (Law) and Muhammad Amjad Deputy Director (Law) for ECP. Naveed Akhtar, Jehanzeb Shinwari, Muhammad Farooq Afridi, Inamullah Alizai and Muhammad Jalaluddin for Respondent No. 6. Date of hearing: 8th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Courts below refusing ad-interim injunction / interlocutory order, challenge to---Application for temporary injunction still pending before Trial Court---Effect---Interlocutory orders which are not final or conclusive in nature cannot be challenged by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction---Adequate remedy in such circumstances---Proper course is to await Trial Court’s decision---Rationale---All interim orders remain open to scrutiny in appeal---Facts of the present matter were that the petitioner bought a top-floor flat with a rooftop where he installed a water tank and solar panels---The dispute arose when the building owner planned further construction over the rooftop, which the petitioner claimed would infringe his easement rights and bar his access to his utilities installed at the rooftop---In the civil suit filed by the petitioner, request for grant of ad-interim injunction was declined by trial court as well as the appellate court---High Court was called upon to challenge the refusals of grant of ad-interim injunction by courts below, where at the outset the petitioner was confronted as to the question of maintainability of the Constitutional petition being against the interlocutory order---Therefore, pivotal question for determination before the High Court was as to “whether a Constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution was maintainable against interlocutory orders refusing an ad-interim injunction?”---Held: Relief sought for through application for interim injunction had no nexus with easement rights rather it amounted to trespassing the property of the adversary---When easement rights were kept in juxtaposition with ownership rights, indubitably ownership rights prevailed and could not be defeated in the garb of so-called easement rights---An ad interim order granted by a court held the field till the next date of hearing and a litigant was supposed to get decided his application for grant of temporary injunction filed under O.XXXIX Rr. 1 and 2 of C.P.C.---The grant of ad-interim injunction by the High Court would have amounted to stepping into the shoes of Trial Court which was not mandated by law---Invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court by challenging grant or refusal of ad-interim injunction by courts below was not an adequate remedy as application for grant of temporary injunction was yet to be decided---If litigants were allowed to question grant or refusal of ad-interim injunction through constitutional petitions, it would open floodgates---Constitutional jurisdiction being an extraordinary jurisdiction could not be invoked to challenge interlocutory orders that were not final or conclusive in nature---The impugned orders were unexceptionable and did not call for any interference by the High Court---Constitutional petition was not maintainable and same was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---Courts below refusing ad-interim injunction / interlocutory order, challenge to---Scope---Every interim order need not to be challenged at that stage because when a suit is finally decided by the Trial Court, all the interim orders become open in appeal. Rashid Baig and others v. Muhammad Mansha and others 2024 SCMR 1385 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199(1)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Sine qua non---Satisfaction of the High Court that no other adequate remedy is provided by law---Scope---Expressions “adequate” and “satisfaction”---Connotations---The expressions “adequate” and “satisfaction” used in clause (1) of Art. 199 of the Constitution are significant---Meaning of “adequate” is not provided in the Constitution, hence ordinary dictionary meaning is to be adopted as provided in Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Edition) which is as follows:-Adequate: (i) Fully satisfying requirements; sufficient, suitable, and acceptable in both quality and quantity; (ii) Legally sufficient; sufficing as a matter of law; (iii) Minimally satisfactory, barely reaching an acceptable standard; just good enough---With regard to the expression “satisfaction”, for maintainability of a Constitutional petition, satisfaction of the High Court is sine qua non to the effect that no other adequate remedy is available to the litigant under the law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is supervisory and extraordinary which can only be exercised in exceptional circumstances such as violation of fundamental rights, lack of jurisdiction by lower court, gross miscarriage of justice and if the orders passed by lower courts are in violation of natural justice. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Cases involving factual controversies---Scope---Matters pertaining to factual controversy requires recording of evidence which the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction cannot undertake. Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others v. Intizar Ali and others 2022 SCMR 472; Province of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works Department, Lahore through Chief Engineer (North/Central) Punjab Highway Department, Lahore v. Yasir Majeed Sheikh and others 2021 SCMR 624 and Messrs Fateh Yarn (Pvt.) Ltd. Faisalabad v. Commissioner Inland Revenue Faisalabad and others 2021 SCMR 1133 rel. (f) Jurisdiction--- ----Every court prior to taking cognizance of and adjudicating upon an issue should first resort to the question of assumption of jurisdiction of the Court---If it comes to the conclusion that jurisdiction can be assumed only then it can adjudicate upon the issue. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel 2024 SCMR 298 rel. Ibrahim Haroon for Petitioner.

Summary: (a) Environmental law—National parks—Forest land—Public trust doctrine—Notification declaring “National Musk Deer Park, Guraiz” (24-09-2007)—Legal effect—Once forest land is notified as a national park, it cannot be subjected to allotment, private occupation, or regularization on so-called humanitarian or administrative “oral permissions”—Protection of ecological assets is a constitutional imperative; State holds such resources in trust for present and future generations—High Court’s direction to protect notification and evict illegal occupants affirmed. (b) Encroachment—Burden and proof—Commission report (05-10-2018) and Deputy Commissioner’s comprehensive report (post-leave order 06-05-2025) established unauthorized possession and constructions within park limits—No documentary sanction or regularization shown—Plea of displacement (1982–1991) and “oral resettlement” by functionaries rejected—Availability of proprietary land in Village Phulawi noted; claim of landlessness disproved—Presumption of correctness attaches to official record and surveys when unrebutted by credible evidence. (c) Judicial review—Environmental governance—Courts’ role—Where agencies fail to prevent encroachment/deforestation, constitutional courts may issue protective, restorative, and supervisory directions to secure public trust resources—High Court’s writ in public interest upheld as resting on sound factual appraisal and settled environmental principles. (d) Directions—Eviction and restoration—Forest Department and District Administration directed to remove all encroachments/constructions from National Musk Deer Park, Guraiz, and hand over recovered land to Wildlife & Fisheries Department—Operation to be completed within six months—Administrative cooperation mandated. (e) Systemic failures—Record-tampering and collusion—Court notes pervasive pattern across AJK of: (i) forest land being misrepresented as proprietary/Shamilat through manipulated revenue entries; (ii) procurement of decrees to mask usurpation; (iii) institutional inaction—Condemns collusion of elements within Forest/Revenue departments and public representatives—Calls for immediate structural reforms and accountability. (f) Policy/reform roadmap—Court urges Government to: constitute high-powered Forest Land Reclamation Task Force; conduct GIS/satellite mapping and create tamper-proof digital boundaries; audit two decades of revenue mutations and void fraudulent conversions ab initio; strengthen forest and land revenue statutes with deterrent penalties; retrieve and reforest encroached tracts under scientific plans; activate Environmental Courts/Green Benches; prosecute/discipline complicit officials; ensure transparency via public portals; institutionalize community stewardship; and consider a moratorium on civil suits involving forest land absent a certified forest-status report—Periodic oversight by Chief Secretary recommended. (g) Climate, biodiversity, and ecosystem services—Rationale and comparative guidance—Forests’ role in carbon sequestration, water/soil conservation, biodiversity, and disaster mitigation emphasized—Reliance placed, by way of guidance, on *Ilyas Jandalvi & others v. PDA & others* (2022 SCR 812) discussing deforestation risks; Lahore High Court’s environmental survey in *PLD 2019 Lahore 664*; and Pakistan Supreme Court’s suo motu on “New Murree Project” (2010 SCMR 361). Disposition: Appeal dismissed—High Court judgment dated 21-10-2024 maintained—Eviction/restoration directions affirmed with six-month completion timeline—Copy to Chief Secretary AJK for implementation and strict compliance.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, future maintenance allowance and future marriage expenses-Prospective/ future marriage expenses, grant of-Scope and limitations in Family Law jurisprudence-Facts in brevity were that the petitioners (daughters) filed a suit against respondent No.1 (father) seeking recovery of maintenance allowance at Rs.10,000/- per month each and future maintenance at the same rate, along with Rs.2,000,000/- as marriage expenses, contending they were unmarried and their marriages would be arranged-The Family Court decreed Rs.5,000/- per month each for the past and Rs.10,000/- per month for the future with 10% annual increase, and Rs.1,000,000/- as marriage expenses payable at the time of marriage-Respondent No.1’s (father) appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court, but his writ petition was partially accepted by the High Court, setting aside the decree to the extent of marriage expenses, thereafter being dissatisfied, the petitioners filed the present petition-Significant question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to-Whether a father could be compelled under the Family Courts Act, 1964 to pay prospective or future marriage expenses for his daughters when the claim of daughters was merely speculative and was founded solely on apprehensions-Held: The Family Courts Act, 1964 recognized in section 5 read with its Schedule-I certain categories of claims including maintenance, dower, recovery of dowry articles, restitution of conjugal rights, jactitation of marriage etc. but not prospective marriage expenses, unless a concrete cause arose-Thus, entertaining such speculative claims could open a floodgate of hypothetical litigation, undermining the procedural discipline and judicial economy-A suit for marriage expenses could be preferred if such expenses were immediate, certain, and unjustly denied, especially if customary contributions, jahez or rukhsati costs, were refused at the time of an actual engagement or marriage-However, law did not create a statutory obligation on a father to bear advance or indefinite marriage expenses, especially when no marriage date was fixed, no engagement or preparation was underway, therefore, the claim was speculative and indeterminate in nature-In the present case, the petitioners had neither shown any arrangement for their marriages nor any evidence of finalized preparations-Their apprehension of financial need, though genuine and understandable, did not translate into a legal debt enforceable through court in the said circumstances-Despite the emotional and financial vulnerability daughters often face in such situations the law did not empower the Courts to direct payments for future and indeterminate events-The claim of the petitioners (daughters) as to marriage expenses, although based on understandable concerns, was premature and not maintainable, however, they (petitioners) were at liberty to seek appropriate legal recourse at a proper time when their marriages were to be fixed in future and in case of refusal of respondent No.1 (father) to take responsibility of expenses of the same-No case for grant of leave was made out which was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Faiz Bakhsh and others v. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Bahawalpur and others 2006 SCMR 219 rel. (b) Administration of justice- -Courts are forums of law and not speculation as well as supposition- -Relief may only granted on the basis of existing rights and actual infringement thereof, not of imaginary and hypothetical causes-Courts must be cautious in entertaining claims which are premature, uncertain or not ripe for adjudication-No suit can be instituted for future cause of action that may or may not arise.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, future maintenance allowance and future marriage expenses---Prospective/ future marriage expenses, grant of---Scope and limitations in Family Law jurisprudence---Facts in brevity were that the petitioners (daughters) filed a suit against respondent No.1 (father) seeking recovery of maintenance allowance at Rs.10,000/- per month each and future maintenance at the same rate, along with Rs.2,000,000/- as marriage expenses, contending they were unmarried and their marriages would be arranged---The Family Court decreed Rs.5,000/- per month each for the past and Rs.10,000/- per month for the future with 10% annual increase, and Rs.1,000,000/- as marriage expenses payable at the time of marriage---Respondent No.1’s (father) appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court, but his writ petition was partially accepted by the High Court, setting aside the decree to the extent of marriage expenses, thereafter being dissatisfied, the petitioners filed the present petition---Significant question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether a father could be compelled under the Family Courts Act, 1964 to pay prospective or future marriage expenses for his daughters when the claim of daughters was merely speculative and was founded solely on apprehensions”---Held: The Family Courts Act, 1964 recognized in section 5 read with its Schedule-I certain categories of claims including maintenance, dower, recovery of dowry articles, restitution of conjugal rights, jactitation of marriage etc. but not prospective marriage expenses, unless a concrete cause arose---Thus, entertaining such speculative claims could open a floodgate of hypothetical litigation, undermining the procedural discipline and judicial economy---A suit for marriage expenses could be preferred if such expenses were immediate, certain, and unjustly denied, especially if customary contributions, jahez or rukhsati costs, were refused at the time of an actual engagement or marriage---However, law did not create a statutory obligation on a father to bear advance or indefinite marriage expenses, especially when no marriage date was fixed, no engagement or preparation was underway, therefore, the claim was speculative and indeterminate in nature---In the present case, the petitioners had neither shown any arrangement for their marriages nor any evidence of finalized preparations---Their apprehension of financial need, though genuine and understandable, did not translate into a legal debt enforceable through court in the said circumstances---Despite the emotional and financial vulnerability daughters often face in such situations the law did not empower the Courts to direct payments for future and indeterminate events---The claim of the petitioners (daughters) as to marriage expenses, although based on understandable concerns, was premature and not maintainable, however, they (petitioners) were at liberty to seek appropriate legal recourse at a proper time when their marriages were to be fixed in future and in case of refusal of respondent No.1 (father) to take responsibility of expenses of the same---No case for grant of leave was made out which was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Faiz Bakhsh and others v. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Bahawalpur and others 2006 SCMR 219 rel. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Courts are forums of law and not speculation as well as supposition- --Relief may only granted on the basis of existing rights and actual infringement thereof, not of imaginary and hypothetical causes---Courts must be cautious in entertaining claims which are premature, uncertain or not ripe for adjudication---No suit can be instituted for future cause of action that may or may not arise. Mian Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 — S. 5 & Schedule-I — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3) Maintenance allowance and claim for future marriage expenses by unmarried daughters — Judicial enforceability of prospective claims — Scope and limitations — Petitioners instituted a suit seeking (i) monthly maintenance from their father and (ii) anticipatory marriage expenses, asserting they were unmarried and their marriages were to be arranged — Family Court decreed the suit partially: maintenance at Rs.5,000/- per month retrospectively and Rs.10,000/- per month prospectively with annual increase; and Rs.1,000,000/- each as marriage expenses — Appeal dismissed; however, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution allowed respondent’s writ petition to the extent of marriage expenses, holding the claim to be premature and speculative — Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that while a father has moral obligations, no statutory duty exists under the Family Courts Act to bear indefinite or future marriage expenses absent a concrete, present, and enforceable cause — Courts are to decide actual infringements of existing rights, not speculative or hypothetical grievances — In the absence of any fixed marriage date, engagement, or denied customary obligations, the claim was held non-maintainable — Premature claims were found to undermine judicial discipline and open floodgates of uncertain litigation — Petition dismissed, however liberty preserved for petitioners to file afresh if and when actual cause arises. Held, speculative claims for marriage expenses not legally enforceable until crystallized by a definite cause of action. - Faiz Bakhsh and others v. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Bahawalpur and others (2006 SCMR 219)

Summary: ----Rr.68(2) & 73(3)---Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act (XXIV of 1948), S.2---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.24---Failure to pay an amount of royalty and rentals, allegation of---Issuance of demand notice for compound payment of markup on outstanding amount of royalty and rentals, challenge to---Vires of law---Imposition of surcharge as ‘other charges’ when parent statute not providing a specific provision for imposition of that surcharge---Legality and scope---The challenge in the present case concerned the legality/vires of sub-rule (2) of R. 68 and sub-rule (3) of R. 73 of the Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, under which markup was imposed on unpaid royalties and rentals---The question before the Court was “whether the Provincial Government, under its delegated rule-making authority derived from the Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Minerals Development (Government Control) Act, 1948, was empowered to introduce such a financial burden when the parent statute itself contained no express provision authorizing the levy of markup”?---Held: Provincial Government was not vested with the powers to impose markup if in its opinion a person had failed to make payment of the amount of royalty or rental as required by either R. 68 or 73 of the 2002 Rules---The imposition of markup was strictly not covered by the power to determine rates by the Provincial Government and was in excess of that power---It had been assumed to vest in the Provincial Government by the 2002 Rules---Such a power related to taking of property which was a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution and could not be assumed to vest in the Provincial Government by virtue of rules which specifically did not confer such a power to inhere in the Provincial Government---If the legislature intended to include the imposition of mark up in the broader power to determine rates, a precise clause could have been added to S. 2---It was noticeable that various clauses of S. 2 enjoined clear and specific powers which did not include the levy of markup---Such a power, therefore, could not be derived unilaterally to enrich the Provincial Government---Sub-rule (2) of rule 68 and sub-rule (3) of R. 73 of the Rules 2002were declared ultra vires and illegal and they were struck down---Consequently, the impugned order and the demands issued under these rules were non est and were declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect---The notices were also quashed---Constitutional petitions were allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.24--- Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002 , Rr. 68(2) & 73(3)---Constitutional protection of property rights---Scope---Payment of mark-up on outstanding amount of royalty and rentals---Constitu-tionality---Clause (1) of Art. 24, without equivocation, states that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law---The right to hold on to property, thus, is a fundamental right and can only be infringed if the law so permits---If the rule-making power of the Provincial Government does not extend to the impost of mark-up then Art. 24 is triggered and judicial review must be employed to undo the essential wrongness of the action. (c) Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002--- ----Rr.68(2) & 73(3)---Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act (XXIV of 1948), S.2(8)---Imposition of mark-up as ‘other charges’---Imposition of mark-up was not specifically authorized under the law---In order to justify imposition of mark-up authorities attempted to bring the charge of mark-up within the ambit of the term ‘any matter ancillary or incidental to the matters set out in the for going clauses’---Legality---Ancillary and incidental powers---Ambit and scope---Clause (8) of S. 2 provided making of rules on any matter ancillary or incidental to the matters set out in the forgoing clauses of S. 2---It was argued by the respondent authorities that the payment of markup would be covered by any matter ancillary or incidental to the matters set out in the other clauses of S. 2---Validity---This argument had no legal basis---There was no doubt that the term ‘any matter ancillary or incidental to the matters set out in the for going clauses’ did not cover the imposition of markup in case of failure to pay the principal amount of royalty or rentals---The reliance of the respondents was on clause (8) of S. 2 to cull out a power to fix a penalty---That clause concerned with ancillary and incidental powers---The precise argument, if accepted without demur, would be that under the garb of this clause, the Provincial Government was empowered to make rules to confer upon itself broad and polycentric powers which could go beyond the permissible limits---This argument was constitutionally invalid and had no legal basis---Sub-rule (2) of R. 68 and sub-rule (3) of R. 73 of the Rules 2002 were declared ultra vires and illegal and they were struck down---Consequently, the impugned order and the demands issued under these rules were non est and are declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect---The notices were also quashed---Constitutional petitions were allowed, in circumstances. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Delegated legislation---Scope---Delegated legislation is intended to advance the purpose of primary legislation and if a rule goes beyond the rule-making power conferred by the statute or if a rule supplants any provision for which power has not been conferred it becomes invalid---So the rule is that a charge must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language in the statute itself---If there is none, then no power vests in the delegatee to do so by implication through Rules---Delegated power to make rules is circumscribed by the strict periphery of powers defined in the statute itself which cannot be exceeded to assume more powers than granted by the delegator. Sindh Revenue Board through Secretary Government of Sindh Karachi and others v. Messrs Quick Food Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2023 SCMR 1776; Sanam Javaid Khan through Attorney v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and others 2024 SCMR 819; Messrs Usman Enterprises v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1997 MLD 3161; PLD 1988 SC 370 and Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority v. Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others PLD 2023 SC 378 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statute---Imposition of surcharge as ‘other charges’ when parent statues does not specifically authorize levy of that specific surcharge---Legality---Fiscal statutes are to be interpreted strictly and there is no room for any intendment---Surcharge cannot be levied under the category of ‘other charges’. (f) Unjust enrichment--- ---Definition, concept and scope---Unjust enrichment means ‘any unequal transfer of value without an adequate legal basis’---There are three elements to the cause of action on the basis of unjust enrichment; i) an enrichment of the defendant; ii) a corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff; and iii) an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment---For a claim of unjust enrichment to succeed, there must be enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff and this enrichment must be unjust in such a way that there should be no lawful justification for the same. Orient Power Company (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Officer v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through Managing Director 2021 SCMR 1728; Haider Industries through Managing Partner and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law Division at Islamabad and others 2016 PTD 2004 and Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2014 PTD 1939 rel. Garland v. Consumers Gas Co. (2004) 1 SCR 629 and Supreme Court of United Kingdom 2015 UKSC 66 ref. Imtiaz Rasheed Siddiqui, Shahryar Kasuri, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Ali Umrao, Haider Aziz, Muhammad Saeed Anjum, Ms. Kanwal Tariq, Shahzad Hassan Pervaiz, Irfan Dawood, Salman Ejaz, Ms. Ayesha Qazi, Asad Abbas Butt, Ashiq Ali Rana, Muhammad Adil, Salman Alam Khan, Arslan Amir Tarar, Faisal Anwar and Qari Habib ur Rehman Zubairi for Petitioners. Hassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G. with Rashid Bhatti, Law Officer and Asad Ameer, Deputy Director for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th June, 2025. (d) any law providing for the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period, either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property, or for the benefit of its owner; or

Summary: Whether the learned Assistant District Public Prosecutor was legally competent to file an application for summoning the petitioners in absence of a statutory complaint filed by a designated Inspector under Section