Summary: The respondent filed application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ("the Act"), inter alia, on the basis of an unregistered arbitration agreement, which was treated as application under Section 8 of the Act and the arbitrator was appointed with direction to pass an award to be later on submitted before the Trial Court. This Court, inter alia, held that the Trial Court erred in converting the application under Section 20 into the application under Section 8 of the Act inasmuch as both the provisions form part of different procedural regimes under the Act. In case of application under Section 8 of the Act, once an arbitrator is appointed, the Court becomes functus officio whereas in contrast, under Section 20 of the Act, the role of the Court is not limited to the appointment of an arbitrator; rather, the Court first determines whether there exists an arbitration agreement and then, under sub-Section (4), orders the filing of the agreement and makes the reference. Section 20 of the Act, provides a procedural mechanism for initiating arbitration through judicial intervention where no arbitration proceedings have commenced independently. The structure of Section 20 is sequential and substantive. Sub- Section (1) permits any party to an arbitration agreement to apply to the Court for filing the agreement. Sub- Section (3) provides that the Court, if satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists, shall order the agreement to be filed. Most critically, under Section 20(4), it is only after such filing that the Court becomes competent to refer the dispute to arbitration by appointing an arbitrator. This staged progression is not a ceremonial formality; it reflects a deliberate legislative intent to ensure that the existence and authenticity of the arbitration agreement is first judicially scrutinized, and the document is formally brought onto the Court's record, before the arbitral process is triggered. The act of filing, accompanied by judicial satisfaction under Section 20(3), constitutes a jurisdictional condition precedent to the making of any reference or the appointment of an arbitrator. The necessity of this filing becomes all the more pronounced when the opposing party has specifically objected to the very existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, as was done by the appellant in the present case. The appeal was allowed and the impugned order of appointment of arbitrator was set aside with direction to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after adhering to the mandatory requirements of sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 20 of the Act, including proper judicial satisfaction as to the existence and filing of the arbitration agreement dated 01.07.2006, in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations of this Court. 318Crl. Misc. 33508/25 Sunny Hakim Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Amjad Rafiq 10- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 5113 2026 PCr.LJ 7 (Lahore)

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S. 5, Sched.-Maintenance allowance of minor-Fixation of quantum and continuity of 'nafaqah' (maintenance) of a minor following dissolution of a marriage-Obligation of father to maintain child-Father disputing the quantum of maintenance allowance-Financial incapacity of father to maintain child, plea of-Plea of financial incapacity has to be substantiated with documentary evidence-Facts in brevity were that the former wife of the petitioner filed a suit seeking recovery of dower, maintenance for herself and her minor son (respondent No.2), and dowry articles-Trial Court decreed the suit granting her Rs.15,000 maintenance per month till completion of her iddat, Rs.5,000 in lieu of dower, a 6-marla house, nine tolas of gold or its value, and specified dowry articles, while awarding the minor Rs.25,000 maintenance per month with 10% annual increase until majority-Appellate court partly modified the decree reducing former wife's quantum of maintenance allowance and revised the assessed value of the dowry articles-Petitioner's subsequent Constitutional petition before the High Court was dismissed leading to the present civil petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, primarily challenging the quantum of maintenance awarded to the minor-Held: Petitioner disputed the quantum of maintenance fixed by the courts below by asserting that he had returned from abroad and was earning only Rs.100,000/- per month and remarried and was supporting another family-However, no documentary evidence was brought on record, such as a salary slip or income statement to substantiate this claim-It was established that the petitioner was a well-qualified individual who possessed the earning capacity to maintain the minor at the amount fixed by the courts below-Therefore, depriving the minor of the maintenance already awarded was deemed not to be in the best interest of justice-Amount of maintenance determined by the courts below was neither excessive nor beyond the petitioner's financial capacity-No case was made out for interference with the concurrent findings of the all three courts below-Petition was dismissed and leave declined, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S. 5, Sched.-Maintenance allowance of a child-Continuation of maintenance allowance despite child reaching age of majority-Precondition-Incapacitation of child due to mental or physical limitations-Scope-When a minor upon reaching majority is found to be incapacitated or otherwise unable to earn due to physical or mental limitations the father remains bound to maintain him. Humayun Hassan v. Arsalan Humayun PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S. 5, Sched.-Maintenance allowance of a minor-Father to maintain his children, obligation of-Scope-A father bears a solemn and continuous obligation to provide maintenance for his offspring and this duty, grounded not merely in financial capacity but in the principle of nasab (lineage), persists until the son attains the age of puberty, and in the case of a daughter, until her marriage-In certain case fathers upon the dissolution of marriage or after losing custody, become hesitant to discharge their obligation of maintenance, viewing it as contingent upon matrimonial cohabitation or custodial rights-Such a perception is legally flawed and ethically untenable in light of Islamic principles, as the father's obligation is not lessened by the child being in the hizanat (custody) of the mother. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S. 5, Sched.-Providing maintenance allowances to minor and wife, obligation of-Distinction-Obligation to maintain a child is distinct and independent from the obligation to maintain a wife-The latter ceases upon the termination of the marital bond, whereas, the former survives the marriage itself and is directly tied to the immutable bond of paternity. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S. 5, Sched.-Maintenance allowance of minor-Obligation of father to maintain his children-Quantum of maintenance, determination of-Factors and considerations-Inability/incapacity of father to maintain child-Effect-Obligation of mother to maintain minor given her financial ease-Grandfather, responsibility of-Scope- -The determination of appropriate quantum of maintenance involves two principal considerations: (i) the nature and extent of the child's reasonable requirements and (ii) the fathers financial means-Maintenance traditionally includes food, raiment, and lodging-However, this list is not exhaustive-Given evolving societal standards and the overarching principle of welfare of the minor, the term must be interpreted broadly to encompass all reasonable expenses necessary for the physical, mental, and emotional development of the child-This includes, inter alia, educational costs, healthcare, and other needs consistent with the natural growth and comfort of the minor-The amount awarded should reflect the family's social status, ensuring that the child is not deprived of opportunities for development and well-being solely due to the dissolution of the marriage-The second consideration pertains to the father's financial capacity to maintain the child-Under Islamic principles, the obligation of maintenance is generally subject to certain conditions-Firstly, the child must be in need-If the child possesses independent means sufficient for his/her own support, the duty of the father to provide maintenance does not arise-Secondly, the child must be unable to earn due to minority or incapacity-Thirdly, the father must possess the means to provide such maintenance-While most Islamic schools of thought agree that the father's financial ability is a necessary precondition, the Hanafi school maintains a distinct view holding that, in the case of children, the obligation to maintain arises irrespective of actual wealth, provided the father has the capacity to earn-Therefore, the mere fact that the father is not working, in the absence of any serious mental or physical challenges, cannot be admitted as a valid justification for his failure to discharge the obligation of maintenance towards his children-In circumstances where the father lacks the means to provide maintenance and is incapable of earning due to genuine limitations, the duty to maintain the children may devolve upon the mother if she is in a position of financial ease-If neither parent possesses sufficient means, the obligation may extend to the paternal grandfather, subject to his financial ability to provide support to the children.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of minor---Fixation of quantum and continuity of ‘nafaqah’ (maintenance) of a minor following dissolution of a marriage---Obligation of father to maintain child---Father disputing the quantum of maintenance allowance---Financial incapacity of father to maintain child, plea of---Plea of financial incapacity has to be substantiated with documentary evidence---Facts in brevity were that the former wife of the petitioner filed a suit seeking recovery of dower, maintenance for herself and her minor son (respondent No.2), and dowry articles---Trial Court decreed the suit granting her Rs.15,000 maintenance per month till completion of her iddat, Rs.5,000 in lieu of dower, a 6-marla house, nine tolas of gold or its value, and specified dowry articles, while awarding the minor Rs.25,000 maintenance per month with 10% annual increase until majority---Appellate court partly modified the decree reducing former wife's quantum of maintenance allowance and revised the assessed value of the dowry articles---Petitioner’s subsequent Constitutional petition before the High Court was dismissed leading to the present civil petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, primarily challenging the quantum of maintenance awarded to the minor---Held: Petitioner disputed the quantum of maintenance fixed by the courts below by asserting that he had returned from abroad and was earning only Rs.100,000/- per month and remarried and was supporting another family---However, no documentary evidence was brought on record, such as a salary slip or income statement to substantiate this claim---It was established that the petitioner was a well-qualified individual who possessed the earning capacity to maintain the minor at the amount fixed by the courts below---Therefore, depriving the minor of the maintenance already awarded was deemed not to be in the best interest of justice----Amount of maintenance determined by the courts below was neither excessive nor beyond the petitioner’s financial capacity---No case was made out for interference with the concurrent findings of the all three courts below---Petition was dismissed and leave declined, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of a child---Continuation of maintenance allowance despite child reaching age of majority---Precondition---Incapacitation of child due to mental or physical limitations---Scope---When a minor upon reaching majority is found to be incapacitated or otherwise unable to earn due to physical or mental limitations the father remains bound to maintain him. Humayun Hassan v. Arsalan Humayun PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of a minor---Father to maintain his children, obligation of---Scope---A father bears a solemn and continuous obligation to provide maintenance for his offspring and this duty, grounded not merely in financial capacity but in the principle of nasab (lineage), persists until the son attains the age of puberty, and in the case of a daughter, until her marriage---In certain case fathers upon the dissolution of marriage or after losing custody, become hesitant to discharge their obligation of maintenance, viewing it as contingent upon matrimonial cohabitation or custodial rights---Such a perception is legally flawed and ethically untenable in light of Islamic principles, as the father’s obligation is not lessened by the child being in the hizanat (custody) of the mother. Humayun Hassan v. Arsalan Humayun PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Providing maintenance allowances to minor and wife, obligation of---Distinction---Obligation to maintain a child is distinct and independent from the obligation to maintain a wife---The latter ceases upon the termination of the marital bond, whereas, the former survives the marriage itself and is directly tied to the immutable bond of paternity. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of minor---Obligation of father to maintain his children---Quantum of maintenance, determination of---Factors and considerations---Inability/incapacity of father to maintain child---Effect---Obligation of mother to maintain minor given her financial ease---Grandfather, responsibility of---Scope- --The determination of appropriate quantum of maintenance involves two principal considerations: (i) the nature and extent of the child’s reasonable requirements and (ii) the fathers financial means---Maintenance traditionally includes food, raiment , and lodging---However, this list is not exhaustive---Given evolving societal standards and the overarching principle of welfare of the minor, the term must be interpreted broadly to encompass all reasonable expenses necessary for the physical, mental, and emotional development of the child---This includes, inter alia, educational costs, healthcare, and other needs consistent with the natural growth and comfort of the minor---The amount awarded should reflect the family's social status, ensuring that the child is not deprived of opportunities for development and well-being solely due to the dissolution of the marriage---The second consideration pertains to the father’s financial capacity to maintain the child---Under Islamic principles, the obligation of maintenance is generally subject to certain conditions---Firstly, the child must be in need---If the child possesses independent means sufficient for his/her own support, the duty of the father to provide maintenance does not arise---Secondly, the child must be unable to earn due to minority or incapacity---Thirdly, the father must possess the means to provide such maintenance---While most Islamic schools of thought agree that the father's financial ability is a necessary precondition, the Hanafi school maintains a distinct view holding that, in the case of children, the obligation to maintain arises irrespective of actual wealth, provided the father has the capacity to earn---Therefore, the mere fact that the father is not working, in the absence of any serious mental or physical challenges, cannot be admitted as a valid justification for his failure to discharge the obligation of maintenance towards his children---In circumstances where the father lacks the means to provide maintenance and is incapable of earning due to genuine limitations, the duty to maintain the children may devolve upon the mother if she is in a position of financial ease---If neither parent possesses sufficient means, the obligation may extend to the paternal grandfather, subject to his financial ability to provide support to the children. Azeem ul Haq Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Acceding State (Property) Order, (P.O. No. 12 of 1961)--- ----S.3---West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962), Ss.3 & 5---Petitioners seeking inheritance rights as collateral successors of former Nawabs---Determination of entitlement--- Federal government as competent authority to decide succession and distribution of property of former Acceding States, jurisdiction of---Jurisdiction of civil court to decide question of legal heirship, inheritance and succession---Exception---Brief facts were that the petitioners sought inheritance rights in the property left by the late Nawabs, not as direct legal heirs of late Nawab but as his collateral successors through previous Nawabs, thereby challenging order dated passed by the government---Following the promulgation of The Acceding State (Property) Order, 1961, the federal government became the competent authority to adjudicate questions of succession or distribution of property belonging to former Princely States---The federal government, acting under these provisions, examined the matter and rejected the petitioners’ claim---The background showed that the late Nawab, acceded to Pakistan in 1947 and a subsequent merger agreement in 1954 entitled him and his family to certain properties and allowances---Held: Collaterals or persons claiming to be legal heirs under S.3 of the 1961 Order had a right to approach the Federal Government for determination of their entitlement in accordance with Muslim Personal Law---Moreover, West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 was to apply in all questions regarding succession where the parties were Muslims---There could be no legal impediment to the petitioners asserting their rights of inheritance under Muslim Personal law before the Government of Pakistan---In the present case, impugned order passed by the Federal Government failed to adjudicate upon the principal question of the eligibility or entitlement of the petitioners as legal heirs---Petitioners had claimed such entitlement based on their collateral relationship with the late Nawab, and in this regards, they were obligated to establish their genealogical linkage through a properly drawn pedigree chart and supporting evidence---Further, intricate questions regarding legal heirship, inheritance, and succession were ordinarily to be adjudicated by civil court under S.9 of the C.P.C by way of a suit for declaration---Federal Government was bound to ensure proper adjudication of claims, while considering the Islamic law of inheritance and its applicability---Impugned order did not refer to any evaluation of determination nor did it conclusively establish that the petitioners were excluded from inheritance---In the absence of such findings no final adjudication could be made---Impugned order was set aside and matter was remanded to the federal government with the direction to proceed in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Limitation---Questions of inheritance are not defeated by limitation and no limitation period runs against the assertion of inheritance rights. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Remand of case by High Court while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction---Remand of case---Principle---Where factual controversies exist and complete justice cannot be done without leading evidence, the matter should be remanded to the competent authority for a fresh decision after recording evidence. Muhammad Mukhtar and others v. Muhammad Sharif 2007 SCMR 1867; Mst. Shahida Zareen v. Iqrar Ahmed Siddiqui 2010 SCMR 119 and Muhammad Dervaish Al-Gilani v. Muhammad Sharif 1997 SCMR 524 rel. Ashiq Hussain Tarar and Khalid Masood Rana for Petitioners. Usman Rasool Ghumman, A.A.G and Zafra Khalid, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of KA & GB & SAFRON for the State.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S.5 (5)---Additional benefits at the time of divorce---Entries in columns in Nikahnama---Scope---Petitioner / ex-wife was aggrieved of dismissal of her claim regarding extra benefits in case of divorce by respondent / ex-husband as per entry in Nakahnama---Validity---Columns in Nikahnama are meant for guidance of parties and do not enjoy status of conclusively determining intention of parties---Courts while determining rights and obligations of parties in light of entries made in columns in Nikahnama, give due consideration to intention of parties, rather than getting carried away by headings thereof---High Court set aside judgment and remanded the matter to Lower Appellate Court for decision of appeal afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Mst. Iram Shahzadi v. Muhammad Imran-ul-Haq and others 2019 MLD 112; Syed Nadeem Raza through Attorney General v. Mst. Amna-Tuz-Zahra 2011 CLC 726; Wasif Ali and another v. Mrs. Fakhra Jabeen and others 2023 CLC 1021; Mst. Fakhra Jabeen v. Wasif Ali and another Civil Petitions Nos.768 and 827 of 2022; Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum and others PLD 2022 SC 686 and Yasmeen Bibi v. Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan and others PLD 2016 SC 613 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Writ of certiorari--- Scope--- Power of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution to interfere with orders of Courts below is limited to the inquiry whether the Courts below acted or undertook the proceedings in accordance with law--- Writ of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute of appeal or revision as its scope is limited. Rahim Shah v. The Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and another PLD 1973 SC 24 and Muhammad Azim Khan Afridi v. The President of Pakistan through Principal Secretary and others 2023 SCMR 68 rel. For Petitioner Jamil Hussain Qureshi, Nawazish Ali Gondal, Jamshed Ahmed, Ms. Faiza Sultan and Ms. Hublul Wareed (in W.P. No. 4233 of 2021). Faisal Iqbal Khan and Ms. Farzana Faisal (in W.P. No. 672 of 2023). Azhar Yousaf (in W.P. No. 322 of 2022). Syed Ishfaq Hussain Naqvi, Muhammad Ali Haider, Ms. Hijab E Zainab, Ms. Jowaria Tariq and Ms. Zain Hyder Malik (in W.P. No. 1906 of 2023). Date of hearing: 24th June, 2025.

Summary: (Against order dated 12.07.2010 passed in W.P. No. 1631 of 2008 by Lahore High Court, Lahore). (a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 52---Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991), S. 13---Pre-emption suit---Dispute over actual sale consideration---Suit dismissed for non-prosecution---Restoration of suit---Alienation of property during interregnum---Effect and legality---Lis pendens---Principle---Applicability---Alienation of suit property after dismissal of suit for non-prosecution and before its restoration falls within the sphere of lis pendens---Factual background of present case was that appellants / plaintiffs (pre-emptors) filed a suit for possession through pre-emption against respondent No. 5 (vendor) regarding the suit land claiming the sale price was Rs.200,000, while respondent No.5 asserted that it was Rs.250,000---Suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and was later on restored---After dismissal of suit and before its restoration, respondent No.5 (vendor) sold the property to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees)---During pendency of the suit, respondent No. 5 (vendor) made a statement before the trial court that the original vendor could be summoned to confirm the actual sale consideration and that whatever amount the vendor admitted to have received could be treated as the sale price for decreeing the suit---The only question before the Trial Court requiring determination was the price of the suit land and respondent No.5 had no objection if the original vendor was summoned for ascertaining the actual amount of sale, but the Trial Court did not accede to the request of the appellant and proceeded to frame the issues---Trial Court dismissed the said request but the revisional court accepted it, decreeing the suit---Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (subsequent vendees) challenged the revisional court verdict before the High Court, whereby, the decree was set aside and the matter was remanded for decision on merits, prompting the present appeal by the preemptor concerning the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens---Primary question warranting determination before the Supreme Court was as to "whether the Respondents Nos. 2 to 4, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of the pre-emption suit despite a stay order, were bound by the statement of their predecessor-in-interest under the rule of lis pendens, and whether the appellant (pre-emptor), who had already deposited the amount of Rs.250,000/- in compliance with that statement, could claim that the transaction was struck by lis pendens and was entitled to have the suit decreed?"---Held: So far as the argument that the property was purchased during the period when the suit was dismissed, therefore, the principle of lis pendens did not apply to the case of the subsequent buyers, the said argument had no force, because if a suit was dismissed and then restored, the restoration order related to back period and a transfer/sale after dismissal and before restoration was subjected to the principle of lis pendens embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882---However, in the present case, the petitioners purchased the disputed property through a mutation when the proceedings in the suit were in progress after its restoration after dismissal for non-prosecution---Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 had acquired the title to the suit property subject to the final outcome of the lis and as such were bound by the result of the suit stricto sensu in all respects, as their transferor i.e. respondent No.5 was bound---High Court erred in law while passing the impugned order, which suffered from material illegality, therefore, same could not be allowed to sustain further---Resultantly, the impugned order was set aside and appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali 2016 SCMR 1773 rel. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 52---Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991), S. 13---Preemption suit---Doctrine of lis pendens---Applicability---Exception stated---The doctrine of lis pendens is fully applicable to suits for pre-emption---Validity of a pre-emption decree is not affected by any sale made during litigation and is binding on the purchaser---The only exception to the doctrine of lis pendens applicable to pre-emption claims is in one situation, where the sale by the vendee is to one who has a superior right of pre_emption provided that the sale is within the period of limitation when such right can be exercised. Basit Sibtain v. Muhammad Sharif 2004 SCMR 578 and Sawar Muhammad Sharif v. Makhmool 1991 SCMR 1419 rel. (c) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----Ss.41 & 52---Lis pendens---Principle---Defence against lis pendens---Being bona fide purchaser, plea of---A transfer by ostensible owner does not automatically become void simply because it was made pendente lite but such transfer cannot affect the rights of the other parties in the suit, thereby making the sale subject to the outcome of the decree---In other words, a bona fide purchaser, who retains title, remains bound by the final decree and bears the risk that any rights declared in the suit will prevail over their purchase---Even a bona fide purchaser without notice of litigation is bound by the result of the suit---Where a suit land is alienated during pendency of proceedings before the Supreme Court any person who purchases the land or raised construction thereon would be doing so at his own risk and cost. Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Khan 2002 SCMR 2003; Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti PLD 2011 SC 905; Sheikh Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad v. Faiz Ahmad 2023 SCMR 2158; Tabassum Shaheen v. Uzma Rahat 2012 SCMR 983 and Aasia Jabeen v. Liaqat Ali 2016 SCMR 1773 rel. Ch. Muhammad Maqsood Buttar, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Mian Muhammad Athar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 10th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Circulars and administrative directives--- Effect--- Executive clarifications in the form of circulars and administrative directives cannot override, amend or curtail scope of statute itself or rules framed thereunder. (b) West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963--- ----R. 4.10 (3)(a)---Circular No. FD (PCDC) 3 (225)/2022, dated 05-12-2022, issued by Government of Sindh, Finance Department---Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 2(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 25---Family pension---Divorced daughter, entitlement of---Determining factor---Dispute between parties was with regard to release of family pension to respondent who was daughter of deceased civil servant and was divorced after the death of civil servant---Validity---Dependency is not a metric for financial stability rather it is an assumption that disregards actual economic need and lived experiences of many women---Claim of surviving daughters should be based on need and individual assessment rather than a legal framework built on patriarchal assumptions as to what is stereotypically believed to constitute dependency---This presumptive exclusion based solely on marital status is unconstitutional , discriminatory and a violation of Articles 14, 25, and 27 of the Constitution ---Concept of tying a daughter's eligibility to family pension solely to her marital status results in an unjustifiable distinction---Women are independent right-holders, autonomous and should be entitled to family pension where financial need is established---Pakistan's obligations under international law reinforce the principle that women cannot be denied access to economic entitlements based on marital status alone---As a party to Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Pakistan is required to abolish discriminatory laws and practices that impair women's enjoyment of rights on an equal footing with men---Provision of Article 13 of the Constitution thereof guarantees women equal rights in family benefits, while Article 2(f) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),obliges States to repeal existing laws and regulations that constitute discrimination---Circular, which imposes restrictions unsupported by the Act or the Rules, is void ab initio, unconstitutional, and of no legal effect---Timing of death of civil servant could not lawfully be used to extinguish a surviving daughter's right to claim pension---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Secretary, Government of Punjab v. M. Ismail Tayer 2014 SCMR 1336; Muhammad Ismail Memon: In the matter of Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 226 of 2006 PLD 2007 SC 35; Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Mohammad Said Khan PLD 1973 SC 514; I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041; Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Khajani Devi v. Union of India and others 2016 (4) RCR (Civil) 158; Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971) 2 SCC 330; Bhagwanti v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 2088; Poonamal v. Union AIR 1985 SC 1196 and Carson and others v. The United Kingdom [20 10] ECHR 338 ref. Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General, Sindh for Petitioners (via video link, Karachi). Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th July, 2025.

Summary: Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Maintenance allowance for minor daughters---Quantum, enhancement of---Family Court entertaining enhancement application instead of fresh suit for maintenance enhancement---Powers, scope and legality---For consideration of enhancement of maintenance allowance separate suit need not be filed and instead Family Court may entertain application under section 151, C.P.C. for enhancement---Supreme Court remanding the matter to the Trial Court to reconsider the enhancement application under section 151, C.P.C.---Facts in brevity were that the daughters of petitioner filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance through their mother which was decreed at Rs.800 per month for each daughter with a 10% annual increment---Their application for enhancement was initially dismissed by the Family Court but the District Court increased it to Rs.1,500 per month, later further enhanced by the High Court to Rs.2,500 per month for each daughter with the same annual increment, considering their day to day and educational expenses---Dissatisfied, the daughters sought further enhancement, while the petitioner challenged the increase before the Supreme Court---Held: Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction relating to maintenance allowance and the matters connected therewith---Once the decree by the Family Court in a suit for maintenance (for minors) was granted, thereafter, if the granted rate for monthly allowance was insufficient and inadequate, in that case, institution of fresh suit was not necessary rather the Family Court could entertain any such application (under section 151, C.P.C.) and if necessary make alteration in the rate of maintenance allowance---In the present matter when the High Court fixed the maintenance allowance of respondents Nos.4 and 5 at Rs.2,500/- per month each, the monthly take home salary (earning) of the petitioner was Rs.33,026/-, however, as per computer generated salary slip submitted by the respondents' side and not denied by the petitioner, the take home salary of the petitioner was Rs.161,148/-, which would have further increased after increment---Therefore, to keep the door open for the parties to further challenge and agitate, if aggrieved of the order of enhancement or otherwise, it was deemed appropriate that in view of the above development, the matter be remanded to the Trial Court to consider the request of the respondents for enhancement of the maintenance allowance, treating the same as an application under section 151 of C.P.C.---Present matter was remitted to the Trial Court to consider the application of the respondents Nos. 4 & 5 for enhancement of the maintenance allowance , obviously, after obtaining reply from the petitioner and dilating upon the evidence, so produced by the parties and decide the matter treating the same as an application under section 151, C.P.C., within a period of not more than one month, even if it had to fix the case on day to day basis, under intimation to the Deputy Registrar, Lahore Registry Branch of the Supreme Court---Present petitions were disposed of, in circumstances. Lt. Col. Nasir Malik v. Additional District Judge Lahore 2016 SCMR 1821 rel. Asif Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A. No. 919-L of 2016) and Rana Rashid Akram Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A. No. 1056-L of 2016) for Petitioners. Rana Rashid Akram Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A No. 919-L of 2016) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 – Ss. 5, 17 – Maintenance of child – Scope and quantum – Principles derived from Islamic jurisprudence and case law - Held, father is under a continuous legal and religious obligation to maintain his children regardless of the marital status with the mother or custodial arrangements – This obligation is derived from the immutable bond of paternity and not contingent upon cohabitation or custody – Cited with approval: Humayun Hassan v. Arsalan Humayun (PLD 2013 SC 557); Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law, Sections 369–370. (b) Islamic law – Nafaqah (maintenance) – Determination of amount – Considerations of child's needs and father's financial capacity - Held, maintenance must include all reasonable expenses essential for physical, mental, and emotional development of the child, including food, shelter, healthcare, education, and social needs – The father’s income and earning capacity must be weighed, but mere unemployment is not a valid defense if the father is physically and mentally capable of earning – Hanafi position noted: obligation to earn subsists even if wealth is not currently possessed – Cited texts: Hedaya, Ameer Ali on Mahomedan Law, Fyzee’s Outlines of Muhammadan Law. (c) Family law – Custody and maintenance – Distinction – Termination of marriage does not absolve father from child support - Held, the obligation to maintain a child continues post-divorce and is independent of the wife’s right to maintenance – Such duty is not diminished if the child is in the hizanat of the mother – Ethically and legally untenable to link maintenance with custody. (d) Constitutional petition – Scope of interference – Concurrent findings – No material evidence produced to displace factual findings - Held, petitioner failed to produce any documentary evidence (e.g., salary slips, income tax returns) to disprove the findings of the lower courts regarding his financial ability – Petitioner’s claim of limited income and remarriage not substantiated – High Court rightly dismissed the constitutional petition as no jurisdictional error or illegality found in concurrent decisions. (e) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Art. 185(3) – Leave to appeal – Principles – Concurrent findings of fact by trial, appellate, and High Court – No interference warranted Held, Supreme Court declined to grant leave as no question of law of public importance was made out, and the findings of the courts below were duly supported by the record and legal principles. Disposition: Leave to appeal declined. Petition dismissed. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Guardians and Wards—Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5—Maintenance allowance for minor daughters—Scope of enhancement—Family Court’s jurisdiction to alter without fresh suit Petitioners challenged High Court's enhancement of maintenance allowance from Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 2,500 per month per child. Both daughters and their father filed opposing petitions: the former for further enhancement, the latter for reduction. The Supreme Court held that the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain an application for enhancement of maintenance under S.151, C.P.C., without requiring a new suit. Held: Family Court may alter maintenance if existing allowance is inadequate, treating it as an application under S.151 C.P.C. Cited Case: Lt. Col. Nasir Malik v. ADJ Lahore (2016 SCMR 1821) (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)—Leave to appeal—Salary increase post-HC judgment—Grounds for remand to trial court for fresh assessment The petitioner’s salary had significantly increased (from Rs. 33,026 to Rs. 161,148) since the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that such a material change in financial circumstances warranted reassessment. The matter was remanded to the Family Court to re-evaluate the adequacy of maintenance allowance in light of current income. Held: Changed financial circumstances may justify remand for reassessment of fair maintenance. (c) Execution of Maintenance Decrees—Default in payment—Determination of arrears—Direction to clear in instalments Despite court orders, the father failed to pay the enhanced maintenance in full. The Supreme Court directed both parties to file concise statements before the executing court. Any determined arrears would be payable in three equal monthly instalments. Held: Defaulter must clear maintenance arrears as per court determination within fixed timeline. (d) Practice and Procedure—Remand—Expeditious disposal—Trial court directed to decide application within one month The trial court was directed to decide the application for enhancement within one month, preferably by holding day-to-day hearings, and to inform the Deputy Registrar of progress. Held: Remand with timeline ensures expedited relief in matters concerning welfare of minors. Disposition: CPLAs disposed of. Matter remanded to trial court for reassessment of maintenance allowance under S. 151 CPC, with arrears (if any) to be cleared in 3 monthly instalments.