Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Court has allowed the revision petition filed by Fazal Karim, setting aside the judgment of the appellate court and restoring the trial court`s decision. The court held that the gift deed dated 05.06.2012, relied upon by respondent No.1, is invalid and unenforceable due to lack of registration and failure to establish the essential elements of a valid gift under Muhammadan Law. The petitioner, Fazal Karim Khan, had sought a declaration of his 2/7th share in the suit property, which was part of the inheritance left by his father Lal Dad Khan. The court found that respondent No.1`s claim of ownership through the gift deed was unfounded, as the deed was unregistered and respondent No.1 failed to establish the original transaction of gift. The court also noted that respondent No.1`s possession was as a cultivator, not owner, and that the petitioner had a lawful share in the suit property as an heir of Lal Dad Khan.

Summary: In my considered view, the findings of the learned courts below are legally unsustainable. It is settled law that once the execution of a document is proved in accordance with the law, a presumption of truth attaches to its contents, including the recital of consideration, applying the maxim acta probant sese ipsa (documents speak for themselves). The rationale behind this presumption is rooted in public policy and the sanctity of commerce: written instruments inherently command a higher degree of credibility than oral testimony. To allow oral assertions to easily displace written obligations would introduce uncertainty and instability into legal rights. Consequently, the general rule remains that documentary evidence prevails over oral evidence. 1 Furthermore, it is also settled that when an unregistered deed is followed by possession, preference can be given to such unregistered deed over a registered deed. 2 While the presumption attached to the document was rebuttable, the onus to rebut it lay heavily on the defendants. In the instant case, Defendant No. 1 offered only evasive denials in the written statement and, significantly, failed to enter the witness box to face the test of cross-examination. Bald allegations that a deed is fictitious, unsupported by the executor’s own testimony, are insufficient to disprove the contents of a document already proved by marginal witnesses. Mere evasively assertions that the deed is factitious are insufficient to disprove execution and contents of the document. 3 Therefore, the findings of the courts below on Issues No. 2 and 3 are not tenable. 1 . Muhammad Mumtaz Shah (Deceased) through LRs. and others vs. Ghulam Hussain Shah (Deceased) through LRs. And others (2023 SCMR 1155) and Muhammad Khan deceased through L.Rs. vs. Muhammad Akram (2025 CLC 228). 2 . Rehmat Wali Khan and another vs. Ghulam Muhammad and others (PLD 2023 SC 506). 3 . Sajjad Ahmad Khan vs. Muhammad Saleem Alvi and others (2021 SCMR 415)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Transfer of criminal proceedings---Pre-arrest bail application pending before competent Court---Application by complainant for transfer---Scope---Petitioner/complainant sought transfer of pre-arrest bail applications filed by accused/respondents in FIR No.430/2024 under Ss.380, 506(ii), 34, PPC, Police Station Margalla, Islamabad, from Court of Additional Sessions Judge (GBV), Islamabad-West to any other Court on ground of non-confidence---Sessions Judge dismissed transfer application and imposed costs---High Court held that transfer of pending case from competent Court cannot be claimed as matter of right. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Transfer application---Not to be granted routinely---Whims and wishes of party---A case can be transferred only where record establishes that party seeking transfer is unlikely to receive fair and impartial proceedings in accordance with law---Transfer cannot be ordered merely because a litigant expresses dissatisfaction, non-confidence, or personal discomfort with Presiding Officer. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Transfer of case---Apprehension of bias---Requirement of cogent material---Petitioner failed to articulate any genuine, reasonable or substantiated apprehension of bias or miscarriage of justice---Vague apprehensions, conjectures and unfounded perceptions that justice may not be administered fairly are insufficient for transfer of case. Cited Cases: • Abdul Latif and another v. Syed Kausar Ali Shah Bukhari and another 2022 PCr.LJ 741 Lahore • Ahmad Nawaz and two others v. Akhtar Hussain and another 2004 YLR 885 (d) Administration of justice---- ----Justice must be done and seen to be done---Balanced with protection of Presiding Officer---High Court observed that while justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, courts cannot permit transfer applications based on vague or frivolous allegations---Repeated or baseless transfer applications may overawe or pressurize trial Court, undermine judicial independence, and disturb confidence in justice delivery system. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Transfer jurisdiction---Extraordinary relief---Fair trial---No reasonable apprehension shown---Where petitioner failed to show any reasonable or genuine apprehension of bias or denial of fair trial, extraordinary jurisdiction for transfer could not be exercised---Trial Court was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with law and decide matter on its own merits. (f) Criminal revision---- ----Order refusing transfer of pre-arrest bail application---Interference refused---Impugned order dismissing transfer application did not suffer from illegality, perversity or irregularity warranting revisional interference---High Court found no substance in petitioner’s grievance and declined to disturb order passed by Sessions Judge. Disposition: Criminal Revision No.02 of 2026 was dismissed; order dated 18.12.2025 passed by Sessions Judge, West Islamabad, refusing transfer of pre-arrest bail applications of respondents Nos.2 and 3 was maintained; trial Court was directed to proceed with the matter strictly in accordance with law and decide it on merits without being influenced by observations made by High Court.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----Ss. 302(b), 34—Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal jurisprudence—Ocular account—Chance witnesses—Credibility—Standard— Conviction for murder was founded mainly on ocular testimony of complainant (father) and another witness (uncle) who claimed to have seen the incident at a location where neither had residence nor property—Supreme Court held that such witnesses fell in the category of chance witnesses, requiring a natural, plausible and confidence-inspiring explanation for presence—Neither witness explained presence in FIR or examination-in-chief; justification (going to buy a buffalo and returning) surfaced for the first time in cross-examination, treated as belated improvement—Unnatural coincidence of reaching the spot exactly when the assailants allegedly arrived further dented credibility—Where presence becomes doubtful, testimony becomes unsafe for reliance—Ocular account held unreliable. (b) Criminal trial—Appreciation of evidence—Material contradictions—Effect— Supreme Court noted glaring contradictions between alleged eyewitnesses on (i) departure time, (ii) distance of village Beharri from occurrence spot, (iii) duration of stay at seller’s house, (iv) whether buffalo had a calf, (v) timing of reaching seller’s house, (vi) availability of hiding place at spot, and (vii) sequence/timing of police arrival, shifting of dead body and post-mortem—Such inconsistencies struck at root of presence and veracity—Alleged seller (Yameen) was neither associated in investigation nor produced to corroborate claimed purpose—Cumulative effect created serious doubt about presence; witnesses held procured/introduced after occurrence. (c) Criminal jurisprudence—Unnatural conduct—Stereotyped role assignment in firearm cases— Witnesses gave minute, segmented attribution of each shot to each accused and corresponding body part injuries—Court held such narration humanly improbable given speed/velocity of firearms and ordinary human reaction (especially father witnessing son’s murder)—Observed recurring pattern of stereotyped accounts in murder FIRs/ocular statements assigning precise shot-by-shot roles to rope in multiple accused—Such conduct reinforced conclusion of deliberation and unreliable ocular account. (d) Circumstantial evidence—Recoveries/forensics—Corroborative nature—Delay—Non-corroboration— Prosecution alleged different weapons (.7mm rifle, .44 rifle, .30 pistol) with distinct firing roles—However, spot recoveries comprised only five empties, one missed bullet and two bullets of .44 bore—No .30 bore empty recovered from alleged position of one accused; no .7mm empties recovered despite assigned role—PFSA report showed empties fired from two weapons, and High Court had treated recovery as inconsequential due to unexplained delay in dispatch—Supreme Court endorsed principles that forensic/recovery evidence is corroborative, meant to support trustworthy ocular account, and cannot by itself sustain conviction where direct evidence is unreliable. (e) Medical evidence—Supporting value only—Non-identification of assailant— Medical evidence did not align with the specific injury attribution advanced by alleged eyewitnesses—Court reiterated settled law that medical evidence may confirm nature/time/weapon-type but cannot identify assailant and cannot repair fundamentally unreliable ocular evidence. Cited Cases (medical evidence principle): Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain (PLD 2009 SC 53) Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain (2008 SCMR 1103) Mursal Kazmi alias Qamar Shah v. The State (2009 SCMR 1410) (f) Criminal jurisprudence—Benefit of doubt—Right, not concession— Where prosecution evidence suffers from material contradictions and lack of trustworthy corroboration, even one reasonable circumstance creating doubt entitles accused to acquittal as a matter of right—Principle applied: “better that ten guilty be acquitted than one innocent be convicted.” Disposition: Criminal Appeals allowed; convictions and sentences set aside; appellants acquitted and ordered to be released if not required in any other case. Complainant’s petition for enhancement of sentence dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----S. 302(b)—Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Art. 129(g)—Murder—Ocular account—Presence of witness—Standard— Where conviction rested substantially on solitary ocular testimony of complainant, Supreme Court reiterated that an eyewitness must establish his presence at the spot at the relevant time through strong, independent and confidence-inspiring evidence; absence of plausible explanation for presence at occurrence site rendered testimony unsafe—Complainant belonged to different Chak than place of occurrence and gave no plausible purpose for being with deceased at time of incident—Presence held highly doubtful, creating reasonable doubt entitling accused to acquittal. (b) Criminal trial—Investigation versus prosecution story—Contradictory prosecution version—Effect— Investigating Officer had opined that fatal shot was not fired by appellant but by another person (later acquitted co-accused); forensic/identification material was aligned with that alternative suspect—Yet complainant consistently attributed single fatal shot exclusively to appellant and alleged motive only against him—Such fundamental inconsistency, coupled with finality of co-accused’s acquittal (unchallenged by State/complainant), undermined prosecution narrative and supported inference that occurrence took place in some other manner. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Art. 129(g)—Withholding material witnesses—Adverse inference— Two natural witnesses (Sarwar and Amir Aziz), residents of the same locality as the crime scene and cited in FIR narrative, were given up/abandoned without justification—Supreme Court drew adverse inference under Article 129(g) that had they been produced, they would not have supported prosecution—Non-production materially weakened prosecution case. (d) Criminal jurisprudence—Identification at night—Source of light—Omission—Effect— Time of occurrence stated as about 7:30 p.m., while official sunset time was 6:35 p.m., indicating darkness at incident time—Complainant did not disclose in FIR or evidence any source of light enabling identification—Such omission was treated as a serious infirmity sufficient by itself to create doubt regarding identification and veracity of prosecution version. (e) Benefit of doubt—Rule— Where multiple material infirmities exist (doubtful presence, unexplained non-production of natural witnesses, inconsistency with investigation/forensic narrative, absence of light source), conviction cannot be sustained; accused is entitled to benefit of doubt as a matter of right. Disposition: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: 44Objection Case (Civil) 10-26 MST NAZEERAN MAI VS MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir 16-01- 2026 2026 LHC 89