Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: i. A larger bench of Subordinate Judiciary Service Law Tribunal while analyzing the scope, object and spirit of the Performance Evaluation Report(s) / Annual Confidential Report(s) has held as under:- firstly that the entries in PER are the opinion of a Reporting Officer with respect to his subordinate employee, secondly that before recording the said entries, the Reporting Officer is not required to provide an opportunity of hearing to the employee, thirdly that the PERs / ACRs are meant to evaluate the performance and suitability and not to punish an employee, fourthly that any adverse remark must be based on objective assessment and be recorded carefully and in good faith, fifthly that the primary purpose of ACR is to maintain efficiency in Service Law and assist DPC / competent authorities in making promotion and posting decision, sixthly that PER or Confidential Report intended for administrative guidance and cannot be used arbitrarily or with malafide intention, and seventhly before recording any adverse remarks, the Reporting Officer has to resort for remedial measures like counseling, warning etc. ii. The larger bench while highlighting the duty of Reporting Officer and Countersigning Officer in the matter of PER / ACR has ultimately declared as under:- a. Before recording adverse entries in the PER/ACR, the Reporting Officer is not required to provide an opportunity of hearing to the incumbent employee, however, before recording any adverse remarks he is statutorily bound to resort to all curative and remedial measures including counseling, warning etc. and then in this regard to record its opinion in the PER in good faith and with full application of mind and sense of responsibility and the countersigning authority is also bound to make a fair assessment of the entries of the Reporting Officer made in the PERs and to form an independent opinion. b. Adverse entries in the PER including “unfitness for promotion” is not by itself a penalty rather it is an opinion of the Reporting Officer and the same can neither be termed nor treated as penalty, however, if such entries in the PER are taken and considered by the DPC / Competent Authority as an exclusive tool for withholding / refusal of promotion then it will assume the status of a penalty and then in such eventuality, the DPC / Competent Authority before making any decision shall be obligated to provide an opportunity of hearing to such employee.

Summary: Bail denied --- (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----Ss. 497 & 498—Pakistan Penal Code, Ss. 141, 149, 354-A, 452, 147, 148, 149—Pre-arrest bail—Scope—Extraordinary relief—Conditions— Petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in case involving house trespass, assault, and outraging modesty of complainant’s daughter—Pre-arrest bail declined by Trial Court and High Court—Validity—Supreme Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary discretionary relief to be granted only in extraordinary circumstances to protect innocent persons from mala fide arrest and abuse of process—Petitioner must establish reasonable grounds showing prima facie innocence, existence of further inquiry, and mala fide intention behind arrest—Such relief cannot be used as substitute for post-arrest bail nor granted as matter of course—Petitioners failed to satisfy mandatory conditions—Pre-arrest bail rightly refused. Cited Case: Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique (PLD 2009 SC 427) (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----S. 497—Pakistan Penal Code, S. 354-A—Prohibitory clause—Heinous offence—Effect on bail— Offence under Section 354-A PPC (assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage modesty) falls within prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C.—Such offences are treated as heinous and serious in nature—Where accused are specifically nominated in FIR with active roles and supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., bail cannot be granted in absence of exceptional circumstances—Petitioners’ involvement prima facie established—Case did not fall within ambit of further inquiry. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----Ss. 141 & 149—Unlawful assembly—Common object—Vicarious liability— Where accused persons form unlawful assembly and commit offence in prosecution of common object, each member becomes vicariously liable for acts done by others—Common object can be inferred from conduct of accused, weapons carried, and circumstances of occurrence—Specific overt act by each accused is not essential where offence is committed in prosecution of common object—Presence and participation of petitioners in unlawful assembly sufficiently alleged—Liability under Section 149 PPC attracted. (d) Criminal jurisprudence— ----Further inquiry—Scope— Further inquiry arises where tentative assessment creates reasonable doubt regarding involvement of accused—Expression “reasonable grounds” refers to legally admissible and credible grounds appealing to judicial mind—Where FIR is prompt, accused specifically nominated, roles assigned, and allegations supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., case does not fall within further inquiry. Disposition: Criminal Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused; pre-arrest bail declined; observations held tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: A revision petition challenging a remand order would bear Court fee of Rs.500/- by treating the same as revision against order and not against a decree in terms of Entry No.12 of amended Schedule of the Court Fee Act, 1870.

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)— ----S. 13(1)(i)—Civil Service Regulations, Regulation 418—Pensionary benefits—Entitlement after resignation—Effect of delay in claiming pension—Scope— Petitioner, a civil servant, resigned from service in 2007 after completing more than twenty years of qualifying service and later applied for pensionary benefits in 2020—Department and Federal Service Tribunal declined pension on grounds of voluntary resignation and belated claim—Validity—Supreme Court held that pension is a vested and constitutional right earned through long, continuous and faithful service and is not a bounty dependent upon discretion of employer—Once qualifying service requirement is fulfilled, entitlement to pension accrues immediately upon resignation followed by its acceptance—Delay in submission of formal application does not extinguish such vested right—Neither doctrine of laches nor provisions of Limitation Act apply to defeat pensionary claims—Tribunal erred in denying pensionary benefits on ground of delayed application—Petitioner held entitled to pensionary benefits in accordance with law. Cited Cases: Secretary, Government of Punjab, Finance Department v. Ismail Tayer (2015 PLC (C.S.) 296) I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Punjab (1991 SCMR 1041) (b) Civil Service Regulations— ----Regulation 418—Scope and application—Forfeiture of past service—Interpretation— Regulation 418 placed under Chapter XVII relating to reckoning of service—Said regulation governs counting of past service when civil servant resigns to take up another appointment and does not operate as an independent provision to deny pensionary benefits after completion of qualifying service—Regulation 418 cannot be interpreted to deprive a civil servant of pensionary benefits solely on ground of resignation—Tribunal and departmental authorities misapplied said regulation—Resignation after qualifying service does not disentitle civil servant from pension. Cited Cases: Chief Engineer, Hydel (North), WAPDA v. Zafarullah Shah (2003 SCMR 684) Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Mubarak (PLD 1990 SC 346) (c) Service jurisprudence— ----Pension—Nature and character— Pension is a vested, enforceable right accruing from completion of qualifying service and cannot be withheld arbitrarily—Formal application is procedural requirement and delay therein does not extinguish substantive right—Authorities are bound to grant pension once qualifying service is established. Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of Federal Service Tribunal was set aside; petitioner was declared entitled to pensionary benefits in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, Rr. 1 & 3—Withdrawal of suit—Effect—Bar to fresh proceedings—Compromise not recorded— Petitioners’ predecessor earlier instituted suit challenging registered lease deed concerning disputed shop, which suit was dismissed as withdrawn (simpliciter) without seeking permission to file a fresh suit on same cause of action—Subsequently, petitioners’ predecessor instituted another suit seeking declaration, injunction and alternate possession on same subject-matter and challenging same lease deed—Trial Court decreed suit and Appellate Court maintained decree; High Court in revision set aside concurrent judgments and dismissed suit—Validity— Supreme Court held that where earlier suit is withdrawn unconditionally without liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, a subsequent suit on the same subject-matter/cause of action is barred—Plea that earlier withdrawal was based on private compromise was rejected as no compromise/terms were ever placed on judicial record, nor disclosed in withdrawal application, nor recorded by Court—Court can only record compromise on material formally presented—Unchallenged withdrawal order attained finality; petitioners, having acquiesced, could not later re-characterize unconditional withdrawal as conditional—Bar under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC squarely applied. Cited Cases: Ghulam Abbas v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs (2016 SCMR 1403) Azhar Hayat v. Karachi Port Trust (2016 SCMR 1916) Muhammad Yar (Deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Amin (Deceased) through LRs (2013 SCMR 464) Malik Shahid Mehmood v. Malik Afzal Mehmood (2011 SCMR 551) Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Mrs. Nusrat Rasool (PLD 2008 SC 146) (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, R. 2—Limitation—Fresh suit after withdrawal—Effect— Where earlier suit is withdrawn, plaintiff in any fresh suit remains bound by limitation “as if the first suit had not been instituted”—Section 14, Limitation Act, 1908—Exclusion of time—Not attracted merely because earlier suit was filed and later withdrawn—Petitioners neither pleaded nor proved due diligence/good faith prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or other defect of like nature—Challenge to registered lease deed of 1995 after lapse of years held manifestly time-barred. Cited Cases: Mrs. Akram Yaseen v. Asif Yaseen (2013 SCMR 1099) Muhammad Saeed Bacha v. Late Badshah Amir (2011 SCMR 345) (c) Civil procedure— ----Estoppel/acquiescence—Finality of withdrawal order— Withdrawal order passed in presence of parties and remained unchallenged despite availability of remedies—Petitioners estopped from disputing its consequences and from reopening settled position by alleging unrecorded compromise—Private arrangement not reflected in judicial record cannot defeat statutory bar under Order XXIII. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused; Civil Petition dismissed; judgment of High Court in revision upheld, holding subsequent suit barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC and also time-barred.

Summary: A revision petition challenging a remand order would bear Court fee of Rs.500/- by treating the same as revision against order and not against a decree in terms of Entry No.12 of amended Schedule of the Court Fee Act, 1870. 45Service 70730/25 Muhammad Shahid Sharif &

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending