Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997----Ss. 9(c) & 15---Recovery of charas from two intercepted vehicles---Contradiction regarding alleged absconder---Photographic evidence---Petitioners were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge CNS, Multan, in FIR No.27 of 2020 registered at Police Station ANF, Multan, and each sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine, which convictions were maintained by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench---Prosecution case was that on secret information a raiding party intercepted a Toyota Corolla and a Double Cabin Hilux near the Toll Plaza, Taunsa Sharif, on 21.11.2020, allegedly recovering a total of 199 packets of charas, from which 10-gram samples were extracted, while one accused Syed Haq Nawaz Agha was said to have fled from the driving seat taking advantage of twilight hours and was declared a Proclaimed Offender---Held, that the foundational edifice of the prosecution case was severely undermined by a glaring and irreconcilable contradiction regarding the arrest of co-accused Syed Haq Nawaz Agha---FIR and testimony of the complainant (PW-4) categorically asserted that he effected his escape from the driving seat, yet unimpeachable photographic evidence (Ex. DD) portrayed all five accused individuals, including the alleged absconder, in the custody of the Anti-Narcotics Force, bound in handcuffs and flanked by official personnel, with both vehicles/case property also shown present---Investigating Officer, confronted with Ex. DD in cross-examination, conceded the genuineness of the image and admitted the presence of Syed Haq Nawaz Agha---Such contradiction demolished the theory of his escape, leading to the irresistible conclusion that he was in custody of ANF and was subsequently released by the concerned authorities themselves, thereby exposing a fraud upon the Court. (b) Criminal Procedure Code----S. 342---Defence plea of false implication and custodial torture---Medical corroboration---Presumption of regularity of official acts---Rebuttal by mala fides---Petitioners in their statements under S. 342, Cr.P.C. consistently maintained that they were falsely implicated as a retaliatory measure following their protest against illegal detention of Syed Haq Nawaz Agha, that they were summoned to the police station, beaten, and that the actual accused was let off---Held, that the stance was not a mere bald assertion but was fortified by medical documents---Medical Report of the Medical Officer, District Jail Multan (Ex. DF-4) recorded complaints of diffused chest pain, pain in both flanks and history of haematuria, with both accused stating they were beaten by police during arrest---Medico-legal certificate (Ex. DF-1) recorded shortness of breath, pain epigastrium, blood in sputum, multiple lacerations and history of hematuria---Existence of these injuries, coupled with a formal grievance lodged by the Pakistan Patriotic Youth Organization (Ex. DA), created a compelling nexus between the alleged torture and subsequent fabrication of the recovery---Presumption that official acts were done rightly and solemnly (omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta) was a rebuttable inference, remaining valid only so long as the record was not tainted by evidence of mala fides, procedural dishonesty, or a departure from the path of justice---Plea of victimization was substantially corroborated by the grievance application seeking inquiry into conduct of ANF officials, by physical trauma recorded in the MLCs transforming a mere allegation into a proven fact of abuse, and most damningly by the perjured narrative of the 'fleeing' of Syed Haq Nawaz Agha whose presence was verified by Ex. DD---Prosecution expressed an intent to subject the image to forensic scrutiny, as evidenced by the order sheet dated 30.5.2022, but thereafter remained silent; such strategic retreat further strengthened the plea of mala fides---Police witnesses were as competent as any other witness, but the presumption of their reliability was not absolute---Where the defence successfully rebutted the presumption of regularity by establishing a high probability of planting and retaliation, testimony of official witnesses could no longer be deemed reliable or independent, and conviction could not be sustained on the basis of witnesses whose conduct was steeped in malice and procedural dishonesty---It appeared highly probable that the petitioners were utilized as scapegoats to fill the void left by the illicit release of the actual offender---Prosecution's failure to explain the injuries, taken together with the fabricated story of the absconder's escape, shattered the certainty required for a conviction, entitling the petitioners to acquittal on the basis of a reasonable and multi-faceted doubt. (c) Administration of justice----High-handedness of investigating agency---Direction for departmental inquiry---Mendacity exhibited by the investigating agency, specifically regarding the fabricated escape of an accused, was a matter of grave concern striking at the root of the rule of law---Such high-handedness by the ANF could not be countenanced---Competent authorities of the ANF were directed to look into the matter with immediate effect, and a formal departmental inquiry was to be initiated against the officials involved, in accordance with law. Cited Cases: None relied upon by the Court. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in Criminal Appeal No.850 of 2022, and judgment of the trial Court dated 25.08.2022, set aside; appellants Muhammad Shafi, Rooh Ullah, Najeeb Ullah and Wazir Muhammad acquitted of the charges and directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case; departmental inquiry directed against ANF officials involved. (Crl. P. No.847 of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 04.05.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Limitation---Jail petitions---Condonation of delay---Death sentence---Jail Petitions Nos.260 and 268 of 2024 were barred by 27 days and Jail Petition No.261 of 2024 was barred by 31 days---Held, that keeping in view the nature of the sentence awarded to the petitioners, i.e., sentence of death, coupled with the plausible explanation furnished in the applications, delay in filing the jail petitions was condoned in the interest of justice. (b) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997----Ss. 6, 7(a) & 7(c)---Explosive Substances Act, 1908----Ss. 3 & 5(A)---Murder of police officials, attempted murder, rioting armed with deadly weapons, vicarious liability of unlawful assembly, and terrorism---Two episodes of occurrence---FIR No.47 dated 13.04.2016, Police Station Bangala Iccha, District Rajanpur---On spy information that members of notorious gangs armed with sophisticated weapons including hand grenades were present in the Kacha area of Chak Dhanwani, a raiding party of three police teams proceeded to arrest them---In the first episode, the accused, emerging from a morcha, threw hand grenades and opened fire; six police officials embraced martyrdom and several others sustained firearm injuries---In the second episode, when injured and deceased were being shifted by boats, further accused joined from different sides, ammunition of the police ended, official arms and belongings were snatched, and twenty-four police officials were kept hostage from 13.04.2016 till 21.04.2016, when they were rescued on intervention of the Pakistan Army---Ocular account of the first episode was furnished by injured eyewitnesses and other members of the police party, who consistently assigned the role of effective firing upon deceased Head Constable Muhammad Ajmal to petitioner Ghulam Rasool alias Chhoto, upon deceased Constable Muhammad Tariq to petitioner Muhammad Khalid alias Khalidi, and upon deceased Constable Shakeel Ahmad to petitioner Ishaq---Presence and participation of several other petitioners in the first episode was not shown, and though presence of petitioner Sher Khan was shown he was not assigned the role of effective firing on any deceased or injured---Medical evidence and circumstantial evidence in the shape of blood-stained earth, crime empties with positive FSL report, and recoveries of weapons of offence from Ghulam Rasool alias Chhoto, Khalid alias Khalidi and Ishaq, corroborated the ocular account---Defence failed to establish previous enmity, ill-will or ulterior motive suggesting false implication---Held, that the prosecution successfully established the guilt of Ghulam Rasool alias Chhoto, Muhammad Khalid alias Khalidi and Ishaq through trustworthy, confidence-inspiring and wholly reliable direct evidence of injured eyewitnesses and other police officials, corroborated by strong circumstantial and medical evidence, not only in the murderous assault upon the police party but also in the subsequent episode of abduction, snatching of official weapons and hostage-taking---Argument that some of the deceased and injured sustained only a solitary firearm injury was of no legal consequence in the facts of the case---Sentences awarded to them were fully commensurate with the gravity, heinousness and barbarity of the offences and did not call for any mitigation. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860----Ss. 148 & 149---Rioting armed with deadly weapons---Vicarious liability of member of unlawful assembly---Ingredients---Held, that S. 148, P.P.C., deals with rioting armed with deadly weapons, whereas S. 149, P.P.C., embodies the principle of vicarious liability by providing that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every member of such assembly at the relevant time shall be held guilty of that offence---For attracting S. 149, P.P.C., the prosecution is required to establish that the accused persons constituted an unlawful assembly; that they shared a common object; that the offence was committed in prosecution of such common object or was such which the members knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution thereof; and that the accused persons were members of the unlawful assembly at the time of commission of the offence---Existence of common object is to be inferred from overall conduct, nature of weapons, manner of assembling, coordinated movements, concerted attack, violence at the spot and consequences flowing therefrom---In the present case the prosecution proved all essential ingredients of S. 149, P.P.C., beyond reasonable doubt in respect of the petitioners who formed part of the unlawful assembly that jointly launched a deadly assault upon the police party with the object of resisting arrest, eliminating police officials and challenging the writ of the State---Each member of that unlawful assembly was equally liable for the acts committed by the others in prosecution of their common object, including murder, attempted murder, firearm injuries, abduction and hostage-taking. (d) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997----S. 6---"Terrorism"---Armed attack upon police officials discharging official duties---Held, that the police officials had proceeded to the area in lawful discharge of official duties for arrest of proclaimed offenders and dangerous criminals belonging to notorious gangs operating in the Kacha area---Instead of submitting to the authority of law, the petitioners and their accomplices mounted a coordinated and ruthless attack; six police officials were murdered, several others sustained firearm injuries, twenty-four police officials were abducted, official weapons and personal belongings were snatched, and the abducted officials were unlawfully detained as hostages for several days---Such acts were not merely offences against individual police officials but constituted a direct assault upon the authority and writ of the State---Conduct of the petitioner-convicts squarely fell within the ambit of "terrorism" as defined under S. 6 of the Act, inasmuch as the acts were designed to create a sense of fear and insecurity amongst law enforcement agencies, overawe the Government, intimidate public servants in the discharge of their lawful duties, and challenge the authority of the State through indiscriminate violence and armed resistance---Any organized armed attack upon police officials performing official duties is an attack upon the entire criminal justice system and cannot be viewed with leniency. (e) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860----Ss. 34, 149, 302, 324 & 337---Vicarious liability---Accused joining only the second episode of occurrence---Absence of common object with the first episode---Held, that petitioners Qasim, Din Muhammad, Piyara, Basheer, Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, Hussain Bakhsh alias Gaila, Behram, Akram, Samad, Nadir and Sher Khan were, on the prosecution's own case, involved in the second episode: they arrived when injured and martyred police officials were being shifted through boats, resorted to firing which proved ineffective, and thereafter abducted police officials, snatched official weapons and kept them as hostages---Eyewitnesses of the second episode consistently implicated them, and their testimonies remained unshaken---However, no evidence was brought on record to establish that they were active members of the unlawful assembly of the first episode, or that they shared the common object of that assembly so as to attract vicarious liability under S. 149 or S. 34, P.P.C., in respect of the murders, attempted murders and hurts committed during the first episode---Prosecution evidence itself distinguished their role from those who participated in the first episode---Conviction and sentence of those petitioners under S. 302, P.P.C., and various offences relating to hurt, therefore could not be sustained. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.1091 of 2024 filed by Ishaq dismissed; leave refused. Jail Petition No.260 of 2024 dismissed to the extent of Ghulam Rasool alias Choto, Khalid alias Khalidi and Ishaq; leave refused; their convictions and sentences under Ss. 302(b), 324, 365, 395, 353, 412, 186, 121, 122, 337-D, 337-A(i), 337-L(ii), P.P.C., Ss. 7(a) and 7(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and Ss. 3 and 5-A of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, upheld. Jail Petition No.260 of 2024, to the extent of Behram, Basheer, Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, Hussain Bakhsh, Piyara, Akram, Din Muhammad and Sher Khan, converted into appeal and partly allowed: convictions and sentences under Ss. 302(b), 395, 412, 337-D, 337-A(i), 337-L(ii) and 149, P.P.C., and Ss. 3 and 5(A) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, set aside and they were acquitted of those offences; convictions under Ss. 186, 121, 122, 324, 353 and 365, P.P.C., maintained, with sentence under S. 121, P.P.C., reduced from life imprisonment to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment; conviction under S. 7(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, converted into S. 7(b) of the Act and they were sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment; substantive sentences to run concurrently; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., extended. Jail Petitions Nos.261 of 2024 and 268 of 2024 converted into appeals and partly allowed in like terms as to Qasim, Samad and Nadir. (Crl.P. No.1091 of 2024 and J.Ps. Nos.260, 261 and 268 of 2024, decided 04.05.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Compromise with legal heirs of deceased---Acquittal---Retrospective criminal amendment---Held, subsequent Amendment Act (in force 22.10.2016) not applicable retrospectively to occurrence of 10.12.2013 (nullum crimen / nulla poena sine lege)---In light of compromise between petitioner and legal heirs, miscellaneous application accepted. Disposition: Crl. M.A. No. 1091/2024 accepted; jail petition converted into appeal and allowed; petitioner acquitted on basis of compromise and to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Dated 04.05.2026.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964----S. 5 and Schedule---Dowry articles, bridal gifts and personal property and belongings of a wife---Gold ornaments gifted by parents at the time of marriage---Exclusive property of the bride---Jurisdiction of Family Court---Respondent-wife instituted a family suit for recovery of dowry articles or their market value, maintenance and other ancillary reliefs---Trial Court partly decreed the suit including gold ornaments; appellate Court reduced the decree for gold ornaments from 87 tolas to 44 tolas; High Court dismissed the husband's constitution petition---Held, that jewellery and ornaments gifted to a bride were not merely ceremonial accessories but often constituted financial security and economic autonomy---Such property, irrespective of whether described as jahez, dowry, bridal gifts or personal belongings, remained the exclusive property of the bride, over which neither the husband nor the in-laws could claim dominion---Any property given to a woman at the time of marriage by her parents, relatives, husband or in-laws, for her personal use and benefit, vested absolutely in her---Ownership was determined not by nomenclature but by the intention underlying the transfer and the exclusive entitlement of the bride---Unauthorized retention, deprivation or misappropriation of such property by the husband or his family amounted to unlawful withholding of the wife's proprietary rights, remediable before the Family Court---Legislative scheme of S. 5 read with the Schedule conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Family Courts in matters including dowry and the personal property and belongings of a wife---Inclusion of those distinct entries demonstrated legislative intent to secure effective remedies for women deprived of property brought into marriage or gifted during its subsistence---Expression "personal property and belongings of a wife" was broad enough to encompass jewellery, gold ornaments, bridal gifts and all such articles exclusively belonging to the wife---To hold otherwise would reduce women's proprietary entitlements to customary claims dependent on the will of the husband or his family, contrary to the statutory framework and constitutional values of dignity, equality and protection of property---Even if gold ornaments were described as bridal gifts, the determinative consideration remained whether they were given exclusively for the use and benefit of the bride; once that intention was established, the property fell within the wife's personal belongings---A suit for recovery against the husband and mother-in-law alleged to have jointly retained such ornaments was fully maintainable before the Family Court. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976---Presents to family of the groom---Distinction from gold ornaments given to the bride personally---Reliance on Muhammad Sajid v. Shamsa Asghar---Held, that reliance upon Muhammad Sajid's case was misconceived---In that case articles presented to the family of the groom fell within "presents" under the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act, 1976, and did not constitute dowry articles or bridal gifts recoverable through Family Court jurisdiction---Present case was materially distinguishable, the gold ornaments having been given to the respondent-wife personally by her parents for her exclusive use and benefit, squarely falling within "personal property and belongings of a wife" over which the Family Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Sajid v. Shamsa Asghar PLD 2025 SC 461 Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave declined; no order as to costs. (C.P. No.5432 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 04.05.2026 at Islamabad; approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)----Ss. 3(1A), 13, 14 & 2(41)---Further tax at four percent on taxable supplies to unregistered person---Poultry feed manufacturers supplying to poultry farmers---Poultry farmers exempt from sales tax and not required to be registered---Whether further/additional tax under S. 3(1A) leviable on poultry feed manufacturers or poultry farmers---Commissioner (Inland Revenue), LTU, Lahore held by order dated 11.09.2024 that manufacturers of poultry feed were liable to additional tax under S. 3(1A) as recipients of supply were not registered, and Lahore High Court dismissed writ petitions under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Held, that S. 3 is the charging section and S. 3(1A) was inserted as part of charging provision for levy of further tax on taxable supplies to persons who have not obtained registration or are not active taxpayers; proviso permits Federal Government, by notification in the official Gazette, to specify supplies exempt from further tax---Admittedly poultry farmers are exempt from sales tax, while poultry feed manufacturers factually make supplies to unregistered persons, which created an anomaly; plain reading of S. 3(1A) leads to absurdity as it creates no exception except through the proviso and poultry industry had not been exempted by the Federal Government---To reconcile, Court looked to the mischief sought to be cured, namely to encourage and promote concerned business persons to get registered and become active taxpayers---Under S. 14 read with S. 2(41), a person who is exempt and thus not making taxable supplies is not required to pay sales tax or even to register---Poultry farmers, not being required to be registered by law, could not be penalised, and making poultry feed manufacturers liable to further tax (which would eventually be passed on to poultry farmers) would be unjust and against the system of payment of sales tax under the Act---Synchronising Ss. 3(1A), 13, 14 and 2(41), since non-registration is mandated by law (S. 14), no penal consequences by way of additional tax fall upon either category of petitioners---High Court erred in upholding the order of the tax authorities; its judgment did not reflect the correct interpretation of law. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Arif Ice Factory v. Federation of Pakistan 2021 PTD 1608 (Lahore High Court; view upheld by the Supreme Court in C.P. No.2272-L/2021, Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Muhammad Arif Ice Factory, Lahore etc., holding that further tax under S. 3(1A) could not be imposed on exempt ice manufacturers) Disposition: Petitions allowed and converted into appeals, which are accepted; impugned judgment dated 04.12.2025 of the Lahore High Court set aside (cause title of the judgment gives the date as 24.12.2025); writ petitions of the petitioners allowed as prayed and orders passed by the tax authorities set aside. F.C.P.L.A. Nos.202 to 204, 442 and 587 of 2026, decided 04.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending