Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: An oral agreement to sell allegedly executed by a person having no lawful authority from the true owners, coupled with the absence of specific pleadings regarding the date, time, place, consideration and witnesses of the transaction is held to be incapable of conferring any enforceable right or title. Consequently, the concurrent findings being based on misreading and non-reading of evidence are set aside in revisional jurisdiction and the impugned mutations are restored.

Summary: PUNJAB PRE-EMPTION ACT, 1991 (IX OF 1991) - SECTION 13 - SUIT FOR POSSESSION THROUGH PRE-EMPTION - STRICT PROOF OF TALBS - DELAYED KNOWLEDGE OF SALE - CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE THROUGH POSSESSION - REGISTERED NOTICE A.D. - REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF SERVICE - MISREADING OF EVIDENCE BY APPELLATE COURT - SCOPE OF REVISIONAL JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 115 C.P.C. Right of pre-emption - Mandatory compliance of statutory Talbs - Burden of proof upon pre-emptor - Revisional interference against legally flawed appellate findings. Held, the right of pre-emption is a weak and defeasible right operating in derogation of a completed sale transaction; therefore, the statutory requirements relating to Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad must be proved through strict, cogent and confidence-inspiring evidence. A pre-emptor cannot succeed merely on the basis of a superior right unless it is affirmatively established that all mandatory Talbs were performed strictly in accordance with Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. Observed, that spontaneity and immediacy constitute the essence of Talb-i-Muwathibat. An unexplained delay in acquiring knowledge of the sale, coupled with an improbable or unverified source of information, materially weakens the pre-emptor?s claim and casts doubt upon the genuineness of the demand. Where the vendees had taken open possession immediately after the sale, such possession constituted constructive notice of the transaction, particularly against a co-sharer or adjoining owner claiming close nexus with the property. Further held, that mere dispatch of notice through registered post acknowledgment due does not by itself satisfy the mandatory requirement of Talb-i-Ishhad. In pre-emption matters, actual service or refusal must be established through reliable evidence. Any ordinary presumption of postal service stands rebutted where postal witnesses themselves admit that the notices were returned unserved owing to incomplete address or inability to trace the addressee. Held further, that although findings of the first Appellate Court ordinarily carry weight, revisional interference is justified where such findings are founded upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence, improper shifting of burden of proof, or dilution of mandatory statutory requirements. An appellate finding treating mere postal dispatch as conclusive proof of service, despite evidence of non-delivery, suffers from material illegality and remains amenable to correction under Section 115 C.P.C. Civil Revision allowed - Judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court set aside - Judgment of the trial Court restored - Suit for pre-emption dismissed for failure to strictly prove mandatory Talbs.

Summary: Against order dated 27.05.2024 passed by Custom Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad

Summary: FIA has placed restriction on bank accounts of petitioner. Seeks removal

Summary: FAO Against Order dated 15-02-2022 passed by Learned Judge Banking Court, Islamabad.

Summary: (a) Sind Medical Colleges Act, 1987----S. 3---MBBS admission---Reserved quota for residents of Lyari---'Lyari Town (previous)'---Territorial limits---Respondent, a meritorious candidate who obtained 84.695% aggregate under the prescribed formula (50% MDCAT, 10% matriculation, 40% intermediate) and was placed at serial No.771 in the merit list for the academic session 2023-24, claimed admission against the fifteen seats reserved for residents of Lyari in the petitioner-college on the strength of her domicile and Permanent Residence Certificate; claim was declined as her address did not fall within the territorial limits of 'Lyari Town (previous)'; High Court allowed her constitutional petition on the premise that there had been no change in the territorial limits of Lyari for the purposes of the reserved seats---Held, S. 3 of the Sind Medical Colleges Act, 1987 vests the Government of Sindh with rule-making authority to regulate admissions in public sector medical colleges, expressly including the power to provide for allocation of seats---On establishment of the college in 2010, fifteen seats were reserved for residents of Lyari Town as it then existed as a defined administrative unit, and the entitlement was anchored to that territorial delineation---With abolition of the town-based system of local government and reorganisation of Karachi districts into District Municipal Corporations, admissions against the Lyari quota continued, pending a revised policy, on the basis of pre-existing territorial limits, which position was incorporated in the prospectus from the academic session 2014-15 onwards by describing the quota as pertaining to 'Lyari Town (previous)'---Use of this expression was deliberate and determinative and signified continuation of the original territorial criterion notwithstanding later administrative reconfigurations; any interpretation expanding the quota to areas included in Lyari by later administrative changes would run contrary to the plain language of the prospectus and defeat the object of the reservation---On the record (letter dated 21.03.2024 of Additional Deputy Commissioner-I (South) relying on the report of Mukhtiarkar, Sub-Division Lyari dated 27.02.2024), respondent's residence did not form part of Lyari Town during 2001-2013 and fell within the limits of Lyari Town Municipal Corporation only after 2022---High Court overlooked the crucial distinction between present-day administrative boundaries of Lyari and the territorial limits expressly preserved in the prospectus as 'Lyari Town (previous)', and entitlement had to be determined by reference to the latter---Respondent had not challenged the territorial demarcation adopted for the quota nor asserted that it was arbitrary, discriminatory or unlawful, and the matter had to be adjudged strictly within the four corners of the prospectus, without need for the Court to delve into the policy underlying the demarcation---As the respondent's residence did not fall within 'Lyari Town (previous)', she could not claim admission against the Lyari quota. (b) Judicial review---Policy matters---Reservation of seats, domicile-based eligibility and territorial limits for quota---Held, reservation of seats, prescription of domicile-based eligibility and determination of territorial limits for such quota, particularly for historically underprivileged localities, are pre-eminently matters of policy informed by considerations of equity, access to education and regional disadvantage---Scope of judicial review is circumscribed; the Court does not sit in appeal over policy choices and may interfere only where the policy is shown to be patently arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or contrary to law, none of which was asserted or demonstrated. Cited Cases: • Dossani Travels (Private) Limited v. Messrs Travel Shop (Private) Limited PLD 2014 SC 1 • Mian Muhammad Afzal v. Province of Punjab 2004 SCMR 1570 (c) Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC)---Fixed intake capacity of medical college---Admission in excess of sanctioned seats---Intake capacity of the petitioner-college stood fixed at 100 MBBS seats by PMDC, the statutory regulatory authority, and it was not disputed that all sanctioned seats were filled---Held, determination of intake is made by PMDC on the basis of specialised expertise and assessment of academic and clinical resources and it is best equipped to take policy decisions in that regard---Any direction to accommodate the respondent would necessarily result in admission in excess of the approved strength, contrary to the regulatory framework governing medical education, and the Court was not inclined to interfere with such policy of the regulatory body and the college. (d) Educational institutions---Institutional autonomy---Admission policy and prospectus---Interference by courts---Held, Courts must sparingly interfere in the internal governance and affairs of educational institutions; courts are neither equipped with expertise nor possess experience for interference in such policy matters, though they can judicially review a policy if it is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution---Authorities of educational institutions are vested with the power to lay down eligibility criteria in their own rules, regulations or prospectus, and academic, administrative and disciplinary autonomy must be respected, unless they contravene the compass of their authority or act in breach of applicable statutes or admission policies as laid down in the prospectus. Cited Cases: • Vice-Chancellor Agriculture University Peshawar v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SCMR 527 • Muhammad Mumtaz Khan v. Siraj Bibi 2024 SCMR 956 (e) Equity---Entitlement to reserved seat---Held, respondent was no doubt a meritorious candidate, but entitlement to a reserved seat must flow from the applicable legal framework and criteria prescribed therein; jurisdiction of the Courts is to apply the law and rules as they stand on the statute book, and equitable considerations, however compelling, cannot override the prescribed eligibility criteria. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Aamir Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2019 SCMR 1021 Disposition: Leave granted and appeal allowed; impugned order dated 30.04.2024 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No.D-1813 of 2024 set aside and the constitutional petition filed by the respondent dismissed. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1990, Ss. 11, 12(8), 14(1) & 14(2)---Appointment of Chairman, BISE, Bannu---Power of Controlling Authority---Departure from notified selection process---Government constituted Search and Scrutiny Committee (SSC) with Terms of Reference to evaluate and interview shortlisted candidates and recommend a panel of three officers for approval of Chief Minister; SSC interviewed candidates on 26.09.2024 and recommended three officers, not including the petitioner; summary was thereafter altered by inserting petitioner's name in a revised summary without fresh deliberation by the Committee and without recorded reasons, and he was appointed by notification dated 13.05.2025; Peshawar High Court set aside the notification and directed re-advertisement of the post---Held, Ss. 11, 12(8) and 14(1) confer upon Controlling Authority (the Chief Minister or his nominee) power to appoint the Chairman, but such power is neither absolute nor unfettered and must be read conjointly and harmoniously and exercised in conformity with constitutional discipline of lawful administration, i.e., fairness, transparency, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness---Where the executive itself has structured the appointment process through a notified procedure and an SSC, discretionary power under the Act cannot be exercised in disregard of the prescribed mechanism or in a manner undermining institutional integrity; public appointments are not to be made on subjective preference or undisclosed considerations but through a process reflecting merit, accountability and due application of mind---That Chairman holds office during pleasure of Controlling Authority under S. 14(2) does not imply the power is absolute, unfettered or unregulated. Cited Cases: • Aman Ullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 1990 SC 1092 • Abid Hassan and others v. P.I.A.C. and others 2005 SCMR 25 • Abu Bakar Siddique and others v. Collector of Customs, Lahore and others 2006 SCMR 705 (b) Administrative law---Structuring of discretion---"Seven instruments" of administrative justice---Held, wherever wide-worded discretionary powers exist, there remains need to structure the discretion by regularising and organizing it; discretion must operate within recognizable legal limits and be governed by principles of legality, fairness, transparency, reasoned decision-making, proportionality, non-arbitrariness and accountability, which are not mere aspirational ideals but enforceable standards, assuming heightened significance in public appointments as the process concerns public trust and not private preference---Functionaries cannot be allowed to exercise discretion at whim, sweet-will or in arbitrary manner and must act fairly, evenly and justly; authority may exercise discretionary powers without any guideline but must not do so in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Cited Cases: • Aman Ullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 1092 (approvingly referring to Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text) • Abid Hassan and others v. P.I.A.C. and others 2005 SCMR 25 • Abu Bakar Siddique and others v. Collector of Customs, Lahore and others 2006 SCMR 705 (c) Public appointments---Test for validity of appointment process---Held, applying test laid down in Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division (PLD 2012 SC 132)---(i) whether an objective selection procedure was prescribed, (ii) whether it had reasonable nexus with the object of the exercise, and (iii) whether it was adopted and followed with rigour, objectivity, transparency and due diligence---Once the Government itself instituted a structured selection mechanism through the SSC, the same could not thereafter be departed from arbitrarily or without recorded reasons; impugned appointment, made dehors the duly notified process and in disregard of recommendations already made, failed the test and could not be sustained in law. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division PLD 2012 SC 132 (d) Doctrine of pleasure---Administrative discretion---Self-imposed procedural discipline---Held, doctrine of pleasure or existence of administrative discretion cannot be invoked to legitimize a process which on its face departs from the very mechanism devised by the executive itself; to accept contrary contention would endorse an unstructured and opaque exercise of power divorced from accountability---Doctrine of pleasure does not confer an unfettered licence on the executive to act in disregard of self-imposed procedural discipline and cannot be used as a shield for arbitrariness, nor override an institutional process adopted by competent authority to ensure integrity in selection---Where executive has consciously elected to regulate the process by constituting SSC and prescribing Terms of Reference, it cannot treat such framework as inconsequential or optional---Court agreed with High Court that SSC was constituted to secure objective, merit-based and transparent selection, and its recommendations could not be bypassed through an undisclosed, unilateral and unrecorded alteration of the panel; absence of any fresh meeting of the Committee, reconsideration of earlier recommendations or recorded reasons for revising the summary rendered appointment legally unsustainable---Administrative decisions affecting public appointments must disclose basis of departure from prescribed procedure, and silence of the record in this regard is fatal to validity of such action; departure absent recorded reasons, fresh evaluation or lawful basis amounts to arbitrariness proscribed by constitutional and administrative law. (e) Public appointments---Observations---Court observed that appointments to important public offices must demonstrably conform to constitutional standards of fairness, transparency, institutional integrity and merit-based governance; public authority cannot be exercised on undisclosed considerations, nor can structured procedures be reduced to empty formalities; legitimacy of public administration depends on disciplined and transparent exercise of power in accordance with law. Disposition: Petition dismissed and leave refused; judgment dated 05.03.2026 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No.3405-P/2025 (setting aside the notification appointing petitioner as Chairman, BISE, Bannu, and directing re-advertisement of the post in accordance with criteria notified on 01.09.2025, with selection of Chairman within three months and interim entrustment of duties to any other suitable person by controlling authority) upheld as suffering from no legal or constitutional infirmity. F.C.P.L.A. No.754 of 2026, order dated 30.04.2026 (Rozi Khan Barrech, J.). Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Sind Medical Colleges Act, 1987---S.3---Admission to public-sector medical college---Reserved seats for residents of Lyari---Authority of Provincial Government---Government of Sindh possessed statutory authority to regulate admissions in public-sector medical colleges, including allocation and reservation of seats---Upon establishment of petitioner-college, fifteen seats were reserved for residents of Lyari Town as it then existed---Eligibility for such quota was linked to the territorial limits of the administrative unit existing at the time of allocation. (b) Prospectus---Medical-college admission---Lyari quota---Expression “Lyari Town (previous)”---Interpretation---Subsequent changes in local-government structure abolished the former town system and altered municipal boundaries---Pending formulation of a revised policy, admissions against the Lyari quota continued to be governed by the earlier territorial limits---Prospectus deliberately described the quota as relating to “Lyari Town (previous)”, thereby preserving the original territorial criterion notwithstanding later administrative reconfiguration---Expression was clear and determinative and could not be interpreted as including areas brought within present-day Lyari through subsequent boundary changes. (c) Medical-college admission---Reserved quota for historically underprivileged locality---Object and purpose---Lyari quota was designed to benefit residents of the historically underprivileged localities comprising Lyari Town at the time the reservation was created---Territorial limits of “Lyari Town (previous)” constituted the defining criterion of eligibility---Expanding the quota to areas included in Lyari through later administrative changes would contradict the plain language of the prospectus and defeat the object underlying the reservation. (d) Evidence---Domicile and Permanent Residence Certificate---Eligibility for territorial quota---Respondent possessed domicile and Permanent Residence Certificate showing residence in present-day Lyari, but official verification by the Additional Deputy Commissioner-I (South), based upon the Mukhtiarkar’s report, established that her residence did not form part of Lyari Town during the period 2001 to 2013---Residence came within Lyari Town Municipal Corporation only after 2022---Entitlement to the reserved seats was to be assessed with reference to “Lyari Town (previous)” and not present municipal boundaries---Respondent, therefore, did not fall within the prescribed territorial class. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.199---Educational admission policy---Territorial demarcation of quota---Judicial review---Respondent had not challenged the territorial demarcation as arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or unlawful but merely claimed to fall within it---In absence of a challenge to the legality of the criterion, matter was required to be decided strictly under the governing prospectus---Reservation of seats, domicile-based eligibility and territorial limits of a quota were policy matters informed by considerations of equity, access to education and regional disadvantage---Courts did not sit in appeal over such policy choices and could interfere only where the policy was patently arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or contrary to law. Cited Cases: Dossani Travels (Private) Limited v. Messrs Travel Shop (Private) Limited PLD 2014 SC 1 Mian Muhammad Afzal v. Province of Punjab 2004 SCMR 1570 (f) Educational institutions---Institutional autonomy---Admission policy and eligibility criteria---Judicial interference---Educational institutions possessed academic, administrative and policy autonomy in matters concerning admissions, eligibility and internal governance---Courts lacked the specialized expertise and institutional experience necessary to substitute their judgment for decisions of educational and regulatory bodies---Interference was permissible only where the institution acted beyond its lawful authority, violated the applicable statute or disregarded its own admission policy---Where the eligibility criterion in the prospectus was unambiguous, courts could not impose an alternative interpretation. Cited Cases: Vice-Chancellor, Agriculture University, Peshawar v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SCMR 527 Muhammad Mumtaz Khan v. Siraj Bibi 2024 SCMR 956 (g) Pakistan Medical and Dental Council---Sanctioned intake of medical college---Admission beyond approved capacity---Judicial direction---PMDC, as statutory regulator, had fixed the petitioner-college’s MBBS intake at one hundred seats on the basis of available academic, clinical and institutional resources---All sanctioned seats had already been filled---Direction to admit an additional candidate would result in admission beyond the approved capacity and would be contrary to the regulatory framework---Determination of intake capacity was a matter of specialized expertise and policy best left to PMDC and the medical college---Court could not direct admission in excess of sanctioned strength merely on compassionate or equitable considerations. (h) Medical-college admission---Meritorious candidate---Reserved seat---Eligibility criteria---Equity---Respondent was a meritorious candidate who had qualified MDCAT and secured placement in the merit list---Merit alone, however, did not create entitlement to a reserved seat where the candidate failed to satisfy the territorial condition attached to the quota---Courts were bound to apply the law, rules and prospectus as they stood---Sympathy and equitable considerations, however compelling, could not override mandatory eligibility requirements. Cited Case: Muhammad Aamir Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2019 SCMR 1021 (i) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.199---High Court directing admission against reserved quota---Misreading of governing prospectus---High Court proceeded on the premise that there had been no relevant change in the territorial limits of Lyari and treated present-day residence as sufficient---Such approach overlooked the distinction between current administrative boundaries and the expressly preserved limits of “Lyari Town (previous)”---Respondent’s residence fell outside the relevant territorial limits and all sanctioned seats were already occupied---Direction granting admission was legally unsustainable. Disposition---Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed---Order of the High Court directing admission of the respondent in MBBS First Year was set aside---Constitutional petition filed by the respondent was dismissed.