Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ----S. 12---Specific performance of contract---Dismissal of suit for non-deposit of balance sale consideration---Scope---Appellants filed a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement and sought an injunction. The Civil Court directed the appellants to deposit the balance sale consideration by specific dates, which they repeatedly failed to do despite extensions granted. Held, the remedy of specific performance is equitable, and a plaintiff seeking such relief must demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform their contractual obligations. The appellants’ failure to deposit the balance sale consideration disentitled them from discretionary relief, as their conduct lacked bonafides. Cited Cases: • Haji Abdul Hameed Khan v. Ghulam Rabbani 2003 SCMR 953 • Adil Tiwana v. Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash 2015 SCMR 828 • Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam 2015 SCMR 21 (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) ----Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2---Interim relief---Effect of non-compliance with court orders---Scope---Interim relief granted to maintain the status quo in a suit for specific performance does not shield the plaintiff from the consequences of non-compliance with court orders. Failure to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated timeframe results in the cancellation of the agreement and forfeiture of earnest money as per the contract terms. (c) Equitable Remedies---Principle of readiness and willingness ----Discretionary nature of relief---Scope---Relief of specific performance is not automatic and is subject to the court’s discretion. A plaintiff seeking equity must perform their obligations under the contract to merit relief. The appellants’ repeated failures to comply with court directions and their inability to deposit the balance amount despite extensions indicated a lack of seriousness and stripped them of all equities. (d) Disposition--- Appeal dismissed as meritless. The appellants’ failure to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated timeframe, despite the respondents’ willingness to honor the agreement upon compliance, demonstrated a lack of bonafides, disentitling them to equitable relief. Outcome: Regular First Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 426(1)(2-B)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997),Ss.7 & 25(8)---Qatl-i-amd and act of terrorism---Suspension of sentence---Procedure---Appealfiled by the accused against conviction by the Trial Court was dismissed by High Court againstwhich leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court---Contention of accused was that therewas no possibility of the appeal being disposed of in near future by the Supreme Court, he wasentitled for grant of bail---Validity---For suspension of sentence granting leave to appeal was oneof the conditions but the sentence could only be suspended if the High Court thought it fit anddiscretion still rested with the High Court---Accused was required to satisfy the High Court tosuspend the sentence that appeal could not be disposed of within the stipulated period; judgmentsought to be suspended suffered from a legal error; convict was on bail during the appealpending before the High Court and legal bar for suspension of sentence did not exist---Merits ofthe case could not be touched nor reappraisal of evidence was permitted while deciding theapplication under S.426(2-B), Cr.P.C.---Provisions of S.426(2-B), Cr.P.C. did not apply to thepresent case---Convict could not be released on bail during the pendency of appeal ascontemplated by S.25 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Bar of S.25 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997was fully attracted in the present case which being a special law would prevail upon S.426(2-B),Cr.P.C.---Application for suspension of sentence was dismissed in circumstances.Atta Ullah alias Hasnain alias Hassan v. The State 2009 PCr.LJ 257 distingusihed.

Summary: Issue:Whether a candidate, whose nomination papers were rejected and who thus did not participate as a contesting candidate in the election, has the locus standi to file an Election Petition under Section 52 of the Representation of People Act, 1976 (ROPA).---Holding:The Supreme Court held that only a validly nominated candidate who has not withdrawn or retired and thus remains a contesting candidate can file or maintain an Election Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 1976. Since the appellant's nomination papers were rejected, and the rejection attained finality, he was not a contesting candidate and thus had no locus standi to challenge the election.----Reasoning:The Court reasoned that the law's intent is clear that "candidate" in the context of an Election Petition under Section 52 refers to a "contesting candidate." The Court observed that allowing a candidate whose nomination papers were rejected to file an Election Petition would lead to an anomaly, as such a candidate cannot seek any relief under Chapter VII of ROPA, 1976. Furthermore, the Court noted its previous judgments affirming that a candidate whose nomination papers are rejected cannot seek relief through an Election Petition.----Decision:The Civil Appeal was dismissed for lack of merit, affirming the decision of the Election Tribunal and holding that the appellant did not have the locus standi to file an Election Petition.

Summary: Issue:Whether the imposition of sales tax on the appellant, a division of the Government of Punjab engaged in non-commercial government functions, is constitutional under Articles 165 and 165A of the Constitution of Pakistan.----Holding:The Supreme Court held that the imposition of sales tax on the appellant was unconstitutional, as the appellant, being an integral part of the Government of Punjab and engaged in governmental functions, was exempt from federal taxation under Article 165 of the Constitution. The Court found that the stones/spawl handled by the appellant constituted "property" of the provincial government, exempt from federal taxation.----Reasoning:The Court reasoned that the Executive Engineer, acting on behalf of the Provincial Government and not engaged in commercial activities, falls under the exemption provided by Article 165 of the Constitution. The Court further clarified that stones/spawl qualify as "property" within the meaning of Article 260 of the Constitution, making them exempt from federal taxation. The Court also dismissed the argument that previous payment of taxes created an estoppel against claiming the constitutional exemption, stating that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution.---Decision:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Lahore High Court, and held that the sales tax imposed on the appellant was unconstitutional. The appellant was awarded costs.