Summary: (a) Municipal law—Encroachments and unauthorized commercial use—Green belts and public parks—Commercial activities such as tuck shops or structures within designated green belts and residential areas held illegal and in violation of prior court orders—Municipal authorities directed to remove all unauthorized constructions and cease further encroachments immediately. (b) Planning regulations—Conversion of residential plots into commercial use—Illegality—Court took judicial notice of widespread irregularities in granting permissions for commercial construction within residential zones—Such permissions declared contrary to law and planning regulations—Director Estate, Mirpur Development Authority, directed to ensure strict compliance and prevent further violations. (c) Administrative responsibility—Mayor and officials of Municipal Corporation and MDA directed to submit detailed explanation and compliance report specifying legal authority, extent of violations, and remedial measures—Failure to comply to entail further proceedings. (d) Judicial supervision—Court retained seisin of matter and directed maintenance of separate file for monitoring compliance and further action. Disposition: Directions issued—All unauthorized commercial activities in green belts and residential areas ordered to be removed—Future commercial construction on converted plots prohibited pending further orders.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)- -Ss. 9 & 22-Suit of recovery of damages-Maintainability-Mental stress and agony-Suit filed by respondent / customer was decreed against appellant / bank for recovery of damages-Banking Court granted damages of Rs.5,000,000/- on account of mental stress, agony etc. suffered by respondent / customer-Validity-Such damage did not occur out of any contractual or financial obligation between the parties-Respondent / customer might have a right to institute a claim against appellant / bank for seeking such damages, and those could only be awarded by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, and not by Banking Court in its special jurisdiction-Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment and decree to such extent as Banking Court had travelled beyond the scope of its jurisdiction-Respondent / customer remained at liberty to file any civil suit for damages etc. against appellant / bank in a court of competent jurisdiction for seeking his claims of damages, in accordance with law-Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly. 2015 SCMR 1341; 2025 CLD 1; 2024 CLD 1536 and 2023 CLD 1464 rel. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)- -Ss. 9 & 22-Suit for recovery of money-Negligence of bank-Respondent / plaintiff was aggrieved of deduction of disputed bill of credit card, five years after the card was stolen and had been so reported to appellant / bank-Judge in Chambers of High Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent / plaintiff and directed to return disputed amount along with markup-Validity-Appellant / bank was not without some fault and blame and was negligent in its approach and dealing with the entire matter-Appellant / bank accepted to have initially closed investigation into the complaint of respondent / plaintiff in year 2001, then unilaterally re-opened it and withdrew disputed amount from respondent / plaintiff five years post-closing the investigation-This was negligence and mismanagement on the part of appellant / bank-Amount in question was adjudicated by appellant / bank itself without giving respondent / plaintiff any proper opportunity for hearing and rebutting the same-It was the appellant / bank itself who held that a contractual relationship existed between the parties by relying upon various Terms and Conditions between them-Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court allowing recovery of funds wrongly auto-debited from the account without any forewarning or permission and without any proper due process being followed-Intra Court Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2024 CLD 1536; 2009 CLD 49; 2009 CLD 432; 2007 CLD 457; 2006 CLD 167; 2010 SCMR 1883; 2008 SCMR 456; PLD 2016 SC 730; 2015 SCMR 1698; PLD 2012 SC 268; PLD 2020 SC 338; 2015 SCMR 1698 and 2009 CLD 1564 rel.

Summary: (a) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)--- ----Ss. 25 & 28---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.10-A & 185(3)--- Deficiency in payment of court-fee---Inadequately stamped memorandum of appeal---Effect---Consequent rejection of appeal---Legality---Courts to allow rectification of deficiency in court-fees---Scope---Duty of Courts to ascertain precise amount of deficient court-fee and then grant a reasonable period to petitioner to remedy the deficiency---The Province of Punjab allotted 100 kanals of land to “A” under a tubewell scheme, and after his death, his heirs executed a general power of attorney in favour of “MH” who agreed to sell the land to respondent “MC”---When “MH” failed to honor the agreement, MC filed a suit for specific performance, which the Trial Court decreed in his favour---The Province challenged this decree through an appeal, but its counsel filed an inadequately stamped memorandum of appeal and, despite seeking repeated adjournments, failed to deposit the proper court-fees-- -Consequently, the District Court rejected the appeal, and the High Court, in revision, upheld that rejection---Therefore, the core issue before the Supreme Court for determination was as to “whether the rejection of the petitioner’s first appeal due to insufficiently stamped court-fees was lawful”?---Held: When the memorandum of appeal was initially presented, the ministerial staff reported that court-fees was needed---However, the specific amount of the deficient court-fee was not indicated, leaving a crucial gap in the proceedings---The file was subsequently presented to the district judge, who, rather than determining the exact sum owed in court-fees, opted to adjourn the case at the petitioner’s request to allow time to submit the required fee---In a bid to rectify the situation, the petitioner sought seven adjournments to address the fee deficiency---Despite these attempts, the petitioner failed to fulfil this requirement---As a result, the district judge ultimately rejected the memorandum of appeal---This procedural approach, characterized by an improper handling of the case, defeated substantial justice and fell short of the established principles of law---It was incumbent upon the district judge to first ascertain the precise amount of the deficient court-fee and subsequently grant a reasonable period for the petitioner to remedy this shortfall---This essential exercise was neglected, rendering the rejection of the memorandum of appeal invalid---Consequently, the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial, which is a right protected under Article 10-A of the Constitution---The significance of this oversight alone warranted a revision of the order that led to the rejection of the first appeal, however, the High Court overlooked this critical aspect when it dismissed the petitioner’s application under Section 115, C.P.C.---So viewed, the order of the High Court was also illegal---Consequently, the High Court judgment along with the district judge's order was set aside---The case was referred back to the district judge, who was directed to determine the exact amount of the court-fee owed---After this assessment, the district judge was directed to provide the petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to rectify any deficiencies in the payment of the court-fee and after granting that opportunity the district judge could proceed to adjudicate the matter according to the law---Present petition was converted into appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)--- ----S.28---Collection of court-fees---Purpose and object---True object is to facilitate administration of justice while protecting State interests without undermining fairness or integrity of proceedings---Scope---The primary intention behind this legislation (Court-fees Act, 1870) is to ensure a steady stream of revenue that benefits the State rather than to empower litigants with a tool of technicality that could be used to burden their adversaries unjustly---This understanding underscores the importance of upholding justice and fairness within the legal system---Thus, the focus should remain on the true purpose of the Act, facilitating the administration of justice while safe guarding the interests of the State without compromising the integrity of legal proceedings. Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289 and Sardar Muhammad Kazim Ziauddin Durrani and others v. Sardar Muhammad Asim Fakhuruddin Durrani 2001 SCMR 148 rel. Banwari Lal v. Mahesh and others AIR 1918 PC 188 ref. (c) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)--- ----Ss. 25, 26 & 28---Collection of court-fees by the State---Balancing the State’s revenue interests with the imperatives of fairness and justice in legal proceedings---Scope and guiding principles---Discretion of Presiding Officer to allow subsequent proper stamping---Rectification in deficiency of court-fee---Procedure stated---According to section 25 of the Court-fees Act 1870, in conjunction with section 26 thereof, the collection of court-fees is mandated to be executed through the use of stamps---The legislation specifies that the stamps intended to signify the payment of these fees may be of impressed, adhesive, or a combination of both types---Moreover, section 28 of the Act 1870 stipulates that a document requiring a stamp will be deemed invalid unless it bears the appropriate markings indicating that the court-fee has been duly paid---However, the statute recognizes the possibility of human error; if a document is inadvertently accepted, filed, or utilized in any court without the necessary stamping, the presiding judge possesses the discretion to allow for its subsequent proper stamping---If the judge deems it appropriate to grant this allowance, once the document is correctly stamped, it and all related proceedings will be considered as valid as if the necessary stamping had been executed at the outset---These provisions impose a dual responsibility on the court, particularly when documents are not properly stamped---Firstly, the court must ascertain the exact amount of applicable court-fees---Secondly, it may provide the necessary timeframe for the party involved to remedy any deficiencies in the payment, ensuring both compliance with the law and the preservation of fairness in the legal process. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.149---Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), S.28---Deficiency in payment of court-fee---Rectification of deficiency---Party to be allowed to rectify the deficiency/shortfall---Scope---There exists an additional legal provision that facilitates the rectification of certain procedural deficiencies which is articulated in section 149 of C.P.C.---This section empowers the court to permit a party to remedy any shortcomings in the court-fees owed on various legal documents, including plaints, memorandum of appeal, and applications for the review of judgments, etc---Notably, this allowance extends even beyond the expiration of the statutory limitation period required for the submission of these documents---In essence, Section 149, C.P.C. provides a mechanism by which a flawed document can be retrospectively validated, provided that the deficiency in the court-fee is rectified with the leave of the court---When one examines Section 28 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, in conjunction with Section 149, the law can be summarized as follows: (a) Ordinarily, a document that is insufficiently stamped is not to be received, filed, or recorded in a court; (b) When, however, an insufficiently stamped document is presented, the court has the authority to assess the precise amount of court-fees required and may grant the submitting party a reasonable timeframe to address the deficiency; (c) Should the party rectify the fee shortfall within the given time limit, the document is to be considered to have been presented and accepted on the original date of its filing; (d) If the deficiency is not remedied within the timeframe fixed, the document will be rendered invalid and without legal effect---It is important to emphasize a significant aspect of Section 28 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, along with Section 149, C.P.C.---These provisions do not obligate the Court to grant an extension of time for parties to address any deficiencies in court-fees---Instead, the authority to remedy such deficiencies lies within the Court's discretion, meaning that it cannot be assumed as an automatic right---However, it is essential to recognize that the pursuit of law fundamentally aims to deliver justice; it is not merely a series of rigid procedures but a pathway to achieving fair outcomes. Mst. Parveen v. Mst. Jamsheda Begum and another PLD 1983 SC 227; Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289; Yaqoob Khan v. Rasool Khan and others 1981 SCMR 155; Ch. Nazir Ahmed v. Abdul Karim and another PLD 1990 SC 42 and Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Collector, Badin v. Haji Abdul Shakoor and others 1997 SCMR 919 rel. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VII, R.11(c), O. XLI, R. 3 & S. 107---Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), S.28---Deficiency in payment of court-fees---Rectification of deficiency---Scope---Duty of Court to determine the deficiency and provide opportunity to a party to rectify such deficiency---Duty of party to rectify the deficiency in the timeframe permitted by court---Order VII, Rule 11 (c) of C.P.C. stipulates that a plaint must be rejected if the relief sought is appropriately valued, yet the plaint is submitted on insufficiently stamped paper---In such instances, if the Court directs the plaintiff to provide the proper stamped paper within a specified timeframe and the plaintiff fails to comply, the plaintiff's claim stands to be rejected---It is also crucial to note that, under the provisions of section 107, C.P.C. in conjunction with Order XLI, Rule 3, C.P.C., the stipulations of Order VII, Rule 11(c), C.P.C. extend to the memorandum of appeal as well---Consequently, an appellate Court possesses the same authority and obligations as a Court of original jurisdiction when dealing with suits filed before it---Therefore, just as a Court of original jurisdiction is mandated by Order VII, Rule 11(c), C.P.C. to grant sufficient time for rectifying any court-feeds efficiencies in the plaint, an appellate Court is equally obliged to do the same concerning a memorandum of appeal---In this context, it is essential to emphasize that the question of discretion does not come into play---The appellate Court is required to first explicitly and accurately assess the amount of the Court-fee deficiency before proceeding further---Following this determination, the Court must grant a reasonable period for the appellant to rectify the deficiency---Thus, rejecting a memorandum of appeal is deemed unlawful without first adhering to these essential criteria---It is necessary to clarify that when a plaintiff or an appellant is granted time to rectify a deficiency in court-fees as stipulated under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., they must conform to this requirement within the given time frame---Should they fail to fulfil this obligation and subsequently request additional time without providing a valid justification, it may be interpreted as an act of obstinacy and a deliberate disregard for the authority of the law---In such circumstances, the court may reasonably determine that the plaintiff or appellant forfeits his entitlement to any further extensions, as his actions reflect a refusal to comply with legal mandate. Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289; Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Collector, Badin v. Haji Abdul Shakoor and others 1997 SCMR 919; Noor Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Sharif and others 1988 SCMR 1955; Malik Allah Dad deceased through his legal representatives and others v. Yasin and another 1990 SCMR 1638; Muhammad Hanif and others v. Muhammad and others PLD 1990 SC 859; Mukhi Chatromal and another v. Khubchand and 6 others 1993 SCMR 1113; Sardar Ahmed Yar Jang v. Sardar Noor Ahmed Khan PLD 1994 SC 688 and Zulfiqar Ali and others v. Mst. Sajida Begum 1995 SCMR 911 rel. (f) Administration of justice--- ----Substantial justice over technical compliance---Minor unintentional mistakes---Legal practitioners sometimes make unintentional mistakes when drafting pleadings or filing cases---Such errors, while regrettable, often result in outcomes that can attract sanctions or penalties---However, in the administration of justice, it is crucial to recognize that not all mistakes warrant strict punitive measures---To give life to the principle that wrong must not go unpunished, and that right must not go un enforced, a degree of leniency must be accorded to errors that do not stem from contumacy or intentional misconduct---By adopting a more forgiving approach towards certain minor mistakes, the judiciary can prevent the rigid application of rules from hindering the broader mission of justice delivery---This perspective is vital because the judiciary is respected not because it has the technical ability to legitimize unfairness, instead, its respect is rooted in its fundamental role as an arbiter of fairness, capable of identifying and rectifying injustices---The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system---It is this ability to prioritize substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Baleeg-uz-Zaman, Additional A.G. along with Imran Safdar, Tehsildar for Petitioner. Ch. Ijaz Akbar Nusrat, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 22nd August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)--- ----Ss. 25 & 28---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.10-A & 185(3)--- Deficiency in payment of court-fee---Inadequately stamped memorandum of appeal---Effect---Consequent rejection of appeal---Legality---Courts to allow rectification of deficiency in court-fees---Scope---Duty of Courts to ascertain precise amount of deficient court-fee and then grant a reasonable period to petitioner to remedy the deficiency---The Province of Punjab allotted 100 kanals of land to “A” under a tubewell scheme, and after his death, his heirs executed a general power of attorney in favour of “MH” who agreed to sell the land to respondent “MC”---When “MH” failed to honor the agreement, MC filed a suit for specific performance, which the Trial Court decreed in his favour---The Province challenged this decree through an appeal, but its counsel filed an inadequately stamped memorandum of appeal and, despite seeking repeated adjournments, failed to deposit the proper court-fees-- -Consequently, the District Court rejected the appeal, and the High Court, in revision, upheld that rejection---Therefore, the core issue before the Supreme Court for determination was as to “whether the rejection of the petitioner’s first appeal due to insufficiently stamped court-fees was lawful”?---Held: When the memorandum of appeal was initially presented, the ministerial staff reported that court-fees was needed---However, the specific amount of the deficient court-fee was not indicated, leaving a crucial gap in the proceedings---The file was subsequently presented to the district judge, who, rather than determining the exact sum owed in court-fees, opted to adjourn the case at the petitioner’s request to allow time to submit the required fee---In a bid to rectify the situation, the petitioner sought seven adjournments to address the fee deficiency---Despite these attempts, the petitioner failed to fulfil this requirement---As a result, the district judge ultimately rejected the memorandum of appeal---This procedural approach, characterized by an improper handling of the case, defeated substantial justice and fell short of the established principles of law---It was incumbent upon the district judge to first ascertain the precise amount of the deficient court-fee and subsequently grant a reasonable period for the petitioner to remedy this shortfall---This essential exercise was neglected, rendering the rejection of the memorandum of appeal invalid---Consequently, the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial, which is a right protected under Article 10-A of the Constitution---The significance of this oversight alone warranted a revision of the order that led to the rejection of the first appeal, however, the High Court overlooked this critical aspect when it dismissed the petitioner’s application under Section 115, C.P.C.---So viewed, the order of the High Court was also illegal---Consequently, the High Court judgment along with the district judge's order was set aside---The case was referred back to the district judge, who was directed to determine the exact amount of the court-fee owed---After this assessment, the district judge was directed to provide the petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to rectify any deficiencies in the payment of the court-fee and after granting that opportunity the district judge could proceed to adjudicate the matter according to the law---Present petition was converted into appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)--- ----S.28---Collection of court-fees---Purpose and object---True object is to facilitate administration of justice while protecting State interests without undermining fairness or integrity of proceedings---Scope---The primary intention behind this legislation (Court-fees Act, 1870) is to ensure a steady stream of revenue that benefits the State rather than to empower litigants with a tool of technicality that could be used to burden their adversaries unjustly---This understanding underscores the importance of upholding justice and fairness within the legal system---Thus, the focus should remain on the true purpose of the Act, facilitating the administration of justice while safe guarding the interests of the State without compromising the integrity of legal proceedings. Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289 and Sardar Muhammad Kazim Ziauddin Durrani and others v. Sardar Muhammad Asim Fakhuruddin Durrani 2001 SCMR 148 rel. Banwari Lal v. Mahesh and others AIR 1918 PC 188 ref. (c) Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)--- ----Ss. 25, 26 & 28---Collection of court-fees by the State---Balancing the State’s revenue interests with the imperatives of fairness and justice in legal proceedings---Scope and guiding principles---Discretion of Presiding Officer to allow subsequent proper stamping---Rectification in deficiency of court-fee---Procedure stated---According to section 25 of the Court-fees Act 1870, in conjunction with section 26 thereof, the collection of court-fees is mandated to be executed through the use of stamps---The legislation specifies that the stamps intended to signify the payment of these fees may be of impressed, adhesive, or a combination of both types---Moreover, section 28 of the Act 1870 stipulates that a document requiring a stamp will be deemed invalid unless it bears the appropriate markings indicating that the court-fee has been duly paid---However, the statute recognizes the possibility of human error; if a document is inadvertently accepted, filed, or utilized in any court without the necessary stamping, the presiding judge possesses the discretion to allow for its subsequent proper stamping---If the judge deems it appropriate to grant this allowance, once the document is correctly stamped, it and all related proceedings will be considered as valid as if the necessary stamping had been executed at the outset---These provisions impose a dual responsibility on the court, particularly when documents are not properly stamped---Firstly, the court must ascertain the exact amount of applicable court-fees---Secondly, it may provide the necessary timeframe for the party involved to remedy any deficiencies in the payment, ensuring both compliance with the law and the preservation of fairness in the legal process. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.149---Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), S.28---Deficiency in payment of court-fee---Rectification of deficiency---Party to be allowed to rectify the deficiency/shortfall---Scope---There exists an additional legal provision that facilitates the rectification of certain procedural deficiencies which is articulated in section 149 of C.P.C.---This section empowers the court to permit a party to remedy any shortcomings in the court-fees owed on various legal documents, including plaints, memorandum of appeal, and applications for the review of judgments, etc---Notably, this allowance extends even beyond the expiration of the statutory limitation period required for the submission of these documents---In essence, Section 149, C.P.C. provides a mechanism by which a flawed document can be retrospectively validated, provided that the deficiency in the court-fee is rectified with the leave of the court---When one examines Section 28 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, in conjunction with Section 149, the law can be summarized as follows: (a) Ordinarily, a document that is insufficiently stamped is not to be received, filed, or recorded in a court; (b) When, however, an insufficiently stamped document is presented, the court has the authority to assess the precise amount of court-fees required and may grant the submitting party a reasonable timeframe to address the deficiency; (c) Should the party rectify the fee shortfall within the given time limit, the document is to be considered to have been presented and accepted on the original date of its filing; (d) If the deficiency is not remedied within the timeframe fixed, the document will be rendered invalid and without legal effect---It is important to emphasize a significant aspect of Section 28 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, along with Section 149, C.P.C.---These provisions do not obligate the Court to grant an extension of time for parties to address any deficiencies in court-fees---Instead, the authority to remedy such deficiencies lies within the Court's discretion, meaning that it cannot be assumed as an automatic right---However, it is essential to recognize that the pursuit of law fundamentally aims to deliver justice; it is not merely a series of rigid procedures but a pathway to achieving fair outcomes. Mst. Parveen v. Mst. Jamsheda Begum and another PLD 1983 SC 227; Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289; Yaqoob Khan v. Rasool Khan and others 1981 SCMR 155; Ch. Nazir Ahmed v. Abdul Karim and another PLD 1990 SC 42 and Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Collector, Badin v. Haji Abdul Shakoor and others 1997 SCMR 919 rel. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VII, R.11(c), O. XLI, R. 3 & S. 107---Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), S.28---Deficiency in payment of court-fees---Rectification of deficiency---Scope---Duty of Court to determine the deficiency and provide opportunity to a party to rectify such deficiency---Duty of party to rectify the deficiency in the timeframe permitted by court---Order VII, Rule 11 (c) of C.P.C. stipulates that a plaint must be rejected if the relief sought is appropriately valued, yet the plaint is submitted on insufficiently stamped paper---In such instances, if the Court directs the plaintiff to provide the proper stamped paper within a specified timeframe and the plaintiff fails to comply, the plaintiff's claim stands to be rejected---It is also crucial to note that, under the provisions of section 107, C.P.C. in conjunction with Order XLI, Rule 3, C.P.C., the stipulations of Order VII, Rule 11(c), C.P.C. extend to the memorandum of appeal as well---Consequently, an appellate Court possesses the same authority and obligations as a Court of original jurisdiction when dealing with suits filed before it---Therefore, just as a Court of original jurisdiction is mandated by Order VII, Rule 11(c), C.P.C. to grant sufficient time for rectifying any court-feeds efficiencies in the plaint, an appellate Court is equally obliged to do the same concerning a memorandum of appeal---In this context, it is essential to emphasize that the question of discretion does not come into play---The appellate Court is required to first explicitly and accurately assess the amount of the Court-fee deficiency before proceeding further---Following this determination, the Court must grant a reasonable period for the appellant to rectify the deficiency---Thus, rejecting a memorandum of appeal is deemed unlawful without first adhering to these essential criteria---It is necessary to clarify that when a plaintiff or an appellant is granted time to rectify a deficiency in court-fees as stipulated under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., they must conform to this requirement within the given time frame---Should they fail to fulfil this obligation and subsequently request additional time without providing a valid justification, it may be interpreted as an act of obstinacy and a deliberate disregard for the authority of the law---In such circumstances, the court may reasonably determine that the plaintiff or appellant forfeits his entitlement to any further extensions, as his actions reflect a refusal to comply with legal mandate. Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289; Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Collector, Badin v. Haji Abdul Shakoor and others 1997 SCMR 919; Noor Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Sharif and others 1988 SCMR 1955; Malik Allah Dad deceased through his legal representatives and others v. Yasin and another 1990 SCMR 1638; Muhammad Hanif and others v. Muhammad and others PLD 1990 SC 859; Mukhi Chatromal and another v. Khubchand and 6 others 1993 SCMR 1113; Sardar Ahmed Yar Jang v. Sardar Noor Ahmed Khan PLD 1994 SC 688 and Zulfiqar Ali and others v. Mst. Sajida Begum 1995 SCMR 911 rel. (f) Administration of justice--- ----Substantial justice over technical compliance---Minor unintentional mistakes---Legal practitioners sometimes make unintentional mistakes when drafting pleadings or filing cases---Such errors, while regrettable, often result in outcomes that can attract sanctions or penalties---However, in the administration of justice, it is crucial to recognize that not all mistakes warrant strict punitive measures---To give life to the principle that wrong must not go unpunished, and that right must not go un enforced, a degree of leniency must be accorded to errors that do not stem from contumacy or intentional misconduct---By adopting a more forgiving approach towards certain minor mistakes, the judiciary can prevent the rigid application of rules from hindering the broader mission of justice delivery---This perspective is vital because the judiciary is respected not because it has the technical ability to legitimize unfairness, instead, its respect is rooted in its fundamental role as an arbiter of fairness, capable of identifying and rectifying injustices---The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system---It is this ability to prioritize substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Baleeg-uz-Zaman, Additional A.G. along with Imran Safdar, Tehsildar for Petitioner. Ch. Ijaz Akbar Nusrat, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 22nd August, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss. 9 & 22---Suit of recovery of damages---Maintainability---Mental stress and agony---Suit filed by respondent / customer was decreed against appellant / bank for recovery of damages---Banking Court granted damages of Rs.5,000,000/- on account of mental stress, agony etc. suffered by respondent / customer---Validity---Such damage did not occur out of any contractual or financial obligation between the parties---Respondent / customer might have a right to institute a claim against appellant / bank for seeking such damages, and those could only be awarded by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, and not by Banking Court in its special jurisdiction---Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment and decree to such extent as Banking Court had travelled beyond the scope of its jurisdiction---Respondent / customer remained at liberty to file any civil suit for damages etc. against appellant / bank in a court of competent jurisdiction for seeking his claims of damages, in accordance with law---Intra Court Appeal was allowed accordingly. ������ 2015 SCMR 1341; 2025 CLD 1; 2024 CLD 1536 and 2023 CLD 1464 rel. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 9 & 22---Suit for recovery of money---Negligence of bank---Respondent / plaintiff was aggrieved of deduction of disputed bill of credit card, five years after the card was stolen and had been so reported to appellant / bank---Judge in Chambers of High Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent / plaintiff and directed to return disputed amount along with markup---Validity---Appellant / bank was not without some fault and blame and was negligent in its approach and dealing with the entire matter---Appellant / bank accepted to have initially closed investigation into the complaint of respondent / plaintiff in year 2001, then unilaterally re-opened it and withdrew disputed amount from respondent / plaintiff five years post-closing the investigation---This was negligence and mismanagement on the part of appellant / bank---Amount in question was adjudicated by appellant / bank itself without giving respondent / plaintiff any proper opportunity for hearing and rebutting the same---It was the appellant / bank itself who held that a contractual relationship existed between the parties by relying upon various Terms and Conditions between them---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court allowing recovery of funds wrongly auto-debited from the account without any forewarning � or permission and without any proper due process being followed---Intra Court Appeal was dismissed accordingly. ������ 2024 CLD 1536; 2009 CLD 49; 2009 CLD 432; 2007 CLD 457; 2006 CLD 167; 2010 SCMR 1883; 2008 SCMR 456; PLD 2016 SC 730; 2015 SCMR 1698; PLD 2012 SC 268; PLD 2020 SC 338; 2015 SCMR 1698 and 2009 CLD 1564 rel. ������ Ijaz Ahmed Zahid for Appellant. ������ Muhammad Haseeb Jamali for Respondent No. 1. ������ Syed Saad Bin Khurram for Respondent-SBP. ������ Date of hearing: 14th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Court Fees Act, 1870— —Ss. 28 & 34—Payment of deficient court fee—Scope— Court Fees Act, like fiscal legislation, is designed to ensure revenue collection for the State and not to empower litigants to defeat adversaries on technical grounds—Where a document is filed with deficient court fee, Court must determine the exact deficiency and allow reasonable time for rectification—Once deficiency is removed within time granted, document relates back to original filing date—Rejection without prior assessment and opportunity violates principles of fairness. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)— —S. 149 & O. VII, R. 11(c); O. XLI, R. 3—Rectification of deficiency in court fee— Section 149 CPC permits curing deficiency in court fee even after expiry of limitation—Obligation of trial and appellate courts is to ascertain exact shortfall and grant time to pay—Order VII, R.11(c) CPC applies equally to plaints and memoranda of appeal; rejection is unlawful unless deficiency first determined and reasonable opportunity granted. (c) Constitutional Law— —Art. 10-A—Right to fair trial— Failure of appellate court to determine deficiency in court fee before rejecting memorandum of appeal amounted to denial of fair trial guaranteed under Art.10-A of the Constitution—Technical lapse cannot override substantive justice where absence of contumacy or mala fide is evident. (d) Administration of justice— —Judicial discretion—Exercise in matters of court fee— Discretion to condone or extend time to make up deficiency is to be exercised in furtherance of justice—Rigid application of rules should not hinder access to justice—Leniency may be denied only where contumacy, mala fide, or deliberate non-compliance is established. Cited Cases Banwari Lal v. Mahesh AIR 1918 PC 188 Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 Mst. Parveen v. Mst. Jamsheda Begum PLD 1983 SC 227 Yaqoob Khan v. Rasool Khan 1981 SCMR 155 Ch. Nazir Ahmed v. Abdul Karim PLD 1990 SC 42 Assistant Commissioner & Land Acquisition Collector, Badin v. Haji Abdul Shakoor 1997 SCMR 919 Noor Muhammad v. Muhammad Sharif 1988 SCMR 1955 Malik Allah Dad v. Yasin 1990 SCMR 1638 Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad PLD 1990 SC 859 Mukhi Chatromal v. Khubchand 1993 SCMR 1113 Sardar Ahmed Yar Jang v. Sardar Noor Ahmed Khan PLD 1994 SC 688 Zulfiqar Ali v. Mst. Sajida Begum 1995 SCMR 911 Disposition Petition converted into appeal—Allowed—Orders of District Judge (14.04.2016) and High Court (03.12.2020) set aside—Matter remanded to District Judge, Bhakkar to determine exact court fee deficiency, grant reasonable time to petitioner for payment, and then decide case on merits.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Scholarships, grant of---Petitioners sought enhancement of scholarship limits citing inadequacy of granted limit/allowance for foreign university admissions---Legality---Scope---Respondent No. 2 announced scholarships titled “LLM and PhD Scholarships for the Students of Balochistan” through an advertisement---The petitioners, being eligible candidates, appeared in the test---Subsequently, respondent No. 2 issued provisional offer letters granting the petitioners scholarships for securing admission in foreign universities, allocating USD 15,000 per year for tuition fees and USD 1,250 per month for maintenance---The petitioners challenged the adequacy of this allocation, contending that actual tuition fees at most targeted universities ranged from USD 25,000 - 30,000 per year with living costs exceeding the maintenance allowance---Their request to enhance these amounts to USD 30,000 per annum (tuition) and USD 2,200 per month (maintenance) was not accepted by respondents, leading to the filing of the instant constitutional petition under Art. 199 seeking directions for revision of the scholarship terms and timely release of funds to prevent financial hardship during their studies abroad---Held: Admittedly, the petitioners’ grievance relating to extension of time for securing admission in the foreign universities had been redressed by extending the same, but with no increase in yearly tuition fees and monthly maintenance allowance---Undeniably, the scholarships were announced by the government for the welfare and benefit of aspirants in order to pursue the education abroad and ensure that students from all backgrounds, especially those from low-income families, marginalized communities, or aspirants coming from rural areas got an opportunity to get quality education, contributing to the economy, governance, and innovation, but such initiative obviously was subject to financial constraints, whilst keeping in view the country’s economic woes---When the scholarships were announced certain amount was fixed for tuition fee and monthly allowance as per approved PC-1 for the aspirants of said scholarships, thus the departments were bound to operate within the stipulated financial and policy framework, which could not be arbitrarily modified on a case-by-case basis, henceforth, the petitioners had no vested right to claim more than the amount offered, more particularly, when the scholarships were announced for the aspirants, who agreed to the conditions laid down therein, and for those for whom it might not be suitable, they might avail any other opportunity---None of the vested rights of the petitioners were infringed by the respondents, persuading the High Court to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Judicial review---Educational institutions---Policy decision, interference in---Scope---It is not the constitutional mandate of the courts to run and manage the public or private institutions at micro level or to interfere in their internal policy and administrative affairs---Courts should generally refrain from interfering in the policy decisions taken by the statutory bodies and authorities tasked with running the matters of educational institutions, which otherwise require technical and professional expertise that may only be attained as a result of specialization and experience of working with the educational institutions, but the courts can interfere in a case, where grave injustice has done, which we believe is not available in the instant case. Yasir Nawaz v. Higher Education Commission PLD 2021 SC 745 rel. Imtiaz Ali Dashti for Petitioners. Baqir Bakhtiar, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No. 1. Naimatullah Achakzai, Shamsullah Nasar and Rahim Baz Mandokhail for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 31st July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Suit for recovery of dower decreed to the extent of entitlement to Rs.100,000/-Executing court ordering recovery of gold ornaments at current market value-Legality-Executing court could direct payment of the current market value of gold ornaments if their return was not possible-Respondent No.1 filed a suit before the family court for recovery of dower, dowry articles, and maintenance of minor, which was decreed while declaring her entitled to seven tolas of gold or, in the alternative, Rs.100,000/- as dower-In execution, the family court ordered recovery of either seven tolas of gold or its current market value-The petitioner/husband challenged this in revision, which was allowed by the district court holding that the entitlement was confined to Rs.100,000/-In respondent’s (wife’s) constitutional petition, High Court set aside the revisional order and restored the family court’s execution order, holding that she could recover the gold or its prevailing market value-The petitioner/husband then filed the present civil petition before the Supreme Court raising the question for determination as to-Whether the decree entitling the respondent/wife to seven tolas of gold or in the alternative Rs.100,000/-, limits recovery to the fixed sum or allows recovery of the current market value of gold when return in specie is not possible-?-Held: High Court correctly appreciated the scope of the judgment and decree, the conduct of the parties, and the settled principle that, where a decree expressly afforded alternate modes of satisfaction, the decree-holder retained the liberty to exercise her choice-The contention that the Respondent No. 1 voluntarily sought amendment during execution proceeding was misconceived-The executing court’s order maked it evident that the amendment was merely an addition of Rs. 100,000/- in consequence of the petitioner’s objection, without in any way deleting, relinquishing or substituting the original stipulation of seven (07) tolas of gold-An executing court could direct payment of the current market value of gold ornaments if their return was not possible-Impugned judgment neither suffered from legal error nor reflected any perversity or misapplication of settled law-On the contrary, it reinforced the principle that the court must give effect to the true intent underlying the decree and the contract from which it flew-Impugned judgment was well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation of facts and law-No illegality, perversity, or misreading and non-reading of evidence had been found in the impugned judgment-Accordingly, the instant petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.199-Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-The constitutional courts exercise only limited supervisory jurisdiction and cannot re-appraise evidence or substitute their own opinion for that of the appellate court-Once a matter has been adjudicated upon facts by the trial and the appellate courts, constitutional courts should not exceed their powers by re-evaluating the facts or substituting the appellate court’s opinion with their own-The acceptance of finality of the appellate court’s finding is essential for achieving closure in legal proceedings conclusively resolving disputes, preventing unnecessary litigation, and upholding the legislature’s intent to provide a definitive resolution through existing appeal mechanism. M. Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari and others 2023 SCMR 1434 rel.

Summary: (Against the Order dated 20.11.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi in Writ Petition No. 3346 of 2018). (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dower decreed to the extent of entitlement to Rs.100,000/---Executing court ordering recovery of gold ornaments at current market value---Legality---Executing court could direct payment of the current market value of gold ornaments if their return was not possible---Respondent No.1 filed a suit before the family court for recovery of dower, dowry articles, and maintenance of minor, which was decreed while declaring her entitled to seven tolas of gold or, in the alternative, Rs.100,000/- as dower---In execution, the family court ordered recovery of either seven tolas of gold or its current market value---The petitioner/husband challenged this in revision, which was allowed by the district court holding that the entitlement was confined to Rs.100,000/---In respondent’s (wife’s) constitutional petition, High Court set aside the revisional order and restored the family court’s execution order, holding that she could recover the gold or its prevailing market value---The petitioner/husband then filed the present civil petition before the Supreme Court raising the question for determination as to “Whether the decree entitling the respondent/wife to seven tolas of gold or in the alternative Rs.100,000/-, limits recovery to the fixed sum or allows recovery of the current market value of gold when return in specie is not possible”?---Held: High Court correctly appreciated the scope of the judgment and decree, the conduct of the parties, and the settled principle that, where a decree expressly afforded alternate modes of satisfaction, the decree-holder retained the liberty to exercise her choice---The contention that the Respondent No. 1 voluntarily sought amendment during execution proceeding was misconceived---The executing court’s order maked it evident that the amendment was merely an addition of Rs. 100,000/- in consequence of the petitioner’s objection, without in any way deleting, relinquishing or substituting the original stipulation of seven (07) tolas of gold---An executing court could direct payment of the current market value of gold ornaments if their return was not possible---Impugned judgment neither suffered from legal error nor reflected any perversity or misapplication of settled law---On the contrary, it reinforced the principle that the court must give effect to the true intent underlying the decree and the contract from which it flew---Impugned judgment was well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation of facts and law---No illegality, perversity, or misreading and non-reading of evidence had been found in the impugned judgment---Accordingly, the instant petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---The constitutional courts exercise only limited supervisory jurisdiction and cannot re-appraise evidence or substitute their own opinion for that of the appellate court---Once a matter has been adjudicated upon facts by the trial and the appellate courts, constitutional courts should not exceed their powers by re-evaluating the facts or substituting the appellate court’s opinion with their own---The acceptance of finality of the appellate court’s finding is essential for achieving closure in legal proceedings conclusively resolving disputes, preventing unnecessary litigation, and upholding the legislature’s intent to provide a definitive resolution through existing appeal mechanism. M. Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari and others 2023 SCMR 1434 rel. Ms. Farhana Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. M. Asif Mukhtar Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 10---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXIX, R.1---Application for leave to defend the suit, filing of---Condonation of delay---Knowledge of company---Scope---Defendant / company sought condonation of delay in filing of application for leave to defend the suit on the plea of acquiring knowledge of pendency of suit---Validity---Knowledge of defendant / company was knowledge of its officers---Leave application for defendant / company in view of O. XXIX, R.1, C.P.C. could have been filed by company Secretary or by any Director or other principal officer of the company---Officers who eventually filed leave application for defendant / company had already filed leave application for themselves within the prescribed time---Defendant / company could not say that it did not have knowledge that it was also sued and had to file a leave application within 30 days---Fraud alleged by defendant / company was committed by another defendant and not by plaintiff / financial institution---Plaintiff / financial institution did not prevent defendant / company or its directors from filing leave application within time and could not be faulted for infighting between directors of the company---To extend limitation for leave application by defendant / company, provision of S. 18 of Limitation Act, 1908 could not be invoked---High Court declined to condone delay and leave was not granted---Application for leave to defend the suit was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 9(2) & 10---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss. 2 (8) & 4---Electronic Transactions Ordinance (LI of 2002), Ss. 3 & 12---Suit for recovery of finance---Leave to defend the suit---Statement of accounts---Print out of electronic document---Bar to attestation---Principle---Plaintiff / financial institution instead of appending complete statement of accounts appended only statement of balances and certificate of outstanding amount---Validity---Statement of account envisaged in S. 9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a document reflecting debits and credits and dates thereof from the time of disbursement---Any statement only of balances or a certificate of outstanding amount is not such a statement of account---Statement appended to plaint was not certified as required by S. 9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 as it did not bear the certificate prescribed by S. 2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 and could not be taken as prima facie evidence of existence of entries it had reflected---This recognition was otherwise provided to a certified copy by virtue of S. 4 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Print-out of such electronic document for the purposes of S. 9(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was required to be certified under Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891---Omission of statement of account with plaint was a defect that was rectified to avoid rejection of plaint but the same had deprived defendants of a defense on accounts, thereby raising a substantial question of fact for granting leave to defend---Defendants who were directors and officials of defendant company, were entitled to leave to contest, plaintiffs / financial institution's accounts in as much as those were produced for the first time with the replication---Application was allowed. Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 distinguished. Ali Khan and Company v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. PLD 1995 SC 362; C.M. Textiles (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587; Emirates Global Islamic Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Abdul Salam Khan 2013 CLD 1291; Ali Waqar Azeem v. Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. 2024 CLD 397; Elbow Room v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2014 CLD 985; Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Classic Denim Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2011 CLD 408; Imran Hussain v. Bankers Equity Ltd. 2019 CLD 272; Al Raheem Rice Mills v. Bank Alfalah Ltd. 2018 CLD 1351; Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. v. Abdul Jabbar Gihllin 2013 CLD 88; Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. v. Faizan Ali & Company (Pvt.) Ltd. 2017 CLD 1583; Tasleem Fatima v. Bank of Punjab 2017 CLD 552; Askari Bank Ltd. v. DCD Services Ltd. 2018 CLD 799; 2015 CLD 56; Bankers Equity Ltd. v. Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. 2003 CLD 931; 2010 CLD 651; Decent Builders and Developers v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. 2021 CLD 130; Jamal Tube (Pvt.) Ltd. v. First Punjab Modaraba 2021 CLD 1372; National Bank of Pakistan v. Amna Export (Pvt.) Ltd. 2020 CLD 1243; National Bank of Pakistan v. Pakistan Textile City Ltd. 2021 CLD 194; Soneri Bank Ltd. v. Compass Trading Corporation 2012 CLD 1302; Pak Kuwait Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Active Apparels International 2012 CLD 1036; Pakistan Kuwait Investment Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Three Star Hosiery Mills 2017 CLD 546; NIB Bank Ltd. v. Venus Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. 2020 CLD 1227 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Tuwairqi Steel Mills Ltd. 2019 CLD 1140 ref. (c) Electronic Transactions Ordinance (LI of 2002)--- ----Ss. 2 (m), 3 & 12---Electronic transaction---Print out of electronic document---Certified copy, exemption of---Principle---Production of a "certified copy" under S. 3 of Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 is not exempted rather it exempts "attestation by witness" relating to a document that is "in electronic form"---Provision of S. 2(m) of Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 defines an "electronic document" as a document that is "in electronic form"---Any document on paper is not in electronic form and cannot be termed an electronic document---Print-out of an electronic document should not be confused with electronic document itself, this distinction has been brought out in S. 12 of Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002. Syed Shayan Ahmed, Ghulam Murtaza and Ahmed Magsi for Plaintiff. Waqar Ahmed and Abdullah Azzam Naqvi for Defendant No.1. Hassan Khurshid Hashmi for Defendant No.2. Talha Javed, Heer Memon and Ammar Suria for Defendant Nos.3, 4, 5 and 7. Zeeshan Abdullah and M. Adnan Abdullah for Defendant No.6. Dates of hearing: 3rd February, 8th and 24th April, 2025.