Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (Section 14 of Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975)] Through this Civil Revision Application the applicants have challenged the order passed by Vth Additional District and Session Judge Karachi (South) in Civil Appeal, upholding the Judgment and Decree passed by VIIIth Senior Civil Judge Karachi (South) in Civil Suit; dismissing the suit of the Applicants.Provisions of Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957, Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 in the light of the judgments pronounced by the Honble Supreme Court in the cases of Evacuee Trust Property Board v Mst. Zakia Begum and others (1992 SCMR 1313), Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others (2007 SCMR 262) and Evacuee Trust Property Board, through Deputy/Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, Peshawar v. Ali Bahadur (2011 PSC 22), were discussed.No infirmity or material irregularity was found in the impugned judgments of the courts below, which could warrant interference in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, Revision Application was dismissed.

Summary: [Service matters (Back benefits), Service matters (Reinstatement into service)]The petitioners were employees of NADRA in their respective petition they have challenged order imposition of Major Penalty of reduction to a lower stage (two stages).Provisions of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973, Fundamental Rules and Constitution of Pakistan were discussed. It was decided in the case that the impugned order and imposition of Major Penalty of reduction to a lower post, passed against the petitioners were not sustainable in law. Consequently, these petitions were allowed the impugned orders were set-aside with the directions to pay the back benefits to the petitioners curtailed due to imposition of major penalty.

Summary: Service matters (Removal from Service), Service matters (statutory or non statutory rules of service)---The moot question involved in this petition is that whether petitioner is entitled to be reinstated under provisions of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009 (Ordinance) and the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 (Act).The Provisions of Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009 and the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010 (Act) were thoroughly examined and discussed.It was observed that the Provisions of aforesaid Ordinance and the Act is applicable only to employees who fall within the very limited category i.e. recruited during November 1993 to November 1996 and removed during November, 1996 to December, 1998. It may be noticed that the word used between the two described periods, is And. Therefore unless an employee of a corporation concurrently meets both these conditions he is not entitled to the benefit of the Ordinance and Act.Petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan (199), Service matters (NIRC), Industrial DisputeThe questions, which require determination in the present case, were that whether the law expressly empowers the Commission to pass such an interim order in proceedings of unfair labour practice. If not, whether such a power necessarily follows, or is implicit in the powers expressly conferred, being incidental or ancillary to it or consequential to the power to find an employer guilty under the Industrial Relation laws.Provisions of National Industrial Relation Commissions (Procedure & Functions) Regulations, 1973, and Article 199 of constitution were discussed.It was observed that Learned Member NIRC failed to advert the grounds taken in the termination letter and other issues relating to the jurisdiction to pass ante status quo have also not dealt with in a proper manner. The impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded with the direction to decide the application of respondent No. 3 to 12 afresh.

Summary: #NAME?

Summary: ----R. 6---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of maintenanceallowance, dower and dowry articles---Territorial jurisdiction---Determination of---Expression'ordinarily resides'---Scope---Expression 'ordinarily resides' did no

Summary: Detailed Judgement in Urdu.

Summary: Background: The respondent filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement-to-sell dated February 15, 2012, for a 12 marla land and built-up house, claiming that the vendor (proforma respondent) failed to execute the sale deed as agreed. During the proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise, and the District Judge issued a compromise decree on May 29, 2012. Appellant No.1 then filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), claiming that the compromise decree was obtained through fraud and requested it to be set aside. The District Judge accepted this application and set aside the decree. The respondent appealed to the High Court, which restored the compromise decree on February 12, 2016. The appellants then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Was the compromise decree issued by the District Judge obtained through fraud as alleged by the appellants? -----2- Can the compromise decree be valid when a related suit by the appellants regarding the same property was sub judice at the time of the decree? -----3- Did the High Court err in restoring the compromise decree? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that at the time the compromise decree was passed (May 29, 2012), the suit filed by the appellants regarding the same land had already been withdrawn (on May 28, 2012). Therefore, the appellants’ claim that their suit was pending at the time of the compromise was incorrect. The Court also noted that the proforma respondent was the rightful owner of the land, and her transfer of the property to the respondent was lawful. Since the appellants had previously acknowledged the proforma respondent’s ownership, she had full authority to sell the property. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to restore the compromise decree, stating that the District Judge had erroneously set it aside. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 12(2), Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.)

Summary: Summary pending