Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -Ss. 96, 115 & O.XLI, R.1-Final decree in a suit for partition, appeal against-Decree sheet not prepared at the time of filing appeal-Effect on maintainability of appeal-Decree prepared during pendency of appeal-Appeal not being preferred against a decree, plea of-Decree sheet being sine qua non for maintaining appeal-Scope-Exception-Delay on the part of court staff in preparing the decree sheet-Effect-Act of court would prejudice no man-Principle-Applicability-Briefly, the applicants instituted a suit for separate possession through partition asserting that the parties were co-owners of joint property; The suit was preliminarily decreed with the consent of the parties, directing partition while maintaining their respective possessions-A local commission was appointed to conduct partition proceedings, and after objections from both sides were dismissed, a final decree was passed, subject to preparation of the decree sheet on requisite stamp paper-An appeal filed by the respondents was initially dismissed due to non-preparation of the decree sheet, whereafter the applicants applied for its preparation, resulting in the instrument of partition being prepared and the decree sheet ultimately drawn during the pendency of the appeal-The appellate court accepted the appeal leading the applicants/plaintiffs to file the present civil revision-Pivotal issue which came up before the High Court requiring determination was as to-whether the appeal was competent and maintainable in the absence of a formally prepared decree sheet, and whether limitation for filing such appeal commenced before the decree was drawn, particularly where the decree was prepared during the pendency of the appeal due to acts or omissions of the court rather than the parties?-Held: From the joint reading of S.96 and O.XLI, R.1 of C.P.C., it was made clear that appeal in terms thereof was only competent against the decree and not the judgment-Appellate Court was though competent to dispense with the production of copy of judgment but not the decree, which was sine qua non for preferring an appeal-Applicants never provided the requisite stamp papers, enabling the Trial Court to prepare the instrument of partition and the decree sheet-Applicants for the first time moved an application for submission of stamp duty and preparation of decree sheet on 9.02.2015, which was allowed but even then the decree sheet was not prepared-There was no fault of respondents in preparation of decree-Had there been any peccadillo on the part of respondents it could not be made basis to penalize them in the shape of dismissal of their appeal-Principle-Act of court shall prejudice no man-was squarely attracted to the present case-The applicants had failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned judgment, warranting interference by the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction so as to set at naught the impugned judgment-Application was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Ijaz and another v. Muhammad Shafi through L.Rs. 2016 SCMR 834 and Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others v. Murad Ali Khan PLD 1972 SC 69 rel. Jabar Khan v. Akhtar Hussain and others 2001 MLD 1624; Sher and another v. Bhai Khan and another 2008 CLC 232 and Noor Ali and 3 others v. Muhammad Uris and 11 others 2000 YLR 1564 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S.96 & O.XLI, R.1-Decree sheet not appended with the appeal-Effect-Maintainability of appeal-Scope-Decree sheet being prepared during pendency of appeal-When decree sheet was being prepared during the pendency of the appeal, so the appellate court was vested with the power to mould the relief for meeting the ends of justice. Muhammad Farooq and others v. Javed Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 73 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S.115-Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court-Judgments at variance-Preference-High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction is supposed to make comparative analysis of both the judgments of Courts below in order to determine their validity on the touchstones of S.115 of the C.P.C-It is cardinal principle of law that in the matter of giving preference to the judgments of lower courts, while analyzing the same in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the preference and regard is always given to the findings of the appellate court, unless those are suffering with any legal infirmity or material irregularity. Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 1300; Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar and 2 others 2015 SCMR 1 and Muhammad Hafeez and another v. District Judge, Karachi East and another 2008 SCMR 398 rel.

Summary: Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Art. 110---Recovery of rent---Limitation---Suit filed by appellants / plaintiffs was dismissed by Trial Court as the same was barred by limitation---Validity---For recovery of rent prescribed limitation is mentioned in Art. 110 of Limitation Act, 1908 which is three years---In terms of subject agreements, date of commencement for payment of annual rentals was to start after seven days from installation of equipment, therefore, suit should have been filed within three years that was latest by 09-02-1983 but it was instituted on 07-08-1986---Trial Court had rightly concluded that the suit was time barred---No evidence was brought on record by appellants’ / plaintiffs’ witness that alleged loan was disbursed to them, therefore, evidence of appellants / plaintiffs did not support their stance with regard to supply of entire consignment of system / equipment---Appellants / plaintiffs failed to prove claim against respondent / defendant and also failed to prove any privity of contract between appellants / plaintiffs and respondent / defendant---Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by Trial Court---Intra Court Appeal was dismissed in circumstances. Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through Legal Representatives v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi 1991 SCMR 2300; Islamuddin and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others PLD 2004 SC 633 and Director Industries, Government of N.-W.F.P. Peshawar v. Messrs Nowshera Engineering Company Limited through Managing Director and 4 others 2002 CLD 286 ref. Hassan Ali for Appellants. Zahid F. Ebrahim for Respondent. Dates of hearing: 8th August and 8th September, 2025.

Summary: Following points are discussed in this judgment: 1. Appeal was not preferred against the decree and as such it was not tenable at all. 2. Decree was though prepared during the pendency of the appeal by the orders of the appellate court but it was never brought on record by the appellant to meet with the requirements of Order XLI Rule 1 of the C.P.C. 3. After preparation of the decree, the appellants never amended their appeal, so as to call in question the vires of decree. 291Misc. Writ 46461/25 Muhammad Ashraf Vs SNGPL etc Mr. Justice Malik Waqar Haider Awan 03- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5512 PLJ 2025 Lahore 982

Summary: In matters where the litigant had to suffer on account of counsel engaged from mufassil areas, courts have condoned fault on the said account relating to pleadings and other procedural matters requiring precision, which had been overlooked by the counsel. Hence, by setting-aside order, whereby right to file written statement had been struck of, another opportunity was provided to the petitioner to file written statement. 290Civil Revision- Civil Revision (Against Decree) u/s. 115, C.P.C. 830-16 SYED IMTIAZ HUSSAIN DECEASED THROUGH LR ETC. VS MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN ETC. Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf 08- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5519 PLJ 2025 Lahore 987 (Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi)

Summary: Held that a summary suit under Order XXXVII, CPC ordinarily has two phases: the first, being the stage of summary proceedings commencing from the institution of the suit and ending with the decision on leave to defend. If the plaint is returned on account of jurisdiction or leave is refused, the matter concludes at this stage. If the leave is granted, the second phase follows, in which the suit is treated as a regular/ordinary trial: issues are framed, parties adduce their evidence, the burden of proof is determined in the light of those issues, and the case is decided on merits, in accordance with the general procedure of the CPC and law of evidence. 287Jail Appeal 24423/22 Muhammad Imtiaz etc. Vs The State The Chief Justice 08- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5669

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 175C---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 40B---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24A---Posting of officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises---Back to back extension of such posting---Reasons for extension, absence of---Effect---Consecutive orders were issued under S.175C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’), whereby officers of Inland Revenue had been posted at various business premises of the Company, being engaged in the manufacturing and sale of poultry feed, in order to monitor for successive periods of thirty days, extended back-to-back without reasons---Whether the repeated extensions of thirty days each under the S.175C of the Ordinance, 2001, without assigning reasons or disclosing material, can be sustained in law---Petitioner (Taxpayer/Company called into question the validity of consecutive orders contending that the authority could not be exercised arbitrarily or indefinitely, and that monitoring under such provision must necessarily be time-bound and justified by cogent reasons---Validity---Pertinently, S. 175C of the Ordinance, 2001 is pari material S.40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act, 1990’) in both language and purpose; and the doctrine of pari materia permits courts to interpret two provisions in harmony where they are couched in substantially similar terms, address the same issue and seek to achieve a common object---Section 175C of the Ordinance, 2001, in essence, replicates the scheme of S. 40B of the Act, 1990 by empowering the Board or Chief Commissioner to post officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises of a taxpayer to monitor production, supply of goods, rendering of services and stock position---Though the S. 175C of the Ordinance, 2001 does not, in express terms, prescribe a limitation of time for such postings, however, the law does not recognize unfettered and unbridled discretion and monitoring cannot be indefinite; rather must be for a defined period and for a lawful purpose contemplated by the statute---Once that purpose is achieved or exhausted, the monitoring must come to an end, and the authority cannot be left at large to extend the period in its unfettered discretion---All statutory powers must be exercised within lawful limits, which must be exercised for a reasonable and time-bound period to achieve the legitimate object of the statute---In the present case, while the initial orders (of 03.05.2025 and 13.05.2025) can be regarded as valid exercises of power under S. 175C of the Ordinance, 2001, the subsequent orders (dated 02.06.2025 and 29.06.2025) extending the posting of at the petitioner’s hatcheries suffered from a conspicuous absence of reasons---No material had been disclosed as to why continued monitoring was necessary, what object remained unachieved, or what irregularity justified prolongation---The extensions, being unreasoned and indefinite in effect, were arbitrary and fell foul of S. 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which obliged every public authority to act reasonably, fairly and in accordance with the purpose of law---Such action also fail the test of proportionality embodied in the constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom of trade---Thus, High Court set-aside office orders extending posting declaring the same to be without lawful authority while the initial posting orders stood spent by efflux of time---Constitutional petition, filed by taxpayer/company , was partly allowed accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Pakistan Beverages Ltd. 2018 SCMR 1544 and Agha Steel Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 2119 ref. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 175C---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 40B---Posting of officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises---Back to back extension of such posting---Reasons for extension, absence of---Effect---Consecutive orders were issued under S. 175C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’), whereby officers of Inland Revenue had been posted at various business premises of the Petitioner (Manufacturer/Company) in order to monitor for successive periods of thirty days extended back-to-back without reasons---Respondents/Department, while placing reliance upon the judgment in case tilted “Kamalia Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan” reported as 2015 PTD 221 (‘Kamalia Sugar Mills case’), contended that the action was within the lawful competence of the tax authorities since the act of monitoring was not adverse in nature, therefore, the principle enunciated in Kamalia Sugar Mills case governed the present case---Validity---The case law i.e., Kamalia Sugar Mills case, cited by the Respondents/Department , does not advance their case beyond the initial posting of officers---Kamalia Sugar Mills case /judgment expressly observed that in order to prevent arbitrary exercise, the posting order must stipulate a reasonable timeframe, and that any extension should be made known to the taxpayer---Although it is correct that the Board or the Chief Commissioner is not under a statutory obligation to issue a show-cause notice or to record detailed reasons while appointing officers at the business premises for monitoring, this cannot be construed as a license to grant successive extensions in a mechanical or indefinite manner---Every extension of monitoring must be supported by cogent justification, demonstrating the necessity for continued oversight---Even where the orders are time-bound, such as thirty days consecutively in the present case, the power to extend cannot be exercised in such a way that it results in perpetual monitoring under the guise of renewal---The law requires that such exercise of discretion must be reasonable, proportionate, and must culminate at a definite point in time---Therefore, to treat Kamalia Sugar Mills case as an authority for approving back-to-back extensions without reasons would be to stretch the judgment beyond its ratio and to undermine its own cautionary observations---Thus, High Court set-aside office orders extending posting declaring the same to be without lawful authority while the initial posting orders stood spent by efflux of time---Constitutional Petition, filed by taxpayer/company , was partly allowed accordingly. Kamalia Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 PTD 221 ref. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 175C---Posting of officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises for monitoring---Issuance of order by competent / designated authority, absence of---Effect---Approval by the designated authority---Scope ---Objection of the Petitioner/Taxpayer being was the orders had not been issued by the Competent Authority (the Board or the Chief Commissioner) prescribed under S. 175C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’) but by the Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue---Validity---When a statute vests power in a particular authority, such power must be exercised by that authority alone, unless there exists an express provision of delegation duly notified in accordance with law---Section 175C of the Ordinance, 2001 confers authority upon the Board or the Chief Commissioner only, to order the posting of officers of Inland Revenue to the business premises of a person or class of persons for the purpose of monitoring---The wording of the provision leaves no room for ambiguity that the discretion has been consciously restricted to the Board or the Chief Commissioner---Therefore, the Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue, does not find mention in the statutory scheme, nor is there any enabling provision authorizing him to issue such orders independently or on behalf of the Chief Commissioner---When the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, then the same is to be done in that manner only---In the present case, although the office orders recited that “approval” had been obtained from the Chief Commissioner and that the Chief Commissioner was “pleased to appoint”, the operative parts in the orders were issued under the signature and seal of the Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue, the act of signing and issuing an order was not a mere ministerial formality, it was the very exercise of statutory discretion---Unless the record demonstrated that the Chief Commissioner himself passed the order and consciously exercised his statutory discretion, an order issued by any other officer lacking jurisdiction was legally unsustainable---Approval or acquiescence, without direct exercise of power by the designated authority, does not cure the defect---Moreover, S.175C of the Ordinance, 2001 does not contemplate or authorize delegation of power to any officer other than the Board or the Chief Commissioner---Legislative intent is explicit in confining the power to said authorities alone, thereby excluding the possibility of delegation and or sub-delegation---Any attempt to vest such power in an Additional Commissioner or an officer subordinate would be contrary to the express mandate of the statute---Consequently, the issuance of such orders by the Respondent (Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue) without any valid delegation under the law, rendered them ultra vires and void ab initio---Thus, High Court set-aside Office Orders extending posting declaring the same to be without lawful authority while the initial posting orders stood spent by efflux of time---Constitutional petition , filed by taxpayer/company , was partly allowed accordingly. Agha Steel Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 2119 ref. Hafiz Muhammad Idris for Petitioner. Hafiz Ahsan Khokhar on behalf of FBR for Respondent. Dr. Khalid Malik, Director FBR. Khaleeq Ullah Khan, Deputy Director Law. Ms. Reema Masud, Commissioner Inland. Date of hearing: 30th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969— —Ss. 32, 80, 81 & 179—Jurisdiction—Recovery of short-levied taxes—Scope— Customs authorities retain jurisdiction, within five-year limitation, to recover sales tax and advance income tax at the import stage, even where discovered after clearance of goods due to wrongly granted exemption. Insertion of “taxes” in S.32 by Finance Act, 2014 and “including recovery” in S.6(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by Finance Act, 2015, coupled with omission of S.11 Sales Tax Act by Finance Act, 2024, show legislative intent to vest post-clearance recovery jurisdiction in Customs. Sections 80 and 81 envisage assessment not concluded at clearance stage; S.179 provides adjudicatory machinery. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990— —S. 6(1)—Collection and recovery at import stage—Extent— Import-stage sales tax is charged, paid, enforced and recovered in the same manner and time as customs duty. With omission of general recovery jurisdiction of Inland Revenue (earlier S.11), S.6(1) now stands as sole operative provision, incorporating Customs Act machinery for collection and recovery of sales tax at import. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001— —S. 148(5) & (6)—Advance income tax at import stage— Sub-sections (5) and (6) synchronize collection of advance income tax with customs duty, borrowing Customs Act provisions “so far as they relate to collection”. Scheme envisages that Customs may recover unpaid advance tax discovered through post-clearance audit. (d) Fiscal statutes—Amendments—Retrospective application— Amendments by Finance Acts 2012, 2014 and 2015 to Customs Act and Sales Tax Act are procedural; they regulate forum and machinery for collection but do not create new liabilities. Being procedural, they apply retrospectively unless expressly excluded. (e) Constitutional law— —Art. 199—High Court jurisdiction— Sindh High Court erred in holding Customs lacked jurisdiction to recover import-stage sales tax and income tax post clearance; impugned judgments set aside. Dissent (Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.) (f) Customs Act, 1969—Sales Tax Act, 1990—Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Jurisdiction— Held, Customs’ jurisdiction limited to import stage only. Post-clearance recovery of sales tax or income tax lies exclusively with Inland Revenue authorities under respective statutes. Amendments inserting “taxes” (Customs Act) or “including recovery” (Sales Tax Act) do not confer adjudicatory powers to Customs absent express conferment. Import-stage jurisdiction ends once goods are cleared under S.80 of Customs Act; subsequent proceedings must be by Inland Revenue. Civil Petitions dismissed. Cited Cases Gulistan Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 393 (Lahore High Court) (distinguished) Banwari Lal v. Mahesh AIR 1918 PC 188 Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 Other jurisprudence on court-fees and jurisdiction referred for analogy. ----Disposition: By majority (Afridi, C.J. and Shakeel Ahmad, J.)—Petitions converted into appeals—Allowed—Sindh High Court judgments/orders set aside—Customs authorities declared competent to recover short-levied sales tax and advance income tax post-clearance. Dissent (Siddiqui, J.)—Leave refused—Customs jurisdiction confined to import stage; post-clearance recovery lies with Inland Revenue.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19(7)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 12(2) & 151---Transactions / proceedings qua advancing / recovery of finance / loan---Fraud, plea of---Banking Officials / Court, function / responsibilities of---Scope and effect---An application under S. 12(2), C.P.C and S.19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 having been filed by the Appellant (lady) in execution proceedings was dismissed by the Banking Court---Appellant had filed said application seeking setting aside of a judgment and decree as well as the order passed in favour of auction purchasers on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud and concealment of real facts---Banking Court did not agree with what was pleaded in the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. on the basis of the findings concluded, after recording evidence, in an application under S. 151, C.P.C. which was earlier filed by the auction purchasers /respondents for implementation of the judgment and decree---Validity---After the application by the auction purchasers under S. 151, C.P.C was filed, the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) officials had come forward and had apprised the Court that the property stood in the name of appellant---Instead of making efforts to find the appellant, the Court simply concluded, when the bailiff reported that no such woman in the name of appellant was residing in the said address since long, that she was a fake person and KDA officials being in collusion with respondent (lady customer) had forged the documents by recording mutation in favour of appellant---Court did not change such view even after appellant filed application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. with her signature supported by her own affidavit---Court did not realize either that conveyance deed in favour of the appellant was prior to mortgage of the property and therefore, when at the time the property was mortgaged by respondent /customer, the same had already changed ownership in favour of the appellant---The apparent negligence of the bank officials in either accepting the loan application without original title documents of the property and without an inquiry from KDA to determine its ownership also lead to a palpable inference of collusion between the bank officials and respondent /customer---Since there was nothing on record that any inquiry was conducted by the bank into original title of the property being mortgaged and to find out its owner from the KDA, it was clear that the bank either acted in haste to benefit respondent / customer or their officials were in active connivance with her to grant her loan without a valid security---Although, appellant was the recorded owner of the property at the time of its mortgage but in the suit she was not made even a party nor any effort was made to procure her attendance---It was only for application under S. 151, C.P.C., filed by auction purchasers that an effort was made to procure her attendance and on a vague report of the bailliff, she (Appellant) was declared a fake person---No effort was made either to resort to substitute service by way of publication in newspaper for procuring her attendance---Regarding the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., the Banking Court simply got influenced by her previous view taken in application under S.151, C.P.C. that she was a fake person, although she had herself appeared and filed application under S. 12 (2), C.P.C. which necessitated a decision on merits rather than on technicalities---Therefore, not making the appellant as a party in the suit; acceptance of the loan by the bank without original documents of the property; no valid explanation for her absence; non-appearance of beneficiary (respondent /customer) before the Banking Court during the suit and execution proceedings despite service, auction of the property and confirmation of the sale in favour of auction purchasers without any objection by respondent / customer were sufficient facts and circumstances for allowing the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. filed by the appellant---High / Appellate Court, while setting aside the impugned order , directed the Banking Court to decide the application filed by appellant attending all relevant issues---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Haseeb Jamali, Muzamil Hussain Jalbani, Muhammad Shahrukh Siddiqui and Kashan Khan for Appellant. Rizwan Ahmed Siddiqui and Barrister Sultan for Respondent No. 1. Fazle Rabbi Sheikh for Respondent No. 6. Khaleeq Ahmed, Muhammad Usman and Muhayamin Aizaz for Respondent No. 7. Date of hearing: 27th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Interlocutory order---Statute barring appeal, review or revision---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---It is for the Court to decide regarding maintainability of such a Constitutional petition, seized of the matter, to appreciate whether the (interlocutory) order is hitting root of the case and if the defect is not rectified, trial may become defective, and upon its conclusion Appellate Court has to remand the case to cure the defect---This would be sheer wastage of public time and may cause delay in outcome of final decision. Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 447 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Court, duty of---Scope---Rudimentary rule for interpretation of a statute is to remain faithful to the intent of lawmaker and adopt an interpretation which supports attainment of statute’s objective. (c) Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act (XI of 2016)--- ----Ss. 20 & 31---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Recovery of arrears of dues of any kind---Limitation---Petitioner was aggrieved of dismissal of his application by Trial Court declining to frame specific issue pertaining to limitation for recovery proceedings---Validity---Bar of limitation does not apply for recovery of arrears of dues of any kind---Framing of issue regarding limitation was against the intention of framers of the statute and would be a futile exercise---Trial Court framed issue regarding maintainability of suit under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. which was wider in sense and would cover all legal permissible objections---High Court declined to interfere in the order of Trial Court, as petitioner failed to pinpoint any illegality, legal infirmity or perversity in the order---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Sui Southern Gas Company Limited through Sub-Attorney v. Irshad Ali Bhutto and another PLD 2024 Sindh 205 and Muhammad Waqas v. Judge Family Court, Lodhran and 4 others 2020 CLC 680 Distinguished. Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines v. Ghulam Hazrat F.A.O. No. 108-P/2019; Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL), Islamabad v. Messrs S.K. Pvt. Limited and others 2025 SCMR 570 and Ahsan Ali Dawach v. The State through Chairman NAB and others 2025 SCMR 1041 ref. Ch. Muhammad Shahid Iqbal for Petitioner. Bashir Ahmad Mirza for Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 3rd September, 2025.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss. 3, 117 & 136(b)(iii)---Punjab Partition of Immovable Property Act, 2012 (IV of 2013), Ss. 2 & 3(c)---Agricultural land or land subservient to agriculture, partition of---Scope---Immovable property, definition of---Revenue authorities, powers of---Scope---Report (submitted by Revenue Officer being duly appointed Local Commission after visiting site in presence of parties) proved that still some portion of land was being used for agriculture---Perusal of S.3 read with S.117 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 (‘the Act 1967’) clearly showed that there was no bar/restriction on the Revenue Officer to partition lands under revenue administration if it was not specifically excluded by a Notification of Board of Revenue, Punjab; now, the old S.3 of the Act, 1967 had been replaced---Moreover, as per S.136(b)(iii) of the Act, 1967, partition of only that land was barred which was occupied as the site of a town or village only if the partition may cause inconvenience to the co-sharers / other persons, or diminish utility of the property to be divided, otherwise, partition of any such land was allowed---Further, S.2 of the Punjab Partition of Immovable Property Act, 2012 (‘the Act 2012’) also allowed the Revenue Authorities to partition agricultural land or land subservient to agriculture---The definition of “immovable property” under S.3(c) of the Act, 2012 also excluded agricultural land or land subservient to agriculture---Revenue Authorities had not been barred from partitioning any land in a Khewat which was used for agriculture or used subservient to agriculture---Further, the legal heirs of respondent filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction in the Civil Court which dismissed the suit being not maintainable holding that the respondents needed to get the land partitioned---Thus, the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) rightly passed the impugned order which did not suffer from any legal defect or lacuna calling for interference---Revision petitions, being merit-less, were dismissed. 2016 YLR 1300 ref. Muhammad Naseem Chaudhary, proxy counsel for Petitioners (in both revision petitions). Yaqoob Ali Chaudhary for Respondents (in both revision petitions).