Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged an order issued by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (General)/Inquiry Magistrate, Islamabad, which allowed the extradition request from UAE authorities. The petitioner was accused of murder and robbery in Dubai in 2003, leading to his conviction in absentia for life imprisonment by a Dubai Criminal Court. UAE authorities requested his extradition in 2012, following extensive investigations and evidence collection. After 14 years of evasion, the petitioner was apprehended in Pakistan, leading to the contested extradition proceedings. -----Issues: 1- Is the extradition of the petitioner lawful under the Extradition Act, 1972, given the nature of the evidence and his conviction in absentia? -----2- Were the documents and evidence presented by UAE authorities admissible and sufficient to establish a prima facie case? -----3- Could the petitioner be prosecuted in Pakistan for the alleged crimes? -----4- Did the extradition process violate the principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was convicted in absentia? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Lawful Extradition: The court upheld the extradition order, finding it consistent with the Extradition Act, 1972. It was determined that extradition was the proper course since the crime occurred entirely within UAE jurisdiction. --Sufficient Evidence: The evidence provided by UAE authorities, including forensic reports, confessions, and official records, was deemed admissible and sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Translations and attestations of documents were verified as authentic by the UAE Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan. --Jurisdictional Limitations: The court rejected the petitioner’s argument for trial in Pakistan under Section 3 of the Pakistan Penal Code, noting that no part of the crime occurred in Pakistan, distinguishing it from other cases like the Imran Farooq murder trial. --Natural Justice: The court acknowledged the petitioner's conviction in absentia but emphasized that extradition would allow him to face trial in Dubai, where he could contest the evidence and seek justice under UAE law. The court noted that evidence recorded in absentia is not final under international legal principles, and the petitioner would have the opportunity to confront the evidence against him. The court dismissed the petition and allowed the extradition process to proceed. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2013 Islamabad 80 (Maqsood Ahmed vs. Additional Deputy Commissioner (General)/Inquiry Magistrate): Established that circumstantial evidence and prima facie material are sufficient for deciding extradition cases. Extradition Act, 1972, Section 9: Evidence submitted by a foreign treaty country is admissible for determining prima facie involvement in the alleged crime. Principle of de novo trial: Evidence recorded in absentia does not have finality, and the accused has the right to a fair trial in the jurisdiction of the requesting state.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, an employee of the National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC), was removed from service for unauthorized absence. He contended that his absence was due to medical reasons, supported by medical certificates submitted to NTC, and argued that proper disciplinary procedures were not followed. The NTC maintained that the petitioner did not follow leave approval procedures and failed to rejoin duty even after his claimed medical leave period ended. The petitioner challenged his dismissal and the rejection of his departmental appeal in this writ petition. -----Issues: 1- Was the petitioner’s removal from service lawful and conducted in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations? -----2- Did the NTC have the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings under the E&D Rules, 1973, as opposed to the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000? -----3- Was the petitioner denied a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, due to the absence of an inquiry? -----4- Were the petitioner’s medical certificates improperly disregarded by the NTC? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Lawfulness of Removal: The court found that the petitioner’s removal from service was lawful. The NTC followed its disciplinary procedures, including issuing multiple notices and publishing a final show-cause notice in newspapers, to which the petitioner failed to respond. The petitioner did not rejoin duty after his claimed medical leave period ended on 27.07.2016, nor did he justify his continued absence. --Applicability of Rules: The court held that after the repeal of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, the NTC adopted the E&D Rules, 1973, through its Management Board. The application of these rules was deemed valid. --Fair Trial and Inquiry: The court determined that holding a regular inquiry was not mandatory under the circumstances, as the petitioner’s absence was undisputed and established through official records. The court held that the lack of an inquiry did not prejudice the petitioner’s case. --Medical Certificates: The court noted that while the petitioner submitted medical certificates, he did not provide sufficient evidence of notifying NTC in a timely manner or securing approval for his leave. The certificates alone did not justify his absence from duty. The writ petition was dismissed, with the court finding no illegality or procedural lapse in the petitioner’s removal from service. The petitioner was held accountable for his prolonged and unauthorized absence, and the disciplinary proceedings were upheld as lawful and appropriate. -----Citations/Precedents: Fundamental Rule 67 (FR 67): Leave cannot be claimed as a matter of right and may be revoked by the competent authority. Article 10-A, Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: The right to a fair trial, though not violated here, as no factual controversy was present requiring a regular inquiry. Regulations 1.34, 1.35, and 5.3 (NTC): Govern the disciplinary actions and procedures for NTC employees.

Summary: The allocation of quota has outclassed the open merit. Allowing quota to employees/ teacher sons of the Universities is arbitrariness and authoritarianism. the Universities are public universities and never belonged to its employees or its administration. the public the educational institutions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa shall follow the law and provide no quotas for admission except for disabled students or under privileged class of students of students from under developed/backward areas of the province or FATA

Summary: upgradation of civil servants does not fall within the contemplation of terms and conditions of their service so, High court has jurisdiction to entertain the same. when there is no intelligible differentia between the one set of employees the others of the same department then they have to be treated alike for the purpose of benefits extended to one set of employees and denied to others.

Summary: The petitioners in this case sought promotions and asserted their seniority rights within the NBP, alleging that they had been denied promotions, while their juniors had been promoted in violation of the NBP's rules and policies. They argued that this denial of promotions infringed upon their fundamental rights under the Constitution.Legal Maintainability:The judgment begins by addressing the question of whether the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) Staff Service Rules 1973 are statutory or not. It asserts that these rules are indeed statutory and govern the terms and conditions of service for NBP employees. This determination is based on the fact that the rules were made by the Central Board under Bye-Law 18(a)(iii) of the National Pakistan Bye-Laws, with prior approval of the Central Government. These rules were never repealed or replaced by the non-statutory NBP Staff Service Rules 1980.Precedent Reference (1):The judgment cites the case of Shafique Ahmed Khan and others vs. NESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad & others (PLD 2016 SC.377), which established the principle that the statutory nature of rules and regulations should be determined by their content and efficacy, not just whether they required government approval. If the rules relate to internal control or management, they are non-statutory; if they deal with matters of crucial importance, they are statutory.Precedent Reference (2):The judgment also refers to the case of Muhammad Zaman and others vs. Government of Pakistan and others (2017 SCMR 571), reinforcing the importance of distinguishing between statutory and non-statutory rules and regulations.Promotion Policies:The judgment outlines the promotion policies and criteria set forth by the NBP for promotions, including seniority, professional qualifications, performance ratings, and educational qualifications. It highlights that promotions are subject to various conditions and are not an absolute right.Discrimination Claims:The petitioners claimed that the promotion policy was discriminatory because it allowed the subjective evaluation of employees' performance by the Board members. However, the judgment finds that the petitioners failed to substantiate these claims with tangible evidence and did not prove any malice on the part of the Respondent Bank.Precedent Reference (3):The judgment cites the case of Muhammad Tariq Baddar and other (supra) to emphasize that promotions in service cases are based on eligibility and fitness, where eligibility relates to service conditions, and fitness is evaluated objectively based on specific criteria.Competent Authority's Discretion:The judgment underscores that the Competent Authority has the right to make rules, determine eligibility criteria, and evaluate employees for promotions. It states that the courts should not interfere in such administrative matters unless the policy is against public interest.Precedent Reference (4):The judgment cites various Supreme Court cases to support the principle that no vested right of a bank employee is involved in promotions, and the courts should not interfere unless there is a violation of public interest.Conclusion:In conclusion, the judgment dismisses all the petitions, stating that promotions depend on eligibility, fitness, and the discretion of the Competent Authority. It reiterates that no one can claim promotion as an absolute right and that the policies of the Respondent Bank should not be struck down unless they are against the public interest.

Summary: Background:The case before the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) involves an application by a Judge of the Islamabad High Court challenging the in-camera proceedings prescribed by Paragraph 13 of the Supreme Judicial Council Procedure of Inquiry 2005. The applicant contends that conducting the proceedings in secret violates fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan, particularly Articles 4, 10-A, 14, and 25.---Issues:Whether conducting the proceedings of the SJC in-camera violates the fundamental rights of the applicant as guaranteed by the Constitution.Whether the nature of the proceedings before the SJC falls within the category of cases where an open trial is the norm.Whether the SJC has the discretion to determine the mode of trial, considering the specific facts and circumstances of the case.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The SJC, chaired by Mr. Justice Mean Saqib Nisar, dismissed the applicant's application requesting open proceedings before the council. The reasoning behind this decision lies in the nature of the proceedings before the SJC, which are administrative in nature rather than concerning civil rights or criminal liabilities. The SJC emphasized that the forum consists of Judges of superior Courts who understand the challenges faced by a fellow Judge, making an open trial unnecessary. ---Citations/Precedents:Zulfikar Ali Bhutto v. The State (PLO 1979 SC 53)Mrs. Shahida Zahir Abbasi v. President of Pakistan (PLO 1996 SC 632)The SJC concluded that while an open trial is generally preferred, exceptions exist where in-camera proceedings are necessary for the proper administration of justice. Therefore, the application for open proceedings was dismissed, and the proceedings before the SJC will continue to be conducted in-camera.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------S. 6(1)(b)---Act of "terrorism"---Determination as to whether an offence would fall within theambit of "terrorism"---Essential ingredients to form an act of "terrorism" were the allegationsmade in the FIR; material collected during investigation and surrounding circumstances---To seeas to whether the ingredients of alleged offence had any nexus with the object of the case ascontemplated under Ss. 6, 7 & 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Motivation, object, design andpurpose behind the said act was to be seen in order to determine as to whether a particular actwas an act of terrorism or not---Action resulted in striking terror or creating fear, panic,sensation, helplessness and sense of insecurity among the people in the particular area wouldamount to terror---Such action would squarely fall within the ambit of S. 6 of the Anti-TerrorismAct, 1997 and would be triable by Anti-Terrorism Court.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 302, 324, 365, 147, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(b), 7(e) &23---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abduction with intent secretly andwrongfully to confine a person, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Application for transfer of case from ordinary criminal court to Anti-Terrorism Court by way ofinserting S. 7, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Scope---FIR showed that due to indiscriminate firingof the accused persons at the house of the complainant-petitioner, resulted in the murder of twopersons, causing injuries to five other persons and abduction of two persons fell within the ambitof S. 6, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Action of the accused resulted in striking terror and sence ofinsecurity amongst the people in the vicinity, which amounted to create terror in the area---Circumstances established that Anti-Terrorism Court had exclusive jurisdiction in the case as theaction of accused squarely fell within the ambit of S. 6, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Constitutional petition was allowed with the direction to the concerned Investigating Officer toinsert S. 7, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in the FIR.Ch. Bashir Ahmad v. Naveed Iqbal and 7 others PLD 2001 SC 521; Mst. RaheelaNasreen v. The State and another 2002 SCMR 908; Muhammad Mushtaq v. Muhammad Ashiqand others PLD 2002 SC 841; Nazeer Ahmed and others v. Nooruddin and another 2012 SCMR 517 and Nooruddin v. Nazeer Ahmed and 4 others 2011 PCr.LJ 1370 rel.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------S. 6(1)(b)---Act of "terrorism"---Determination as to whether an offence would fall within theambit of "terrorism"---Essential ingredients to form an act of "terrorism" were the allegationsmade in the FIR; material collected during investigation and surrounding circumstances---To seeas to whether the ingredients of alleged offence had any nexus with the object of the case ascontemplated under Ss. 6, 7 & 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Motivation, object, design andpurpose behind the said act was to be seen in order to determine as to whether a particular actwas an act of terrorism or not---Action resulted in striking terror or creating fear, panic,sensation, helplessness and sense of insecurity among the people in the particular area wouldamount to terror---Such action would squarely fall within the ambit of S. 6 of the Anti-TerrorismAct, 1997 and would be triable by Anti-Terrorism Court.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 302, 324, 365, 147, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(b), 7(e) &23---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abduction with intent secretly andwrongfully to confine a person, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Application for transfer of case from ordinary criminal court to Anti-Terrorism Court by way ofinserting S. 7, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Scope---FIR showed that due to indiscriminate firingof the accused persons at the house of the complainant-petitioner, resulted in the murder of twopersons, causing injuries to five other persons and abduction of two persons fell within the ambitof S. 6, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Action of the accused resulted in striking terror and sence ofinsecurity amongst the people in the vicinity, which amounted to create terror in the area---Circumstances established that Anti-Terrorism Court had exclusive jurisdiction in the case as theaction of accused squarely fell within the ambit of S. 6, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Constitutional petition was allowed with the direction to the concerned Investigating Officer toinsert S. 7, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in the FIR.Ch. Bashir Ahmad v. Naveed Iqbal and 7 others PLD 2001 SC 521; Mst. RaheelaNasreen v. The State and another 2002 SCMR 908; Muhammad Mushtaq v. Muhammad Ashiqand others PLD 2002 SC 841; Nazeer Ahmed and others v. Nooruddin and another 2012 SCMR 517 and Nooruddin v. Nazeer Ahmed and 4 others 2011 PCr.LJ 1370 rel.