Summary: Petitioner having 15 years service in the respondent/ department and has unblemished service record but still his services are on contract basis while his colleagues have been benefited. Petitioner also deserves to be given job security in light Regulation Act, of 2009

Summary: Although in the order of the trial court it was not specifically mentioned that permission to file fresh suit had been allowed but as the suit had been allowed to be withdrawn in view of the statement of counsel for plaintiff to grant permission to file fresh suit which had not been declined, assumption would be that permission to file fresh suit had been allowed to the plaintiff.

Summary: The primary issue centers on the auction of public property and the subsequent failure of the petitioners to meet the financial obligations outlined in the auction terms and conditions. The fundamental argument revolves around the adherence to these terms and conditions and the legal implications of non-compliance.The petitioners had actively participated in the auction, becoming successful bidders. However, they failed to meet the mandatory financial requirements, specifically the deposit of 25% of the total amount within seven days, and the remaining 75% within 30 days from the acceptance of the auction. As a consequence, the opposing party claims that, according to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 85 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), the amount initially deposited should have been forfeited.A critical aspect of the legal analysis is whether the petitioners' failure to adhere to the specified timeframes constitutes a valid ground for the forfeiture of their deposited amount. The argument asserts that the terms and conditions of the auction were clearly stated and should have been followed.The legal discussion delves into the concept of public trust and the obligations of state functionaries when dealing with public property. It emphasizes that those handling public property must act in the best interests of the public and ensure transparency, equity, and impartiality in all proceedings. The court, in this case, is expected to scrutinize whether the auction was conducted in line with these principles and whether any deviations render the auction proceedings null and void, as per established legal precedents.

Summary: The petitioner wanted their election for these positions declared void due to allegations of concealment of assets and liabilities.Malik Muhammad Nawaz had been elected as an MPA from PP-71, Faisalabad, in the General Election of 2013. The petitioner, who was a voter in the same constituency and had been elected as the Chairman of City Union Council 145, filed this petition based on claims of concealment of assets and liabilities by Malik Muhammad Nawaz. In a connected petition, the petitioner sought a writ of quo warranto against Muhammad Razzaq Malik, alleging that he concealed assets and liabilities in his role as the Mayor of Faisalabad Municipal Corporation and Chairman of City Union Council No.137, Faisalabad.The petitioner argued that at the time of contesting the General Election in 2013, both respondents were associated with various companies as directors, shareholders, or partners. They were alleged to have filed incorrect statements of their assets and liabilities by concealing bank guarantees against loans from different banks, which amounted to a breach of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. The petitioner argued that such concealment in a sworn declaration is not condonable in the eyes of the law and referred to various legal precedents to support their case.In response, the counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioner failed to exhaust the alternate remedies available, such as approaching the Speaker of the Punjab Assembly or the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) under Article 63(2) & (3) of the Constitution before seeking relief from the High Court. They also claimed that the petitioner did not raise objections during the submission of nomination papers. Furthermore, a previous petition filed by the petitioner before the ECP on the same grounds had been dismissed as withdrawn, with permission to file a fresh one. The counsel for the respondents contended that the bank's sanctioned finance facilities were fully secured, and no outstanding liabilities existed. They argued that the allegations were made in bad faith and that there was a series of litigation between the parties. The respondents disclosed their shareholdings in the companies when submitting their nomination papers, and as these companies were separate legal entities, there was no obligation to mention the offices or liabilities of those companies. They emphasized that the disqualification under Articles 62 and 63 required dishonesty, and no such dishonesty was evident in this case. The counsel referred to various legal cases to support their arguments.After hearing the arguments and examining the available record, the Lahore High Court considered whether the provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution could be invoked to disqualify the respondents based on the allegations of concealment of assets and liabilities. The Court noted that there were disputed questions regarding the nature of the concealment, the liability of the respondents, and their intent. The Court emphasized that disqualification under these provisions required an element of dishonesty, and it could not be established solely based on a bona fide error or omission.The Court also pointed out that the petitioner had not disclosed the withdrawal of a similar petition before the ECP, which raised questions about the petitioner's bona fides. Additionally, the Court noted that the cases cited by the petitioner were distinguishable from the present case and did not apply to the specific facts and circumstances at hand. The Court underscored that the allegations did not involve corruption, misappropriation of public funds, or breach of fiduciary duty.In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that the allegations of disqualification under Articles 62 and 63 were not established, and the relief sought by the petitioner could not be granted in writ jurisdiction. The Court also highlighted the importance of granting the benefit of the doubt to the candidate and the need for higher standards of proof to establish dishonesty. The Court referred to legal precedents to support its decision and noted that the allegations of concealment and liability arose after the nomination papers were filed and were subsequently settled, further reducing their impact on the case.The Court also emphasized that the petitioner had other avenues for relief through election laws, which could address non-disclosure issues related to nomination papers. In summary, the Court did not find sufficient grounds to disqualify the respondents based on the allegations presented by the petitioner.

Summary: The core issue at hand revolved around a challenge to the decision made by the learned Appellate Tribunal on June 25, 2018. The tribunal had allowed Election Appeal No. 88-A of 2018, which had been filed by respondent No. 6. This decision was based on the grounds that the petitioner held dual nationality, rendering him ineligible to be chosen as a Member of the Provincial Assembly from a constituency designated as PP-120 (Toba Tek Singh). Consequently, the petitioner's nomination papers were rejected.The case was brought before the court, and initially, it was considered to issue notices to all the respondents. However, during these proceedings, the representatives of the Election Commission, along with their legal counsel, were present in relation to other election matters scheduled before the Bench. The counsel for respondent No. 6, who had been the appellant in the earlier tribunal decision, not only accepted the notice but also agreed to present arguments on the same day. Consequently, the court decided to treat this case as a substantial matter and resolve it accordingly.In the subsequent proceedings, the counsel for respondent No. 6 argued first, emphasizing unaddressed objections that were part of their appeal but had not been considered by the Appellate Tribunal. These objections related to various aspects of the petitioner's nomination papers, such as property, finances, and income tax payments. The counsel supported the Appellate Tribunal's decision regarding dual nationality, asserting that, at the time of filing the nomination papers, the petitioner indeed possessed dual nationality, and there was no certificate from the UK Visas and Immigration Authority to prove otherwise. This argument contended that the Appellate Tribunal's decision was in line with legal precedent set by the Honorable Supreme Court in a case known as "Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and others (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 1089)," and thus, there was no illegality or jurisdictional defect in the challenged judgment. Consequently, the petitioner's case was deemed not maintainable and was sought to be dismissed.On the other side, the counsel for the petitioner responded to the objections raised by the counsel representing respondent No. 6. They maintained that all the information provided by the petitioner on their nomination papers, as required by the law, was accurate, and there were no ambiguities regarding the petitioner's assets and finances. The counsel also asserted that neither the respondents nor any other Pakistani agency had claimed any default in the petitioner's payment of dues that could trigger disqualification. Additionally, they argued that leaving certain columns on the nomination papers blank did not warrant penal consequences. Concerning dual nationality, the counsel presented the original certificate issued by the UK Visas and Immigration authority, which demonstrated the "Renunciation of British Citizenship Status" with the date specified as April 11, 2018. They contended that, after renouncing British citizenship, the petitioner should not be subject to penal action for failing to complete the process with the UK Visas and Immigration Authority, especially since he had already surrendered his British citizenship and passport. Therefore, they argued that no grounds for disqualification existed.After hearing the arguments presented by both parties and reviewing the case record, the court grappled with the question of whether the declaration and statements made by a candidate on their nomination papers were false and incorrect and if any material particulars could be determined without conducting an extensive inquiry. The court concluded that, given the complexities involved, it was not feasible to undertake a detailed investigation in a constitutional jurisdiction. This level of inquiry was beyond the scope of summary proceedings that the Returning Officer or the Appellate Tribunal had initially conducted. As a result, the court determined that, in light of Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution, which emphasized the importance of due process, its jurisdiction did not extend to definitively establish whether qualifications and disqualifications outlined in Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution applied to a candidate. Therefore, the court abstained from making such a determination. The court's decision also took into account that respondent No. 6 or any other party eligible under election laws could pursue the appropriate legal channels at the relevant stage, as permitted by the law.With regard to the issue of dual nationality, which had led to the petitioner's exclusion from the election, the court found that it was not in alignment with the precedent set by the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi. In that judgment, the Supreme Court had established the parameters for holding dual nationality, indicating that when a person renounced their citizenship and produced a certificate to that effect, it served as sufficient evidence of surrendering the contested nationality. The court referenced another instance in which a candidate, Mr. A. Rehman Malik, who had held British nationality and was disqualified on these grounds, was subsequently allowed to contest an election when he presented a certificate of renunciation of his U.K. citizenship during a by-election. Therefore, the court underscored that if a person relinquished their second nationality and provided a certificate of renunciation before filing their nomination papers, it should not result in any disqualification or restrictions on participating in the election.Based on these considerations, the court firmly concluded that the Appellate Tribunal had failed to apply the law as laid down by the Supreme Court correctly. Consequently, the judgment in question was found to be legally unsustainable. Therefore, the court made the decision to set aside the judgment by allowing the writ petition. The Returning Officer was directed to include the petitioner's name in the list of eligible and nominated candidates, in accordance with Section 64 of the Elections Act, 2017.

Summary: the petitioner, who was appointed as the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer (M.D./C.E.O.) of the National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK), challenged the government's interference in NESPAK's affairs. The petitioner argued that the government's involvement violated the company's independence and immunity from such interference.The petitioner referred to a judgment by the country's Apex Court, which highlighted the government's historical interference in NESPAK's management, contrary to the company's legal provisions and Articles of Association.The petitioner alleged that political motivations led to their removal from their position. They cited a case involving political victimization of a public servant to support their claim.The case highlighted inconsistencies in the government's position regarding the maintainability of the petitioner's claim under different constitutional articles. It was argued that NESPAK, as a company solely owned by the federal government, should be considered a "person" under Article 199(5) of the Constitution.Additionally, the case discussed the issue of laches, emphasizing that the petitioner filed the petition within a reasonable time as required by Article 199 of the Constitution.The petitioner questioned the procedural flaws in the issuance of the impugned Office Order and the subsequent ratification by the Board. The Court ruled that a flawed foundation could not be supported by subsequent ratification.The petitioner's claims included political victimization, the regularization of contract employees, and the legitimate expectation of completing their second term as M.D./C.E.O. of NESPAK.The Court concluded that the petitioner's removal from the M.D./C.E.O. position was politically motivated and unlawful. It held that the government's interference, the procedural flaws, and the absence of a valid legal foundation for the decision justified judicial intervention.As a result, the Court accepted the petition, set aside the impugned Office Order, and declared it illegal and without lawful authority. No costs were imposed in the case.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 87 & 88---Issuance of process---Proclaimed offender, declaration of---Procedure---Accused asaggrieved of order passed by Trial Court declaring him proclaimed offender---Plea raised by accused wasthat he was not served process---Validity---Trial court was bound to repeat warrants of arrest for someother date but needful was not done and only an attempt to serve notices upon accused was not enough---Important ingredients of Ss. 87 & 88 Cr.P.C. were not fulfilled by Trial Court for serving warrants---Warrants of accused were not affixed on some conspicuous place, i.e., house or home where accusedresided---Trial Court did not receive any report from concerned law enforcement agency to knowwhether warrants were served upon accused or not---Such procedure was contrary to provisions of S.87Cr.P.C. in circumstances.(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-------S.31-A---Abscondance to avoid service of warrants---Prerequisites---Prosecution is required to provefirstly, that accused is absconder; secondly, that court or any Authority or Officer has issued processunder National Accountability Ordinance, 1999; thirdly, that accused has absconded with intention toavoid service of such process; and fourthly, manner in which he evaded or avoided service on himself orconcealed himself with intention to screen out from proceedings or punishment under NationalAccountability Ordinance, 1999.(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-------Ss. 31-A & 32---Appeal---Limitation---Conviction in absentia--- Accused was convicted underS.31-A of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 in his absence when he was declared proclaimedoffender---Plea raised by authorities was that appeal was time barred---Validity---No opportunity wasafforded to accused even otherwise, no evidence was called for by Trial Court and he was convicted onlyon basis of unserved process which was in sheer violation of S.31-A of National AccountabilityOrdinance, 1999---Judgment convicting accused was passed in absentia and he had no knowledge ofpassing of conviction against him therefore, limitation would run from date of gaining knowledge byaccused---Moment the accused was arrested and he came to know about his conviction in absentia, hechallenged his conviction---High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court asprosecution had failed to prove that accused deliberately or intentionally evaded or avoided to appearbefore Trial Court to face trial---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.Iqbal Ahmed Turabi v. State PLD 2004 SC 830 rel.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending