Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XX, R.5, O.XIV, Rr.1, 2 & O.XLI, R.31---Suit for cancellation of lease and possession---Recording evidence of the parties after framing of issues---Dismissal of suit while deciding issue of maintainability without touching any other issues---Scope---Plaintiff filed suit for cancellation of lease and possession wherein issues were framed and evidence was recorded---Trial Court dismissed the suit while giving findings on issue of maintainability while treating it preliminary issue without deciding issues of facts which was upheld by the Appellate Court---Validity---Purpose of conferring power on the Court to first decide the case or any part thereof only on the issue of law was to save the time of Courts and litigants---Court for deciding a case on the issue of law should form a conscious opinion in the light of pleadings of the parties and give notice to the parties that in its opinion the case mighty be disposed of on the issues of law and it should try those issues first---Trial Court, in the present case, had neither consciously framed issue of law nor expressed its intent to dispose of the case on the issue of law---Even settlement of issues of facts had not been postponed and evidence of both the parties had been recorded---Once Court had consumed time in recording evidence then efforts were to be made to decide the case both on law points as well as on merit---Trial Court after completing trial should have passed judgment on all the issues, in circumstances---Courts below had failed to appreciate the pleadings of the parties in correct perspective---Plaintiff had prayed for recovery of possession of suit property on the basis of registered title document and his suit was simple suit for recovery of possession under S.8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877---Plaintiff had not sought any declaration as to his entitlement to any legal character---Even defendant had not raised any legal objection with regard to bar to the present suit in terms of S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877---Dispute between the parties was with regard to entitlement to possession specific suit plot on the basis of title documents---Question of title of the plaintiff and/or defendant could have automatically been determined had the Court decided the issues of facts with regard to entitlement of possession of suit land---Provisions of Ss.42 & 8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 were not complementing each other and were independent provisions of law and dealt with different kinds of grievances---Any person who had been deprived of his immovable property by any unscrupulous person could sue the said illegal occupant and recover its possession without seeking a declaration of his entitlement to his legal character---Findings recorded by the Courts below treating issue of maintainability as preliminary and dismissing the suit were not sustainable, in circumstances---Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were set aside---Matter was remanded to the Trial Court for decision afresh while giving findings on each and every issue---Revision was allowed, in circumstances. Syed Iftikar-ud-Din Haider Gardezi and 9 others v. Central Bank of India Ltd., Lahore 1996 SCMR 669; Sh. Abdul Kabeer v. Mian Abdul Wahid and others 1968 SCMR 464; Sultan Mehmood Shah through L.Rs. v. Muhammad Din and 2 others 2005 SCMR 1872; Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 and Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board, Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 distinguished. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique Anwar v. Faisalabad Development Authority and others 2007 SCMR 1126 and Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 rel.(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss.42 & 8---Provisions of Ss.42 & 8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 were independent provisions of law and dealt with different kinds of grievances---Principles.

Summary: (a) Landlord-Tenant Relationship: ---Termination of lease agreement—Grounds for eviction—Personal use by landlords—Concurrent findings of courts below upheld. ---Respondents filed a rent petition seeking eviction of the petitioner after the lease agreement expired. The petitioner contested the claim, alleging forgery in the lease agreement and asserting improvements made on the property. The courts held that the respondents, as owners, had the right to repossess the property for personal use. Eviction was ordered, and concurrent findings were affirmed by the Supreme Appellate Court. (b) Evidence Law: ---Burden of proof—Authenticity of lease agreement—Marginal witness testimony deemed credible. ---The petitioner alleged that the lease agreement was forged, but failed to produce evidence or witnesses to substantiate the claim. Respondents produced a marginal witness who validated the agreement, leading the courts to accept its authenticity. (c) Constitutional Law: ---Article 23 of the Constitution—Right to property—Reasonable use by owners—Landlords’ fundamental rights protected. ---The Court emphasized that the respondents, as lawful owners, could not be deprived of their right to use the property as suited to their needs. Restricting their right to personal use of the property would violate fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 23 of the Constitution. (d) Procedural Law: ---Concurrent findings of fact—Scope of appellate review—No misreading or non-reading of evidence found. ---The Supreme Appellate Court held that the Rent Controller, First Appellate Court, and Chief Court carefully evaluated evidence and recorded concurrent findings of fact. No illegality or procedural defect warranted interference in the decisions of the lower courts.

Summary: Petitioner was allotted land under 10 years lease scheme in 1968. Petitioner, relying on Notification No. 3215-79/3973-CII dated 03.09.1979, applied for proprietary rights; he was declared eligible to purchase proprietary rights of the land. Petitioner deposited nine installments towards the sale price and only one (last) installment was outstanding. Petitioner and other similar allottees applied to the authorities to receive the last installment and execute the sale deeds in their favour, but their applications were rejected. Other allotteees approached the High Court through constitutional petition and were allowed to deposit the last installment. Petitioner, being similarly placed, applied for similar relief, but the same was disallowed by authorities. Authorities/officials were required to have a uniform policy and implement the same for and against all the persons equally which had not been done in the present case and refusal of same relief to the petitioner was discriminatory. High Court, on the principle of consistency, directed that the petitioner being one of the equally placed persons, was entitled to the same relief of transfer of proprietary rights.

Summary: ----Facts:Dispute over land in Deh Okewari, District Karachi East, measuring 32 acres and 30 ghuntas.Land originally owned by Karachi Panjrapore Association, declared "evacuee" after partition.Appellants purchased leasehold rights from Haris, claiming rig

Summary: -----1. Eviction Due to Expiry of Lease Agreement: (Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 (IRRO), Sections 6, 17(2)(ii)(b)) A tenant is liable to be evicted if they continue to occupy rented premises beyond the lease period without the landlord's written consent. Expiry of a lease agreement constitutes a violation of the tenancy terms, enabling eviction under Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of the IRRO. -----2. Landlord's Personal Bona Fide Need: (IRRO, Section 17(5)) A landlord's bona fide claim for personal use of rented premises is sufficient for eviction unless evidence proves malafide intentions. The landlord has the discretion to choose which property to use, and the tenant cannot challenge this choice. -----3. Written Lease vs. Oral Tenancy: In the absence of a valid written lease agreement, oral tenancy or mutual arrangements do not override the statutory provisions of the IRRO. A landlord's acceptance of rent after lease expiry does not legitimize the tenant's occupation beyond the agreed term. -----4. Service of Notice: (Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, Section 17) Filing an eviction petition constitutes sufficient notice to a tenant under the law. Tenants cannot claim procedural unfairness if they had knowledge of the eviction grounds and participated in proceedings. -----5. Concurrent Findings of Rent Tribunal and Appellate Court: Courts will not interfere with concurrent findings unless there is gross illegality, misinterpretation of law, or a lack of evidence to support the decisions. -----6. Key Precedents Cited: Muhammad Mushtaq v. Muhammad Zubair (Supreme Court, 2017) A tenant continuing to occupy premises post-lease expiry is in breach of tenancy conditions and liable for eviction. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs v. Naveed Merchant (2012 SCMR 1498) The landlord's choice of property for personal use is unquestionable unless shown to be mala fide. Major (Retd.) Muhammad Yousaf v. Mehraj-ud-Din (1986 SCMR 751) Filing an eviction petition serves as a valid notice for tenancy termination. -----7. Disposition: Writ Petition Dismissed: The concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and Appellate Court allowing the eviction petition were upheld.

Summary: The background of the case involves a government scheme called "Grow More Food," introduced in 1956, which leased state land to self-cultivators and small landholders. The appellants and their deceased father were allotted three lots of land under this scheme. However, the leases were canceled and the lands were resumed in 1959, but the cancellation order was later set aside in appeal and the proprietary rights were granted to the appellants by the Board of Revenue. During the cancellation period, the leased property was included in the Schedule of Islamabad Oustees and subsequently allotted to Respondent Nos. 4-7. Respondent No. 1 also purchased the land and challenged the order of review in favor of the appellants. The Lahore High Court allowed Respondent No. 1's writ petition, leading to the present appeals. The Supreme Court examined the facts and legal aspects of the case. It found that the cancellation order by the Board of Revenue in 1999 was illegal and void ab initio. The impugned judgment of the High Court, setting aside the review order, was deemed a nullity in the eyes of the law. The rights of the appellants were previously confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, and the collusive acts by the respondents should not interfere with those rights. The Supreme Court answered the questions raised in the leave granting order as follows: The petitioners were indeed the allottees of the land and entitled to its proprietary rights. The land was not available for further allotment to Islamabad Oustees. Respondent No. 1 cannot be considered a bona fide purchaser in the given circumstances. In light of the above, Civil Appeal No. 1009/2010 was allowed, and Civil Appeal No. 933-L/2013 was dismissed.

Summary: The background of the case involves a government scheme called "Grow More Food," introduced in 1956, which leased state land to self-cultivators and small landholders. The appellants and their deceased father were allotted three lots of land under this scheme. However, the leases were canceled and the lands were resumed in 1959, but the cancellation order was later set aside in appeal and the proprietary rights were granted to the appellants by the Board of Revenue. During the cancellation period, the leased property was included in the Schedule of Islamabad Oustees and subsequently allotted to Respondent Nos. 4-7. Respondent No. 1 also purchased the land and challenged the order of review in favor of the appellants. The Lahore High Court allowed Respondent No. 1's writ petition, leading to the present appeals. The Supreme Court examined the facts and legal aspects of the case. It found that the cancellation order by the Board of Revenue in 1999 was illegal and void ab initio. The impugned judgment of the High Court, setting aside the review order, was deemed a nullity in the eyes of the law. The rights of the appellants were previously confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, and the collusive acts by the respondents should not interfere with those rights. The Supreme Court answered the questions raised in the leave granting order as follows: The petitioners were indeed the allottees of the land and entitled to its proprietary rights. The land was not available for further allotment to Islamabad Oustees. Respondent No. 1 cannot be considered a bona fide purchaser in the given circumstances. In light of the above, Civil Appeal No. 1009/2010 was allowed, and Civil Appeal No. 933-L/2013 was dismissed.

Summary: The background of the case involves a government scheme called "Grow More Food," introduced in 1956, which leased state land to self-cultivators and small landholders. The appellants and their deceased father were allotted three lots of land under this scheme. However, the leases were canceled and the lands were resumed in 1959, but the cancellation order was later set aside in appeal and the proprietary rights were granted to the appellants by the Board of Revenue. During the cancellation period, the leased property was included in the Schedule of Islamabad Oustees and subsequently allotted to Respondent Nos. 4-7. Respondent No. 1 also purchased the land and challenged the order of review in favor of the appellants. The Lahore High Court allowed Respondent No. 1's writ petition, leading to the present appeals. The Supreme Court examined the facts and legal aspects of the case. It found that the cancellation order by the Board of Revenue in 1999 was illegal and void ab initio. The impugned judgment of the High Court, setting aside the review order, was deemed a nullity in the eyes of the law. The rights of the appellants were previously confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, and the collusive acts by the respondents should not interfere with those rights. The Supreme Court answered the questions raised in the leave granting order as follows: The petitioners were indeed the allottees of the land and entitled to its proprietary rights. The land was not available for further allotment to Islamabad Oustees. Respondent No. 1 cannot be considered a bona fide purchaser in the given circumstances. In light of the above, Civil Appeal No. 1009/2010 was allowed, and Civil Appeal No. 933-L/2013 was dismissed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----Writ Jurisdiction---Fraudulent claim---Lease rights---Misrepresentation of facts---Scope of discretionary relief. The respondent claimed ownership of land measuring 325 kanal 4 marla and 200 kanal through notifications issued in 1980 and 1981, and later alleged lease rights over an additional 200 kanal. The government contended that the earlier notifications approving the sale were canceled, and the respondent was only granted a 99-year lease over 200 kanal through a registered lease deed dated 15.10.1981. Held, writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to protect fraudulent claims or ill-gotten gains. Fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings, and a party approaching the court with unclean hands is not entitled to discretionary relief. The respondent misrepresented facts by claiming ownership of land beyond the scope of the lease agreement and fraudulently executed a sale-deed for 126 kanal 1 marla in violation of lease terms. (b) Land Lease Agreement---Transfer of leased property---Validity of third-party sale under lease terms. Under the terms of the 99-year lease agreement, the respondent was restricted from transferring or selling the leased land to any third party. The execution of a sale-deed for 126 kanal 1 marla by the respondent violated these terms and was declared null and void, fraudulent, and legally inoperative. Any revenue records supporting such transactions were deemed forged, and officials involved in preparing these records were held liable for legal action. (c) Principle of Fraud---Effect on judicial proceedings. Fraudulent actions and misrepresentation of facts by the respondent undermined the validity of judicial proceedings. It was reiterated that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings. The respondent's reliance on prior High Court judgments was misplaced, as the issue of sale-deed validity was neither adjudicated nor conclusively determined in those cases. (d) Criminal Liability---Investigation under Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001. The fraudulent execution of the sale-deed and tampering of revenue records by the respondent, in connivance with revenue officials, amounted to corruption and corrupt practices under Section 10 read with Schedule II of the AJ&K Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001. Directions were issued to the Chairman of the Ehtesab Bureau to register a criminal case and initiate an investigation against the responsible parties. ----Cited Cases: Lal Din & another v. Muhammad Ibrahim [1993 SCMR 710] Rehmatullah & others v. Saleem Khan & others [2007 SCJ 655] Talib Hussain & others v. Member Board of Revenue & others [2003 SCMR 549] Ch. Muhammad Younas Arvi v. Sohail Bostan & others [2004 SCR 352] M/s. Ideal Engineering v. Azad Govt. & others [2017 SCR 1100] ----Disposition: Appeal partly accepted. The respondent was declared entitled only to the 200 kanal land under the terms of the registered lease agreement dated 15.10.1981. Claims over the remaining land were declared fraudulent and illegal. Criminal proceedings were ordered against the respondent and complicit revenue officials.

Summary: CMA filed by defendant No.1 under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. for rejection of the plaintSections 42 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act , the Easement Act, 1882 and Transfer of Property Act are discussed.Plain is rejected. --- Summary:This case revolves around a dispute between the plaintiff, H. Nizam Din & Sons (Pvt.) Limited, and defendants No. 1 & 2, Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority (DHA) and DA Marina Club Karachi. The plaintiff, a catering and event management company, had a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with defendants No. 1 & 2, allowing them to organize events at a specific premises, referred to as "Area III" at D.A. Marina Club. The plaintiff sought various reliefs, including the declaration that the MoU constituted a lease and that they could not be evicted without due process.Facts:The plaintiff is a catering and event management company with a good reputation.Defendants No. 1 & 2 entered into an MoU with the plaintiff, allowing them to organize events at "Area III" of D.A. Marina Club for a period of three years, starting from 01.05.2013 to 30.04.2016.The plaintiff made substantial investments in the premises, including the installation of permanent fixtures and an office.In May 2016, the plaintiff proposed an increase in rent, but on 8.8.2016, defendants No. 1 & 2 threatened eviction.The plaintiff filed a suit to prevent forceful eviction and sought various reliefs.Issues:Whether the MoU between the parties constituted a lease or a license.Whether the plaintiff had the right to seek relief against eviction. --- Court's Decision:The court analyzed the terms of the MoU and concluded that it constituted a license rather than a lease. The plaintiff did not have exclusive possession of the premises, and the agreement did not confer the rights of a lessee upon them. Therefore, the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable, and it was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court held that the plaintiff's rights were more akin to those of a licensee, and their remedy, if any, was to seek damages for breach of contract, not an injunction to prevent eviction.Key Legal Principles:Distinction between a lease and a license.A license is a personal privilege with no interest in the land.Exclusive possession is a crucial factor in determining a lease.Relief against eviction may not be available to a licensee.The court relied on various clauses of the MoU to determine the nature of the agreement.