Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged the acquisition of his land in Attock District by the government for defense purposes, specifically for a Drop Zone and training area for a military brigade. The petitioner argued that his land was unjustly included in the acquisition while land owned by a retired Major General was excluded, thereby discriminating against him. The petitioner sought to have his land excluded from acquisition, claiming that it was his only source of livelihood and expressing concerns over receiving inadequate compensation. Earlier petitions by the petitioner had been dismissed, prompting this constitutional petition. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner was discriminated against under Article 25 of the Constitution because the land of another individual (Major General) was excluded from acquisition while the petitioner's land was included. 2- Whether the petitioner’s concerns about inadequate compensation for his land could be addressed through this constitutional petition. Whether the petitioner should challenge the acquisition and compensation through an alternative legal forum. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that: The petitioner failed to establish a case of discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the retired Major General had not been made a party to the petition and that most of his land fell outside the proposed Drop Zone, except for a portion that was acquired. The petitioner did not argue that his land was not within the proposed Drop Zone, and the acquisition was for legitimate defense purposes. The Court held that the petitioner’s apprehension regarding inadequate compensation could not be addressed through the constitutional petition. Instead, the appropriate recourse for the petitioner was to file a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to challenge the award. The Court reaffirmed that disputed questions of fact, such as whether land fell within the Drop Zone, could not be decided in summary proceedings of a constitutional petition and should be handled by the appropriate authorities. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. -----Citations/Precedents: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Article 25 Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 18

Summary: Background:Respondent No. 2, an industrial gas consumer, complained to the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) about excessive gas billing by Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd. (SNGPL) and alleged maladministration by its officials.The Ombudsman's initial findings rejected the complaint, but in a subsequent review, revised findings recommended SNGPL to reconsider the matter and take disciplinary action against delinquent officers.SNGPL challenged these recommendations before the Lahore High Court, arguing that matters related to detection bills and meter tampering fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002.The High Court agreed with SNGPL's argument and held that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over such matters. The Writ Petition was decided in favor of SNGPL on 13.12.2016.---Issues:Whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat has the locus standi to challenge the High Court's order.Whether the Ombudsman can be considered an aggrieved person in this matter.Whether a neutral quasi-judicial adjudicatory forum, like the Ombudsman, can become a party to proceedings challenging its jurisdiction or powers.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat lacks locus standi to maintain the petition as it is not a legal entity and does not enjoy the power to sue or be sued.Even if the petition were filed by the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman cannot be considered aggrieved when the powers vested in him under the law are interpreted or modified by the Parliament or the courts.The Ombudsman, as a neutral quasi-judicial forum, cannot become a party to proceedings challenging its jurisdiction or powers, as it is meant to redress maladministration and maintain neutrality.The petition is dismissed as frivolous litigation, and costs of Rs. 100,000 are imposed under Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The Ombudsman is directed to hold an inquiry into the filing of the petition and submit a report to the Court.Failure to comply with the directions may result in further action by the Court.---Citations/Precedents: Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.---Quote:Ombudsman cannot challenge the curtailment of powers vested in him by law or as interpreted by the constitutional courts. Difference between rights and powers enjoyed by the Ombudsman.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Petitioner seeks direction to respondents to reconsider the petitioner for promotion in BS -20 with all consequential benefits and also seeks direction for transfer of inquiry proceedings (CSB promotion superceded)

Summary: The petitioner, an advocate, relies on previous judgments that highlighted the significance of public interest litigation in combating illegalities, injustice, and social ills. The main argument presented is that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, educational institutions and book depots were closed, preventing the petitioners from adequately preparing for the exams. Moreover, the petitioner argued that the ongoing pandemic poses a risk to the lives of candidates, and conducting exams violates standard operating procedures (SOPs) issued by the National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC). The court, after hearing arguments from both sides, acknowledged the importance of protecting the lives of citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic. It noted the global spread of the virus and the steps taken by the government to address the situation, including the establishment of the National Command & Operations Center (NCOC). The court observed that while the government continued its functions during the pandemic, strict observance of SOPs was emphasized. It highlighted the obligation of citizens to adhere to SOPs under the Doctrine of Sovereignty and cites previous judgments supporting the importance of citizens obeying the Constitution, laws, and policies. The court ultimately decided to dispose of the writ petition, directing the PPSC to conduct the exams as per the schedule while strictly following the restrictions outlined in the SOPs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 154---Information in cognizable cases---Scope---Section 154, Cr.P.C., casts a statutoryduty upon the Officer-in-Charge of Police Station to enter information regarding commissionof any cognizable offence---If the information is given orally to an Officer-in-Charge of thePolice Station he shall reduce it into writing and read it over to the informant and every suchinformation shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be enteredin a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the Provincial Government mayprescribe--- Section 154, Cr.P.C. is mandatory and leaves no scope for exercise of anydiscretion by the police officer concerned in recording the First Information Report or inrefusing to record the same.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 157 & 154---Information in cognizable cases---Procedure where cognizable offencesuspected---Scope---Section 157, Cr.P.C. comes into play when the matter has been initiatedunder S. 154, Cr.P.C.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 157, 156 & 154---Information in cognizable cases---Investigation into cognizablecases---Procedure where cognizable cases suspected---Scope---Procedure to be adopted bythe police officer where he suspects commission of any cognizable offence is provided in S.157, Cr.P.C.---Section 157, Cr.P.C., has to be read along with the provisions of S. 156,Cr.P.C.---Section 157, Cr.P.C., is subject to two provisos: first proviso authorizes theOfficer-in-Charge to proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make investigationon the spot when the information as to commission of any offence is given against anyperson by name and the case is not of serious nature; second proviso authorizes him not toinvestigate the case if there is no sufficient ground for entering into an investigation.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 157, 156 & 154---Information in cognizable cases---Investigation into cognizablecases---Procedure where cognizable cases suspected---Scope---Provisions of S. 157, Cr.P.C.indicate that the powers exercisable by the officer-in-charge of a police station cannot beresorted to unless report made to him in respect of commission of a cognizable offence isreduced into writing and be read over to the informant duly entered in a book to be kept bysuch officer as described within the meaning of S. 154, Cr.P.C.---Mere incorporatingcontents or substance of the report in the roznamcha of police station made to the officer-incharge of the police station by the informant in respect of commission of a cognizableoffence would not be a compliance of the mandate of the law as envisaged by S. 154,Cr.P.C., therefore, before resorting to any of the provisions of S. 157, Cr.P.C., the Officer-inCharge of the Police Station is duty bound to register the report as provided by S. 154,Cr.P.C. and thereafter, proceed under S. 156, Cr.P.C. or under any of the provisions of S.157, Cr.P.C. as the facts and circumstances of the case may admit or warrant.Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt and others PLD 2007 SC539; Abida Parveen v. Deputy Superintendent of Police and others 2012 PCr.LJ 1861 andMst. Shehnaz v. Station House Officer Sariab Police Station, Quetta and 2 others 2003 YLR1941 ref.(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A---Inherent powers of High Court---Quashing of FIR---Eventualities mentioned.FIR can be quashed only in the following eventualities:i) If from the reading of the FIR it does not make out any cognizable offence.ii) If FIR has been registered without lawful authority and jurisdiction; andiii) If any civil liability is given the shape of criminal liability.(f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction and inherentpowers of High Court---Scope---Quashing of FIR---Scope---High Court does not interfere inthe case when it is at investigation stage, either by exercising constitutional jurisdiction or itsinherent powers under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Idea behind the principle is that the police shouldbe allowed to perform its duty in its own sphere to reach at a definite conclusion with regardto complicity or innocence of the accused---Investigating Officer and incharge of the policestation have been invested with powers under Ss. 169 & 173, Cr.P.C. to submit their reportwith their opinion, if evidence in the case is found deficient or there are no reasonablegrounds to justify the forwarding of accused for trial---Accused, on submission of reportunder S. 173, Cr.P.C., for trial, may seek his acquittal under S. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., atany stage from the Trial Court---If the proceedings are pending before any court and itappears that there is abuse of process of court, only then it can make an order for quashing ofproceedings---Quashing of FIR is ordered only in exceptional cases when the same isregistered without lawful authority.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Bail---Amount of surety bond---Scope---Respondent, in FIR under S.489-F, P.P.C., was grantedbail after arrest, subject to furnishing surety equivalent to the amount of dishonoured cheque---Respondent filed application for reduction of the surety amount, which was allowed and hewas directed to furnish cash surety of reduced amount---Respondent, after his release, did notdeposit the remaining surety amount---Revisional court, through impugned order, set asidethe Trial Court's order for depositing the remaining surety amount---Held; purpose of releaseof accused on surety was to ensure his attendance on each and every date of hearing beforethe Trial Court till conclusion of trial---Object of calling upon the accused for furnishingsurety was not to penalize him but to ensure his presence in Court, therefore, the amount ofsurety was required to be fixed with regard to nature of offence so that the very object ofgranting of bail was not defeated---No illegality or irregularity was committed by therevisional court, in circumstances---Constitutional petition was dismissed.Laiq Ahmed v. The State 2011 YLR 75 rel.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 498-F---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Bail---Amount of surety bond---Scope---Fixation of amount of surety equivalent to theamount of dishonoured cheques cannot be applied as a matter of rule in all the cases.Laiq Ahmed v. The State 2011 YLR 75 rel.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Bail---Amount of surety bond---Scope---Amount of surety cannot be used topenalize the applicant or deprive him from the concession of bail.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending