Summary: [Customs Act, 1969 (336) (SRO 506(I)/88), Customs Act, 1969 (336) (SRO 403(I)/96), Customs Act, 1969 (336) (SRO 507(I)/88), Customs Act, 1969 (336) (SRO 577(I)/2006), Customs Act, 1969 (336) (SRO 53(I)/70), Customs Act, 1969 (336) (SRO 878(I)/85), Customs Act, 1969 (336) (SRO 447(I)/2004)] Exemption is a privilege being enjoyed by diplomats and otherdignitaries. If we trace history of last 50 years (though there wereearlier SROs also), we come across initial SRO 53(I)/70 issued in exerciseof powers available under Section 19 of Customs Act for all articles ofhousehold and personal effects including motor vehicles for the personaluse by the ruler of any of the Gulf Sheikhdoms including vehiclesimported by the UAE dignitaries which includes use and donations towelfare projects in Pakistan with conditions, such as articles will not besold without prior consent of Central Board of Revenue, as it then was.It was persons specified SRO as it contained list of all such dignitarieswith a table attached.Vehicle was imported in 2002 when SRO 506(I)/88 was active. Itrestricted the sale without prior permission of Federal Government,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be routed through a formal application. Inother event, no such vehicle could have been sold within two years of itsimportation to anyone other than Department of Investment Promotionor diplomatic representatives or mission of foreign government, exceptwhen the diplomatic representative by whom it was imported istransferred within two years of its importation and it has been used byhim for not less than one year. So nothing beneficial could be achievedby respondent through said SRO

Summary: Appendix "H" ofImport Policy Order 2016 provides list of Pre-shipment InspectionCompanies which includes M/s SGS whose certificate was provided bythe respondent at the time of import. The Committee, allegedlyconstituted for compliance of Import Policy Order 2016, howeverconsidered the manufacturing year of the vehicle as 2006 on the basis ofseatbelt, which perhaps is extraneous consideration; there is no seriouschallenge to the pre-shipment report of M/s SGS which is one of the preshipment inspection companies, as structured in Appendix "H" of ImportPolicy Order 2016. There has to be material of evidentiary value to forma different view than the one disclosed in M/s SGS certificate.

Summary: The first petition was voluntarily withdrawn during a hearing before a Judge-in-Chamber at the Lahore High Court. Subsequently, the Lahore High Court dismissed the second petition.The petitioner's legal representative contended that the withdrawal of the first petition should not hinder a re-examination, as it was not based on the merits of the case. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this assertion, citing established legal precedent. The Court clarified that a new bail petition, following the rejection of a prior one, is permissible only if it introduces new grounds that have surfaced after the dismissal of the previous petition. The Court emphasized that a previously available ground, once abandoned, cannot be reintroduced as a fresh argument.The Court further elucidated that the withdrawal of a bail petition often occurs when the likelihood of dismissal is high, and revisiting the matter after withdrawal is generally deemed unnecessary. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the Lahore High Court's decision to dismiss the second bail petition, asserting that the act of withdrawing the first petition effectively amounted to a relinquishment of the presented grounds. The petitioner's request for leave was turned down.

Summary: The Supreme Court found that the respondent had been explicitly mentioned in the FIR for causing firearm injury and sharing a common intention with co-accused to commit the crime. The Court determined that the Lahore High Court had not adequately considered the seriousness of the offense and the potential for the respondent to pose a threat. Therefore, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, nullified the impugned order, and revoked the respondent's bail.

Summary: (a) Bolan University of Medical and Health Sciences Act (VII of 2017)-------S. 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 105---Vires of S.15, Bolan University of Medicaland Health Sciences Act, 2017---Vice-Chancellor---Appointment by Governor/ Chancellorwithout advice by Government/ Cabinet/Chief Minister---Scope---Chancellors of universitieshad to be bound in the same manner as the Governor of a province would act and was boundunder clause (1) of Art. 105 of the Constitution---Section 15(1) of the Bolan University ofMedical and Health Sciences Act, 2017, was inserted in complete disregard of the spirit of18th Amendment and in violation of Art. 105 of the Constitution---Contention that theGovernor while working under a statute was not bound to act on the advice of the ProvincialGovernment was devoid of force and had no legs to stand---Any attempt to expound oradvance any distinction between the Governors' constitutional powers/functions and hispowers or functions under any statute would run contrary to the law---Governor was boundto act on the advice of Chief Minister in appointment of Vice-Chancellor of governmentuniversities---Constitutional petition was allowed and Cls. (1) & (2) of S.15 of the Act, 2017,were struck down from the statute being violative of Art. 105 of the Constitution.Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Sindh HighCourt Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 879 and Aamir Raza Ashfaqv. Minhaj Ahmed Khan 2012 SCMR 6 rel.(b) Constitution of Pakistan-------Fourth Schedule, Part II, Entry No. 12---Standards in institutions for higher education andresearch, scientific and technical institutions---Before the 18th Amendment, education as asubject was placed at Entry 38, under Part I of the Concurrent List, which was moved to theFederal Legislative List, Part II, as Entry 12---Joint jurisdiction of both the Provinces and theFederation had been established over the subject---Education was recognized as a right butnot a justiciable one, however, the 18th Amendment Act made the said right justiciable, i.e. itcould be enforced through Courts---Eighteenth Amendment ensured autonomy for thefederating units and it was after the passage of the same that the subject of education fellunder the exclusive domain of the provinces---Federal Legislature could not enact legislationin the provinces except in the matter pertaining to higher education, research and scientificand technical institutions.----Arts. 48 & 105---Advice of Prime Minister and Chief Minister---Strict construction---Scope---Except otherwise so provided under the Constitution, the President and Governor arebound by the advice tendered by the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister respectively andin the manner prescribed in the Constitution---Governor has no other powers except thosewhich are expressly conferred upon him by the Constitution.

Summary: (a) Bolan University of Medical and Health Sciences Act (VII of 2017)-------S. 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 105---Vires of S.15, Bolan University of Medicaland Health Sciences Act, 2017---Vice-Chancellor---Appointment by Governor/ Chancellorwithout advice by Government/ Cabinet/Chief Minister---Scope---Chancellors of universitieshad to be bound in the same manner as the Governor of a province would act and was boundunder clause (1) of Art. 105 of the Constitution---Section 15(1) of the Bolan University ofMedical and Health Sciences Act, 2017, was inserted in complete disregard of the spirit of18th Amendment and in violation of Art. 105 of the Constitution---Contention that theGovernor while working under a statute was not bound to act on the advice of the ProvincialGovernment was devoid of force and had no legs to stand---Any attempt to expound oradvance any distinction between the Governors' constitutional powers/functions and hispowers or functions under any statute would run contrary to the law---Governor was boundto act on the advice of Chief Minister in appointment of Vice-Chancellor of governmentuniversities---Constitutional petition was allowed and Cls. (1) & (2) of S.15 of the Act, 2017,were struck down from the statute being violative of Art. 105 of the Constitution.Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473; Sindh HighCourt Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 879 and Aamir Raza Ashfaqv. Minhaj Ahmed Khan 2012 SCMR 6 rel.(b) Constitution of Pakistan-------Fourth Schedule, Part II, Entry No. 12---Standards in institutions for higher education andresearch, scientific and technical institutions---Before the 18th Amendment, education as asubject was placed at Entry 38, under Part I of the Concurrent List, which was moved to theFederal Legislative List, Part II, as Entry 12---Joint jurisdiction of both the Provinces and theFederation had been established over the subject---Education was recognized as a right butnot a justiciable one, however, the 18th Amendment Act made the said right justiciable, i.e. itcould be enforced through Courts---Eighteenth Amendment ensured autonomy for thefederating units and it was after the passage of the same that the subject of education fellunder the exclusive domain of the provinces---Federal Legislature could not enact legislationin the provinces except in the matter pertaining to higher education, research and scientificand technical institutions.(c) Constitution of Pakistan-------Arts. 48 & 105---Advice of Prime Minister and Chief Minister---Strict construction---Scope---Except otherwise so provided under the Constitution, the President and Governor arebound by the advice tendered by the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister respectively andin the manner prescribed in the Constitution---Governor has no other powers except thosewhich are expressly conferred upon him by the Constitution.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Background: The appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, by the Model Criminal Trial Court-II/IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. The conviction was related to a robbery that resulted in the murder of three individuals during a heist at a Mobilink Franchise shop. The appellant was accused of being involved in the robbery and the subsequent murders. The appellant appealed against the conviction, challenging the validity of the trial court’s judgment. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court erred in applying Section 17(4) of the Hudood Ordinance, which mandates the death penalty, and instead sentencing the appellant to life imprisonment. 2- Whether the trial court properly followed the mandatory legal provisions, particularly regarding the imposition of a lesser sentence without providing the necessary reasons as required under Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). 3- Whether the trial court’s failure to adhere to the legal requirements in sentencing renders the judgment defective and necessitates a re-trial. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Federal Shariat Court identified significant legal flaws in the trial court's judgment, leading to the decision to set aside the conviction and remand the case for re-trial: --Misapplication of Section 17(4) of the Hudood Ordinance: The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 17(4), which only provides the death penalty as Hadd for an adult guilty of Haraabah involving murder. However, the trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment as Ta’zir, without providing the mandatory justification for not imposing the death penalty. The Federal Shariat Court emphasized that this misapplication of the law was a critical error, as Section 17(4) does not allow for any sentence other than death. --Failure to Provide Justification for Lesser Sentence: The trial court did not comply with Section 367(5) Cr.P.C., which requires the court to state reasons for imposing a lesser sentence than death when the law provides for the death penalty. The failure to provide these reasons renders the judgment legally defective. The Federal Shariat Court highlighted that sentencing is a serious judicial responsibility that requires careful consideration of the law and the circumstances of the case. --Remand for Re-Trial: Due to these significant legal errors, the Federal Shariat Court set aside the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for re-trial. The trial court was directed to re-write the judgment by properly applying the mandatory legal provisions, including providing reasons for the sentence imposed. The re-trial was ordered to be completed within three months, ensuring that the appellant's right to a fair trial, as mandated by Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, was upheld. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Ismail v. State (2017 SCMR 713) Muhammad Aslam & others v. The State & another (PLD 2009 SC 777) Abdul Salam v. The State (2000 SCMR 338) The appeal was accepted, and the case was remanded to the trial court for re-trial due to substantial legal and procedural errors in the original judgment.

Summary: Summary pending