Summary: Regular First Appeal, against judgment / decree

Summary: Background: The petitioners, holding positions as Superintendents (BPS-17) in the Anti-Terrorism Court and Custom and Banking Court of Gilgit-Baltistan, filed a writ petition seeking redesignation and upgradation of their posts to Staff Officer (BPS-18). They argued that similar posts in the District Judiciary of Gilgit-Baltistan were upgraded from BPS-17 to BPS-18, creating disparity despite identical qualifications and job duties. They requested equal treatment in alignment with Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Gilgit-Baltistan Governance Order, 2018. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners, employed as Superintendents in special courts, are entitled to redesignation and upgradation to BPS-18 similar to their counterparts in the District Judiciary. -----2- Whether the current differentiation violates the principle of equal treatment under Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Chief Court found that the petitioners perform similar duties to those in the District Judiciary, who were already upgraded to BPS-18. Since no reasonable classification justifying the differential treatment was presented, the court ruled that denying the petitioners’ upgradation constitutes discrimination. Referring to a prior judgment on upgradation in a similar case, the court held that the principle of equal treatment applies. The writ petition was accepted, and the court directed the respondents to issue notifications for upgradation within three months, ensuring compliance with equal treatment standards. -----Citations/Precedents: Article 25, Constitution of Pakistan – Ensures equality before the law and prohibits discrimination. Gilgit-Baltistan Governance Order, 2018 – Includes provisions for equal treatment under the law. Divisional Bench Judgment in W.P. No. 301 of 2019 – Established the precedent for upgradation based on similar duties and qualifications, supporting equal treatment for posts across different courts.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) ----Ss. 44-A & 13----Execution of foreign decree----Maintainability----Reciprocating territories----Principles of enforcement----Interpretation. Appellant sought enforcement under Section 44-A, C.P.C., of a final order and decree passed by the Central Family Court, United Kingdom, directing respondent No.1 to pay Pounds Sterling 577,665 and costs of Pounds Sterling 78,098, along with confirmation of a freezing order on respondent No.1’s properties. The District Court dismissed the application, reasoning that the appellant had previously sought execution of an interim freezing order from a different court. Held, Section 44-A, C.P.C., permits execution of decrees from superior courts in reciprocating territories as if passed by a Pakistani court. A freezing order is interim in nature and not a "decree" under Explanation 3 of Section 44-A, C.P.C. The appellant's application was for enforcement of a monetary decree distinct from the earlier proceedings, and such dismissal was unwarranted. Disposition: Impugned judgment set aside; matter remanded to the District Judge for further proceedings. (b) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) ----Ss. 13(a)-(f) & 44-A(3)----Foreign judgment----Grounds for refusal of execution----Applicability of exceptions. Under Section 13, C.P.C., foreign judgments are conclusive unless they fall within specified exceptions, including lack of jurisdiction, fraud, or violation of natural justice. Respondent No.1 is entitled to raise objections to the foreign decree's enforcement in post-remand proceedings on any of the six grounds under Section 13, C.P.C. Courts in Pakistan will not reevaluate the correctness of conclusions reached by foreign courts but only consider exceptions under Section 13. Disposition: Respondent No.1 may resist enforcement of the foreign decree under Section 13, C.P.C. (c) Interpretation of procedural law----Jurisdiction of courts under S. 44-A, C.P.C. Section 44-A, C.P.C., does not impose a requirement for the executing court to have jurisdiction to entertain the original suit. The provision enables direct execution of foreign decrees in Pakistan, treating them as if passed by domestic courts. The scheme of Section 44-A is distinct from Section 39, C.P.C., governing domestic execution and does not require compliance with territorial jurisdiction prerequisites applicable under domestic execution rules. Cited Case: Syed Jaffer Abbas v. Habib Bank Ltd. PLD 2014 Sindh 209. Disposition: Appellant's execution application was rightly filed in Islamabad for enforcement of respondent No.1’s Islamabad-based properties. (d) Family law----Execution of foreign decrees----Enforcement of financial orders in family disputes. Appellant obtained a decree for financial relief in matrimonial proceedings before the Central Family Court, United Kingdom, which was sought to be enforced in Pakistan under Section 44-A, C.P.C. Courts must enforce foreign monetary decrees unless shown to contravene exceptions under Section 13, C.P.C. Observations regarding differences in family laws between the United Kingdom and Pakistan do not bar execution proceedings but are subject to objections by the judgment debtor in the appropriate forum. Disposition: Appeal allowed; execution proceedings remanded for further action.

Summary: Petitioner is aggrived that PPRA has issued revised TOR's for contractors involved in distribution bids, impugns the TOR's and seeks restoration of its profile as elegible contractor

Summary: Both the star witnesses of the prosecution are Relative of the Deceased.

Summary: Appointment of Bishop.

Summary: The petitioner has failed to point out that the respondent No.3 was not qualified to hold the office of Provincial Police Officer or that there was no consensus between Federal and Provincial Governments for his appointment resulting into procedural defect going to the root of matter and causing prejudice to rights of the Provincial Government for said appointment. It is within the domain of appointing authority to determine who to appoint while making such appointment and this Court cannot take upon its function of appointing authority in order to judge the suitability of a candidate for such appointment. Writ petition in the form of quo-warranto is an extra-ordinary discretionary jurisdiction and this Court is not bound to exercise such jurisdiction in each and every case. Reliance in this respect may be placed on "Asif Hassan and others Vs. Sabir Hussain and others" (2019 SCMR 1720). Hence, this Court is not inclined to hold that the appointment of the petitioner was not in accordance with law.

Summary: ocular account is in line with medical evidence as well as other corroboratory evidence

Summary: Pending

Summary: Pending