Summary: Section of Law: Article 199 of the Constitution.(a) A suit brought on the basis of an unregistered deed should not be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC if contents of the plaint discloses a cause of action & the suit is not otherwise barred by any law.

Summary: Deputationist recalled by the province in the exigencies of service have no right of any kind to object.

Summary: Mere assertion that lawyer had not been authorized to withdraw appeal is not sufficient to recall the withdrawal order through application under Section 12(2) of CPC as for that purpose the Applicant in addition to above was also required to establish the grounds provided under Section 12(2) CPC, that said order was a result of fraud, misrepresentation or Court lacked the jurisdiction to pass the same.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed a constitutional petition seeking enhancement of maintenance allowance, which was partly decreed by the Family Court in Sheikhupura on September 15, 2015. The petitioner No. 1 married the respondent on March 24, 2011, and they had one child, petitioner No. 2. Following differences, the petitioner filed a suit for past and future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 30,000 per head per month. The Family Court decreed the suit partly, granting petitioner No. 1 maintenance only for the period of "Iddat" at Rs. 15,000, and for petitioner No. 2 at Rs. 5,000 per month with a 10% annual increase. Dissatisfied with this, the petitioners filed the instant writ petition seeking enhancement of the decreed maintenance. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner (mother) can be deprived of maintenance allowance despite having a suckling baby with her. 2- Whether the maintenance allowance of the minor can be waived by the mother or any blood relative. 3- Whether the maintenance allowance fixed by the Family Court reflects the respondent's financial status and the growing needs of the minor. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that the mother of a suckling baby cannot be deprived of maintenance allowance, emphasizing that the father is responsible for maintaining his child, especially during the period of breastfeeding, which is considered up to 2.5 years under Islamic law. Thus, the mother is entitled to maintenance for this period. The Court ruled that the right to maintenance for the minor cannot be waived by the mother or any blood relative, as it is a right granted by Shariah. The Court noted that the Family Court had not fully considered the respondent's financial capacity and the increased costs of raising the child. The judgment was modified to entitle the mother to maintenance for the period of breastfeeding and acknowledged that the Family Court could reassess and enhance the maintenance allowance as necessary. The Court partly accepted the petition, modifying the Family Court’s judgment and decree to include past maintenance allowance for the mother at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per month from July 24, 2013, to July 13, 2014, with a 10% annual increase. The maintenance allowance for the period of "Iddat" and for the minor as decreed by the Family Court was upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: Lt. Col. Nasir Malik vs Additional District Judge Lahore (2016 SCMR 1821): "Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction relating to maintenance allowance and the matters connected therewith. Once a decree by the Family Court in a suit for maintenance (for minors) was granted, thereafter, if the granted rate for monthly allowance was insufficient and inadequate, in that case, the institution of a fresh suit was not necessary rather the Family Court may entertain any such application (under S.151, C.P.C) and if necessary make alteration in the rate of maintenance allowance."

Summary: Pending

Summary: Pending

Summary: Pending

Summary: Leave---During the proceedings, it was revealed that the show cause notice, which was central to the case, was re-initiated based on an order dated May 23, 2011. This show cause notice was issued under sections 66A and 66 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, pertaining to the assessment year 97-98. The case revolved around two key questions:Whether the Tribunal's decision, stating that the order under section 66-A of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was time-barred, was justified under the given circumstances.Whether the Tribunal's decision, based on the case law cited as 2008 PTD 1316, to rule against the department was justified under the given circumstances.In examining the matter, it was noted that the Income Tax Department (now the Federal Board of Revenue) had relied on section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance. This section specified that a notice could only be issued within four years from the date of an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. In this case, the Deputy Commissioner's order was dated March 16, 1998.However, the show cause notice in question was issued on May 23, 2011, which was more than thirteen years after the Deputy Commissioner's order, rendering it time-barred according to section 66-A. A notice dated June 12, 2013, was also mentioned, but it was similarly issued beyond the stipulated four-year period. Consequently, the court found that the initiation of action under section 66-A was not permissible after four years.In light of these observations, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. The petitioner was also directed to pay costs amounting to twenty thousand rupees. The court also emphasized that the Income Tax Department, now the Federal Board of Revenue, should act fairly in dealing with taxpayers, adhere to applicable laws, and not needlessly waste the time and resources of taxpayers and the legal system.

Summary: [Offence punishable under section 322, PPC does not fall within the probibitory clause of section 497(1) Cr.P.] (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 497(1) & (5)---- Grant of bail in non-prohibitory offenses—Absence of exceptional circumstances—Judicial discretion. Petitioner, a member of the Eagle Squad (law enforcement agency), was accused of firing at a vehicle during routine duty, resulting in injuries to the complainant and the death of his cousin—Allegations were framed under Ss. 302, 324, and 34, PPC—Supreme Court held that the facts of the case did not support a charge of Qatl-e-Amd (intentional murder) under S. 302, PPC—Court determined that the offense prima facie fell under S. 322, PPC (Qatl-bis-Sabab), which does not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), CrPC—Since S. 319, PPC (Qatl-i-Khata) is bailable, the petitioner was entitled to bail as a matter of right unless exceptional circumstances were present—Following precedents in Tariq Bashir v. State (PLD 1995 SC 34), Muhammad Tanveer v. State (PLD 2017 SC 733), and Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar (2009 SCMR 1488), Court reaffirmed that in non-prohibitory offenses, bail is the rule and refusal is an exception—No exceptional circumstances, such as risk of absconding, tampering with evidence, or repeating the offense, were found to justify denial of bail—Bail granted. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302, 322, 319, 324, 34---- Nature of offense—Qatl-bis-Sabab distinguished from Qatl-i-Amd—Legal implications for bail. Supreme Court examined the intent behind the petitioner’s act and found no enmity, provocation, or deliberate intent to kill—Petitioner, along with other Eagle Squad members, had attempted to stop the complainant’s vehicle, which did not comply—Firing at the vehicle resulted in injuries and an unintended fatality, leading to the classification of the offense as Qatl-bis-Sabab (S. 322, PPC) rather than Qatl-i-Amd (S. 302, PPC)—Since S. 322, PPC is outside the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), CrPC, the petitioner was entitled to bail—Court reiterated that in such cases, intent and circumstances must be carefully evaluated before imposing the higher charge of intentional murder. (c) Judicial Review & Discretion---- ----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 189---- Binding effect of Supreme Court precedents—Duty of High Courts to exercise discretion judiciously. Supreme Court found that the Balochistan High Court failed to exercise judicial discretion properly—Court observed that denial of bail in non-prohibitory offenses without applying the rule-exception test constitutes an error of law—It reiterated that Supreme Court rulings on bail are binding under Art. 189 of the Constitution—Failure to apply the correct legal standard in bail matters leads to arbitrary detention and misuse of judicial discretion—High Court’s order was set aside for failing to justify bail refusal based on any legal exception. (d) Bail Conditions & Expedited Trial---- ----S. 497(5), CrPC---- Bail granted—Right of prosecution to seek cancellation in case of misuse. Petitioner was granted post-arrest bail subject to furnishing a bail bond of Rs. 100,000/- with one surety—Court directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously—Clarified that if the petitioner misuses the bail concession or causes delay in the trial, the prosecution may move for cancellation of bail under S. 497(5), CrPC—Observations in the bail order were tentative and would not influence the trial’s final outcome. Disposition: Appeal allowed—High Court order set aside—Post-arrest bail granted. Petitioner admitted to bail upon furnishing surety of Rs. 100,000/-. Trial court directed to expedite proceedings—Prosecution allowed to seek bail cancellation in case of misuse. Supreme Court reaffirmed that bail in non-prohibitory offenses must not be denied arbitrarily unless exceptional circumstances exist.

Summary: The suit for recovery on the basis of pronote under Order XXXVII of the CPC was rightly decreed by the Trial Court on the basis of evidence on record.