Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Appeal filed before the Supreme Court---Appeal time- barred by 22 days---Condonation of delay, application for---Wrongadvise/confusion of counsel not sufficient cause for condonation of delay---In the application seeking condonation of delay it was stated that initially the legal advice received was that a leave petition ought to be filed before the Supreme Court---In the said application in another paragrapgh it was stated that thereafter the legal advice was that an appeal lay as of right---It was this confusion or conflict in legal advice that led to the delay in the filing of the appeal---Wrong legal advice such as appeared to be involved in the present case did not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of law---Since it was the appellant's own position that an appeal lay as of right with the present appeal being barred by time, the delay could not be condoned---Application seeking condonation of delay was dismissed, with the result that the appeal also stood dismissed. Khushi Muhammad through LRs and others v Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 distinguished. (b) Precedent--- ----Any case, whether of the Supreme Court or of a High Court, that establishes binding precedent turns on facts proved or admitted. Sh. Zameer Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Sanaullah Zahid, Addl. A.G. Punjab for Respondents Nos. 1-3. Date of hearing: 15th November, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss.42 & 8---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 11, 115, O. VII, R. 11 & O. XI, Rr. 2, 3---Rejection of plaint owing to decision in the earlier suit on the basis of compromise---Res judicata, principle of---Scope---Application for rejection of plaint on the basis of res judicata filed by the petitioners along with their written statement in the latter suit for declaration, possession and partition instituted by the respondents was accepted by the Trial Court, however, the appellate court reversed the finding of Trial Court for the reason that the decision in the earlier suit was not conclusive having been taken on a compromise and not on merits---Validity---Principle of res judicata is based on the consideration that the same cause should not be tried for the second time between the same parties and there must be an end to the litigation between the parties---Mere observation on a question of fact without proper adjudication in absence of evidence, would not operate as res judicata--- Besides, other grounds, the condition of a final decision on the merits of a dispute between the parties is of paramount importance---When litigation ended on the basis of a statement of parties, without conclusive determination of the disputed question of fact on merits between the parties, the same could at best be termed a decision on the basis of a compromise/settlement and under such circumstances the principle of res judicata would not attract to subsequent litigation---Doctrine of res judicata could only be applied when the previous lis/application or proceeding had directly or substantially decided the controversy between the parties on merits after recording their evidence---Except one of the respondents, none of the parties in the case remained parties in the earlier lis, thus, provision of O. XI, Rr. 2 & 3, C.P.C. was not attracted to that proceedings---High Court refused to exercise its revisional jurisdiction being narrow and limited in its scope and dismissed the civil revision, in circumstances. Muhammad Saleem v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala PLD 2005 SC 511 and Mubeen Rafeeq v. Rashid Ahmad PLD 2022 Sindh 449 rel. Iftikhar Jan for Petitioner. Rehmanullah for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th April, 2022.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----S. 19---Ejectment of tenant---Striking off defence---Petitioner/ landlord was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court setting aside eviction order passed against respondent/tenant to vacate rented premises---Validity---Oral testimonies and documentary evidence produced by petitioner/landlord remained unchallenged, as right of respondent/tenant to cross-examine petitioner's/landlord's witnesses was struck off and that order attained finality, having remained unchallenged by respondent/tenant---In absence of any rebuttal or cross-examination, evidence led by petitioner/landlord stood uncontro-verted---Material on record conclusively established that petitioner/ landlord was lawful owner of the property---Rent proceedings , by their very nature, are summary in character and are intended to ensure swift and efficient resolution of landlord-tenant disputes, particularly in cases of default, so as to safeguard landlord's Constitutionally protected right to property---Petitioner/landlord remained embroiled in litigation for over seven years merely to recover possession of his property---Course of delay ran counter to the foundational objectives of rent legislation and summary adjudication---Such undue delays not only eroded Constitutional rights of property owners but had also given rise to broader economic and social justice concerns---For landlords, prolonged litigation entails financial strain, loss of rental income, and an inability to utilize their property for productive purposes, which can hinder economic growth---Conversely, tenants facing eviction proceedings often live in uncertainty, which can affect their social and economic stability---A just legal system must, therefore, ensure an equitable balance between rights of landlords and tenants, a balance that is fundamentally disrupted when cases are permitted to stagnate in judicial pipeline---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court and restored that of Lower Appellate Court, which had rightly upheld the claim of petitioner/landlord---Supreme Court directed respondent/tenant to vacate property in question within two months---Appeal was allowed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10A---Right to fair trial and due process of law---Artificial Intelligence (AI), use of---Principle---Right to a fair trial before a competent, independent, and impartial judge is a fundamental principle of due process---AI must not overshadow the core guarantee of judicial autonomy--- While AI has potential to improve consistency and efficiency in legal processes, it also carries risk of introducing biases and limiting judicial discretion---Fairness and transparency must apply equally to AI-assisted rulings---Though AI may enhance efficiency and consistency, it cannot replicate normative judgment, ethical reflection, or contextual sensitivity essential to the act of judging---Dignity of judicial role lies not in mechanical generation of outcomes but in deliberative process of reasoning, listening, and responding a task that remains inherently and irreducibly human---Judicial reasoning involves not only logic but also humanity and it requires attentiveness, moral courage, and the ability to question unjust laws or outdated precedents- --By contrast, AI operates within the constraints of existing data and lacks creative imagination and jurisprudential foresight necessary to develop new legal doctrines or safeguard emergent rights---Comparative jurisdictions have cautiously explored AI-assisted adjudication. 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(c) Administration of justice--- ----Alternate Dispute Resolution---Mediation---Artificial Intelligence (AI), use of---Principle---AI lacks ability to feel emotional tenor, to de-escalate tension between parties, or to recognize the power of silence in a negotiation---AI also cannot build trust across the table through empathy, qualities essential to successful mediation---This is where human mediators continue to hold the advantage---AI may be able to streamline many facets of legal practice, it cannot replicate deeply human process of mediation, where the emphasis is on understanding, negotiating, and resolving conflicts through human interaction---Mediation is emerging as the future power player in dispute resolution. Muhammad Shahzar Ilahi, 'Most Lawyers I Know Will be Irrelevant in 10 Years' < medium= member_ios&rcm = ACoAABMfGrMBX_wunGlxSCmC6vWI765cPtD D2rI> accessed 9 April 2025; Sir Robert Buckland, 'AI, Judges and Judgment: Setting the Scene' M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 220, Harvard Kennedy School (November, 2023) and PhD Researcher in AI and Law, University of Buckingham (U.K.) rel. Moeen Ahmed, Advocate High Court with special permission for Petitioner (through V.L. Lahore Registry). Khalid Jamil, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (through V.L. Lahore Registry). Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025.

Summary: ----Registered gift deed, challenge to---Inheritance claims---Limitation, applicability of---Subsequent third-party transfers on the basis of gift deed---Gift deed not challenged in lifetime---Effect---Inheritance claims must overcome limitation unless exceptional circumstances---Exceptional circumstances where limitation did not apply in inheritance cases stated---The pivotal question under consideration in the instant matter was as to "whether, in the realm of inheritance claims, the bar of limitation retained its binding force and whether a legal heir could successfully challenge a decades-old registered gift and subsequent third-party transfers on the basis of inheritance, without first overcoming the statutory bar of limitation, particularly where the predecessor-in-interest, during their lifetime, neither contested the transaction nor asserted any legal right thereto"---Petitioner along with respondent No. 16, filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against a registered gift deed dated 03.09.1981, executed by his maternal grandfather (the original owner) in favor of his uncles (respondents Nos. 7-10) regarding some ancestral land---After the gift deed, respondents 7-10 sold the property to third parties (respondents 1-6) via registered sale deeds in 1984, and relevant mutations were sanctioned accordingly---During proceedings of the suit the contesting defendants filed application under section O. VII, R. 11 of C.P.C. which was disposed of by the Trial Court by completely ignoring the third party rights and questions of waiver, acquiesce and limitation---Being aggrieved of the Trial Court order the contesting respondents preferred civil revision petition under S. 115, C.P.C. which was allowed vide the impugned decree and consequently the plaint was rejected being barred by limitation---Held: It was not in all cases of inheritance that the question of limitation became irrelevant---In various claims of inheritance brought by female legal heirs against their brothers/male heirs, the question of limitation could not be ignored in every such case and such question of limitation was dependent upon facts and circumstance of each case---The impugned gift deed was challenged by the petitioner/plaintiff on 24.11.2015, after 34 years of the impugned gift deed and 06 years after the death of Mst. "SB" (real sister of respondents Nos. 7-10)--- T he present petitioner/ plaintiff had not inherited anything qua his claim on the basis of his relationship with his deceased mother Mst. "SB" as she did not leave behind any inheritance with respect to the suit property---Not only was the impugned gift deed not challenged within her lifetime, the subsequent transactions of sales to third parties, evidenced by registered instruments were not challenged either---If a predecessor did not challenge a transaction in his/her lifetime, which transaction purported to deprive the predecessor of his/her share and third party rights had been created, simple claim on the basis of inheritance would not absolve the question of limitation---The lack of challenge by the donor within the lifetime was fatal and the bar of limitation would accordingly apply---The question of limitation could not be dubbed irrelevant in every claim of inheritance---Only in the cases of exceptional facts, the question of limitation had not been treated as a statutory bar against the claims of inheritance---Those exceptional cases may be summed up in the following terms: i. Cases filed by female heirs, within their lifetime, claiming fraud and misrepresentation played against them qua the immoveable property left behind by their predecessor in interest; ii. Cases where it is pleaded and proved that the deprived female heir(s) were being paid some proportionate share from the income/lease of the immoveable property in question; iii. Cases where a co-sharer has successfully pleaded and proved that the rival heir or co-sharer was in deemed possession of immoveable property on behalf of all other heirs/siblings; iv. Cases where no third-party rights have been created in the immoveable property, which is/was subject matter of undisputed inheritance; v. Cases where the elements of acquiescence and waiver are absent on the part of the claimant legal heir or his/her predecessor in interest---The question of limitation could neither be ignored in every claim based on purported rights of inheritance nor it was permissible for the litigants to lay a statute barred challenge by couching the relief in the form of an inheritance claim---However, under the few exceptions, where a female was deprived of her share in the immoveable property of her predecessor, limitation would not be a question against her claim of inheritance where the female had successfully pleaded all the ingredients of fraud being played upon her while sanctioning the inheritance mutation by excluding her from inheritance---The limitation would not be an obstacle in the case of inheritance as where the fact of claimant lady being deprived from the inherited property by way of impugned mutation was concealed from her, however,she pleaded and proved that she was being paid her share of income from the property and once the same was denied, she brought the suit within her lifetime---A claim of inheritance must cross the bridge of limitation, waiver and acquiescence---An unchecked tendency of encouraging a relief in the guise of inheritance was not warranted under the law, particularly when the property in issue changed hands and the slumber of a purported claimant of inheritance crystalized valuable rights in favour of third parties---The encouragement of such claims and long drawn trials in statute barred suits was counter productive for genuine and bona fide claims of female heirs---In the instant case, predecessor in interest of the petitioner/plaintiff (Mst. "SB") never voiced any grievance against the impugned mutation; even on her demise in 2009, her legal heirs kept a mum for almost six years despite being resident of same village, and suddenly woke up from slumber and filed the suit in November 2015, which was not permissible under the law---There was no substance in the petition which was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299; Mushtaq Ul Aarifin and others v. Mumtaz Muhamamd and others 2022 SCMR 55; Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others PLD 2014 SC 167; Lal Khan through Legal Heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through Legal Heirs PLD 2011 SC 657; Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others 2007 SCMR 1446; Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1; Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLD 2022 SC 353; Syed Kausar Ali Shah and others v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah and others 2022 SCMR 1558; Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others 2002 SCMR 1330; Taj Muhammad Khan through L.Rs. and another v. Mst. Munawar Jan and 2 others 2009 SCMR 598; Saadat Khan and others v. Shahid-Ur-Rehman and others PLD 2023 SC 362; Shabla and others v. Ms. Jahan Afroz Khilat and others 2020 SCMR 352; Mohammad Boota (Deceased) through L.Rs., and others v. Mst. Fatima daughter of Gohar Ali and others 2023 SCMR 1901 and Noor Din (Deceased) through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VII, R. 11---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.3---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.100---Gift---Inheritance---Rejection of plaint---Plaint barred by law---Recording of evidence---Scope---Plaint that is clearly barred by limitation on its face must be rejected summarily---Duty of courts to act suo motu on limitation---Frivolous and fictitious claims to be nipped in the bud at the outset---Limitation runs even against void order---Presumption of authenticity attached to 34 year old gift deed---When the plaint is barred by any law on the face of it, recording of evidence would be a futile exercise and would amount to encouraging the abuse---Where on the plain reading of the plaint, it can be clearly seen that the suit is patently barred by limitation, no evidence is required---To plead that a plaint cannot be rejected because of the suit being barred by limitation/law, without recording evidence, is to plead against the mandate of law as contained in O. VII, R. 11 C.P.C., which essentially requires the court to reject the plaint which appears from its contents to be barred by limitation---Aggrieved person has to pursue his legal remedies with diligence and if a suit is beyond limitation, the delay of each and every day consumed for approaching the court beyond the period of limitation has to be explained---In the instant case the plaint on the face of it failed to explain the delay of a period of 34 years---The contents of the plaint failed to set up a case in a manner which rendered the question of limitation as a mixed question of law and fact---Mere reading of the contents of the plaint made it abundantly clear that it was statute barred and was liable to be dismissed in terms of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C without employing valuable judicial resources and time of the Trial Court---By specifically incorporating the provision in terms of O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C, the legislature has empowered the court with an independent suo motu and sua sponte power to examine the plaint by using its wisdom---The courts always nip a frivolous suit in the bud, by rejecting such frivolous, fictitious and untenable claims in order to retain courts' docket and time for more serious claims---Non-actionable plaint or suit is a non-starter and in the interest of administration of justice and good judicial governance, it is best if such plaints are dismissed at the earliest---Keeping in view the mandatory provision of S. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is duty of every court and forum itself to look into the question of limitation irrespective of the fact whether any objection in this regard has been raised or not---Limitation runs even against a void order and a void order too has to be challenged within limitation---In the instant case, there was no justification at the outset merely by considering the averments of the plaint to overlook the delay of 34 years---When Mst. "SB" did not challenge the impugned gift deed in her life time despite third party transfers through registered deeds, petitioner/plaintiff had no right to claim inheritance of Mst. "SB"---Under Art. 100 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 a presumption was attached to the impugned gift deed which was 34 years old document at the time of its challenge before the Trial Court---In the instant case, predecessor in interest of the petitioner/plaintiff (Mst. "SB") never voiced any grievance against the Impugned mutation; even on her demise in 2009, her legal heirs kept a mum for almost six years despite being resident of same village, and suddenly woke up from slumber and filed the suit in November 2015, which was not permissible under the law---There was no substance in the petition which was dismissed, in circumstances. Agha Syed Mushtaque Ali Shah v. Mst. Bibi Gul Jan and others 2016 SCMR 910; Fatima Moeen v. Additional District Judge, Sheikhupura 1992 SCMR 1199; Mst. Gul Nisa v. Muhammad Arif 1996 SCMR 1239; Haji Abdul Sattar v. Farooq Inayat 2013 SCMR 1493; Irshad Ali v. Sajjad Ali PLD 1995 SC 629; Muhammad Afzal v. Muhammad Hayat 1994 SCMR 12; Haji Abdul Karim and others v. Messers Florida Builders Pvt. Ltd . PLD 2012 SC 247; Saqib Ali v. Government of Punjab and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 310; Shahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department, Peshawar and others 2022 SCMR 1810; Lal Khan through Legal Heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through Legal Heirs PLD 2011 SC 657; Qaisar Mushtaq Ahmad v. Controller of Examination and others PLD 2011 SC 174; Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad and others PLD 1985 SC 153; Ahsan Ali and others v. District Judge and others PLD 1969 SC 167; Syed Iftikhar Hussain v. Ijaz Ahmad Cheema and another 1996 SCMR 943; Dilmir v. Ghulam Muhammad and 2 others PLD 2002 SC 403; Haji Ghulam Rasul and others v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Auqaf Department, Lah. and others 2003 SCMR 1815; Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore 2006 SCMR 783; Muhammad Sami v. Additional District Judge, Sargodha and 2 others 2007 SCMR 621; Government of N.W.F.P. and others v. Akbar Shah and others 2010 SCMR 1408; Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212; Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company GEPCO; Gujranwala v. Khalid Mehmood and others 2023 PLC 65; Kiramat Khan v. IG. Frontier Corps and others 2023 SCMR 866; Abid Hussain v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan through Chief of Air Staff, Islamabad 2021 SCMR 645; Muhammad Sharif and others v. MCB Bank Limited and others 2021 SCMR 1158; Haji Wajid v. Provincial Government through Secretary Board of Revenue Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others 2020 SCMR 2046; Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs Preventive, Karachi 2015 PTD 107 = 2014 SCMR 1594; Ch. Shujaat Hussain and others v. Zafar Ahmed Qureshi and others 2014 SCMR 585; Messrs Blue Star Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax and others 2013 SCMR 587; Evacuee Trust Property Board and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 262; Rehmatullah and others v. Saleh Khan and others 2007 SCMR 729; Government of Sindh through Advocate-General, Sindh, Karachi v. Masood Hussain and others 2002 SCMR 155; Ali Muhammad through Legal Heirs and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others 2001 SCMR 1822; S.Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another 1978 SCMR 367; Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others 2007 SCMR 1446; Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others 2002 SCMR 1330 and Jamil Khatoon and others v. Aish Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 222 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---The purpose of invoking Art. 199 of the Constitution is to advance justice, rectify legal wrongs, and protect rights---Constitutional petition is not a substitute for appeal or revision---While exercising jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution, in the matters arising from appellate or revisional orders, High Court should only be concerned with whether or not the courts below acted within their jurisdiction---If such a court has the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it is considered competent to make a decision, regardless of whether the decision is right or wrong, and even if the said decision is considered to be incorrect, it would not automatically render it as being without lawful authority so as to invoke High Court's Constitutional jurisdiction---The object of exercising jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution is to foster justice preserve rights and to right the wrong---The conversion of scope of exercise of constitutional jurisdiction into that of a second appeal or second revision has consistently been deprecated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Muhammad Hussain Munir v. Sikandar PLD 1974 SC 139; Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan and 2 others PLD 1985 SC 131; Hasan Din v. Hafiz Abdus Salam and others PLD 1991 SC 65; Mst. Mobin Fatima v. Muhammad Amin and 2 others PLD 2006 SC 214 and Secretary to the Govt. of the Punjab v. Ghulam Nabi and 3 others PLD 2001 SC 415 rel. Rana Muhammad Shahid Mahmood for Petitioner. Rana Ahmad Tayyab Shahid, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 6. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 and 7 to 16. Date of hearing. 23rd April, 2025.

Summary: ----S.12(2)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.8---Question of maintainability of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Application filed before the District court, whereas, matter decided on merits by the High Court---Proper/competent forum for application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Scope---Merger of decrees---Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. must be filed before the court that passed the final judgment, decree, or order---Proper forum for filing the application was High Court---Once an appellate decree merges into a High Court decision, it becomes the final order for the purpose of S. 12(2), C.P.C.---No subsequent application lies before a subordinate court---Legal point for determination before the High Court was as to "whether the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. would be competent before the subordinate court or the High Court, where the decree of the subordinate court had merged into the final judgment of the High Court"---Brief facts of the case were that the suit for possession filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed by the civil court on 15.11.1997 by declaring the sale deed of respondent No.1 as based on fraud and collusion---Appeal filed by respondent No.1 was accepted on 07.09.1998 by the Additional District Judge, with the result that findings of the Trial Court were reversed and the suit was decreed in favour of respondent No.1 by upholding his sale deed, against which petitioner filed civil revision before the High Court which was dismissed on merits on 08.10.2015 and findings of the Additional District Judge were upheld by holding that registered instrument/sale deed attains presumption of truth and had preference over the mutation---Petitioner, thereafter, challenged the High Court decision before the Supreme Court of Pakistan which was withdrawn on 06.03.2020---Thereafter, petitioner filed application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. before the Additional District Judge on 01.02.2024 which was dismissed on 20.04.2024 and the said order was brought under challenge through the instant revision petition---Held: Decree passed by Additional District Judge dated 07.09.1998 had merged into order dated 08.10.2015 passed by the High Court, therefore, said order was final order in the matter and application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. filed by the petitioner before Additional District Judge was not maintainable and was rightly dismissed for the reason that same was required to be made before the court that had passed the final decision---Competent forum to challenge the validity of judgment, decree or order under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was the Court which passed the final order---In the present case, the final order had been passed by the High Court as the Supreme Court had not entertained the petitioner's application for leave to appeal against the same---No ground to warrant interference in the impugned order was made out for the reason that the same did not suffer from any illegality, jurisdictional defect or mis-reading and non-reading of material available on record. Rasool Bakhsh and another v. Muhammad Ramzan 2007 SCMR 85 and Province of Punjab through Collector, Sialkot v. Muhammad Irshad Bajwa 1999 SCMR 1555 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Forum for filing application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Finality of judgment of High Court the determining factor for the purpose of competent forum for an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Dismissal of leave to appeal by Supreme Court, effect of---High Court decree stands where leave to appeal is denied by the Supreme Court---If Supreme Court merely reaffirms a judgment or order of a High Court by refusing leave, the final judgment for purposes of S. 12(2), C.P.C. will be of the High Court and not of the Supreme Court---If, however, Supreme Court reverses a judgment of a High Court and records a finding on question of fact or law contrary to what was held by the High Court, in that event the final judgment or order would be of the Supreme Court for the purposes of S. 12(2), C.P.C. Khawaja Muhammad Yousaf v. Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas and others 1999 SCMR 1516 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Competent forum for filing an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Improper forum invoked under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Principle of merger of decrees---Scope---High Court's affirmation closes the door to subordinate court proceedings---Findings affirmed by High Court attain finality after refusal of leave to appeal by Supreme Court---No reopening before subordinate court under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---The reason provided by the petitioner for filing application under S. 12(2) C.P.C. before the Additional District Judge (who accepted appeal of respondent No.1) was that the appeal of respondent No.1 had been allowed by the Additional District Judge by reversing the findings of the Trial Court, whereafter, the order of the Additional District Judge was maintained by the High Court, and then the petition for leave to appeal was withdrawn from the Supreme Court, hence, the petitioner was aggrieved of the order of the Additional District Judge which was maintained by higher forums, consequently the petitioner had filed application before the Additional District Judge, which according to him was maintainable---Validity---Such argument of the petitioner was fallacious for the reason that supposing an order passed by the Trial Court was upheld up to the High Court or the Supreme Court on merits and not on technical grounds, then this argument of the petitioner would enable the aggrieved party to restart another round of litigation by filing application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. before the civil court by ignoring the findings affirmed by the forums above, therefore, this was not a valid ground to file application before the Additional District Judge---No ground to warrant interference in the impugned order was made out for the reason that the same did not suffer from any illegality, jurisdictional defect or mis-reading and non-reading of material available on record---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Azmat Islam Ghilzai for Petitioner.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R.10---Joinder and non-joinder of necessary and proper party---Object, purpose and scope---If a person deemed necessary to a suit is not joined as a party, this situation is referred to as non-joinder- --All persons must be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief is alleged to exist---Necessary party is the person in whose absence no effective order can be passed at all---Proper party is the person in whose absence effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on a question involved in proceedings. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 2 (d)---Word "party"---Connotation---Word "party"as defined in section 2(d) of Family Courts Act, 1964, includes any person whose presence as such is considered necessary for a proper decision of the dispute---To ensure presence of real defendant, power is also given to Family Court to add such a person as a party to the dispute---As such the definition is liberal and extensive and is not confined only to spouses rather, it gives a right and the prerogative to choose and implead in a suit as defendant, the person against whom relief is sought. Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Recovery of dowery articles---Joinder of parties other than spouses---Petitioners/defendants were brother and wife of ex-husband of respondent/plaintiff---Suit for recovery of dowery articles was decreed by Family Court against petitioners/defendants---Judgment and decree was maintained by Lower Appellate Court and High Court-- -Validity---Jurisdiction of Family Court is not contingent upon identities of individuals or persons involved; instead, it is fundamentally defined by nature of subject matter presented in suit---Any dispute that pertains to the categories outlined in the schedule of Family Courts Act, 1964 can be brought to Family Court, regardless of who the parties are---Such broad approach is designed to ensure that a diverse array of family-related disputes - ranging from matrimonial issues to child custody arrangements, can be addressed in a specialized forum tailored to handle sensitive familial matters---Legislation does not specify particular individuals or persons who possess exclusive right to initiate or defend actions in Family Court---Petitioners/defendants failed to bring forth any witnesses who could confirm return of dowry articles in their presence---Petitioners/ defendants were obligated to return dowry articles in question and a decree was issued in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Petitioners/ defendants failed to point out any irregularities or errors in proceedings of Family Court or any discernible errors in law that High Court could have the authority to address in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663; Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591; Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495; Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir 2011 SCMR 1361 ref. Fawad Ishaq v. Mst. Mehreen Mansoor PLD 2020 SC 269 distinguished. (d) Precedent--- ----Generalizing of judgment---Principle---Legal case holds authority solely concerning specific issues it addresses and the conclusions it reaches---Judgment cannot be generalized beyond its context, as it is only applicable to the situation at hand and does not serve as a precedent for matters that lie outside its explicit scope. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)---Family disputes-- -Writ of certiorari---Scope---High Court can issue an order of certiorari to rectify jurisdictional errors committed by subordinate Courts in family law matters---Such errors can arise when Family Courts or First Appellate Courts issue decisions without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or fail to exercise their jurisdiction altogether---Certiorari order is applicable when Family Court or First Appellate Court acts in an illegal or improper manner while exercising its jurisdiction---This includes situations where Court makes determinations without providing an affected party opportunity to be heard or where procedural methods employed contravene fundamental principles of natural justice---It is crucial to recognize that High Court's jurisdiction to issue certiorari is fundamentally supervisory, meaning, it does not possess authority to function as an appellate body---Such supervisory role imposes clear limitations: specifically, it prohibits High Court from reevaluating or questioning factual findings made by subordinate Courts based on their assessment of evidence---High Court does not engage in reviewing or re-weighing evidence that underlies decisions made by Family Court or First Appellate Court---Instead, it may only nullify a decision it finds to be beyond jurisdiction or grossly erroneous without imposing its own conclusions in place of those reached by lower Courts---Certiorari orders can be granted solely when a clear error of law is evident on the face of record; however, this does not extend to addressing errors of fact, regardless of their severity. Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Tauseef Ejaz Malik, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Branch Registry Lahore for Respondents Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R.10---Joinder and non-joinder of necessary and proper party---Object, purpose and scope---If a person deemed necessary to a suit is not joined as a party, this situation is referred to as non-joinder- --All persons must be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief is alleged to exist---Necessary party is the person in whose absence no effective order can be passed at all---Proper party is the person in whose absence effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on a question involved in proceedings. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 2 (d)---Word "party"---Connotation---Word "party"as defined in section 2(d) of Family Courts Act, 1964, includes any person whose presence as such is considered necessary for a proper decision of the dispute---To ensure presence of real defendant, power is also given to Family Court to add such a person as a party to the dispute---As such the definition is liberal and extensive and is not confined only to spouses rather, it gives a right and the prerogative to choose and implead in a suit as defendant, the person against whom relief is sought. Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Recovery of dowery articles---Joinder of parties other than spouses---Petitioners/defendants were brother and wife of ex-husband of respondent/plaintiff---Suit for recovery of dowery articles was decreed by Family Court against petitioners/defendants---Judgment and decree was maintained by Lower Appellate Court and High Court-- -Validity---Jurisdiction of Family Court is not contingent upon identities of individuals or persons involved; instead, it is fundamentally defined by nature of subject matter presented in suit---Any dispute that pertains to the categories outlined in the schedule of Family Courts Act, 1964 can be brought to Family Court, regardless of who the parties are---Such broad approach is designed to ensure that a diverse array of family-related disputes - ranging from matrimonial issues to child custody arrangements, can be addressed in a specialized forum tailored to handle sensitive familial matters---Legislation does not specify particular individuals or persons who possess exclusive right to initiate or defend actions in Family Court---Petitioners/defendants failed to bring forth any witnesses who could confirm return of dowry articles in their presence---Petitioners/ defendants were obligated to return dowry articles in question and a decree was issued in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Petitioners/ defendants failed to point out any irregularities or errors in proceedings of Family Court or any discernible errors in law that High Court could have the authority to address in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663; Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591; Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495; Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir 2011 SCMR 1361 ref. Fawad Ishaq v. Mst. Mehreen Mansoor PLD 2020 SC 269 distinguished. (d) Precedent--- ----Generalizing of judgment---Principle---Legal case holds authority solely concerning specific issues it addresses and the conclusions it reaches---Judgment cannot be generalized beyond its context, as it is only applicable to the situation at hand and does not serve as a precedent for matters that lie outside its explicit scope. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)---Family disputes-- -Writ of certiorari---Scope---High Court can issue an order of certiorari to rectify jurisdictional errors committed by subordinate Courts in family law matters---Such errors can arise when Family Courts or First Appellate Courts issue decisions without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or fail to exercise their jurisdiction altogether---Certiorari order is applicable when Family Court or First Appellate Court acts in an illegal or improper manner while exercising its jurisdiction---This includes situations where Court makes determinations without providing an affected party opportunity to be heard or where procedural methods employed contravene fundamental principles of natural justice---It is crucial to recognize that High Court's jurisdiction to issue certiorari is fundamentally supervisory, meaning, it does not possess authority to function as an appellate body---Such supervisory role imposes clear limitations: specifically, it prohibits High Court from reevaluating or questioning factual findings made by subordinate Courts based on their assessment of evidence---High Court does not engage in reviewing or re-weighing evidence that underlies decisions made by Family Court or First Appellate Court---Instead, it may only nullify a decision it finds to be beyond jurisdiction or grossly erroneous without imposing its own conclusions in place of those reached by lower Courts---Certiorari orders can be granted solely when a clear error of law is evident on the face of record; however, this does not extend to addressing errors of fact, regardless of their severity. Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Tauseef Ejaz Malik, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Branch Registry Lahore for Respondents Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss. 30 & 37---Punjab Environmental Protection Act (XXXIV of 1997), S. 16---Issuance of Show Cause Notice---Competition Commission of Pakistan---Powers and functions---Petitioners (engaged in running businesses) invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court assailing Show Cause Notices ("impugned notices") issued by the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) to protect the regime of antitrust law---Section 30 (1) and (2) of Competition Act, 2010 ('the Act 2010'), is perimetria to S.16 of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 wherein the Authority, Commission or Agency has to be satisfied of contravention of provision of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, before making any proceedings in the case but such satisfaction cannot be done unless subsection 30(2) of the Act 2010 is invoked and thus it has to be read first as the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) has to give notice of intention to make order and to give the undertaking an opportunity to be heard in detail-- -Section 30(2) of the Act 2010 then comes into play with the notice issued by the CCP with its intention to make orders stating reasons to the undertaking of contravention with some material which the CCP based it on; it then has to sit with the respondents and clarify whether there is any contravention of the provision of the Act 2010 and such notice issued under this section has to be read with S. 37(4) of the Act 2010 as per enquiry initiated under S. 37 of the Act 2010, which had already been done by the CCP in the present case---Language of S. 30(2) of the Act 2010 is very clear which states that the CCP first shall serve notice of its intention stating reasons to the undertaking and by giving an opportunity of being heard with supportive material whereas as per proviso to S. 30(2), the CCP can decide the case ex-parte in case the undertaking does not avail the opportunity of being heard---High Court directed the petitioners to file their replies by agitating all points raised in these petitions before the CCP who shall proceed ahead with an objective approach to the matter strictly as per law---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly. (b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----Ss. 28, 30 & 37---Competition Commission of Pakistan initiating enquiries on its own---Powers of---Section 28 of the Competition Act, 2010 ('the Act 2010') while delineating the functions and powers to the Competition Commission of Pakistan ('CCP'), empowers it (CCP) to initiate 'proceedings' in accordance with the procedures of the Act 2010---Section 28 of the Act 2010 explicitly states that the CCP may conduct enquiries into the affairs of any undertaking as may be necessary for the purposes of the Act 2010---Said broad mandate underscores the CCP's role as a proactive regulator, capable of initiating investigations to promote competition and prevent anticompetitive behavior---Section 30(1) of the Act 2010 empowers the CCP to make orders in cases of contravention of the provisions of Chapter II; it mandates that the CCP must adopt due process by providing notice of its intention to make such an order, thereby ensuring that the undertaking has an opportunity to be heard---This procedural safeguard is essential for maintaining fairness and transparency in the regulatory process---However, it is crucial to note that the initiation of an enquiry under S. 37 of the Act 2010 does not equate to a formal proceeding under S. 30 of the Act 2010, as the latter involves potential penal consequences---Section 37 of the Act 2010 is particularly pertinent to the CCP's authority to conduct enquiries---Subsection (1) of S. 37 of the Act 2010 empowers the CCP to initiate enquiries on its own or upon a reference from the Federal Government; this provision is significant as it allows the CCP to act independently, without waiting for a complaint or external prompting---Under S. 37 of the Act 2010, enquiries and studies are independent tools employed by the CCP to collect and assess information on market trends---Importantly, such enquiries do not constitute an adverse action or a formal proceeding under S. 30 of the Act 2010---CCP can initiate inquiries on its own accord under S. 37(1) of the Act 2010, which allows it to address potential violations proactively---CCP has authority to initiate enquiries based on its own assessment of market conditions, thereby enhancing its regulatory effectiveness---Thus, the Act 2010 does not pose any embargo upon CCP rather it empowers the commission to initiate enquiries on its own against any undertaking to serve the purposes of the Act 2010---High Court directed the petitioners to file their replies by agitating all points raised in these petitions before the CCP who shall proceed ahead with an objective approach to the matter strictly as per law---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly. Dalda Foods Limited v. Competition Commission of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 1991 and A. Rahim Foods (Pvt.) Limited Competition Commission of Pakistan v. K&N'S Foods (Pvt.) Limited and others PLD 2023 SC 516 ref. (c) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----S. 30---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Issuance of Show Cause Notice, assailing of---Jurisdiction of Competition Commission of Pakistan, non-challenging of---Effect----Jurisdiction of Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) to issue the "impugned notices" had not been agitated by the petitioners---Petitioners has not controverted or challenged the authority of the CCP to issue 'notice' so no question of issuance of show cause notice without valid jurisdiction arises in any manner for maintainability of instant petition---High Court directed the petitioners to file their replies by agitating all points raised in these petitions before the CCP who shall proceed ahead with an objective approach to the matter strictly as per law---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly. (d) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----Ss. 28, 30 & 37---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Issuance of Show Cause Notice by Competition Commission of Pakistan, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Whether extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court can be determinatively applied where the 'injury' is not actual rather perceived in the form of mere issuance of show cause notice---Held, that contents of impugned notices issued by the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) revealed that the petitioners (businessmen) had only been called upon to show cause in writing and to appear and place before the CCP, facts and material in support of their contentions and to avail the opportunity of hearing---Show Cause Notice is delivered to a person by an authority in order to get the reply back with a reasonable cause as to why a particular action should not be taken against him with regard to the defaulting act---By and large, it is a well-defined and well-structured process to provide the alleged defaulter with a fair chance to respond to the allegation and explain his position within reasonable timeframe"---Therefore, a show cause notice is not a testament of an adverse proceeding against a party rather it is an intimation of initiation of a process, which requires certain answers and clarifications from the party addressed---As such a show cause notice is not and ought not to be a culmination of unfavorable determination against the party but it is, and it must be adopted as a mode of opportunity to enable the party to provide explanation of certain facts or missing information as required by the relevant law in a case where shortcomings or omissions thereof surface or are noted either through the enquiry, tentative or otherwise, or by information received by the department in any other manner---Petitioners should have responded to the show-cause notice before seeking intervention, as this practice undermines the department's ability to proceed with cases effectively---Thus, mere issuance of a show cause notice is not an adverse order---Since through the "impugned notices" a chance was given to the "petitioners" to appear and produce evidence/material in response to the allegations levelled in the "enquiry report" therefore, the petitioners' grievance was not actual rather it was perceived---Present constitutional petition was filed against the "impugned notices" by the petitioners, which was not an adverse order and they had agitated an injury which was neither actual nor immediate rather was perceived and suppositious---High Court directed the petitioners to file their replies by agitating all points raised in these petitions before the CCP who shall proceed ahead with an objective approach to the matter strictly as per law---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Jahangir Khan Tareen and others 2022 SCMR 92; Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Faisalabad and others v. Messrs Punjab Beverage Company (Pvt.) Ltd. 2008 SCMR 308 and Abdul Razzaq v. Lahore Development Authority through Director General and another 2017 PLC (C.S.) Note 2 ref. (e) Words and phrases--- ----'Show cause' notice---Definition. (f) Words and phrases--- ----Show cause notice---Meaning and scope---Term Show Cause Notice is a formal communication that informs the recipient of alleged legal violations and provides them an opportunity to respond, embodying the principles of natural justice and due process, which ensures a fair hearing and protection of rights before any adverse action is taken. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Messrs Millat Tractors Limited, Lahore and others 2024 SCMR 700 ref. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Issuance of a Show Cause Notice, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Mere issuance of a show cause notice does not amount to an adverse action; and a constitutional petition against a show-cause notice is not maintainable unless such a notice has been issued without lawful authority, is wholly without jurisdiction, coram non judice or is based on mala fides. Saeed Ahmad and others v. Chairman O.G.D.C.L. and others 2020 PLC 27 ref. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Issuance of show cause notice, assailing of---Constitutional petition--- Maintainability--- Principles regarding maintainability of constitutional petition against mere issuance of show cause notice are: (i) Show Cause Notice is not an adverse order unless it could be clearly shown to the satisfaction of the Court that it has been issued by an authority not vested with jurisdiction or it was issued for mala fide reasons; (ii) The exception relating to want of jurisdiction does not include every jurisdictional error; a wrong exercise of jurisdiction or interpretation of the law cannot be treated as want of jurisdiction;(iii) Constitutional jurisdiction is exercised if the Court is satisfied that the person is an 'aggrieved party' within the context of Art. 199 of the Constitution and no adequate remedy is provided by law; if adequate statutory remedies are provided under the relevant statute, it is to be taken into consideration while exercising discretion under Art. 199 of the Constitution; (iv) By passing or circumventing statutory forums is to be discouraged; (v) The approach should be to advance the object and purpose of a statute and every effort should be made to uphold the sanctity of the legislative intent rather defeating it. Strategic Plans Division and another v. Punjab Revenue Authority and others PLD 2024 Lah. 545 ref. (i) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----Ss. 30 & 37---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199--- Issuance of Show Cause Notice by Competition Commission of Pakistan, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Doctrine of ripeness---Petitioners (engaged in running businesses) invoked constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court assailing Show Cause Notices ("impugned notices") issued by the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) to protect the regime of antitrust law---Validity---Approach of the petitioners was contradictory to the doctrine of ripeness; this doctrine is also a determinative parameter for maintainability and merit adjudication of a constitutional petition within the bound of Art. 199 of the Constitution---Term 'ripeness' has been defined in Blacks' Law Dictionary, 11th Edition, as 'The state of a dispute that has reached, but has not passed the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made'---Principle of ripeness is grounded in the notion that judicial resources must be preserved, ensuring that Courts engage only with disputes that are actual and immediate; it reflects the view that Courts should concern themselves with tangible, present, or imminent issues, avoiding the exhaustion of their efforts on abstract or perceived questions layered in probabilities and apprehensions; as such, judicial intervention is discouraged in matters that, at least for the time being, do not bear a direct or substantial impact on the parties involved---Therefore, present constitutional petitions, in the instant point of time, are contradictory to the doctrine of ripeness and prematurity---High Court directed the petitioners to file their replies by agitating all points raised in these petitions before the CCP who shall proceed ahead with an objective approach to the matter strictly as per law---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly. (j) Jurisdiction--- ----Doctrine of ripeness---Applicability and significance---Doctrine of ripeness ensures that Courts avoid premature adjudication by requiring disputes to be concrete and focused, preventing abstract disagreements over policies---This principle protects agencies from judicial interference until their decisions are formalized and felt by the challenging parties, allowing Courts to benefit from agency expertise and a developed record. (k) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Preamble---Preamble to a statute is though not an operational part of the enactment but it is a gateway, which opens before the Court the purpose and intent of the legislature, which necessitated the legislation on the subject and also sheds clear light on the goals which the legislator aimed to secure through the introduction of such law---Preamble of a statute, therefore, holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect the true purpose and intent of the law. Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447; Dilsons (Private) Limited and others v. Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and another 2021 CLD 1317; A. Rahim Foods (Pvt.) Limited and another v. K&N'S Foods (Pvt.) Limited and others 2023 CLD 1001; Competition Commission of Pakistan and others v. Dalda Foods Limited, Karachi 2023 SCMR 1991 and LPG Association of Pakistan through Chairman v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Islamabad and others 2021 CLD 214 ref. (l) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----Ss. 28, 30 & 37---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Issuance of Show Cause Notice by Competition Commission of Pakistan, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Issuance of the "impugned notices" is an initial yet primary step of the process to ensure fair opportunity, which is also akin to probability of mediation-- -Therefore, the constitutional petitions, in the instant point of time, were contradictory to the doctrine of probability of mediation---High Court directed the petitioners to file their replies by agitating all points raised in these petitions before the CCP who shall proceed ahead with an objective approach to the matter strictly as per law---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs RYK Mills 2023 SCMR 1856 ref. (m) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----Ss. 30, 37, 41, 42 & 44---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Issuance of Show Cause Notice by Competition Commission of Pakistan, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Alternate and efficacious remedy not availed---It was an opportunity for the petitioners to explain their position and if they did so, the impugned notices were and ought to be deemed satisfied without any further adverse action---As the matter had not ripened under Chapter IV of the Competition Act, 2010, under which certain powers had been given to the Regulator to decide the matter and once it was decided by the CCP, the petitioners had the remedies under S. 41 of the Act 2010 by way of an appeal before the Appellant Bench of the Commission and an appeal to the Competition Appellate Tribunal under S. 42 of the Act 2010, and further appeal to the Supreme Court under S. 44 of the Act 2010, and such remedies had not been exhausted by the petitioners---If a Regulator is barred from exercising any of such functions, the purpose of law will not only be compromised but the intent behind making of such law will also be jeopardized---Moreover, if the Court starts interfering at initial steps of the Regulator for not initiating inquiry, then it will create hurdle for the Regulator to proceed in the matter to protect the very purpose and object of law---In presence of availability of an alternate efficacious remedy, jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution cannot be invoked---High Court directed the petitioners to file their replies by agitating all points raised in these petitions before the CCP who shall proceed ahead with an objective approach to the matter strictly as per law---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly. Chenab Flour and General Mills v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343 ref. (n) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Alternate and efficacious remedy---High Court, before granting relief to a Petitioner by exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the "Constitution", must satisfy itself regarding the non-availability of any alternate remedy, or in case Court is inclined to grant relief even in presence of alternate remedy, Court should be satisfied that circumstances of the case make the other remedy inadequate---In presence of availability of an alternate efficacious remedy, jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. Indus Trading and Contracting Company v. Collector of Customs (Preventive) Karachi and others 2016 SCMR 842; Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813 and Muhammad Abbasi v. Station House Officer Bhara Kahu and 7 others PLD 2010 SC 969 ref. Sardar Taimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with Uzair Shafie, Barrister Jahanzeb Awan and Arshad Mahmood, Muhammad Imran Malik, Advocate Supreme Court with Aakif Majeed Butt, Hassan Ismail and Asim Tufail Farooqi for the Petitioner (in connected W.P. No. 1633 of 2024). Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Additional Attorney General with Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General, Barrister Asadullah Chattha and Barrister Ambreen Abbasi for Respondents/ Competition Commission of Pakistan with Hafiz Nasim, Senior Legal Advisor along with Musa Hayat Tarar, Adeel Peter and Hassan Raza, Legal Advisor for Competition Commission of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 09th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 100 & 101---Second Appeal---Maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it concerns the state that there be an end to litigation)---Applicability---Provisions restricting grounds that may be taken in second appeal are based on public policy expressed in the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it concerns the state that there be an end to litigation)---Conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained---No Court has power to add or enlarge the grounds, so as to determine a question merely on an equitable ground if they come in conflict with them or ignore the provisions of law. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 100---Second appeal---Suit for specific performance---Judgment at variance---Findings of facts--- Preference--- Suit filed by respondent/plaintiff was decreed in his favour by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court allowed appeal of petitioners/defendants and dismissed the suit---High Court while disposing of Second Appeal, decreed the suit in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Validity---If findings of facts reached by Lower Appellate Court are at variance with those of Trial Court, the former are to ordinarily prevail although it would not possess the same value or sanctity as that of a concurrent finding---Such findings by Lower Appellate Court are immune from interference in Second Appeal provided they have passed the test prescribed under section 100, C.P.C.---Findings of two Courts cannot be subjected to a Second Appeal, even if erroneous---In the present case judgment passed in Second Appeal was nothing but a replacement by High Court of its own view in an attempt to do equity which was not permissible under section 100, C.P.C.---Second Appeal could not operate as a regular First Appeal under section 96 C.P.C.---Supreme Court set aside judgment and decree passed by High Court in exercise of Second Appeal and restored that of Lower Appellate Court, as it was an interference and was neither justified nor required---Specific performance was only a discretionary relief and such discretion was lawfully exercised by Lower Appellate Court---Appeal was allowed. District Council Sialkot v. Nazir Ahmed Khan 2001 SCMR 1641 and Mir Abdullah v. Muhammad Ali 1977 SCMR 280 rel. Muhammad Aqil, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Muhammad Saleem Ansari, Advocate High Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil service--- ----Considerable length of service---Appointment later found to have been procured through misrepresentation---Dismissal from service---Retrospective recovery of salary---Scope---Petitioner, after rendering services for fifteen years, was dismissed on account of defect in his initial appointment, and salaries received by him were also held recoverable---Validity---Though a public employment secured through misrepresentation or tampered credentials is void ab initio and confers no vested right upon the appointee, nonetheless, the issue of retrospective salary recovery for services rendered over a significant period engages broader principles of fairness, equity, and administrative accountability---In the present case, after fifteen years of continuous and uninterrupted service of petitioner, the Department initiated an inquiry into educational credentials of the petitioner---There is no material on record to show that the petitioner deliberately concealed or suppressed his academic record during this time or resisted verification---On the contrary, service of the petitioner was accepted, utilized, and remunerated without demur or objection---Petitioner had indeed discharged all assigned responsibilities without lapse---In such circumstances, the employer having accepted and benefited from fifteen years of unblemished service cannot now seek restitution of benefits already consumed---Principles of equity, good conscience, and public interest dictate that in the absence of fraud or dishonest conduct by the employee, retrospective recovery of wages is unjust---The recovery of salary for services lawfully and diligently performed is impermissible, notwithstanding defects in the initial appointment---Thus, the order for recovery in the present case is arbitrary, excessive, and in clear violation of equitable principles---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned judgment to the extent of recovery of salary from the petitioner, however, the petitioner's dismissal from service, on account of ineligibility at the time of appointment, would remain intact---Petition was converted into an appeal and was partially allowed accordingly. Shams ur Rehman v. Military Accountant General, Rawalpindi 2020 SCMR 188 and Engineer in Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207 ref. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----S. 70---Employment---Considerable length of service---Appointment later found to have been procured through misrepresentation---Dismissal from service---Retrospective recovery of salary---Scope---Doctrine of quantum meruit---Petitioner, after rendering services for fifteen years, was dismissed on account of defect in his initial appointment, and salaries received by him were also held recoverable---Validity---In the present case, the doctrine of quantum meruit finds clear and compelling application---This equitable principle permits reasonable compensation for services rendered where one party has knowingly accepted and benefited from the work of another, even in the absence of a valid or enforceable contract---For over fifteen years, the petitioner continuously performed duties that fulfilled institutional needs and was compensated accordingly---To retrospectively invalidate such remuneration despite the employer's full knowledge and acceptance of the services rendered would be contrary to the fundamental tenet that no person should unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of another---In the present case, it was the employer/ Department that stood to benefit unjustly---Said principle finds statutory recognition under Section 70 of the Contract Act, 1872---Therefore, even where an employment / appointment is found to be irregular, if the employee has continuously and faithfully discharged official functions and the employer has enjoyed the resulting benefit over a significant period, the doctrine of quantum meruit furnishes both a moral and legal basis to preclude retrospective recovery of salary---Labors that is not donated but knowingly accepted must be compensated regardless of technical infirmities in the appointment process---The recovery of salary for services lawfully and diligently performed is impermissible, notwithstanding defects in the initial appointment---Thus, the order for recovery in the present case was arbitrary, excessive, and in clear violation of equitable principles---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned judgment to the extent of recovery of salary from the petitioner, however, the petitioner's dismissal from service, on account of ineligibility at the time of appointment, would remain intact---Petition was converted into an appeal and was partially allowed accordingly. Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd (1936) 2 KB 403 and Benedetti v. Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50 ref. (c) Employment--- ----Doctrine of quantum meruit---Scope---The doctrine of quantum meruit, literally meaning "as much as he has earned" or "as much as he deserves" and is a foundational principle of equity and restitution in both common law and civil law jurisdictions---Said principle enables a party to claim reasonable compensation for services rendered or work performed, even where a contract is void, unenforceable, or otherwise defective---The doctrine rests not merely on contractual notions, but on the broader equitable premise that a person who has received and retained a benefit should not be allowed to do so without paying reasonable compensation, particularly where the services were not intended to be gratuitous; which creates an implied obligation in law, akin to a quasi-contract, compelling restitution where unjust enrichment would otherwise result. State of West Bengal v. Messrs B.K. Mondal and Sons AIR 1962 SC 779 ref. (d) Civil service--- -----Doctrine of administrative acquiescence---Scope---Considerable length of service---Appointment later found to have been procured through misrepresentation---Dismissal from service---Retrospective recovery of salary---Scope---Petitioner, after rendering services for fifteen years, was dismissed on account of defect in his initial appointment, and salaries received by him were also held recoverable---Validity---The doctrine of administrative acquiescence rooted in principles of equity and fairness, which (doctrine) is based on the idea that if a person, observing another about to perform an act that might infringe upon their rights, remains silent in circumstances where an objection might have prevented the act, they may later be estopped from objecting---Transposed to public law, it implies that prolonged inaction or silence by a public authority, particularly where it had the duty and opportunity to act may amount to institutional acquiescence---In such cases, the authority's delay in enforcing its rights or correcting an irregularity can defeat retrospective punitive action, especially where the individual affected has acted in good faith and to the authority's benefit throughout---The prolonged inaction by the department, its failure to undertake any meaningful verification or scrutiny of the petitioner's appointment for fifteen years amounted to institutional negligence---Significantly, it was only after the passage of fifteen years that the department initiated an inquiry into the petitioner's appointment---Said belated action, without any intervening misconduct by the petitioner, underscored that the lapse lies entirely with the department---Administrative silence over such an extended period, particularly where it results in the receipt and acceptance of services, may amount to acquiescence and estop the department from seeking retrospective punitive measures---Petitioner could not be faulted for the department's own dereliction of its gatekeeping responsibilities---While the eventual termination of service due to irregular appointment may be legally sustainable, the direction for recovery of fifteen years' salary without any allegation or proof of fraud or mala fide intent on the part of the petitioner was manifestly disproportionate, inequitable, and legally untenable---The recovery of salary for services lawfully and diligently performed was impermissible, notwithstanding defects in the initial appointment---Thus, the order for recovery in the present case was arbitrary, excessive, and in clear violation of equitable principles---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned judgment to the extent of recovery of salary from the petitioner, however, the petitioner's dismissal from service, on account of ineligibility at the time of appointment, would remain intact---Petition was converted into an appeal and was partially allowed accordingly. Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129; Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454 and Market Committee, Multan v. Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) Multan 2023 SCMR 1683 ref. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Imran Masood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. (Through V.L. Lahore Registry) Mian Ghulam Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan Date of hearing: 19th May, 2025.