Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 203---Chief Justice of High Court---Observations---State functionaries were aggrieved of observations made by Chief Justice of Lahore High Court against them in judgment pertaining to transfer of a criminal case from one Court to the other Court---Validity---Chief Justice of High Court acted within his Constitutional authority under Article 203 of the Constitution to supervise proceedings of subordinate Courts, including Anti-Terrorism Courts---In the light of dismissal of reference against Presiding Judge by Administrative Judge due to insufficient grounds, the Chief Justice was fully justified in not taking further action on the transfer application, which lacked merit and was based solely on a reference that lacked compelling evidence---Chief Justice of a High Court in a province is the patris familias of judiciary within that province---Any inaction on the part of Chief Justice of High Court, in response to any such like complaint of a judicial officer would be contrary to his Constitutional obligations under Article 203 of the Constitution---Observations in question were not to be regarded as determinative or conclusive in any subsequent forum and any future assessment of their conduct should be made independently, on its own merits, strictly in accordance with the law---Petition for leave to appeal was disposed of accordingly. Mehram Ali's case PLD 1998 SC 1445 rel. Syed Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Special Prosecutor, assisted by Mudassar Hussain Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in all cases). Respondents Not represented (in all cases). Date of hearing: 7th April, 2025.

Summary: Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss. 5, Sched., 10(5) & 10(6)---Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula---Return/surrender of dower---Principles---Family Court while dissolving marriage on the basis of Khula decreed the claim of the dower of plaintiff (ex-wife) to the extent of 75% of unpaid dower mentioned in column No. 16 of the Nikahnama in the shape of residential house and return of 25% of paid dower as mentioned in columns Nos. 13 & 14 of the Nikahnama---Plea of the petitioner (ex-husband/defendant was that the rule that allowed return or surrender of up to 25% of admitted prompt dower or up to 50% of deferred dower encapsulated in Ss. 10(5) & 10(6) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, ('the Act 1964') had been declared repugnant to the injunctions of Islam by the Federal Shariat Court in case titled, "Imran Anwar Khan and others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Ministry of Law, Lahore and others" reported as PLD 2022 FSC 25 ('the Imran Anwar Khan case')---Question was what were the principles governing the surrender or return of dower in case of dissolution of marriage or Khula in the light of 'Imran Anwar Khan case'?---Held, that Family Court had the discretion to determine the quantum of return or surrender of dower in a case of dissolution of marriage or Khula depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case---Therefore, when divergent pleadings regarding entitlement or surrender of dower are taken by the parties in a suit for dissolution of marriage, the proper course is to decide the same after recording of evidence---However, Ss. 10(5) & 10(6) of the Act 1964 were introduced in 2015 to regulate the question of surrender of dower in the case of Khula which prescribed a discretionary upper limit for the Court to order surrender of dower up to fifty percent of deferred dower or up to twenty-five percent of admitted prompt dower of the wife in favour of the husband---Courts generally invoked S. 10(5) of the Act 1964 even in a case of Khula where either the suit was decreed summarily or otherwise when it was proved that Khula was obtained by the wife for no fault of the husband---Judgment in the 'Imran Anwar Khan case' was rendered in this context; which struck down the prescribed upper ceiling with respect to surrender of dower encapsulated in subsections (5) & (6) of S. 10 of the Act 1964 being repugnant to Islam and as such, declared the same to be ineffective from 01.05.2022---It is, therefore, pertinent to examine and assess its impact on the pending cases involving the cases of Khula---Pertinently, the Federal Shariat Court, in case titled "Saleem Ahmad and others v. Government of Pakistan through Attorney General of Pakistan and 2 others" reported as PLD 2014 Federal Shariat Court 43 while setting certain principles, concluded [ in Para (xii)]that "the quantum of return or surrender of dower shall be decided in the light of said/certain principles without resort to statutory upper ceiling stipulated in Ss. 10(5) & 10(6) of the Family Courts Act 1964 having been struck down as repugnant to injunctions of Islam after the cutoff date declared in the Imran Anwar Khan case"---In the present case, the Family Court framed a specific issue (No. 2) regarding entitlement of the respondent/plaintiff to a decree for dower in her favour and against the petitioner in view of dissolution of marriage---Columns Nos. 13, 14 & 16 of the original pert of (duly Exhibited) Nikahnama revealed that Rs. 5000/- cash, 03 Tolas gold ornaments and 05 Marlas constructed house were listed therein as dower---As such, the plea/version of the petitioner based on oral evidence regarding non-fixation of 05 Marlas house was discarded for the reason that presumption of truth was attached to Nikahnama produced by the respondent which could not be dislodged by counter evidence---Accordingly, the Courts below after due appreciation of evidence on record, concurrently held that at the time of Nikah, cash and gold ornaments were paid to the respondent but 05 Marlas constructed house was not paid at that time or thereafter---Whereas, the respondent substantially proved the reasons for seeking Khula as per her pleadings and successfully established that she was not entirely at fault for failure of her matrimonial relationship---At the same time, the respondent did not produce conclusive evidence of torture and cruelty on the part of the petitioner to prove that she was not at fault at all---Therefore, it can safely be concluded that proportionally, the petitioner was more at fault than the respondent for the dissolution of marriage between them---Family Court after declaring the entire dower as prompt invoked Ss. 10(5) & 10(6) of the Act 1964 and ordered that the respondent was entitled to her dower but must return or surrender 25% of her admissible dower as consideration for Khula---In this context, the non-paid dower stipulated in the Nikahnama in the shape of house measuring 05 Marlas was reduced in measurement to 03 Marlas and 07 Sarsais---Applying the principles of law enunciated in the 'Imran Anwar Khan case' to the facts and circumstances of the instant lis, it became explicitly evident that decision of the Courts below regarding grant of Khula to the respondent against return or surrender of 25% of dower was fully justified based on evidence on record in the wake of charges of cruelty, torture and use of drugs against the petitioner since it was not a case of Khula simpliciter based on personal dislike of the respondent against the petitioner---Hence, notwithstanding that upper ceiling of surrender of dower contained in subsections (5) & (6) of S. 10 of the Act 1964 had been struck down by the Federal Shariat Court yet the decision was otherwise sustainable on the touchstone of principles of Islamic law reiterated and endorsed in the 'Imran Anwar Khan case'---High Court maintained the impugned judgments and was not inclined to interfere with the same in exercise of extraordinary and discretionary constitutional jurisdiction vested under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Constitutional petition filed by ex-husband/defendant, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Dr. Anees Ahmad v. Mst. Uzma PLD 1998 Lah. 52; Khalid Mahmood v. Anees Bibi and 2 others PLD 2007 Lah. 626; Muhammad Kamran v. Mst. Samera Majeed and others 2018 YLR 1251; Mst. Saima Irum and 3 others v. Tariq Javed and another 2006 MLD 83; Mst. Zahida Bi v. Muhammad Maqsood 1987 CLC 57; Imran Anwar Khan and others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Ministry of Law, Lahore and others PLD 2022 FSC 25 and Saleem Ahmad and others v. Government of Pakistan through Attorney General of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 2014 FSC 43 ref. Muhammad Irfan Arabi and Muhammad Kaleem Ullah Chishti for Petitioner. Rana Mehboob Ali for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, assisted by Muhammad Zubair, Research Officer. Date of Hearing: 17th October, 2022.

Summary: Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J; Shakeel Ahmad, J. agreeing; Musarrat Hilali, J. dissenting--- (a) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S. 12---Custody of minor---Remarriage of mother---Effect---Mere fact of mother's remarriage does not ipso facto disentitle her from the custody of minor. (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S.12---Suit for custody of minor daughter---Remarriage of mother---Welfare of minor---Determination---Petitioner/father of minor daughter was aggrieved of concurrent findings of facts by all Courts below disentitling him from the custody of his minor daughter which was with respondent/mother---Plea raised by petitioner was that mother was not entitled to the custody as after divorce she had remarried a person falling in prohibitory degree to the minor---Validity---Petitioner was residing abroad and merely two months after his marriage with respondent, he returned abroad while respondent stayed in Pakistan---Petitioner pronounced divorce upon respondent while residing abroad---Petitioner had neither seen his minor daughter since her birth nor made any effort to meet her---He did not return to Pakistan to pursue custody of minor instead filed application for custody after his arrival in Pakistan due to demise of his father---Petition and subsequent appeal were filed through his attorney, who represented him in the proceedings---Petitioner did not appear personally in either trial or Lower Appellate Court or in Constitutional petition---Application for custody was not motivated by affection or concern for the minor instead it was a retaliatory measure in response to the suit instituted by respondent for recovery of dowry articles and maintenance---There was no evidence on record to suggest that respondent failed in her duty to properly care for the minor or to provide her with proper education and upbringing---Minor was about 13 years of age, she had never seen her father, who had been residing outside Pakistan since before her birth---Throughout her life, she had developed a strong emotional attachment with her mother, who was her sole source of love, care, guidance, and financial support---Petitioner, as the father, had never made any attempt to contribute towards minor's educational expenses, nor had he inquired about her schooling or well-being---Minor was receiving quality education in a reputable private school and had consistently been securing top positions in her class, which reflected her academic excellence, proper upbringing, and stable environment---At such delicate and formative stage of adolescence, when emotional security, proper moral upbringing, and a strong educational foundation are of paramount importance for minor's future growth and development, any unwarranted disturbance or change in environment of minor would likely cause irreversible harm to minor's personality and career---It was imperative for welfare, betterment and best interests of the minor, that her custody remain with her mother---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court which was well-reasoned and had considered all material aspects of the case---Petitioner failed to point out any illegality or infirmity in concurrent findings of the Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. [Majority view] Khan Muhammad v. Mst. Surayya Bibi and others 2008 SCMR 480; Rahimullah Choudhary v. Mrs. Sayeda Helali Begum and others 1974 SCMR 305; Feroze Begum v. Muhammad Hussain 1978 SCMR 299; Mehmood Akhtar v. District Judge, Attock and 2 others 2004 SCMR 1839; Tahira v. Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and others 1990 SCMR 852; Mst. Feroze Begum v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Hussain 1983 SCMR 606; Munawar Bibi v. Muhammad Amin and another 1995 SCMR 1206; Mst. Razia Bibi v. Riaz Ahmad and another 2004 SCMR 821; Mst. Beena v. Raja Muhammad and others PLD 2020 SC 508; Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem 2014 SCMR 343; Raja Muhammad Owais v. Mst. Nazia Jabeen and others 2022 SCMR 2123; Mst. Shahista Naz v. Muhammad Naeem Ahmed and another 2004 SCMR 990; Mst. Firdous Iqbal v. Shifaat Ali and others 2000 SCMR 838 and Sardar Hussain and others v. Mst. Parveen Umer PLD 2004 SC 357 rel. Per Musarrat Hilali, J (dissenting) [Minority view]--- (c) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S. 12---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Suit for custody of minor daughter---Remarriage of mother---Welfare of minor---Determination---Petitioner/father of minor daughter was aggrieved of concurrent findings of facts by all Courts below disentitling him from the custody of his minor daughter which was with respondent/mother---Plea raised by petitioner was that mother was not entitled to the custody as after divorce she had remarried a person falling in prohibitory degree to the minor---Validity---Petitioner was biological father of the minor who had sought custody of his minor daughter residing with her maternal grand-mother---Respondent had already remarried and was settled abroad whereas petitioner had not remarried---Given the sensitive nature of custody matters and paramount importance of welfare of minor, assertions raised by petitioner, though not determinative at present stage of proceedings before Supreme Court, merited issuance of notice, which would have enabled a more comprehensive assessment of the matter---Father holds a position of vital importance in a child's life, offering not only emotional stability but also social identity and support within our societal structure---Petition did not merit dismissal without issuance of notice to respondent. Ch. Afrasiab Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with petitioner in-person. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 22nd April, 2025.

Summary: ----R. 149 (2)---Quetta Development Authority Ordinance (IV of 1978), Preamble & S. 40---Housing scheme---Conversion/usage of residential area into commercial area---Scope and effect---Petitioners, residents of a Housing Scheme being regulated under Quetta Development Authority/QDA (scheme-in-question), were aggrieved of involvement of the private respondents in commercial activities (in the shape of Offices, Clinics, Guest Houses, Restaurants and Schools etc.) in the residential area of scheme-in-question---Contention of the petitioners was that on account of mushroom growth of unlawful commercial activities, they were facing multifarious inconveniences---Validity---Rule 149(2) of the Balochistan Building Control And Town Planning Rules, 2022, prescribes a complete procedure to avail sanction or approval for converting residential area into commercial---Not a single document had been brought on record by the private respondents to show that any such prescribed sanction/approval for converting the disputed premises into commercial or any other particular purpose, other than the residence, had been obtained---Record also revealed that the QDA (Respondent) merely issued notices regarding violations to the private respondents yet the same were issued on temporary basis and there was nothing on record to show that any penal action was initiated or taken against them---Private respondents were involved in commercial activities in the residential area which wrong was recurring since long and the concerned authorities of the official respondents were negligent and remained mum---High Court directed the official respondents (Quetta Development Authority) to cease all commercial activities found in violation of applicable laws/ regulations immediately---Constitutional petition, was allowed accordingly. (b) Balochistan Building Control and Town Planning Rules, 2022--- ----R. 149(2)---Quetta Development Authority Ordinance (IV of 1978), Preamble & S. 40---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Housing scheme---Conversion/usage of residential area into commercial area---Scope and effect---Fundamental rights of residents---Scope---Petitioners, residents of a Housing Scheme being regulated under Queta Development Authority/QDA (scheme-in-question), were aggrieved of involvement of the private respondents in commercial activities (in the shape of Offices, Clinics, Guest Houses, Restaurants and Schools etc.) in the residential area of scheme-in-question---Contention of the petitioners was that on account of mushroom growth of unlawful commercial activities, they were facing multifarious inconveniences and their fundamental rights of free movement and peaceful enjoyment of property had seriously been jeopardized---Validity---It was duty of respondent/QDA to provide a complete residential atmosphere to the residents of scheme-in -question---Due to negligence on the part of authority and non-implementation of the provisions of law, mushroom growth of non-residential/commercial activities-in-question have cropped up which has overloaded the domestic facilities meant for residents of the area in the shape of choking of drains, parking of vehicles on roads/streets, traffic congestion, use of extra electricity and gas---Engagement of private respondents in commercial activities in residential areas are causing harm to the environment, public health and the general well-being of the community which warrants intervention by the High Court to safeguard the interests of the public and ensure compliance with the law---High Court directed the official respondents (Quetta Development Authority) to cease all commercial activities found in violation of applicable laws/regulations immediately---Constitutional petition, was allowed accordingly. (c) Balochistan Building Control and Town Planning Rules, 2022--- ----R. 149(2)---Quetta Development Authority Ordinance (IV of 1978), Preamble & S. 40---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 25---Housing scheme---Usage of residential area as commercial one since long---Vested right---Negative equality---Wrong concession---Petitioners, residents of a Housing Scheme being regulated under Queta Development Authority/QDA (scheme-in-question), were aggrieved of involvement of the private respondents in commercial activities (in the shape of Offices, Clinics, Guest Houses, Restaurants and Schools etc.) in the residential area of Scheme-in-question---Contention of the petitioners was that on account of mushroom growth of unlawful commercial activities, they were facing multifarious inconveniences and their fundamental rights of free movement and peaceful enjoyment of property had seriously been jeopardized---Contention of private respondent was that a vested right had been created in his favour as he was occupying the premises for the commercial activity since long, as such commercial activities were going on around the area---Held, that said contention was without any substance for the reason that Art. 25 of the Constitution does not envisage any negative equality---Such right can only be claimed when decision is taken in accordance with law---A wrong concession in favour of one person does not entitle any other person to claim benefit of a wrong decision---If such type of activities are allowed, it would seriously impair the use of the property not only of petitioners but of all those who were living in such residential areas---High Court directed the official respondents (Quetta Development Authority) to cease all commercial activities found in violation of applicable laws/regulations immediately---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Salman Khan for Petitioners. Syed Jamil Agha for Respondent No. 1. Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Addl. A.G. for Respondent Nos.2, 4 and 5. Muhammad Mushtaq Anjum for Respondent No.3. Date of hearing: 21st March, 2024.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Inherent power of High Court---Scope and principles---Quashing of criminal proceedings---High Court can quash a judicial proceeding pending before any subordinate court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of the process of that court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice---Expression "abuse of process" used under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., connotes an unwarranted or irrational use of legal proceedings or process which also includes the presence of ulterior motives for activating the process for unjustified arrest or groundless criminal prosecution---At the same time, this inherent jurisdiction cannot be deemed to be an alternative jurisdiction or additional jurisdiction and cannot be exploited to disrupt or impede the procedural law on the basis of presumptive findings or hyper-technicalities---Instead, it is intended to protect and safeguard the interests of justice and to redress grievances of aggrieved persons, for which no other procedure or remedy is provided in the Cr.P.C---Remedy provided under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., cannot be construed as an alternate remedy or substitute for an express remedy provided under Section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., as the case may---Therefore, the ordinary remedy provided under the law cannot be bypassed or circumvented. Shahnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD 1971 SC 677; Canadian Union of Public Employees v. City of Toronto 2003 SCC 63; (R. v. Power [1994] 1 SCR 601, at p. 616; R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 SCR 1659, at p. 1667 and R. v. Scott, [19901 3 SCR 979, at p. 1007 ref. (b) Words and phrases--- ----Phrase "abuse of process"---Definition provided. Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Gamer, 9th Edition) at page 11; Words and Phrases (West Publishing Co., Vol. 11 at page 355; Jowitt's Dictionary of Law (John Burke, Vol. 1) at page 16; Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary (1988 10th Edition), at page 10 and Law Lexicon with Legal Maxims (M.C.Desai, J. Vol. 1) at page 17 ref. (c) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A & 265-K---Prevention of illegal possession of property---Complaint filed under section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Application/ petition for quashing proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 dismissed by the High Court on the ground that Trial Court had already taken cognizance of the matter---Legality---Impugned order of High Court showed that the main reason for dismissing the quashment petition was that the Trial Court has already taken cognizance, and no other reason had been assigned---It was not the case that the petition was rejected due to the non-availing of an alternate remedy by the petitioner as provided under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C, but the only reason was that the Trial Court had taken cognizance which was neither a lawful justification nor was it persuasive enough to dismiss the quashment petition summarily without considering the grounds raised for the culmination of proceedings in the petition moved under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., as to whether any prima facie case was made out which actually warranted the prevention of the abuse of process, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; the impugned order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the High Court with the direction to decide the quashment application afresh after issuing notice to the parties. Shoaib M. Ashraf, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record Ameerudin, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Dr. Muhammad Shahrukh, Advocate High Court for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Saleem Akhtar, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 15th October, 2024.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Inherent power of High Court---Scope and principles---Quashing of criminal proceedings---High Court can quash a judicial proceeding pending before any subordinate court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of the process of that court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice---Expression "abuse of process" used under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., connotes an unwarranted or irrational use of legal proceedings or process which also includes the presence of ulterior motives for activating the process for unjustified arrest or groundless criminal prosecution---At the same time, this inherent jurisdiction cannot be deemed to be an alternative jurisdiction or additional jurisdiction and cannot be exploited to disrupt or impede the procedural law on the basis of presumptive findings or hyper-technicalities---Instead, it is intended to protect and safeguard the interests of justice and to redress grievances of aggrieved persons, for which no other procedure or remedy is provided in the Cr.P.C---Remedy provided under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., cannot be construed as an alternate remedy or substitute for an express remedy provided under Section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., as the case may---Therefore, the ordinary remedy provided under the law cannot be bypassed or circumvented. Shahnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD 1971 SC 677; Canadian Union of Public Employees v. City of Toronto 2003 SCC 63; (R. v. Power [1994] 1 SCR 601, at p. 616; R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 SCR 1659, at p. 1667 and R. v. Scott, [19901 3 SCR 979, at p. 1007 ref. (b) Words and phrases--- ----Phrase "abuse of process"---Definition provided. Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Gamer, 9th Edition) at page 11; Words and Phrases (West Publishing Co., Vol. 11 at page 355; Jowitt's Dictionary of Law (John Burke, Vol. 1) at page 16; Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary (1988 10th Edition), at page 10 and Law Lexicon with Legal Maxims (M.C.Desai, J. Vol. 1) at page 17 ref. (c) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A & 265-K---Prevention of illegal possession of property---Complaint filed under section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Application/ petition for quashing proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 dismissed by the High Court on the ground that Trial Court had already taken cognizance of the matter---Legality---Impugned order of High Court showed that the main reason for dismissing the quashment petition was that the Trial Court has already taken cognizance, and no other reason had been assigned---It was not the case that the petition was rejected due to the non-availing of an alternate remedy by the petitioner as provided under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C, but the only reason was that the Trial Court had taken cognizance which was neither a lawful justification nor was it persuasive enough to dismiss the quashment petition summarily without considering the grounds raised for the culmination of proceedings in the petition moved under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., as to whether any prima facie case was made out which actually warranted the prevention of the abuse of process, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; the impugned order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the High Court with the direction to decide the quashment application afresh after issuing notice to the parties. Shoaib M. Ashraf, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record Ameerudin, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Dr. Muhammad Shahrukh, Advocate High Court for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Saleem Akhtar, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 15th October, 2024.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989--- ----R.10(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14, 25 & 27---Compassionate appointment---Married daughter of deceased civil servant---Discrimination---Principle of intelligible differentia---Appellant was daughter of deceased civil servant and was appointed under Rule 10(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989---Appointment of appellant was terminated after she contracted marriage---Validity---Reasonable classification must be founded on intelligible differentia and must bear rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by law---Exclusion of married daughters, despite Rule 10(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, itself is inclusive and silence on marital status lacks any rational basis---No intelligible differentia is discernible between a married son and a married daughter that would justify such exclusion in light of the underlying purpose of Rule 10(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, which is to provide compassionate economic relief to bereaved family of a deceased or incapacitated civil servant---Such arbitrary classification is not only unreasonable but plainly unconstitutional, offending the guarantees of equality (Article 25), non-discrimination in public service (Article 27), and the right to dignity (Article 14)---Such act of authorities had undermined expectations of deceased civil servants whose families were assured of lawful security under the compassionate appointment framework---Supreme Court declared clarification of authorities and letter dated 28-04-2023, whereby married daughters were excluded from compassionate appointment under Rule 10(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, to be discriminatory, ultra vires, issued without lawful authority, and incompatible with Constitutional guarantees and international legal obligations---Supreme Court directed respondent/authorities to restore appointment of appellant with all back-benefits and set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal---Supreme Court reaffirmed that all judicial and administrative authorities bear a Constitutional responsibility to adopt gender-sensitive and gender-neutral language; that this was not a mere formality but reflected a substantive commitment to the values of dignity, equality, and autonomy guaranteed to all citizens under Articles 14, 25, and 27 of the Constitution---Supreme Court observed that the Judiciary must lead by example, ensuring that the words used to interpret and apply law did not themselves had become instruments of exclusion---Appeal was allowed. S.G.G. Edgar, Craies on Statute Law (Universal Law Publishing Co, 7th Edition, 1971); Muhammad Nadeem Arif v. IG Police, Punjab 2011 SCMR 408; Federal Public Service Commission v. Altaf Hussain 2015 SCMR 581; Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1910; Union of India v. Majji Jangammayya AIR 1977 SC 757; B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka AIR 1979 SC 1676; P.D. Aggarwal v. State of U.P. AIR 1987 SC 1976; Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy AIR 1986 SC 737; State of Madhya Pradesh v. GS Dall AIR 1991 SC 772; JAC of Airlines Pilots Association v. DG, Civil Aviation AIR 2011 SC 2220; N S Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes (LexisNexis, 13th Edition, 2022); Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab 2005 SCMR 186; Federation of Pakistan v. Shuja Sharif 2023 SCMR 129; Hadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691; Syed Azam Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 201; Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265; Meenakshi Dubey v. Madhya Pradesh AIR 2020 MP 60; Smt. Bhuvaneshwari V. Puranik v. State of Karnataka AIR 2020 Kar. 2303; Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831; Vice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SMCR 527; Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574; Dr. Vijaya Manohar v. Kashi Rao AIR 1987 SC 1100; Sir William Blackstone in William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book The First: Chapter the Fifteenth: Of Husband and Wife (Oxford Press) defines coverture as, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities that either of them acquires by the marriage; E. H. Deering, 'Coverture and Lasting Effects of Gender Inequality: An Analysis through Equal Protection Jurisprudence' Washington University Jurisprudence Review (Volume 16, Issue 2, 2024); Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Ricardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Kirchberg v. Feenstra 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Bombay Labour Union v. Messrs International Franchises AIR 1966 SC 942; C. B. Muthamma v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 1868; Air India v. Nargesh Meerza AIR 1981 SC 1829; Joseph Shine v. Union of India AIR 2018 SC 4898; Murdoch v. Murdoch [1975] 1 SCR 423; Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). Pakistan ratified ICCPR in 2010 and ICESCR in 2008 and Pakistan ratified the CEDAW on 3 December, 1996; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 33 on Women's Access to Justice, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/33 (2015) accessed 23 March, 2025; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy of Myth: A Theory of Dependency (The New Press, 2005); bell hooks, Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics (South End Press, 2000). She chose to write her name in lowercase to de-emphasize her personal identity and draw attention to her work and message, rather than herself; Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (translated by H.M. Parshley) (Jonathan Cape, 1953); In existentialist terms (drawing on Jean-Paul Sartre, a French philosopher), the "other" means being objectified, excluded from subjectivity, and treated as something less than fully human, especially in social, cultural, and legal systems; Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (translated by H.M. Parshley) (Jonathan Cape, 1953); General Post Office, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Jalal PLD 2024 SC 1276; Paragraph 25 of the judgment provides that "it is clarified that the instant judgment shall not affect the appointments already made of the widow/widower, wife/husband or child of deceased or retired civil servants"; Zarai Taraqiati Bank v. Sarfraz Khan Jadoon 2021 SCMR 1305; Pakistan Medical and Dental Council v. Muhammad Fahad Malik 2018 SCMR 1956; According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the term "liability" connotes "the quality or state of being liable" or "one that acts as a disadvantage"; Paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment rel. (b) Islamic law--- ----Women rights over their earnings---Scope---Under Islamic jurisprudence, a woman retains full ownership and control over her property, earnings, and financial affairs, irrespective of her marital status---Any presumption that a married woman becomes financially dependent on her husband is not only legally untenable but also religiously unfounded, and contrary to egalitarian spirit of Islamic law. Surah An-Nisa (4:7): "For men is a share of what the parents and close relatives leave, and for women is a share of what the parents and close relatives leave, be it little or much-a share ordained rel. Rehman Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through V.L. Peshawar Registry). Shah Faisal Ilyas, A.A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Ms. Sabra Parween, DEO (F) Karak for Respondents. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 17th March, 2025.

Summary: Constitution Petitions Nos. 22, 20, 25 to 28 and 30 of 2025, decided on 19th June, 2025. (Constitutional Petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for declaring Notification No. F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025 regarding Transfer of Judges to Islamabad High Court as Illegal and Unconstitutional). AND C.M.A.2136/2025 IN C.P.22/2025 and C.M.A.2137/2025 IN C.P.20/2025 and C.M.A.2138/2025 IN C.P.26/2025 and C.M.A.2139/2025 IN C.P.27/2025 and C.M.A.2047/2025 IN C.P.28/2025 (Stay applications) Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Shahid Bilal Hassan and Salahuddin Panhwar, JJ.; Naeem Akhter Afghan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ. dissenting. [Majority view] (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 175A, 184(3), 200(1) & 200(2)---Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), S. 3---Judges from Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court and Balochistan High Court transferred to Islamabad High Court by the President of Pakistan under Article 200(1) of the Constitution---Dispute over seniority between the transferred judges and judges that already existed prior to the transfer---Whether transfer of a Judge of the High Court to another High Court by the President amounted to a fresh appointment?---Held: Powers of the President of Pakistan under Sub-article (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution for the transfer of a Judge of the High Court from one High Court to another High Court and the provisions contained under Article 175A of the Constitution for appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, High Courts, and the Federal Shariat Court by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan ("JCP") are two distinct provisions dealing with different situations and niceties---Neither do they overlap nor override each other---Article 200 of the Constitution is absolutely not dependent, concomitant, or at the mercy of Article 175A of the Constitution, but is an independent and stand alone provision dealing with the transfer of judges of a High Court (permanently or temporarily) and not the appointment of judges, which assignment has been incontrovertibly conferred to the JCP autonomously in terms of Article 175A of the Constitution---Transfer of a judge by the President of Pakistan by means of Article 200 of the Constitution (permanently or temporarily) cannot be construed as a fresh appointment---Furthermore, the powers of transfer conferred to the President by none other than the framers of the Constitution cannot be questioned on the anvil or ground that if the posts were vacant in the Islamabad High Court, then why they were not filled up by JCP through fresh appointments---Transfer from one High Court to another High Court can only be made within the sanctioned strength, which can only be regarded as a mere transfer and does not amount to raising the sanctioned strength of a particular High Court---Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 is only germane to the appointment of judges and does not, in any way, mean that a judge can only join the Islamabad High Court through a fresh appointment and not by way of a transfer or, in other words, that Article 200 does not apply to the Islamabad High Court, which interpretation would be against the exactitudes of the Constitution---Neither can Section 3 of the said Act supersede/override a constitutional mandate, nor can it control, nullify, or rescind the powers of transfer that are vested in the President of Pakistan under Article 200 of the Constitution---Thus, for all intents and purposes the transfer of judges by the President of Pakistan, by means of the impugned Notification No. F.10 (2)/2024-A.II, dated 1st February 2025 ("Notification") was within the framework of the Constitution and cannot be declared ultra vires---There was no All Pakistan Cadre/unified or combined seniority list of High Court judges for determining their seniority at the time of transfer, therefore, the terms and conditions of transfer (permanently or temporary) including seniority should have been taken up and mentioned by the President of Pakistan at the time of issuing the Notification of transfer in terms of Article 200 of the Constitution---Supreme Court partially remanded the matter to the President of Pakistan, without upsetting the Notification of transfer, to determine the seniority after examining/vetting the service record of the transferee judges as soon as possible, including the question of whether the transfer was on a permanent or temporary basis---Supreme Court directed that till such time that the seniority and nature of transfer (permanent or temporary) of the transferee judges was determined by the President of Pakistan by means of notification/ order, the Judge already holding the office of Acting Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court, would continue to perform as the Acting Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly along with the applications. [Majority view] (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 200---Transfer of High Court judges from one High Court to another---Powers of the President of Pakistan---Scope---Exercise of the powers of transfer by the President of Pakistan under Article 200 of the Constitution is not unregulated or unfettered---It is structured on a four tier formula which expounds that no judge shall be transferred except with his consent and after consultation by the President with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of both High Courts---It means that if at the very initial stage, a judge intended to be transferred from one High Court to another High Court refuses the offer/proposal, then obviously the matter ends forthwith---Even in the case of consent, the transfer shall be subject to consultation with two Chief Justices of the High Courts and the Chief Justice of Pakistan, as the paterfamilias of judiciary, who may, during the consultation process, pragmatically ruminate the pros and cons germane to the transfer proposal, including the aspect of public interest, if any---Hence, for all intents and purposes, it is reverberated beyond any shadow of doubt that before exercising the power of transfer, certain inbuilt procedures and mechanisms have to be followed in letter and spirit and the decision, or the right of refusal or primacy, is within the sphere and realm of judiciary and not within the domain of executives-- -Therefore, it does not in any case compromise the independence of the judiciary for the discernable reason that the decision to accept or reject is exclusively within the hands of the judiciary. Per Naeem Akhter Afghan, J. dissenting; Shakeel Ahmad, J. agreeing . [Minority view] (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 2A, 4, 25, 175A, 184(3), 200(1) & 200(2)---Islamabad High Court Act (XVII of 2010), S. 3---Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024, R. 6---Judges from Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court and Balochistan High Court transferred to Islamabad High Court by the President of Pakistan under Article 200(1) of the Constitution---Dispute over seniority between the transferred judges and judges that already existed prior to the transfer---Whether transfer of a Judge of the High Court to another High Court by the President of Pakistan was a temporary appointment?---Held: Three Judges in question who had been transferred to Islamabad High Court (IHC) had been transferred by the President vide impugned notification on permanent basis---Clause (1) and Clause (2) of Article 200, read in conjunction with each other, do not provide for permanent transfer of a Judge of a High Court from one High Court to another High Court, but provide for transfer of a Judge of a High Court from one High Court to another High Court for a period i.e. on temporary basis---Permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC had been made by the President in wrong exercise of discretion under Clause (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution---It had offended Article 175A of the Constitution and had made the same redundant---Process for permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC suffered from concealment of relevant and material facts from the transferee Judges, from the Chief Justices of the Islamabad High Court (IHC), Lahore High Court (LHC), Sindh High Court (SHC), Balochistan High Court (BHC) and from the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP)---Process for permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC was also lacking meaningful, purposive and consensus oriented consultation with the Chief Justices of IHC, LHC, SHC, BHC and CJP on all the relevant issues---Process for permanent transfer of three Judges to IHC had been completed in an unnecessary haste, and suffered from mala fide in facts as well as mala fide in law---Transfer had not been made by the President in the public interest---While transferring the three Judges to IHC on permanent basis, the President had failed to apply his independent mind with an objective opinion---Object of proportionate representation of all the Provinces in IHC could have conveniently been achieved by making fresh appointment of Judges from the Provinces by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) under Article 175A of the Constitution as Rule 6 of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024 binds/mandates the Members of the JCP to ensure proper diversity in terms of region as well as gender and religion, subject to the prescribed criteria---Transfer of Judges in the present case was violative of Articles 2A, 4 and 25 of the Constitution and it had undermined the independence of judiciary, due process and principle of equality---Impugned Notification No.F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025 issued by the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of Pakistan, whereby in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution, the President of Pakistan had transferred one Judge each from the Lahore High Court, High Court of Sindh and High Court of Balochistan to Islamabad High Court, was declared null and void and of no legal effect---Constitutional petitions were allowed. [Minority view] (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 200---Transfer of High Court judges from one High Court to another---Powers of the President of Pakistan---Scope---Clause (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution is subservient to Clause (1) of Article 200 of the Constitution and both are interconnected---According to the doctrine of harmonious construction, while interpreting Clause (1) and Clause (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution, both the clauses have to be harmonized and, being consistent with each other, have to be read in conjunction with each other for giving effect to both without creating conflict or absurdity. (e) Administration of justice--- ----If a case can be decided on other or narrower grounds, the court will abstain from deciding a larger constitutional question than what is necessary for the determination of the case. "Treatise on constitutional limitations" by Cooley pages 159 to 186; "Constitutional Law of India" Vol-I by H.M. Seervai, pages 260 to 262; "Fundamental Law of Pakistan" by the late Mr. A.K. Brohi, pages 562 to 592; "Judicial Review of Public Actions" Vol-I by Mr. Justice Fazal Karim, pages 488 to 492 and Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 ref. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ---Arts. 175A & 200---Transfer/appointment of Judges of the Superior Courts---No role of intelligence agencies---Intelligence agencies, including Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have no role under the Constitution for appointment or transfer of Judges---Being subordinate to the Executive, the intelligence agencies, including ISI, cannot override the Executive, the Judiciary, the Constitutional bodies and the Constitutional office holders. For the Petitioners: Muneer A. Malik, Senior Advocate Supreme Court Salahuddin Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record (in C.P. No. 22 of 2025) assisted by Ms. Zainab Janjua and Ms. Faaiza Qazi, Advocates. Idrees Ashraf Malik, Advocate Supreme Court Raja Muqsit Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps. Nos. 20 and 25 of 2025) Hamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court Waqar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps. Nos. 26 and 27 of 2025) Faisal Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court Riasat Ali Azad, Advocate Supreme Court Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record Assisted by M. Ammar Rafique and Sikandar Naeem Qazi, Advocate (in C.Ps. Nos. 28 and 30 of 2025). For the Respondents: For the Federation, the President of Pakistan Registrar SCP and Secretary JCP Mansoor Usman Awan, A.G.P. Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. A.G.P. Raja Shafqat Mehmood Abbasi, D.A.G. Muhammad Amir Malik, Advocate-on-Record Assisted by: Mr.Hasan Mehmood, Legislative Advisor, Ministry of Law, Ms. Mariyam Ali Abbasi and Saad Javed Satti, Advocates. For Province of Punjab: Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz, A.G. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Addl. A.G. Rao Muhammad Aurangzeb, Asstt. A.G. Assisted by: Muhammad Adil Chattha, Sr.Consultant For Province of Sindh: Suresh Kumar, Addl. A.G. Sibtain Mehmood, Addl. A.G. and Barrister Zeeshan Adhi, Addl. A.G. For Province of KPK: Shah Faisal Ilyas, Addl. A.G. For Province of Balochistan: Muhammad Ayaz Swati, Addl. A.G. and Tahir Iqbal Khattak, Addl. A.G. For ICT: Ayyaz Shaukat, A.G. and Dr. Mirza Muhammad Usman, Advocate-on-Record For the Registrar LHC: M. Shahid Latif Khan, Dy. Registrar For the Registrar PHC: Wajid Ali Khan, Director (Regulations) (via video link from Peshawar) For the Registrar HCS: Sohail Muhammad Laghari, Registrar (via video link from Karachi) For the Registrar IHC: M. Asif Iqbal, Dy. Registrar For the Transferee Judges: Nemo. Dates of hearing: 14th, 17th, 22nd, 29th, 30th April; 07th, 08th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 26th, 27th, 29th May and 16th June to 19th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Setting wife on fire---Cold blooded murder---Quantum of sentence---Doctrine of "rarest of rare"---Applicability---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to death---Validity---Motive attributed to accused was deceased's opposition to his intention of selling the house, which stood proved on record---It is a matter of common experience that domestic disputes over property frequently arise in our society---Resorting to such a brutal act of setting one's spouse on fire reflected violent disposition of accused and pointed towards premeditation---Established motive, when read in conjunction with brutal and deliberate manner in which offence was committed, left no room for doubt that murder of deceased was preplanned and intentional---Crime committed by accused was extremely heinous---Under the doctrine of "rarest of rare", death sentence may be imposed where the offence is exceptionally brutal, shocking to the collective conscience of society and where there exists a compelling need for deterrence---Offence was of the most brutal nature, wherein accused was found guilty of cold-blooded murder of his own wife, mother of his children, that too within the confines of their matrimonial home and in the presence of their young children---Supreme Court declined to extend any leniency to accused and maintained conviction and death sentence awarded to accused---Appeal was dismissed. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd and abetment---Re-appraisal of evidence---Abetment---Proof---Principal accused murdered his wife by setting her on fire and he was sentenced to death---Accused was alleged to have abetted the principal accused in committing murder of his wife---Courts below convicted the accused for qatl-i-amd and sentenced him to imprisonment for life--- Validity---Record neither established presence of accused at the time of occurrence nor had any specific role been assigned to him in the crime report lodged by investigating officer---Prosecution failed to prove involvement of accused or his nexus with alleged offence---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused by the Courts below and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in both cases). Siraj Ali Khan, Addl. PG, Sindh for the State. Complainant in-person (via VL from Karachi) Date of hearing: 12th March, 2025.

Summary: ----S.230(2)(a)---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 224---Caretaker Government/Cabinet---Functions, mandate and primary role---Interference by the Caretaker Cabinet in major policy decisions taken by the elected Government---Effect---Notification issued by elected Government qua creation of new district Wazirabad in Gujrat Division was suspended through subsequent notification issued by the Governor pursuant to decision taken by the Caretaker Cabinet after dissolution of Provincial Assembly of Punjab---Validity---Notification issued by an elected government creating a new district of Wazirabad could not have been suspended by the Caretaker Government as it was tantamount to taking a major policy decision on an issue which was not an urgent matter within the contemplation of S.230(2)(a) of the Elections Act, 2017 (Act, 2017) and it also had the unpalatable effect to influence the elections and adversely affect the free and fair elections---Notification issued by Caretaker Government was liable to generate controversy and was certainly not an activity of a routine nature to be within the competence of the Caretaker Government and it did not spell out any reasonable objective which prompted the Caretaker Cabinet to take such decision which was clearly beyond the scope of the armoury of powers of the Caretaker Cabinet and cast doubt on the purpose for which the decision was taken---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. 2013 SCMR 1205 rel. (b) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----S. 230---Label "Caretaker"---Denotation---Powers of "Elected Cabinet" and "Caretaker Cabinet"---Scope and extent---Label "Care-taker" merely denotes a cabinet for a short duration constituted under peculiar circumstances and to fulfil a constitutional mandate---Distinction between the Elected Cabinet and a Caretaker Cabinet does not lie in the use of powers under the Constitution or the laws but in making decisions while using those powers and which must be limited to the purpose underlying their establishment, thus, although Caretaker Cabinets exercise the same range of powers, their actions and decisions must comport with and not detract from their primary role as tenants of a regime infused with the exalted and core ingredients of neutrality and impartiality---Every power has legal limits and the powers of a Caretaker Cabinet are more limited than an elected cabinet---Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017, is an expression of the need to fence the decision-making powers of a Caretaker Cabinet and this concept is wedded to the notion of a Caretaker Cabinet which is obliged to act compatibly with the role assigned to it and to remain within the confines of its statutory powers. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 218, 219 & 220---Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S.230---Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)---Decision making process undertaken by the Caretaker Cabinet---Role of ECP---Scope---It is the duty of ECP to organize and conduct the election and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted honestly, justly and fairly---Cumulative reading of Arts.218, 219 & 220 of the Constitution read with S.230 of the Act-2017 shows that ECP exercises an overarching power over a Caretaker Cabinet during the time it is in place and whose sole object is to assist ECP to hold elections in accordance with law---No other role has been envisaged either by the Constitution or the law to inhere in a Caretaker Cabinet---ECP has to engage proactively with a Caretaker Cabinet to supervise and oversee the decision-making process by a Caretaker Cabinet on its own volition and without instigation by the superior courts---Constitution vests enormous powers in ECP to do so and under Art.220 of the Constitution it is the duty of all executive parties in the Federation and in the Provinces to assist ECP in the discharge of its functions, thus, ECP has to keep a close eye on all decisions being taken by a Caretaker Cabinet and to correct them if the Caretaker Cabinet falls outside its jurisdiction in any manner or takes decisions which infringe the mandate of S.230 of the Act, 2017---Transgression of powers by the Caretake Cabinet is impermissible---Election Commission of Pakistan must come alive to its duty to rein in on the Caretaker Cabinet if it is found to be disloyal to its mandate and primary role. Tipu Salman Makhdoom, Mubeen ud Din Qazi, M. Akbar Baba, Moeen Ahmed, Muhammad Arshad Kundi, Mirza Saleem Baig, Mian Najam us Saqib, Ali Raza Warraich, Muhammad Ayub Khan, Saeed Ahmad Cheema, Arslan Nawaz Cheema, Muhammad Yasir Ibrahim, Ahmad Raza Khalid, Rana Muhammad Afzal Razzaq Khan, Ch. Tahir Mahmood, Ahmad Sardar Khan Niazi, Rohail Rahman Qazi, Zubair Ali Butt, Ch. Sabir Ali, Dr. Zia Ullah Ranjha, Muhammad Usman Gondal, Waseem Abbas, Umar Sameed, Bilal Rasheed and Muhammad Naeem Chaudhry for Petitioners. Ms. Sheeba Qaiser, A.A.G. with Ch. Muhammad Umer, Director Legal, ECP, Muhammad Haroon Kasi, Director Law, ECP and Saif Ahmad Bhatti, Law Officer, BoR for Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th June, 2023.