Summary: The petitioner, a former contractual employee of the Sindh Revenue Board (SRB), challenged the engagement of private legal counsel by the SRB, arguing that as a government department, the SRB should be represented by the office of the advocate general, rather than hiring private lawyers. The petitioner claimed that the SRB had retained the services of private counsel, resulting in substantial legal fees. He cited the Rasheed Ahmed case as a precedent against the engagement of private counsel by government entities and requested the court to declare the vakalatnamas (authorizations to represent) issued by the SRB in specific cases as void and to direct the deposit of the fees paid to advocates into the national exchequer. The SRB's representative argued that the petitioner's claims were motivated by personal grudges and that the Rasheed Ahmed case applied to the Rules of Business of the Federal Government, not the Government of Sindh. It was contended that the SRB's role in the Government of Sindh was akin to the Federal Board of Revenue's role in the Federal Government, allowing them to engage legal counsel to protect revenue interests. The court considered the arguments presented and referenced the Rasheed Ahmed case, which deprecated the engagement of private counsel by the government without compelling reasons or public interest. It noted that the SRB was not a ministry or division of the Government of Sindh, as confirmed by official documentation. Therefore, the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any legal restraint on the SRB's ability to hire private legal counsel. Additionally, the court expressed doubt about the petitioner's claim being an act of public interest litigation, given the absence of a matter affecting the public at large. The court dismissed the petition, finding it misconceived and lacking in merit.

Summary: Judgments related to several petitions (CP D 4140 of 2018, CP D 4223 of 2018, CP D 4226 of 2018, CP D 4229 of 2018, and CP D 4284 of 2018) involving issues of disqualification of members of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh. The petitions are seeking the permanent disqualification of these members due to alleged non-disclosure of an "iqama" (a residency permit) in their nomination forms. The judgment addresses various legal aspects, including the maintainability of the petitions, the definition of an "iqama" as an asset, and whether the alleged non-disclosure of an iqama constitutes a disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The court concludes that the petitions are maintainable for members currently holding public office, but not for those who are not currently in office. Additionally, the court determines that an iqama is not an asset as defined by the law, and the existence of an iqama alone is not sufficient evidence to establish undisclosed assets. Ultimately, the court dismisses the petitions for being either misconceived, not maintainable, or devoid of merit based on the arguments and evidence presented. The judgments are provided by different judges for each of the mentioned petitions.

Summary: The petitioners argued that the respondents failed to disclose their iqamas and related assets in their nomination forms, which, according to the petitioners, rendered them ineligible for holding public office. The respondents countered by claiming that an iqama is not an asset, that there's no requirement to disclose it in nomination forms, and that all assets were appropriately disclosed. The judgment discusses the maintainability of the petitions considering the timing of their filing, pointing out that under certain circumstances, the High Court's jurisdiction can be invoked to challenge the qualification of individuals even after an election. The court finds some petitions maintainable, given that the respondents were elected to the Provincial Assembly in the 2018 general elections. Regarding the argument whether an iqama qualifies as an asset, the court examines the definition of "asset" and concludes that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that an iqama is an asset. The court also notes that no provision required the disclosure of iqamas in nomination forms. Ultimately, the court dismisses some petitions as not maintainable and the others for lack of merit, as the petitioners were unable to provide clear evidence of undisclosed assets related to the iqamas, thereby rendering the allegations unproven.

Summary: Imposition of compensation/cost to delinquent police official while dealing with petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C---In this case, Tahir Mahmood Gujar, a police official, has filed a revision petition challenging an order from the Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, which directed him to pay compensation of Rs. 10,000 to each of the detenus for their illegal detention. The detenus were allegedly taken into custody by the police and kept in the premises of C.I.A. Staff, Gujranwala, without proper documentation of their arrest. The Sessions Judge, after examining the situation, concluded that the detenus were indeed held illegally and held Tahir Mahmood Gujar responsible for the unlawful detention. The petitioner challenged this decision, arguing that compensation cannot be awarded in habeas corpus cases. The court discussed the permissible orders in habeas corpus cases, including the award of compensation. While acknowledging the validity of awarding compensation, the court finds that a more detailed inquiry should be conducted to determine responsibility for illegal detention. The court sets aside the order directing Tahir Mahmood Gujar to pay compensation and remands the case to the Sessions Judge.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd and common intention---Bail, grant of---Absconsion---Scope---Prosecution case was that the accused was presentalong with two co-accused persons, who fired and killed two persons---Accused wasnominated in the FIR but no role of firing was attributed to him---FIR was also silent as towhether the accused was armed or not---Witnesses, in their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.,had although alleged that the accused was equipped with fire arm and had murdered thedeceased persons but such role was not ascribed to the accused in the FIR---Bail could begranted if the accused had a good prima facie case for bail on merits and his absconsionwould not come in the way while granting bail---Petition for grant of bail was allowed, incircumstances.Mitho Pitafi v. The State 2009 SCMR 299 rel.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 34 & 149---Common intention---Common object---Scope---Mere presence of anaccused at the time of commission of crime is not enough to hold him responsible forcommission of crime, unless the prosecution succeeds in establishing that the accused hadalso shared common intention or common object with his co-accomplices or helped orfacilitated them in the crime.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Bail---Qatl-i-amd and commonintention---No overt act ascribed to accused---Scope---Whenever no overt act was ascribed toaccused, lenient view was required to be taken towards the accused for granting him theconcession of bail.Muhammad Khan alias Muhammad Bux v. The State 2015 PCr.LJ 69 and MuhammadTanveer v. The State 2014 PCr.LJ 1096 ref

Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)-------Ss. 3, 4 & 5---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 540---Illegal dispossession---Summoning of witness---Scope---Petitioner filed application under S. 540, Cr.P.C., forcalling the concerned SHO to tender the proposed document as a witness, which applicationwas dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---If it appeared to the court that a person'sevidence was essential to the just decision of the case then there was no discretion to preventsuch a person from being examined---Power under S. 540, Cr.P.C., to summon a witnessmight be exercised either by suo motu or on an application---Person who might not havebeen examined at the time of investigation or whose name was not included in the calendarof witnesses or in the challan could be summoned under S. 540, Cr.P.C.---In the present casethe parties were in dispute over the property, which they claimed to be the owners of onaccount of petitioners alleged dispossession from the same---Petitioner filed a complaintunder Ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against the respondents for hisalleged dispossession---No doubt, the document which the petitioner wanted to place onrecord i.e. report of SHO dated 16.12.2019 was not filed at the time of filing the complaint---Perusal of the same prima-facie revealed that allegedly the accused/respondents tried toencroach the unsettled property and the petitioner intended to establish the conduct of therespondents as land grabbers through the said document---Trial Court did not make an effortto satisfy itself or to consider the two essential ingredients; firstly, whether the proposedperson was a material witness and, secondly, whether he was essential for a just decision ofthe case---Trial Court was required to take the entire material and the circumstances of thecase into consideration, so as to form an opinion whether summoning of the proposedwitness was essential for a just decision of the case---Trial court, while passing the impugnedorder, did not consider the principles and law laid down for deciding applications under S.540, Cr.P.C and thereby failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, besides the illegality andmaterial irregularity---Grounds for dismissing the application under S. 540, Cr.P.C., wereneither tenable in law nor in consonance with the principles enunciated in that regard---Application was allowed by the High Court setting aside the impugned order and Trial Courtwas directed to call the proposed witness to place the said document on record according tolaw. Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Azan and another 2011 SCMR 474 and ShahbazMasih v. The State 2007 SCMR 1631 rel.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 540---Summoning of witness---Scope---Most critical and fundamental considerationsfor a court while deciding such an application were twofold; firstly, it was to form an opinionas to whether the person was a material witness and secondly, that examining such a witnesswas essential for a just decision of the case---Timing of summoning such a person to beexamined as a witness was irrelevant, provided the court was satisfied that the evidencewould be essential to meet the ends of justice and for a just decision of the case---Likewise,it was also not a bar to examine such a material witness if, during the investigations, his/herstatement was not recorded under S. 161, Cr.P.C., or he did not appear in the calendar ofwitnesses.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XL, R.1---Receiver, appointment of---Scope and requirements---Words "just andconvenient"---Connotation---Plaintiffs during pendency of suit filed application forappointment of receiver, which was dismissed---Validity---Court had jurisdiction to appointreceiver of the suit property in order to protect and preserve the same---Such discretionshould be exercised judiciously by following the norms of law to protect the right of thecitizens---Party seeking relief of appointment of receiver should make out a prima facie caseand establish his title to the suit property---Such party should also show that suit propertywould be wasted and misappropriated if receiver was not appointed---Apprehension ofmismanagement or misappropriation alone was not sufficient for appointment of receiver---Appointment of receiver was the harshest remedy provided under Civil Procedure Code,1908---Power under O.XL, R.1 of C.P.C. should only be exercised when Court had come tothe conclusion that it was just and convenient to appoint receiver to preserve and protect theproperty during pendency of litigation---Words "just and convenient" used in O.XL, R.1 ofC.P.C. was to be interpreted depending upon the facts of each case---Said words denoteconvenience of the party and not that of the Court---Suit property in the present case was inpossession of defendants and revenue entries were also in their names---Appointment ofreceiver in circumstances, was not just and convenient as it would deprive the defendantsfrom usufruct of the properties---Plaintiffs had yet to prove their contention at the trial andthey had failed to show any emergency and loss demanding immediate action forappointment of receiver---No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugnedorders passed by the Courts below---Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine.

Summary: BackgroundThis case involves multiple appeals and petitions led by Gul Taiz Khan Marwat against various judicial bodies, including the Peshawar High Court and Lahore High Court, among others. The case references a series of legal disputes that deal primarily with the administrative, executive, and consultative actions of the Chief Justices and Judges of various High Courts across Pakistan. The appeals and petitions challenge these actions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which pertains to the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts.---IssuesThe primary issue in this case was whether the actions of the Chief Justices or Judges of a High Court, in their executive, administrative, or consultative capacities, are amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. This issue revolves around the interpretation of the term "person" under Article 199(5) and whether it includes judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts when they act in non-judicial capacities.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the actions of the Chief Justices and Judges, when acting in their executive, administrative, or consultative capacities, do not fall within the ambit of "person" as defined in Article 199(5) of the Constitution. Therefore, such actions are not amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199.The Court applied the "but for" test to determine the immunity of judicial actions from challenge under Article 199. It concluded that actions carried out by judges due to their roles inherently linked to their judicial positions are immune from challenge. The Court emphasized the need for judicial comity and maintaining the respect and hierarchical order essential for the judiciary's functioning and public trust.---Citations/PrecedentsCh. Muhammad Akram v. Registrar, Islamabad High Court and others PLD 2016 SC 961 was overruled.Abrar Hassan and Malik Asad were distinguished.Suleman Ali Haideri and another v. Government of Balochistan and others 2004 SCMR 354 referenced.Mujibur Rahman Shami and another v. A Judge of the High Court, Lahore PLD 1973 Lah. 778Mian Jamal Shah v. The Member, Election Commission and others PLD 1966 SC 1Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Akram Shaikh PLD 1989 SC 689Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Lahore High Court through Registrar and others 2010 SCMR 632Asif Saeed v. Registrar, Lahore High Court and others PLD 1999 Lah. 350Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan through Secretary and others PLD 2010 SC 61Asif Naz v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lah. 271Water and Sanitation Agency, Lahore through M.D. v. Lottee Akhtar Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore and others 2019 SCMR 1146Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 1975 SC 457Habib Bank Ltd. v. The State and 6 others 1993 SCMR 1853Muhammad Yar Buttar and 4 others v. Board of Governors, Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, Islamabad and another 1999 SCMR 819

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending