Summary: The brief facts of the case involved a complaint by Respondent No.4 against the petitioner, alleging that the petitioner barged into his house and assaulted his maternal cousin, Razia Bibi. The FIR was initially registered under Section 354 PPC. The petitioner contended that the Magistrate had no authority to interfere with the investigation and that the complaint against him is false. The petitioner's counsel argued that medical evidence is essential to corroborate the alleged assault, and since the petitioner is the brother-in-law of Respondent No.4, Section 452 PPC should not be invoked against him. The judge cites guidelines for the exercise of powers by Magistrates under Sections 167 and 344 Cr.P.C. The judge emphasized the separation of roles between the police and the judiciary in the investigation process and highlighted the limitations on the court's authority to interfere with police proceedings. Ultimately, the judge upheld the Magistrate's order, stating that the Magistrate can direct the Investigating Officer to add, delete, or substitute an offense mentioned in the FIR if circumstances warrant. However, the Magistrate cannot dictate the manner in which the Investigating Officer submitted the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The petition was dismissed based on these considerations.

Summary: The petitioner, initially serving as a Junior Clerk in the City District Government, Lahore, qualified the written examination but had his candidature rejected by the PPSC due to being overage and not submitting a Departmental Permission Certificate. The petitioner argued that the Punjab Civil Servants Recruitment (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1976, entitled government servants to relaxation in the upper age limit. The petitioner contended that there was no distinction made in the rules regarding government departments, and the PPSC, through departmental instructions, wrongfully excluded City District/Zila Council/Local Council servants from the benefit of these rules. The court, after considering arguments from both sides, ruled that the employees of Zila Council are not government servants based on the applicable rules. The judgment highlighted the definition of "government servant" in various enactments and ruled that the petitioner, governed by the Punjab Local Council Servants (Service) Rules, 1997, cannot be termed a government servant for the purpose of relaxation in the upper age limit. The judgment referred to legal precedents and statutes to support the conclusion that the petitioner did not fall within the definition of a government servant. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition.

Summary: Background:This case involves multiple constitution petitions filed by various petitioners, including Justice Qazi Faez Isa, the Supreme Court Bar Association, Abid Hassan Minto, Pakistan Bar Council, and several other bar associations and individuals. The petitions challenge the legality and validity of Reference No. 1 of 2019 filed against Justice Qazi Faez Isa by the President of Pakistan, as well as the proceedings initiated by the Supreme Judicial Council against Justice Isa based on a show-cause notice issued to him. The petitioners argue that the reference and proceedings violate Justice Isa's constitutional rights and seek their annulment.---Issues:Whether Reference No. 1 of 2019 filed against Justice Qazi Faez Isa is legal and valid.Whether the proceedings initiated by the Supreme Judicial Council against Justice Isa based on the show-cause notice are lawful.Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief against the reference and proceedings.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court, comprising multiple judges, allowed the petitions and declared Reference No. 1 of 2019 to be of no legal effect, quashing the proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council against Justice Qazi Faez Isa. The court emphasized the importance of upholding the independence of the judiciary and the constitutional rights of individuals, including judges. It reiterated that no one, including judges, is above the law, but also affirmed that judges have the right to be treated in accordance with the law. Justice Yahya Afridi dissented, finding one of the petitions non-maintainable.

Summary: BackgroundThis case involves a series of constitutional petitions filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the legal proceedings initiated by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) against various petitioners, including Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa. The petitions argue against the actions taken under Reference No. 1 of 2019, which was directed at Justice Isa and involved allegations related to the nondisclosure of assets held in the United Kingdom by his family. The main contention revolves around the legality and procedural propriety of the reference filed by the President of Pakistan and its subsequent handling by the SJC.---IssuesWhether Reference No. 1 of 2019 filed against Justice Qazi Faez Isa by the President of Pakistan is legally and procedurally valid.Whether the proceedings initiated by the Supreme Judicial Council based on the said reference were in accordance with the law.The rights of judges under scrutiny and the implications for judicial independence.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe Supreme Court allowed the petitions, resulting in several crucial determinations:Reference No. 1 of 2019 was declared to have no legal effect and was quashed. Consequently, all proceedings against Justice Isa in the SJC, including a show-cause notice, were abated.The court ordered the Inland Revenue to individually reassess the legality of the assets held by Justice Isa's family in the UK, setting specific deadlines and procedures for this reassessment, separate from the judicial review process.It underscored the constitutional protection of judicial independence and the right of judges and other citizens to be treated according to the law, emphasizing that no individual or institution is above the law, including judges.Justice Yahya Afridi dissented in part, finding Constitutional Petition No. 17/2019 non-maintainable.---Citations/PrecedentsArticle 209 of the Constitution, regarding the procedure for the SJC.Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, under which the assets in question are to be reassessed.Various constitutional principles concerning the independence of the judiciary and the legal protections afforded to judges and citizens.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 489-F---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Scope---Mere issuance of a cheque and it beingdishonoured by itself was not an offence, unless dishonesty on the part of payer is proved.Allah Ditta v. The State 2013 SCMR 51 and Muhammad Sultan v. The State 2010SCMR 806 rel.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 489-F--- Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused issued cheques, which were dishonoured on presentation, due to insufficient balancein the account---Record showed that the entire case was based on the testimony of thecomplainant being star witness of the case---Complainant stated in his statement that in themonth of March 2017, the accused started partnership with a Trading Company and wasdoing business with him of Rs.30000000/----In the meanwhile, Rs. 1,48,000,00/- wasoutstanding against him---On demand of the same, the accused first lingered on the matterbut consequently issued cheques---On presentation, the same were dishonoured due toinsufficient balance in the account---Complainant did not produce any agreement in respectof business partnership, which was the basic document to establish the relationship betweenthe complainant and accused---Statement of complainant was silent with regard to placewhere such transaction took place---Furthermore, complainant had failed to produce a singledocument to establish the existence of any partnership allegedly carried out between him andthe accused---Complainant had also failed to give the full particulars of the said partnership---Complainant could not establish on record that there had been any transaction between himand the accused for which the cheques had been issued and subsequently were declareddishonoured---Complainant stated during cross-examination that he himself filled the chequeat the instance of the accused, meaning thereby that the cheque was filled/written by thecomplainant himself and he also mentioned the amount in the said cheque---Said fact provedthat the accused did not issue the cheque wilfully and intentionally---Similarlywitness/representative of the Bank stated during cross-examination that there was cutting onthe cheque of Rs.600000/=---Said aspect of the matter casted serious doubt in the prosecution case which was not considered by the Trial Court as well as appellate court---Criminalrevision was allowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside the impugned judgmentspassed by the Trial Court and appellate court.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 489-F--- Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of about sixmonths in lodging the FIR---Effect---Accused issued cheques, which were dishonoured onpresentation, due to insufficient balance in the account---Record showed that the allegedcheques were issued on 18.08.2017 and 28.9.2017, but the application for registration of theFIR was submitted on 17.03.2018 and FIR was lodged on 26.08.2018 with delay of sixmonths without an explanation, however, complainant stated during cross-examination thatthe application for registration of the FIR was written by an Advocate in his office on17.03.2018, meaning thereby that the complainant lodged the FIR after deliberation andconsultation, which created serious doubt in the prosecution case---Criminal revision wasallowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside the impugned judgments passed by theTrial Court and appellate court.(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 489-F--- Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Appreciation of evidence---Withholding material evidence---Effect---Accused issuedcheques, which were dishonoured on presentation, due to insufficient balance in the account---Complainant stated in his report as well as in his statement before the court that he wasManager of the Trading Company, meaning thereby that complainant was not the owner ofthe said Trading Company---In such view of the fact, the question arose that in what capacitythe accused had given the cheques to him---Moreso, prosecution neither cited the owner ofthe Trading Company as well as his brother as witnesses in the challan nor produced thembefore the Trial Court---In order to establish the version put forth by the complainant, thepresence of said important witnesses would have further strengthened the prosecutionversion---Non-production of such important witnesses, as provided under Art. 129(g) ofQanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 would cast adverse inference, that if the said witnesses had beenproduced they would not have supported the prosecution version---Criminal revision wasallowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside the impugned judgments passed by theTrial Court and appellate court.Lal Khan v The State 2004 SCMR 1847 rel.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss.22-A, 22-B & 154-Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, order of-Non-compliance-Petitioner was aggrieved of order passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace-Validity-Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, before taking cognizance in the matter of application under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. was obliged to satisfy that petitioner had already approached concerned quarters meant for redressal of his grievance i.e. he had filed application before Station House Officer for registration of case, which was registered under a proper diary number and inaction by Station House Officer was further agitated before higher police hierarchy (Superintendent of Police) under due receipt but with no effect-When such pre-requisite was established then as a second phase it was mandatory that proposed FIR in original was annexed with petition under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. while copy of the same duly attested by the counsel was to be clubbed with the petition-If after taking into consideration/evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case, Ex-Officio Justice of Peace would pass direction for registration of a case, the proposed FIR annexed with file was to be handed over to prosecutor with due receipt who was to onward transmit the same to the highest police officer of the district/tehsil-Receipt issued in such behalf was to contain signatures with name, date and time of its receiver-Such was the duty of concerned police officer to route the same to concerned quarter/Station House Officer for due legal action-District Police Officer or City Police Officer, as the case could be, would be responsible to pay surprise and random visits to police stations so as to ensure that proposed FIRs were entered as regular/formal FIRs for further process/investigation, in accordance with law-Unless order of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace viz. registration of version or FIR was suspended by higher forum, police hierarchy was bound for its implementation in letter and spirit as early as possible but not later than five days, except in compelling circumstances-Otherwise if such matter with regard to non-compliance of order of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace viz. registration of case after five days was brought to the notice of Court the consequences would be on the shoulders of concerned Station House Officer-First Information Report in the present case, was already stood registered at concerned police station, therefore, petitioners had more than one alternate remedy before Trial Court for redressal of their grievance-Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Mian Muhammad Ali v. C.C.P.O. and others PLD 2015 Lah. 313 and Younas Abbas and others v. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal and others PLD 2016 SC 581 rel.

Summary: (a) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-Good faith-Comparative jurisprudence on the role of 'good faith' in enforcement of contractual terms. Hesselink "The Concept of Good Faith"in Hartkamp et al Towards a European Civil Code 4th ed (Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands 2011) 619 at 619; Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433 (Interfoto) at 439F-G; Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) at para 124 per Leggatt J.; British Telecommunications v Telefonica O2 [2014] UKSC 42 at para 37 and Braganza v BP Shipping [2015] UKSC 17 at para 30; See, for example, Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Saeed Bin v Kent [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm) at para 174; Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers [2000] 3 HKCFAR; Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71; Viven-Wilksch"Good Faith in Contracts: Australia at a Crossroads"(2019) 1 Journal of Commonwealth Law 273 at 273-4; Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd (2001) 69 NSWLR 558; Alstom Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2012] SASC 49 and Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15 (Vodafone) ref. (b) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-Public policy-Role of the Constitution (of South Africa), concepts of public policy, fairness, reasonableness, justice and 'ubuntu' with regard to enforcement of contractual terms. The determination of public policy was rooted in the Constitution (of South Africa) and the objective, normative value system it embodied. Constitutional rights applied through a process of indirect horizontality to contracts. The impact of the Constitution on the enforcement of contractual terms through the determination of public policy was profound. A careful balancing exercise was required to determine whether a contractual term, or its enforcement, would be contrary to public policy. Napier v Barkhuizen [2005] ZASCA 119; 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (Barkhuizen SCA) ref. Public policy imported values of fairness, reasonableness and justice. Concept of 'ubuntu', which encompassed these values, was also recognised as a constitutional value, inspiring the constitutional compact, which in turn informed public policy. These values formed important considerations in the balancing exercise required to determine whether a contractual term, or its enforcement, was contrary to public policy. While these values played an important role in the public policy analysis, they also performed creative, informative and controlling functions in that they underlay and informed the substantive law of contract. Many established doctrines of contract law were themselves the embodiment of these values. In addition, these values played a fundamental role in the application and development of rules of contract law to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights [Chapter two of the Constitution of South Africa]. Constitutional Court (of South Africa) recognised the necessity of infusing law of contract with constitutional values. This required courts to exercise both resourcefulness and restraint. While abstract values provided a normative basis for the development of new doctrines, prudent and disciplined reasoning was required to ensure certainty of the law. Abstract values did not provide a free-standing basis upon which a court may interfere in contractual relationships. Domestic law (of South Africa) had always, to a greater or lesser extent, recognised the role of equity (encompassing the notions of good faith, fairness and reasonableness) as a factor in assessing the terms and the enforcement of contracts. Indeed, it was clear that these values played a profound role in law of contract under the constitutional dispensation. However, a court may not refuse to enforce contractual terms on the basis that the enforcement would, in its subjective view, be unfair, unreasonable or unduly harsh. These abstract values had not been accorded autonomous, self-standing status as contractual requirements. Their application was mediated through the rules of contract law; including the rule that a court may not enforce contractual terms where the term or its enforcement would be contrary to public policy. It was only where a contractual term, or its enforcement, was so unfair, unreasonable or unjust that it was contrary to public policy that a court may refuse to enforce it. The enforcement of contractual terms did not depend on an individual judge's sense of what fairness, reasonableness and justice required. To hold otherwise would be to make the enforcement of contractual terms dependent on the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds. This would introduce an unacceptable degree of uncertainty into the law of contract. The resultant uncertainty would be inimical to the rule of law. (c) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-Public policy-Principles governing the judicial control of contracts through the instrument of public policy, stated. Following are the principles governing the judicial control of contracts through the instrument of public policy: (i) Public policy demanded that contracts freely and consciously entered into must be honoured; (ii) A court would declare invalid a contract that was prima facie inimical to a constitutional value or principle, or otherwise contrary to public policy; (iii) Where a contract was not prima facie contrary to public policy, but its enforcement in particular circumstances was, a court would not enforce it; (iv) The party who attacked the contract or its enforcement bore the onus to establish the facts; (v) A court would use the power to invalidate a contract or not to enforce it, sparingly, and only in the clearest of cases in which harm to the public was substantially incontestable and did not depend on the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds; and (vi) A court would decline to use this power where a party relied directly on abstract values of fairness and reasonableness to escape the consequences of a contract because they were not substantive rules that may be used for such purpose. AB v Pridwin Preparatory School [2018] ZASCA 150; 2019 (1) SA 327 (SCA) (Pridwin) at para 27 ref. (d) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-"Pacta sunt servanda", principle of-Scope and significance. The principle of 'pacta sunt servanda' gave effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. In general public policy required that contracting parties honour obligations that had been freely and voluntarily undertaken. Pacta sunt servanda continued to play a crucial role in the judicial control of contracts through the instrument of public policy, as it gave expression to central constitutional values. Contractual relations were the bedrock of economic activity and economic development was dependent, to a large extent, on the willingness of parties to enter into contractual relationships. If parties were confident that contracts that they entered into would be upheld, then they would be incentivised to contract with other parties for their mutual gain. Without this confidence, the very motivation for social coordination was diminished. It was indeed crucial to economic development that individuals should be able to trust that all contracting parties would be bound by obligations willingly assumed. The protection of the sanctity of contracts was thus essential to the achievement of the constitutional vision of society. Indeed, such vision would be imperiled if courts denuded the principle of pacta sunt servanda. However pacta sunt servanda was not the only, nor the most important principle informing the judicial control of contracts. The requirements of public policy were informed by a wide range of constitutional values. There was no basis for privileging pacta sunt servanda over other constitutional rights and values. Where a number of constitutional rights and values were implicated, a careful balancing exercise was required to determine whether enforcement of the contractual terms would be contrary to public policy in the circumstances. (e) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement -"Perceptive restraint", principle of-Scope. According to the principle of 'perceptive restraint' a court must exercise perceptive restraint when approaching the task of invalidating, or refusing to enforce, contractual terms. It was encapsulated in the phrase that a"court will use the power to invalidate a contract or not to enforce it, sparingly, and only in the clearest of cases". AB v Pridwin Preparatory School [2018] ZASCA 150; 2019 (1) SA 327 (SCA) (Pridwin) at para 27(v) ref. This principle followed from the notion that contracts, freely and voluntarily entered into, should be honoured. Constitutional Court (of South Africa) recognised the approach that the power to invalidate, or refuse to enforce, contractual terms should only be exercised in worthy cases. However, courts should not rely upon this principle of restraint to shrink from their constitutional duty to infuse public policy with constitutional values. Nor may it be used to shear public policy of the complexity of the value system created by the Constitution. Courts should not be so recalcitrant in their application of public policy considerations that they failed to give proper weight to the overarching mandate of the Constitution. The degree of restraint to be exercised must be balanced against the backdrop of constitutional rights and values. Accordingly, the"perceptive restraint"principle should not be blithely invoked as a protective shield for contracts that undermined the very goals that the Constitution was designed to achieve. Moreover, the notion that there must be substantial and incontestable harm to the public before a court may decline to enforce a contract on public policy grounds was alien to the law of contract. Per Theron, J; Khampepe ADCJ, Jafta, Majiedt, Mathopo AJ, Mhlantla and Tshiqi, JJ concurring: Froneman, Victor, AJ and Madlanga, JJ. dissenting. (f) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-Public policy, fairness and reasonableness-Ground of public policy upon which a court may refuse to enforce a contractual terms-Scope-[Per Theron, J (Majority view): Public policy imperative to enforce contractual obligations that had been voluntarily undertaken recognised the autonomy of the contracting parties and, in so doing, gave effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity-Such imperative provided the requisite legal certainty to allow persons to arrange their affairs in reliance on the undertakings of the other parties to a contract, and to coordinate their conduct for their mutual benefit-With respect to enforcement of a term, notions of unfairness, unreasonableness or unduly harsh consequences were abstract values which had not been accorded autonomous, self-standing status upon which a court may interfere in contractual relationships]-[Per Froneman, J (Minority view): In cases where constitutional values or rights were alleged to be implicated in the application of public policy in the invalidation or enforcement of contractual clauses, the notions of fairness, reasonableness and simple justice between persons were the unmediated standards against which the validity of the clauses or their enforcement was judged-[Per Victor, AJ (Minority view): Adjudication of fairness in contract could not be plucked from a set of neutral legal principles-'Ubuntu' was an important value which stood alongside other values such as good faith, fairness, justice, equity, and reasonableness-Characterising ubuntu as an adjudicative value in reaching substantive fairness between contracting parties, would achieve a constitutionally transformative result-Furthermore, the recognition of ubuntu in interpreting contracts would not undermine the concept of certainty and contractual autonomy] [Per Theron J. (Majority view): The public policy imperative to enforce contractual obligations that had been voluntarily undertaken recognised the autonomy of the contracting parties and, in so doing, gave effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. This imperative provided the requisite legal certainty to allow persons to arrange their affairs in reliance on the undertakings of the other parties to a contract, and to coordinate their conduct for their mutual benefit. While an explanation provided by a party for not complying with a term of the contract was not the only relevant consideration, it was critical in the overall assessment of whether enforcement of the term would be contrary to public policy in all the particular facts and circumstances of a case. The only reasons advanced by the applicants for their failure to comply with the terms of the renewal clauses were that they were not sophisticated business people and not fully apprised of their rights and obligations regarding their options to renew the leases. The terms of each lease governing termination and renewal were clear and easy to understand. Each lease provided the exact termination date and the renewal clause provided that the lessee must provide written notice of its exercising of its renewal option"at least six (6) months prior to the termination date". These terms appeared in simple, uncomplicated language, which an ordinary person could reasonably be expected to understand. The inescapable inference was that there were no circumstances that prevented the applicants from complying with the terms of the renewal clauses in the leases. The clauses were favourable to the applicants. The only inference to be drawn was that the applicants simply neglected to comply with the clauses in circumstances where they could have complied with them. Applicants had failed to discharge the onus resting on them to demonstrate that in the circumstances of the present case, the enforcement of the clauses would be contrary to public policy. The applicants submitted that the enforcement of the renewal clauses would be contrary to public policy, as it would lead to the failure of a black economic empowerment initiative financed by the National Empowerment Fund with public money. Such harsh outcome alone, absent an explanation for their failure to comply with the terms of the renewal clauses, could not constitute a sufficient basis to hold that the enforcement of the clauses would be contrary to public policy. The applicants were afforded an opportunity to run their own businesses through the financial support of the Fund and the administrative and technical support of Sale's Hire. The possible failure of this commendable black economic empowerment initiative was attributable entirely to their unexplained failure to comply with the renewal clauses. Conduct of the respondent-Trust could not be held to be similar to snatching at a bargain or exploiting a mere technical slip on the part of the applicants. The applicants' failure to exercise their right of renewal within the requisite notice period resulted in the termination of the lease agreements by effluxion of time. There was no cancellation of the lease agreements on the part of the Trust. Instead, the termination occurred automatically by operation of the clear terms of the lease agreements regarding the termination date, in the absence of a valid renewal. The National Empowerment Fund was established to facilitate the redress of economic inequality that resulted from unfair discrimination against historically disadvantaged persons. The applicants have not shown that the failure of their businesses, in these circumstances, would unjustifiably undermine substantive equality enshrined in section 9(2) of the Constitution. To hold that the failure of a black economic empowerment initiative financed by the Fund rendered the enforcement of the renewal clauses deleterious to the constitutional value of equality would have the undesirable result of defeating the Funds own objects. This was because the effect of such a finding would increase the risk of contracting with historically disadvantaged persons who benefitted from the Fund. If the applicants were to succeed, it would establish the legal principle that enforcement of a contractual term would be inimical to the constitutional value of equality, and therefore contrary to public policy, where enforcement would result in the failure of a black economic empowerment initiative. This could, in turn, deter other parties from electing to contract with beneficiaries of the Fund, or force beneficiaries to offset the increased risk by making concessions on other contractual aspects during contract negotiations. These outcomes would, in effect, undermine the very objects that the Fund and section 9(2) of the Constitution sought to achieve. The applicants have failed to discharge the onus of demonstrating that the enforcement of the impugned contractual terms would be contrary to public policy. It was fatal to the applicants' case that they did not adequately explain why they did not comply with the terms that they sought to avoid. In any event, the public policy considerations advanced by the applicants were insufficient to demonstrate that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the terms they sought to avoid. Appeal was dismissed with costs. Per Froneman, J. (Minority view): Application of public policy in determining the unconscionableness of contractual terms and their enforcement must, where constitutional values or rights were implicated, be done directly in accordance with notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness, which could not be separated from public policy. Public policy took into consideration the necessity to do simple justice between individuals and was informed by the concept of 'ubuntu'. Question as to what public policy was and whether a term in a contract was contrary to public policy must be determined by reference to the said values. Regarding the finding that applicants failed to explain why they did not comply with the notice clause in the lease agreement, they did in fact provide an explanation, which was that they were unsophisticated and not versed in the niceties of the law. Such explanation was not contradicted by any direct evidence, but was supported by circumstantial evidence to back up their contention. Their lack of sophistication was illustrated by the content of the renewal notices, none of which were written by lawyers. Furthermore, it was common cause that applicants were not businesspeople, but former employees of respondent-Sale's Hire. They acquired their businesses in terms of a black economic empowerment initiative that sought to facilitate"business ventures pioneered and run by historically disadvantaged persons"and their bargaining power as franchisees in terms of the franchise agreement was unequal to that of the franchisor. Their prejudice in losing their businesses was obvious, against that of the franchisor who stood to lose nothing. Order of High Curt should be reinstated in circumstances of the case. Per Victor, AJ (Minority view): Important value of concept of ubuntu had to be acknowledged on an equal footing for its operation under the Constitution. Philosophical foundations of ubuntu were not new but originated from time immemorial and should be acknowledged as forming a part of the entire jurisprudential heritage including commercial heritage. One of the integral considerations or values of public policy in determining commercial contracts was 'ubuntu', which was an important value that stood alongside values such as good faith, fairness, justice, equity, and reasonableness. Whilst these latter constitutional values went a long way in addressing fairness in the law of contract, the constitutional value of 'ubuntu' added a value of substance. 'Ubuntu' together with the other values, formed a transformative basis in the adjudicative process when deciding whether to set aside an unfair contractual term or its unfair enforcement. 'Ubuntu' together with the other underlying values such as fairness and justice, was one of the central values of jurisprudence generally when adjudicating fairness in contract. Characterising 'ubuntu' as a substantive constitutional value in the law of contract lead to a more context-sensitive basis in its adjudication and facilitated a constitutionally transformative result. Value of 'ubuntu' in adjudicating contractual fairness had to be emphasized as it had a greater and context-sensitive reach, especially where there was inequality in the bargaining power between the parties. O Regan J stated in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality [2004] ZACC 9; 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC); 2005 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) at para 81 and Hutchison and Siliquini-Cinelli"Beyond Common Law: Contractual Privity in Australia and South Africa"(2017) 12 Journal of Comparative Law 49 at 75 ref. The additional scrutiny of commercial contracts through the prism of 'ubuntu', was but a more focused legal methodology to achieve justice as between two parties. It did not exclude or undermine certainty in contract. It remained a central consideration in harmony with the other values. The recognition of 'ubuntu', in interpreting contracts would not undermine the traditionally highly prized jurisprudential concept of certainty and contractual autonomy. Adjudicating fairness in a contract could not be done within a set of neutral legal principles. It would ultimately be based on an underlying moral or value choice. In the present case, the franchise and lease agreements were concluded within the context of the overarching principle of commercial empowerment of previously disadvantaged persons. The contracting parties in this case were not equal in levels of experience. Mr Sales of respondent-Sale's Hire had concluded a cooperation agreement with the National Empowerment Fund (NEF). This Fund provided loans to black-owned entities. This enabled the applicants to borrow money so that they could own and operate Sale's Hire franchise businesses. In concluding this contract with the NEF, Mr Sales as the sole member of respondent-Sales Hire, enjoyed a substantial financial benefit. In return Sale's Hire had an obligation to provide ongoing training, business support and mentorship to the applicants. Sale's Hire's contractual obligations to the Fund in this regard, were clear. Mr Sales as the sole member, was the face of Sale's Hire and among his responsibilities, was the responsibility to negotiate the best rental deal possible for the businesses. The renewal of the rental agreements would also fall within his obligations of ongoing training, business support and mentorship. He was also a trustee of the respondent-Oregon Trust, the landlord in the present case. Mr Sales took no steps to advise the applicants to renew the lease agreement timeously. Instead, in conflict with his obligations, he was instrumental in launching the eviction of the applicants on behalf of the Oregon Trust. The facts in the case showed that the applicants did not have the kind of business experience in renewing contracts for leased premises. As part of Sales Hire's obligations, it was incumbent on Mr Sales to attend to training, business support and mentorship and this would have included assisting the applicants in timeously renewing the leases. It was not a situation where they were negligent or forgot to give notice to renew. They were not versed in the sphere of the law of contract. In light of Mr Sales' conflict of interest and his participation in evicting the applicants, he could not be said to have been acting in a bona fide manner towards the applicants. Whilst the agreement may be fair on its face, it was the implementation phase of the same which would render the eviction of the applicants unfair and contrary to the spirit of 'ubuntu' and the other values. The eviction of the applicants in these circumstances would fail to take into consideration the interests of both parties and the original purpose of the contract, being the empowerment of historically disadvantaged persons in commerce. Per Froneman, J; Madlanga, J concurring (Minority view): (g) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-Fairness and reasonableness-Regulation of unfairness in contract law involved making an underlying moral or value choice within the objective value system of the Constitution-Further guidance should be provided on how such objective values could possibly be translated into practical application-Purpose of court must be to delineate reasonably certain, practical and objective legal principles and rules to guide prospective contracting parties-In so doing the caricature of rogue judges imposing their own subjective and arbitrary opinions of what was fair and reasonable upon unsuspecting litigants must be dispelled-Such approach was best achieved by recognising that the individualism of the law of contract was one that had always taken account of the reasonable expectations of the parties to the contract as well as those of the wider community; this could be done in a manner that ensured objective, reasonable practicality and certainty. [Minority view] (h) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-Public policy-Fairness, justice, equity and reasonableness-Scope-"Pacta sunt servanda", principle of-Application of public policy in determining the unconscionableness of contractual terms and their enforcement must, where constitutional values or rights were implicated, be done directly in accordance with notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness, which could not be separated from public policy-Public policy took into consideration the necessity to do simple justice between individuals and was informed by the concept of 'ubuntu'-Question as to what public policy was and whether a term in a contract was contrary to public policy must be determined by reference to the said values - Such approach left space for pacta sunt servanda to operate, but at the same time also allowed courts to decline to enforce contractual terms that were in conflict with constitutional values even where the parties consented to them-In cases where constitutional values or rights were alleged to be implicated in the application of public policy in the invalidation or enforcement of contractual clauses, the notions of fairness, reasonableness and simple justice between persons were the unmediated standards against which the validity of the clauses or their enforcement was judged. [Minority view] Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] ZACC 5; 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) at paras 27 to 29; Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd [2010] ZASCA 75; 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA); Botha v Rich N.O. [2014] ZACC 11; 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC); 2014 (7) BCLR 741 (CC); NUMSA obo Nganezi v Dunlop Mixing and Technical Services (Pty) Ltd [2019] ZACC 25; 2019 (5) SA 354 (CC); 2019 (8) BCLR 966 (CC); Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd [2012] ZACC 2; 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC); 2012 (5) BCLR 449 (CC) and The Business Zone 1010 v Engen Petroleum Limited [2017] ZACC 2; 2017 JDR 0259 (CC) and 2017(6) BCLR 773 (CC) ref. (i) Contract- -Contractual terms-Enforcement-Good faith-Scope-Common law notion of good faith underlay contract law and it embodied concepts of justice, reasonableness and fairness-Freedom of contract was not the only principle of law of contract, nor was good faith; they both complemented each other. [Minority view] J Muller SC and HL Du Toit instructed by De Klerk and Van Gend Incorporated for the First and Second Respondents.

Summary: (a) Fundamental rights-The applicants were parents of two children that commenced their schooling at an independent (private) school. The applicants concluded identical contracts (Parent Contracts) with the School, a pre-requisite for the admission of the applicants’ children. Clause 9.3 of the Parent Contract provided that the school was entitled to cancel the Parent Contract at any time, for any reason, on a full school term’s written notice. Due to certain series of incidents involving misconduct by the applicants, in particular, the father of the children, the relationship between the school administration and the applicants soured. Resultantly the headmaster of the school, terminated the Parent Contracts on notice in writing to the applicants, in terms of clause 9.3 of the Parent Contracts. Per Theron, J; Jafta, Khampepe, Ledwaba AJ, Madlanga and Mhlantla, JJ. concurring: In the present case, although the children had left the independent school in question by the time the case reached the Constitutional Court (of South Africa), it was still in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal and adjudicate present matter for various reasons; first, the present case raised important and complex legal questions about the constitutional rights of learners under sections 28(2) and 29(1)(a) of the Constitution and the corresponding constitutional duties of independent schools; secondly, the relief sought by the applicants would have broad practical effect because Clause 9.3 of the Parent Contract was a generic clause applied by independent schools across the country; third, the precedent set by the courts below had far broader implications for the rights of learners at independent schools, which were not confined to the school in question or the use of Clause 9.3, and these judgments also stood in conflict with the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence; fourth, the Constitutional Court had been presented with extensive argument from the applicants, as well as the school. In addition, a voluntary association that represented the interests of more than 750 independent schools, and of which the subject school was a member intervened and was joined as a party in the High Court below. It had actively participated in the present matter. Two amici curiae, the Centre for Child Law and Equal Education, had also participated in present proceedings. Finally, this was the first time that the Constitutional Court had an opportunity squarely to address the rights of learners at independent schools. It was also a rare opportunity, not because of the scarcity of rights violations in independent schools, but because of the difficulties and costs involved in litigating these matters to the appellate and apex levels. Most parents and learners in the applicants’ situation would not have the resources to bring a matter before the Constitutional Court. In the present case, the Court was confronted with the constitutional validity of a decision purportedly taken in the exercise of a power conferred by contract. In subjecting private power to constitutional control, section 8(2) of the Constitution recognised that private interactions had the potential to violate human rights and to perpetuate inequality and disadvantage. Independent schools, like the one in the present case, were not exempt from constitutional obligations and the demands for transformation of private relations. The effect of the school’s decision to terminate the Parent Contract was that the children had to leave the school. In this context, the school was obliged to hear the applicants, at least, on whether cancellation was in the children’s best interests, given the likely disruption to their education and wellbeing. These were children who had known no other school and had formed strong bonds with their teachers and friends. It was no answer for the school to claim that a hearing would have made no difference to the decision. The school failed to explain the process it undertook to determine what was in the best interests of the children. A mere statement by the school that a balancing of rights had been undertaken was insufficient and did not satisfy the obligations created by section 28(2) of the Constitution. That the best interests of the children had been given due consideration should be objectively evident. This was not evident in the present case. Section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution spoke about the right of children to be educated and section 29(3) mentioned the freedom given to independent schools to provide education. In providing that education, independent schools were to fulfil their negative obligation in terms of section 29(1)(a) and not obviate children’s rights to basic education enjoyed pursuant to their enrollment at the school. The children’s attendance at the independent school was a result of the agreement concluded between the parents and the school, as reflected in the Parent Contract. However, the children’s enjoyment of the right to a basic education flowed directly from the Constitution. The right to a basic education was independent of the contract and arose as a result of the fact that the children were, at the time, receiving a basic education. In the circumstances of the present matter, the obligation on the school, pursuant to the provisions of sections 28(2) and 29(1)(a) of the Constitution included the duty to inform the parents of its intention to terminate the Parent Contract. School was further obliged to afford one or both of them an opportunity to make representations on the best interests of the children, the impact this could have on the children’s right to an education and possible steps that could have been taken to ameliorate any interference with their right to a basic education. This would have discharged the school’s obligation to protect the children’s rights to a basic education and placed the school in a position to give proper consideration to the best interests of the children, and make a decision that was procedurally and substantively fair. The decision to terminate the Parents Contract was constitutionally invalid, in that it breached the constitutional rights of the applicants’ children. These rights did not arise from the contract, but from the Constitution itself. Adjudication of the matter on such basis rendered it unnecessary to engage with the applicants’ alternative challenge, made on public policy grounds, to the enforcement of clause 9.3. [Majority view] Per Nicholls, AJ; Mogoeng CJ, Cameron and Froneman, JJ. concurring (Minority view): The children had left the school in question by the time the present case reached the Constitutional Court (of South Africa). Therefore, it would not be in the interests of justice for the Court to determine whether the headmaster’s decision to terminate the Parent Contract was invalid. However, what would have practical and far-reaching effects was a pronouncement on the constitutionality of clause 9.3 and the enforcement thereof. To such extent, and to such extent only, it was in the broader public interest for the Constitutional Court to make a decision on such point alone. [Minority view] In the present case, there was nothing facially offensive or unconstitutional about clause 9.3 of the Parent Contracts. However by providing education to children, the independent schools assumed constitutional duties and obligations that inhibited the free exercise of contractual rights. In the present case, these were the best interests of the child as entrenched in section 28(2) of the Constitution and the right to basic education as protected in section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution. Perusal of section 29 of the Constitution (of South Africa) revealed that clearly, there was no general positive duty on private entities to provide education, basic or otherwise. Section 29(3) made it plain that they may establish and maintain independent educational institutions. And when they did so these independent educational institutions provided, at least in a literal sense, -education-. They must maintain standards not inferior to those at comparable public educational institutions. There was thus nothing textually, either in section 29(1)(a) or section 29(3) of the Constitution, that militated against holding that independent schools established under section 29(3) of the Constitution assumed constitutional education obligations towards those children who were educated in them. Every institution, elite or non-elite, that provided non-secondary or non-tertiary education was necessarily simultaneously engaged in providing those attending it a basic education. Independent (private) schools could not be enclaves of power immune from constitutional obligations. The content of independent school’s obligations under the Constitution was circumscribed. It did not extend to a positive duty to continue providing education at the private institution. But, once an independent school provided basic education, it was then required to ensure that the right to basic education of children attending the independent school was not negatively infringed. That would occur, for instance, where no independent opportunity to be heard was afforded before a decision was made to discontinue that education. Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 JDR 0343 (CC); 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) ref. In the present case, the independent school had a negative duty not to impair or diminish the children’s right to a basic education. In addition, there should be no interference with the rights already enjoyed by the children, except where there was proper justification for that interference. Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz [2004] ZACC 25; 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) at para 33; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at para 46; and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para 34 and Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC); 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (Hoërskool Ermelo) ref. While contracts freely and consciously entered into must be honoured, the contractual autonomy of parties was curtailed when dealing with the right of basic education and the best interests of the child. In these instances, the enforcement of the contract must be subject to the constitutional precepts because of the direct applicability of rights in the Constitution. Even if the more general public policy approach was preferred, the result would effectively be the same: it was against public policy to enforce a contractual claim that infringed the constitutional rights of children who were not parties to the contract. Schools that provided basic education were under a constitutional duty not to diminish the right to basic education and at all times to act in the best interests of the child. In most circumstances, this would entail, alerting the parents involved to the proposed termination; providing reasons therefor; and affording an opportunity for a fair and appropriate hearing. Of course, this would entail giving the children themselves the opportunity to express their views on a matter that concerned them, where this would be appropriate. In certain circumstances, what would be reasonable and fair would be to hear their teachers, parents, another intermediary, or even a collection of the same. However, after a hearing, the best interests of the other children at the school, or any other relevant consideration, may well prevail. The constitutional requirement was that there should be both substantive and procedural fairness before any child was excluded from a school. In the present case Clause 9.3 of the Parent Contract between the applicants and the independent school was unconstitutional, contrary to public policy and unenforceable to the extent that it purported to allow the school to cancel the Parent Contracts without following a fair procedure. A child’s basic education should not be terminated without an appropriate and substantively fair procedure. Per Cameron and Froneman, JJ; concurring with Nicholls, AJ [Minority view]: Under the common law, private parties, like independent schools, had no obligation to provide basic education nor, where they did provide it, did they owe any obligation to children not to diminish or interfere with that right. This meant that the provision of private education to learners attending private schools was regulated entirely by principles of contract - including contractual autonomy. Sections 28(2), 29(1)(a) and 29(3) of the Constitution (of South Africa) now imposed on independent schools that provided basic education at least the negative obligation not to diminish or interfere with a child’s right to that basic education. This now was the right that protected basic education. In applying provisions of sections 28(2), 29(1)(a) and 29(3) of the Constitution to private parties like independent schools, the applicable constitutional provisions were section 8(1) and section 8(2) of the Constitution. There was no legislation that directly gave effect to the right that protected basic education where independent schools already provided it. There was, however, at least the negative obligation not to diminish or interfere with a child’s right to a basic education where an independent school provided basic education. This was a new rule that did not exist under the common law or in terms of any legislation. How far did protection of this right by independent schools go? It could not be absolute. Finding that its content required fairness, not only in process-fairness, but also in substance-fairness, before children attending a private school may be required to leave, complied with the requirement in section 8(3)(b) of the Constitution that any limitation upon a newly-established common law right must accord with the limitations provision in the Bill of Rights [Chapter Two of the Constitution of South Africa]. Per Khampepe, J: Jafta, Ledwaba AJ, Madlanga, Mhlantla and Theron, JJ. concurring [Majority view]: Default or starting position should be that the child concerned was given an opportunity to make representations. In the present case the children concerned had a self-standing right to have their views heard on the matter, either in person or through a representative. Independent schools were bound by section 28(2) of the Constitution, which provided that a child’s best interests were of paramount importance in every matter concerning that child. Section 28(2) required that, before an independent school may enforce a termination provision in a Parent Contract in a particular case, it must have due consideration of the best interests of the individual child who would be removed from the school. Section 28(2) also formed a standard that was expected of conduct which affected children in general. In this case, it prescribed that the conduct of independent schools, generally, in terminating Parent Contracts (and thereby interfering with the basic education of children) must be done in accordance with the-best interests of the child-standard required by section 28(2). Section 28(2) standard of the best interests of the child included a procedural right of children to be heard and participate in the decision affecting their lives. In the context of removing a child from their school, the right of the child to make representations and participate in the decision making process, in accordance with their age and maturity, was of utmost importance. Such right was sourced in section 28(2) of the Constitution and buttressed by the Children’s Act, 2005, case-law and international law. Children’s Act, 2005 unequivocally adopted the position that children should be involved in decisions affecting their lives by expressing their views and participating, where possible and appropriate, in these decisions. Section 10 of the Children’s Act, 2005 went further than the position under international law, in that it applied horizontally and therefore also bound private actors, which would include independent schools and parents, to consider the views of the children before a decision about their lives was made. Removing a child from their school was a major life-changing event for a child and, therefore, the child should be afforded the opportunity to have their views and wishes given due consideration. Per Nicholls, AJ: (b) Appeal- -No live controversy between the parties remaining-Mootness-Justiciability of issue-Interest of justice test-Scope-General principle was that an application was moot when a court’s ruling would have no direct practical effect-Courts existed to determine concrete legal disputes and their scarce resources should not be frittered away by entertaining abstract propositions of law, however engaging-Typically, the apex Court would not adjudicate an appeal if it no longer presented an existing or live controversy, and would refrain from giving advisory opinions on legal questions which were merely abstract, academic or hypothetical and had no immediate practical effect or result-However, -mootness-was not an absolute bar to deciding an issue; the question was whether the interests of justice required that it be decided-In class actions or public interest litigation, the decisions pertaining to the rights contained in the Constitution could have a far-reaching practical effect on many others-Interests of justice test, to determine mootness, provided that the discretion of the court to decide the issue irrespective of its mootness was based upon a number of factors which included, but were not limited to, considering whether the order may have some practical effect, and if so, its nature or importance to the parties or to others; the importance and complexity of the issue; the fullness or otherwise of the arguments advanced; and whether a judgment would resolve disputes between different courts-Prospects of success were an additional consideration, which, although important were not decisive in determining whether it would be in the interests of justice to adjudicate the matter, notwithstanding its mootness. Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs [2018] ZACC 52; 2019 (2) SA 329 (CC); 2019 (3) BCLR 383 (CC) at para 7; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) at para 21 and JT Publishing v Minister of Safety and Security [1996] ZACC 23; 1997 (3) SA 514 (CC); 1996 (12) BCLR 1599 (CC) at para 15; President of the Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance [2019] ZACC 35; 2019 JDR 1753 (CC); 2019 (11) BCLR 1403 (CC); Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd [2012] ZACC 11; 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC); 2012 (8) BCLR 785 (CC) at para 32; Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality [2001] ZACC 23; 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC); 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) (Langeberg Municipality) at para 11; POPCRU v SACOSWU [2018] ZACC 24; 2019 (1) SA 73 (CC); 2018 (11) BCLR 1411 (CC) at para 44; Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd [2011] ZACC 3; 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC); 2011 (5) BCLR 453 (CC) at para 20; National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town [2002] ZACC 27; 2003 (3) SA (1) (CC); 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) at para 25 and S v Boesak [2000] ZACC 25; 2001 (1) SA 912 (CC); 2001 (1) BCLR 36 (CC) at para 12; MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay [2007] ZACC 21; 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (Pillay) ref. (c) Contract- -Contractual terms-Unconscionability and enforcement-Pacta sunt servanda, principle of-Scope-Public policy-All contractual agreements between private parties were governed by the principle of pacta sunt servanda, unless they offended public policy-Where it was alleged that constitutional values or rights were implicated, public policy must be determined by reference to the values embedded in the Constitution, including notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness-Application of public policy in determining the unconscionableness of contractual terms and their enforcement must, where constitutional values or rights were implicated, be done in accordance with notions offairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness could not be separated from public policy-Public policy took into consideration the necessity to do simple justice between individuals and was informed by the concept of ubuntu (humanity)-What public policy was, and whether a term in a contract was contrary to public policy, must be determined by reference to such values; this left space for enforcing agreed bargains (pacta sunt servanda), but at the same time allowed courts to decline to enforce particular contractual terms that were in conflict with public policy, as informed by constitutional values, even though the parties may have consented to them. Per Theron, J: (d) Appeal- -No ‘existing or live controversy’ between the parties remaining-Mootness-Justiciability of issue-Matter was moot if it no longer raised an-existing or live controversy-between the parties, such that the Constitutional Court’s order would have no practical effect or result-Mootness was not an absolute bar to the justiciability of an issue-Constitutional Court (of South Africa) had a discretion to entertain an appeal, even if moot, where it was in the interests of justice to do so-Constitutional Court had identified a number of considerations in answering the question of whether it was in the interests of justice to hear an appeal that was moot; these included the nature and extent of the practical effect that any possible order might have and the importance and complexity of the issue. (e) Maxim- -Audi alteram partem-Representation-Scope-Opportunity to make representations would be effective only if it related to the decision to be made and if this was made clear to the affected parties. Sokhela v MEG for Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal 2010 (5) SA 574 (KZP) at para 58 ref. (f) Fair trial- -Fair hearing-Denial of a fair hearing could not be excused merely because one party asserted that their mind was made up and that a hearing would have made no difference. My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly [2015] ZACC 31; 2016 (1) SA 132; 2015 (12) BCLR 1407 (CC) at para 176, citing John v Rees [1969] 2 All ER 274 (CH) at 402 ref.