Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Against impugned letter dated 19.09.18 & 12.12.18 and 02.01.2019 and letter dated 17.01.2019 issued by respondent no.4 and actions taken pursuant to the letters (a) Telecommunications Law – Jurisdiction of PTA – Consultation Process Initiation: ----Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, Ss. 4, 5 & 22(2) – PTA Functions and Powers Regulations, 2006, Regulation No.6 – Scope of PTA’s Jurisdiction Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) to initiate a consultation process regarding wholesale IP bandwidth charges in US Dollars, arguing that Sections 4 and 5 of the 1996 Act do not empower PTA to initiate such a process. It was held that PTA must first decide on its own jurisdiction before proceeding with the consultation process. The issuance of a notice for consultation does not amount to an order or adjudication. Petitioners were directed to raise their objections regarding PTA's jurisdiction before the authority itself, which must decide the matter as a preliminary issue before proceeding further. -----Cited Cases: Zahid Zaman Khan v. Khan Afsar (PLD 2016 SC 409) Izhar Alam Farooqi v. Abdul Sattar Lasi (2008 SCMR 240) Muhammad Siddique Anwar v. Faisalabad Development Authority (2007 SCMR 1126) Mansab Ali v. Amir (PLD 1971 SC 124) ----Disposition: Petitions were disposed of with directions to PTA to decide jurisdictional objections as a preliminary issue before proceeding on merits. (b) Telecommunications Law – Regulatory Authority’s Powers – Validity of Regulation No.6 of PTA Regulations, 2006: ----Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, Ss. 4, 5(2)(o) & 22(2) – PTA Functions and Powers Regulations, 2006, Regulation No.6 – Validity and Scope Petitioners challenged the vires of Regulation No.6 of the PTA Regulations, 2006, arguing that Sections 4 and 5 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 do not empower PTA to initiate a consultation process, except under Section 22(2) for license modification disagreements. The court held that the matter regarding the vires of Regulation No.6 requires detailed examination and remains pending for further arguments, including representation by the Attorney General. ----Disposition: Petition partially remains pending to the extent of the vires of Regulation No.6 of PTA Regulations, 2006. Interim relief was discontinued.

Summary: Protective Bail in Case FIR NO. 237/20 dated 30.05.2020 Offence U/s 489 -F PPC, PS Anarkali, Tehsil & District Lahore

Summary: Challenges the constitution of fuel crises committee further impugned the notification dated 08.06.20 and 09.06.2020 Issued in management of fuel crises

Summary: Remedy of writ petition against administrative opinion of Police u/s 169 CrPC.

Summary: Suit for possession through redemption.Held: (1) In terms of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the right of redemption is a statutory right and no clog can be put against such statutory right. The ibid Section unequivocally affirms the right of redemption in all mortgages. (2) The transaction is one of the mortgage and not the absolute sale, the refusal to get the property redeemed, therefore, becomes recurring wrong on the part of the mortgagee for which the principle of laches is not attracted at all.(3) When the matter is referable to the law of limitation, the question of laches looses its significance.(Revision petition was dismissed in limine).

Summary: Measure of damages under section 73 of the Contract Act. Assessment of reasonable compensation under section 74 of the Contract Act.----The dispute arose from a contract awarded by TCP to Sadan General Trading LLC for the supply of 50,000 metric tons of white sugar from Brazil at a specified rate. The contract included provisions for late shipment penalties and cancellation due to non-delivery within the agreed period. Sadan General Trading LLC failed to make the first shipment within the extended deadline, leading TCP to cancel the contract and forfeit the performance amount.During arbitration, Sadan General Trading LLC argued that TCP's cancellation was premature and discriminatory, seeking compensation for various losses. TCP, in turn, claimed damages for non-delivery and subsequent purchase of sugar at a higher price. The arbitrator found Sadan General Trading LLC in breach of contract but awarded only 50% of the performance amount to TCP as reasonable compensation, considering the absence of proven actual loss.The court dismissed objections raised by both parties against the arbitration award, affirming the arbitrator's decision. It clarified that compensation under Section 74 of the Contract Act does not require proof of actual loss but must be reasonable. The court emphasized that the determination of reasonable compensation depends on the circumstances of each case and that its interference with arbitration awards is limited. Finally, the court ordered interest on the award amount until realization. Thus, the arbitration award was upheld.

Summary: Background:The Supreme Court convened a Suo Moto Case regarding combating the COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan.Various representatives from federal and provincial governments, regulatory authorities, and concerned organizations attended the hearing.Reports were submitted by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Plant Protection Department, Governments of Punjab, Sindh, KPK, and Gilgit Baltistan.---Issues:Lack of transparency in NDMA's procurement of machinery for N95 masks production.Approval sought by NDMA for import of unregistered drugs.Operational status of aircraft for locust control.Verification of pilots' licenses and degrees.Allocation of funds for luxury vehicles by the Sindh Government.Inadequate measures for dealing with COVID-19 and related issues.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:NDMA directed to provide details of purchases, payments, and taxes related to N95 masks production.NDMA asked to explain special favor given to a company for machinery import.NDMA's request for importing unregistered drugs subject to conditions from DRAP.DG Civil Aviation Authority ordered to appear and explain the issue of fake pilot licenses.CEOs of airlines to provide reports on pilot verification.Sindh Government restrained from allocating funds for luxury vehicles until further notice.Concerns raised about Sindh Government's budget allocation and lack of funds for essential services.Government departments directed to take strict action against hoarders of COVID-19 related supplies.DRAP and relevant authorities instructed to ensure availability and reasonable pricing of essential medical supplies.Adjourned to a date after three weeks.

Summary: (a) Patent- -Invention-Sufficient disclosure of information-Scope-Patent reflected a bargain between the inventor and the public-Essence of the bargain between the patentee and the public was that the patentee dedicated the invention to the public by making full disclosure of it, in return for a time-limited monopoly over its use-Benefit afforded to the public was not merely the disclosure, but the ability to "work the invention"after the expiry of the monopoly by the use of the disclosure-Where the invention enabled patentees to make a particular product, and they sought a monopoly over the making and exploitation of the product (which was what a product claim did), they must disclose enough in the teaching of the patent to enable the public also to make the product-If the patentee were able to obtain a product monopoly without disclosing how to make the product, the public would get nothing of substance in return for the grant of the monopoly-Furthermore, other inventors would be deterred from conducting the research and development in fact necessary to take advantage of the inventive idea for the benefit of society as a whole, since during the period of the monopoly they could derive no benefit from their own inventiveness. Generics (UK) Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] EWCA Civ 311; [2008] RPC 19, para 30 ref. (b) Patent- -Invention-Sufficient disclosure of information-Sufficiency, principle of-Scope-Sufficiency was one of the established tools by which was measured the correspondence, or lack of it, between the protection afforded by the claim and the technical contribution to the art made by the disclosure of the invention in the patent-Other main tools were novelty, inventive step and industrial application-In relation to a product claim, sufficiency required substantially the whole of the range of products within the scope of the claim to be enabled to be made by means of the disclosure in the patent, and this both reflected and applied the principle that the contribution to the art was to be measured by the products which could thereby be made as at the priority date, not by the contribution which the invention may make to the value and utility of products, the ability to make which, if at all, laid in the future. Actavis Group PTC EHF v ICOS Corpn [2019] UKSC 15; [2019] Bus LR 1318, para 57 ref. (c) Patent- -Invention-Principles regarding patents as found in European and United Kingdom case law. Survey of case law from Europe and United Kingdom yielded the following principles with respect to patents: i) The requirement of sufficiency imposed by Article 83 of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (1978) ("EPC") existed to ensure that the extent of the monopoly conferred by the patent corresponded with the extent of the contribution which it made to the art. ii) In the case of a product claim, the contribution to the art was the ability of the skilled person to make the product itself, rather than (if different) the invention. iii) Patentees were free to choose how widely to frame the range of products for which they claimed protection. But they needed to ensure that they made no broader claim than was enabled by their disclosure. iv) The disclosure required of the patentee was such as would, coupled with the common general knowledge existing as at the priority date, be sufficient to enable the skilled person to make substantially all the types or embodiments of products within the scope of the claim. That is what, in the context of a product claim, enablement meant. v) A claim which sought to protect products which could not be made by the skilled person using the disclosure in the patent would, subject to de minimis or wholly irrelevant exceptions, be bound to exceed the contribution to the art made by the patent, measured as it must be at the priority date. vi) This did not mean that the patentee had to demonstrate in the disclosure that every embodiment within the scope of the claim had been tried, tested and proved to have been enabled to be made. Patentees may rely, if they could, upon a principle of general application if it would appear reasonably likely to enable the whole range of products within the scope of the claim to be made. But they took the risk, if challenged, that the supposed general principle would be proved at trial not in fact to enable a significant, relevant, part of the claimed range to be made, as at the priority date. vii) Nor would a claim which in substance passed the sufficiency test be defeated by dividing the product claim into a range denominated by some wholly irrelevant factor. The requirement to show enablement across the whole scope of the claim applied only across a relevant range. Put broadly, the range would be relevant if it was denominated by reference to a variable which significantly affected the value or utility of the product in achieving the purpose for which it was to be made. viii) Enablement across the scope of a product claim was not established merely by showing that all products within the relevant range would, if and when they could be made, deliver the same general benefit intended to be generated by the invention, regardless how valuable and ground-breaking that invention may prove to be. [p. 1464] F Generics (UK) Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2009] RPC 13, para 86; Unilever/Stable Bleaches (T 226/85) ECLI:EP:BA:1987: T022685.19870317, decided in March 1987; Exxon/Fuel Oils (T 409/91) EP:BA:1993:T040991.19930318, decided in March 1993; Unilever/Detergents (T 435/91) ECLI:EP:BA:2008, decided in March 1994; Mycogen/Modifying plant cells (T 694/92) ECLI:EP:BA:1996, decided in May 1996, at p 19; Genentech I/Polypeptide expression (T 292/85) ECLI:EP:BA:1988, was decided in January 1988, decided in June 1988, is Nabisco/Micro-organisms (T 361/87) ECLI:EP:BA:1988; Novartis II/Transgenic plant (G 1/98) ECLI:EP:BA:1999, decided by the Enlarged Board in December 1999; Novartis II/Transgenic plant (G 1/98) ECLI:EP:BA:1999; Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1995] RPC 25 and [1997] RPC 1; Chiron Corpn v Organon Teknika Ltd (No 3) [1994] FSR 202. At pp 48-49; May and Baker Ltd v Boots Pure Drug Co Ltd (1950) 67 RPC 23; Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2005] RPC 9 and Generics (UK) Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] RPC 19 ref. Per Lord Briggs, JSC; Lord Reed PSC, Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Sales, JJSC. agreeing; Lady Black, JSC dissenting. (d) Patent- -Validity-Invention-Sufficient disclosure of information-Sufficiency, principle of-Scope-Information disclosed in patents only enabling some product types within range to be made-Question as to whether sufficiency test would be satisfied if an invention disclosed generally applicable principle with potential to yield benefits across range of product types-Per Lord Briggs (Majority view): Disclosure in the patent should enable substantially all products within the scope of a product claim to be made by the skilled person at the priority date-Where a range of products was claimed, subject to de minimis exceptions, the essential patent bargain was not satisfied in relation to products in that part of the range which could not be made, using the teaching in the patent-[Per Lady Black (Minority view): Protection covered by a patent should correspond to the technical contribution to the art made by the disclosure of the invention described therein-Assessing sufficiency (of information disclosed) depended on the nature of the invention and the facts of the particular case] In the year 2001 respondent-company filed patents for a new type of genetically modified mouse. Respondent's breakthrough was a hybrid version of the gene that produced antibodies, combining a section of the mouse's genetic material (the"constant region"DNA) with a section of genetic material from a human (the"variable region"DNA). The resulting mouse could be used to produce antibodies which were suitable for medical treatment in humans, but were sufficiently similar to mouse antibodies that did not cause immunological sickness in the mouse. The idea of combining a human variable region with a mouse constant region was a major contribution to science. In 2013 respondent-company sued appellant-company for infringement of its patents. Appellant was producing its own genetically modified mice, with a similar genetic structure to respondent's mice. Appellant argued that the patents filed by respondent in 2001 were invalid because they fell foul of a patent law rule called sufficiency. Sufficiency meant documents filed with the patent must be detailed enough to enable scientifically skilled readers to make the invention for themselves. Appellant argued that mice developed by it did not infringe respondent's patents as their mice could only be produced as a result of improvements in biotechnological methods that post-dated the respondent's patents and which enabled the full repertoire of human antibody genes to be inserted into the mice. The High Court had held that respondent's patents were invalid as they sought to monopolise more than they contributed to the field - it was only later technological developments that allowed mice like appellant's to be produced. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that respondent's patents contained enough information to enable a skilled reader to insert some of the human material into a mouse's genes; that there was no need for the patents to explain how to make the full range of mice because respondent's idea was a"principle of general application"; that appellant's mice infringed the patents, even though they contained far more human genetic material than could be transferred using the technology disclosed by respondent. Per Lord Briggs, JSC (Majority view): Respondent's patents did not enable a skilled person to make mice containing more than a very small section of the human variable region. The amount of human material was an important factor which was thought to affect the diversity of useful antibodies which the mice would produce. Mice at the more valuable end of the range could not be made using respondent's patents. Respondent was claiming a monopoly which was far wider than its contribution to the art. The Court of Appeal upheld patents over a range of mice even though respondent could only make mice over a small part of the range, at the least beneficial end of the range with the smallest amount of human genetic material. Analysis of the Court of Appeal watered down the sufficiency requirement, a bedrock of patent law, which provided that the disclosure in the patent should enable substantially all products within the scope of a product claim to be made by the skilled person as at the priority date. By watering down the sufficiency requirement, the Court of Appeal tilted the balance of patent law in favour of patentees and against the public. Patents of respondent were invalid for insufficiency. Appeal was allowed. Per Lady Black, JSC dissenting (Minority view): The Court of Appeal recognised the general language used in the claim and its broad scope, and it had well in mind that it extended to a mouse with its entire variable gene locus replaced with the entire human variable gene locus. The Court of Appeal characterised respondent's invention as a principle of general application which solved the problem of immunological sickness. Every mouse encompassed in the claim would have the reverse chimeric locus, or, would benefit from the technical contribution the disclosure of one of the patents had made to the art. Every such mouse would use the invention. This was what led the Court of Appeal to characterise the claim as a principle of general application. For sufficiency, it was necessary for the skilled team to be able to produce transgenic mice incorporating the reverse chimeric locus and producing hybrid antibodies, and this they could do, producing mice which would have had a near wild type response. That the claim encompassed inventive improvements (more human variable region incorporated) did not make it insufficient as any such improvement was still a way of working the original invention. Seen in this way, the sufficiency requirement was met since the invention was deployed in each mouse across the range, irrespective of the quantum of human material incorporated. Per Lady Black, JSC dissenting (Minority view) (e) Patent- -Invention-Sufficient disclosure of information-Sufficiency-Scope-Protection covered by a patent should correspond to the technical contribution to the art made by the disclosure of the invention described therein-Said principle, and the other principles that were relevant to determining sufficiency, could only be applied having close regard to the facts of the particular case-Assessment of sufficiency did depend very much upon the nature of the individual invention and the facts of the particular case. Dates of hearing: 11th and 12th February, 2020.