Summary: Acquittal granted---Background:Ahmad Ali was allegedly shot dead on 30.6.2009 within the jurisdiction of Police Station Chak Baidi, District Pakpattan. The incident involved the petitioners and other co-accused who confronted the deceased and his companions while they were on their way to visit a relative. The petitioners allegedly shot Ahmad Ali multiple times, resulting in his death. The petitioners were convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to death (Muhammad Ajmal) and life imprisonment (Muhammad Sharif). Dissatisfied with the verdict, they filed separate petitions challenging the High Court's judgment.---Issues:Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction.Whether there are discrepancies in the witness testimonies, timing of the incident, and the handling of the case by the police that cast doubt on the guilt of the petitioners.Whether the presence of a firearm with the deceased and the exoneration of some co-accused raise questions about the credibility of the prosecution's case.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court noted several inconsistencies in the prosecution's case, including discrepancies in witness testimonies and the handling of the case by the police. The complainant's shifting statements and discrepancies in the timing of events raised doubts about the reliability of the prosecution's case. Additionally, the presence of a firearm with the deceased, the failure to use it during the alleged attack, and the exoneration of some co-accused added further complexity to the case. Therefore, the court concluded that it would be unsafe to maintain the convictions. Criminal Petition No.402-L of 2015 and Jail Petition No.262 of 2015 were allowed, and the petitioners were acquitted of the charges. Criminal Petition No.412-L of 2015 was dismissed.

Summary: Background:The case involves an appeal against the judgment dated 29.03.2018 of the Peshawar High Court in Writ Petition No.4765-P of 2017. The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Workers Welfare Board (WWB), through its Chairman, is the appellant, challenging the High Court's decision to allow the writ petition filed by the respondents.---Issues:Whether the appointments of the respondents were made in accordance with legal formalities and by the competent authority.Whether the refusal to regularize the respondents' services amounts to discrimination and violates their constitutional rights.Whether contractual employees have an automatic right to be regularized in the absence of specific provisions in the law.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The respondents, employees of the WWB working at various institutes in KPK on contractual basis, approached the High Court seeking regularization of their services, which was granted in the impugned judgment. However, the Supreme Court found that the appointments of the respondents were made by an unauthorized person, the Secretary of the WWB, and were tainted with allegations of corruption and illegal practices. The Court also emphasized that contractual employees have no automatic right to regularization unless provided for by law. Since the respondents' contracts did not contain provisions for regularization and there was no specific law granting such right, the High Court's decision was overturned.---Citations/Precedents:Civil Appeal Nos. 1109 of 2013 and 1424 to 1428 of 2016 dated 14.04.2016

Summary: PLJ 2020 Quetta 29 (DB) Present Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Abdul Hameed Baloch JJ CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER QESCO QUETTA and another - - Petitioners versus AZIZULLAH COMMERCIAL SUPERINTENDENT (BPS - 15) QESCO and 3 others - - Respondents Const P No 1151 of 2017 decided on 682019 Constitution of Pakistan 1973 - - - - - - Art 199 - - Balochistan Industrial Relations Act 2010 S 41 - - Filling of Application for issuance of Notices - - Allowed - - Appeal - - Dismissed - - Appointment promotion - - Entitlement for two steps up - gradation - - Time scale up - gradation - - Respondents are working as Commercial Superintendent since their promotion from post of Commercial Assistant and till now neither any sort of complaint nor any disciplinary action was taken against them and petitioners were satisfied from their hard working - - Petitioners relied upon different official memorandum in written statement but failed to substantiate same - - Mere mentioning documents in pleadings are not enough to be accepted rather same are required to be proved according to Qanoon - e - Shahadat Order 1984 - - Official memorandum clearly manifest that employee working in BPS - 15 are entitled for two steps up - gradation - - Since respondents are fulfilling requisite qualification therefore they were entitled for two step time scale up - gradation - - In view of above petitioners have failed to point out any illegality and irregularity in concurrent judgments passed by Courts below warranting interference by this Court - - Petition was dismissed [Pp 31 32] A B C Mr Ghulam Mustafa Buzdar Advocate for Petitioners Mr Abdul Rasheed Awan Advocate for Respondents No1 to 3Judgement Result:Petition dismissed

Summary: (a) Company- -Reflective loss, principle of-Rule against reflective loss-Scope-Claim filed by a creditor against a company-Whether rule against reflective loss applied to claims made by creditors against companies or was the rule limited to claims by shareholders for diminution in value of shares or dividends. The claimant, a foreign exchange broker carrying on business in London, obtained judgment against two companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands for sums due under a contract, but the companies' assets were found to be of an amount significantly below the judgment debt and the companies subsequently went into liquidation. The claimant alleged that, after the draft judgment had been released, the defendant, a resident of Dubai who was the ultimate beneficial owner and controller of the companies, had dishonestly stripped the companies of their wealth and moved it overseas out of the claimant's reach in order to prevent the judgment from being enforced. Claimant also alleged that the companies' liquidator, funded by the defendant, had taken no steps to recover the companies' losses. The claimant issued proceedings against the defendant in the Commercial Court seeking damages in tort for (i) inducing or procuring violation of its rights under the judgment and (ii) intentionally causing it loss by unlawful means, and was given permission to serve the claim form on the defendant out of the jurisdiction. The defendant applied for an order under Civil Procedure Rules, Pt. 11 to set aside service of the claim form on the ground, inter alia, that since it remained open to the companies' liquidator to pursue any claim against the defendant for any sums unlawfully removed, the 'rule against reflective loss' barred the claimant from making the same claim and so the claimant could not show a completed cause of action in tort. The judge, having rejected said argument and the other grounds of objection, dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal, holding that the 'rule against reflective loss' covered claims by unsecured creditors of a company where each of the creditor and the company had its own cause of action against a third-party defendant in respect of the same wrongful conduct by him. [Per Lord Reed (Majority view): The decisions in the cases of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 and Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 established the 'reflective loss' principle in company law i.e. a diminution in the value of a shareholding or in distributions to shareholders, which was merely the result of a loss suffered by the company in consequence of a wrong done to it by the defendant, was not in the eyes of the law damage which was separate and distinct from the damage suffered by the company, and was therefore not recoverable. The principle was based on the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, which would be subverted if the shareholder could pursue a personal action in those circumstances. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 and Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 ref. It was necessary to distinguish between two types of cases; first, those cases where claims were brought by a shareholder in respect of loss which he had suffered in that capacity, in the form of a diminution in share value or in distributions, which was the consequence of loss sustained by the company, in respect of which the company had a cause of action against the same wrongdoer, and, second, those cases where claims were brought, whether by a shareholder or by anyone else, in respect of loss which did not fall within that description, but where the company had a right of action in respect of substantially the same loss. Claims for first type of cases were barred by the rule in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204. Shareholder cannot bring proceedings in respect of the company's loss, since he had no legal or equitable interest in the company's assets. It was only the company which had a cause of action in respect of its loss. However, depending on the circumstances, it was possible that the company's loss may result (or, at least, may be claimed to result) in a fall in the value of its shares. Its shareholders may therefore claim to have suffered a loss as a consequence of the company's loss. Depending on the circumstances, the company's recovery of its loss may have the effect of restoring the value of the shares. In such circumstances, the only remedy which the law required to provide, in order to achieve its remedial objectives of compensating both the company and its shareholders, was an award of damages to the company. There may, however, be circumstances where the company's right of action was not sufficient to ensure that the value of the shares was fully replenished. One example was where the market's valuation of the shares was not a simple reflection of the company's net assets. Another was where the company failed to pursue a right of action which, in the opinion of a shareholder, ought to have been pursued, or compromised its claim for an amount which, in the opinion of a shareholder, was less than its full value. But the effect of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 was that the shareholder had entrusted the management of the company's right of action to its decision-making organs, including, ultimately, the majority of members voting in general meeting. If such a decision was taken otherwise than in the proper exercise of the relevant powers, then the law provided the shareholder with a number of remedies, including a derivative action, and equitable relief from unfairly prejudicial conduct. The position was different in the second type of cases, as recovery was permissible in principle, although it may be necessary to avoid double recovery. One could take as an example cases where claims were brought in respect of loss suffered in the capacity of a creditor of the company. The arguments which arose in the case of a shareholder had no application in such a case. There was no analogous relationship between a creditor and the company. There was no correlation between the value of the company's assets or profits and the "value"of the creditor's debt, analogous to the relationship on which a shareholder based his claim for a fall in share value. Where a company suffered a loss, it was possible that its shareholders may also suffer a consequential loss in respect of the value of their shares, but its creditors would not suffer any loss so long as the company remains solvent. Even where a loss caused the company to become insolvent, or occurred while it was insolvent, its shareholders and its creditors were not affected in the same way, either temporally or causally. In an insolvency, the shareholders would recover only a pro rata share of the company's surplus assets, if any. The value of their shares would reflect the value of that interest. The extent to which the company's loss may affect a creditor's recovery of his debt, on the other hand, would depend not only on the company's assets but also on the value of any security possessed by the creditor, on the rules governing the priority of debts, and on the manner in which the liquidation was conducted. Most importantly, even where the company's loss resulted in the creditor also suffering a loss, he did not suffer the loss in the capacity of a shareholder, and his pursuit of a claim in respect of that loss could not therefore give rise to any conflict with the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. The potential concern that arose in relation to claims brought by creditors was not, therefore, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. On the other hand, the principle that double recovery should be avoided may be relevant, although it was not necessarily engaged merely because the company and the creditor had concurrent claims against the same defendant. The 'reflective loss' principle laid down in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 was, therefore, limited to claims by shareholders that, as a result of actionable loss suffered by their company, the value of their shares, or of the distributions they received as shareholders, had been diminished. Other claims, whether by shareholders or anyone else, should be dealt with in the ordinary way. [Approach adopted by Lord Bingham only in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 re-affirmed]. Giles v Rhind [2003] Ch 618; Perry v Day [2004] EWHC 3372 (Ch); [2005] 2 BCLC 405 and Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Civ 781; [2004] 2 BCLC 554 held to be wrongly decided. In the present case the principle of reflective loss laid down in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 did not apply, since the claimant was a creditor and not a shareholder. Furthermore, no exception to the said principle applied in the present case. Claimant should be permitted to pursue the entirety of its claim against the defendant.] [Per Lord Hodge; agreeing with Lord Reed (Majority view): Expansion of the so-called"principle"that reflective loss could not be recovered has had unwelcome and unjustifiable effects on the law. If the facts alleged by the claimant in the present case were established, the exclusion of the bulk of its claim under the reflective loss principle would result in a great injustice. Principle of reflective loss which the case of Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 established, was not articulated as a general principle to be applied in all contexts; it was a rule of company law arising from the nature of the shareholder's investment and participation in a limited company and excluded a shareholder's claim made in its capacity as shareholder. Subsequent departure of the reflective loss principle from its foundations in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 had given rise to problems and uncertainties in the law. However the said principle (if applied in its proper context) had a principled basis in company law and ought not to be departed from now]. [Per Lord Sales; agreeing with Lord Reed but with his own reasons (Minority view): Majority opinion in the present case lays down that the reflective loss principle was justified in a shareholder's case but that the rationale for it did not extend to cover a creditor's case; that the reflective loss principle laid down in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (the Prudential case') was a rule of law, and that the the loss suffered by a shareholder in relation to diminution in the value of shares or loss of dividends simply was to be regarded as irrecoverable in a case where the company had a parallel claim against the third party defendant. However, the court in the Prudential case did not lay down a rule of law that a shareholder with a claim against a third party defendant in parallel with, and reflective of, a claim by the company against the same defendant simply had to be deemed to suffer no different loss of his own which he could recover, whatever the true position on the facts. It did not purport to do so. Rather, the court set out reasoning why it thought the shareholder in such a case in fact suffered no loss. There clearly were some cases where the shareholder did suffer a loss which was different from the loss suffered by the company. In the face of such difficulty with the reasoning in the Prudential case, it was not appropriate to re-characterise the court's decision as one laying down a new rule which simply deemed loss suffered by the shareholder to be irrecoverable as a matter of law. If a shareholder had a valid cause of action against the third-party defendant in respect of different loss which he had in fact suffered, it was not open to a court to rule it out as a matter of judicial fiat. The governing principle of importance in relation to shareholder claims as well as in relation to creditor claims was issue of double recovery. Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 ref. Use of the word"reflective" in case law for the principle of 'reflective loss' was deceptive and unhelpful. Where the company suffered loss and this affected the value of shares in it, there was obviously some relationship between the loss suffered by the company and the loss suffered by a shareholder, so that in a loose sense it might be said that the latter loss reflected the former. But the loss suffered by the shareholder was not the same as the loss suffered by the company. There was no necessary, direct correlation between the two. The loss suffered by the shareholder did not reflect the loss suffered by the company, in the stricter sense of there being a one-to-one correspondence between them. The Court of Appeal in the Prudential case conflated the rationale for the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 with that for the reflective loss principle and assumed that a personal action would subvert the rule. That was not the case. A shareholder ought not to be prevented from pursuing a valid personal cause of action. The issue of double recovery could be prevented by other means. The reasoning in the case of Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1, in so far as it endorsed the reflective loss principle as a principle debarring shareholders from recovery of personal loss which was different from the loss suffered by the company, ought not to be followed. Even if the said principle was accepted, it should not be extended to cover a case involving loss suffered by a creditor of the company. There were better ways to avoid double recovery in such a situation, such as by according the wrongdoer a right of subrogation to the extent he paid the creditor sums in respect of the debt owed by the company. A creditor of a company had not chosen to be in a position where he was required to follow the fortunes of the company in the same way as a shareholder. Subject to the company having sufficient assets, whether the creditor got paid or not did not depend on the decision of the directors, as payment of a dividend to a shareholder did: when armed with a court judgment the creditor could execute it against the assets of the company. Moreover, in the present case there was a clear mechanism available to meet the problem of possible double recovery against the defendant in respect of the loss suffered by the claimant and the loss suffered by the two companies. To the extent that claimant sued the defendant and obtained recovery from him for the judgment sum, the defendant could be subrogated to claimant's rights against the two companies or allowed a right of reimbursement in respect of them. Subrogation was a flexible equitable remedy which would be available in the present case for basic reasons of equity and natural justice, in order to ensure that neither the two companies (if claimant did not sue them on the debts) nor the claimant (if it did sue them on the debts) would receive a windfall enrichment by virtue of the payment by the defendant of the judgment sum or part thereof. Giles v Rhind [2003] Ch 618; Perry v Day [2004] EWHC 3372 (Ch); [2005] 2 BCLC 405 and Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA Civ 781; [2004] 2 BCLC 554 ref. Claimant should be permitted to proceed with its claim against the defendant for damages for inducing or procuring violation of claimant's rights under a court judgment, and for intentionally causing loss to the claimant by unlawful means by dissipating the assets of the two companies] Per Lord Reed, JSC [Majority view] (b) Company- -Reflective loss, principle of-Scope of reflective loss principle provided by Lord Bingham in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1. (i) Where a company suffered loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it, only the company may sue in respect of that loss. No action laid at the suit of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no other to make good a diminution in the value of the shareholder's shareholding where that merely reflected the loss suffered by the company. A claim would not lie by a shareholder to make good a loss which would be made good if the company's assets were replenished through action against the party responsible for the loss, even if the company, acting through its constitutional organs, had declined or failed to make good that loss. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] Ch 204; Heron International [Heron International Ltd. v. Lord Grade [1983] BCLC 244]; George Fischer [George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd. v. Multi Construction Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 260]; Gerber [Gerber Garment Technology Inc v. Lectra Systems Ltd [1997] RPC 443] and Stein v Blake [[1998] 1 All ER 724] ref. (ii) Where a company suffered loss but had no cause of action to sue to recover that loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it (if the shareholder had a cause of action to do so), even though the loss was a diminution in the value of the shareholding. George Fischer [George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd. v. Multi Construction Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 260]; Gerber [Gerber Garment Technology Inc v. Lectra Systems Ltd [1997] RPC 443]; Stein v Blake [[1998] 1 All ER 724] and Lee v. Sheard [1956] 1 QB 192, 195-196 ref. (iii) Where a company suffered loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder suffered a loss separate and distinct from that suffered by the company caused by breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each may sue to recover the loss caused to it by breach of the duty owed to it but neither may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty owed to that other. Heron International [Heron International Ltd. v. Lord Grade [1983] BCLC 244]; Gerber [Gerber Garment Technology Inc v. Lectra Systems Ltd [1997] RPC 443]; Stein v Blake [[1998] 1 All ER 724] and Lee v. Sheard [1956] 1 QB 192, 195-196 and R P Howard [RP Howard Ltd v Woodman Matthews & Co [1983] BCLC 117] ref. Gerber and Stein v Blake, particularly at p 726; Barings [Barings plc v Coopers & Lybrand [1997] 1 BCLC 427] at p 435B and Christensen v Scott [1996] 1 NZLR 273 at p 280, lines 25-35 distinguished. (iv) On the one hand the court must respect the principle of company autonomy, ensure that the company's creditors were not prejudiced by the action of individual shareholders and ensure that a party did not recover compensation for a loss which another party had suffered. On the other, the court must be astute to ensure that the party who had in fact suffered loss was not arbitrarily denied fair compensation. Peter Knox QC, Simon Reevell, Richard Samuel, Amit Karia, Chloe Shuffrey (instructed by Trowers and Hamlins LLP (London)) for Intervener (All Party Parliamentary Group on Fair Business Banking).

Summary: Federal Government Land and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance (LIV of 1965) --- ----Ss.3 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Expiry of lease---Extinguishment of occupancy rights---Continued possession by lessee after lease term---Effect---Occupancy charges---Demand notice issued by authorities---Legality and scope ---Auction proceedings for grant of fresh lease term---Lessee of the expired lease claiming 'first right of refusal'---Precondition---Only bona fide lessees/legal occupants could claim 'first right of refusal'---The petitioners in the present connected writ petitions challenged notices issued by Pakistan Railways demanding occupancy charges and declining their claim of 'first right of refusal', despite their previous lease/licence agreements having expired---Held: Objections expressed by the petitioner were not well-founded---The respondents had clarified that they proceeded in accordance with observation made by the Supreme Court with respect to not leasing the property for more than five years---As to the status of the occupants in the expired lease areas it was clarified that the same was that of illegal occupants in terms of the provisions of the Federal Government Land and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965---All claimants were allowed to participate in the open auction while the claim of 'first right of refusal' was made limited to the bona fide lessees/licensees which could not extend any benefit to the illegal occupants---No one had been given any exception and rather in a fair manner the department allowed everyone a fair opportunity to participate in the auction of the leased rights while committing to entertain the 'first right of refusal' of the bona fide lessees only and the said decision did not suffer from any legal error---As to the claim of occupancy rights the occupants of expired lease could not escape their legal responsibility to pay for the use and occupation of property till their eviction---Being so, the impugned letter requiring the payment of occupancy charges was lawfully issued---With respect to the claim of the petitioners having made certain payments could not be settled in the present summary proceedings---Application filed by the petitioners before the authorities if pending were directed to be disposed of in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was disposed of, in circumstances. Muhammad Baqir Hussain for Petitioner. Muhammad Ameer Hamza Dogar, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Saeed Hussain Nagra, Kashif Habib and Khurram Shahzad for Respondent-Railways. Order Rasaal Hassan Syed, J .--- This order will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos.28176, 28879 and 29463 of 2020 as the same raise common questions of law and fact. 2. The petitioners in these Constitutional petitions have challenged notices/letters dated 16.05.2020 issued by the respondents for payment of occupancy charges by the occupants of Pakistan Railways properties. A direction is sought for disposal of the applications for the grant of First Right of Refusal and also for the annulment of demand notice dated 16.05.2020. Perusal of the documents annexed with these petitions, reveals that previously certain writ petitions were filed raising similar demand as also challenging the intended auction by the Railway authorities. In this round of litigation a direction was issued to the respondents vide Order dated 04.12.2019 to pass a speaking order. It is discernable from the file that the order to this effect in terms of response dated 04.03.2020 was issued by the Director/Property and Land, which is annexed with the petitions and reads as follows:- "In compliance to the orders of Honorable Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 04.12.2019 Writ Petitions Nos. 72341/2019, 72342/2019 and 73615/2019, petitioners were called for personal hearing on 29.01.2020. The petitioners/ representatives of petitioners attended the office of Director/Property and Land Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore on the above mentioned date and submitted grievances in writing. All the aspects of the case were examined and discussed with the petitioners/representatives in detail in accordance with the existing rules and policies regarding leasing/licensing of Railways land. During scrutiny of record, it is found that the lease/license period of the petitioners regarding the land possessed by them had already expired and as such no agreement exists between Pakistan Railways and petitioners at present. Central Government Land and Buildings (Recovery of Possession), Ordinance, 1965 is applicable on the disputed property. In reported judgment 2014 MLD 1186 and 2010 MLD 1471, in which Honorable High Courts, hold that every lessee or licensee who remained in occupation of the land or building after the determination of lease or license, became "unauthorized occupant" in respect of suit premises. Furthermore, Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Crl/OP Petition No.120/2016 on orders dated 04.01.2019, directed Pakistan Railways not to lease any property for more than five years. Therefore, the cases of petitioners will be dealt strictly in accordance with the existing rules and policies of Pakistan Railways. It is also observed that the possession of the land is still under the occupation of the petitioners without any agreement which should be got vacated from petitioners by Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways Lahore and they should participate in upcoming auction proceedings. Keeping in view the above position, I am of the view that their claim/representations are not justified/maintainable under the law and the same is regretted. Moreover, after expiry of lease period of the appellants over the land in question is only that of illegal encroacher/occupant who has not vested right to claim retention of possession. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the cases reported as Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Ismail and others (1999 SCMR 1331), Ismail Ahmad and 11 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs, Islamabad and 9 others (2016 MLD 114), Malik Muhammad Riaz and others v. Mrs. Farhat Imran and another (2015 MLD 1191), Ghulam Hussain v. Chairman/Secretary S&GAD, Housing Allotment Committee, Quetta and 2 others (2014 PLC (C.S.) 2019 and Mst. Nazir Mai v. Additional Secretary and 5 others (2011 YLR 972). It is further advised to all the petitioners to participate in the upcoming auction proceedings. The grievances of the petitioners regarding "First Right of Refusal" are limited to bona fide lessees/licensees only and should not benefit illegal occupants as per Central Government land and Building Recovery of Possession Ordinance, 1965". 3. It is evident from the said response that the respondents, in principal, agreed that the cases of the writ petitioners will be treated strictly in accordance with the rules and policy of Pakistan Railways and that the possession of the land under occupation of the writ petitioners would be got vacated and that they will be allowed to participate in the upcoming auction proceedings. The writ petitioners' claim for challenging the auction was regretted while advising them to participate in the intended auction. It was clarified that the First Right of Refusal shall be limited to bona fide lessees which should not benefit illegal occupants as per provisions of Central Government Land and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965. It was further explained that as per order of the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 04.01.2019, the respondents could not lease any property of Pakistan Railways for more than five (5) years. 4. In the instant case, the petitioners now claim that respondent No.3/Divisional Superintendent (DS) Pakistan Railways by issuing notice for recovery was bent upon expelling them to accommodate some blue-eyed persons, which if not checked, will result in unfair treatment. The other grievance is that the respondents were intended to decline the First Right of Refusal to the occupants of the expired lease and that the claim for payment for occupancy charges was extremely excessive. 5. Having heard the arguments by learned counsel from both sides and considering the same, it is observed that the objections expressed by the petitioners are not well-founded. As noted supra the respondent-department has already clarified in response dated 04.03.2020 that the respondents were proceeding in accordance with the observation made by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan that they could not lease the property for more than five (5) years. As to the status of the occupants in the expired lease areas, it was clarified that the same was that of illegal occupants, in terms of the provisions of the Central Government Land and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1965. All claimants were allowed to participate in the open auction while the claim of First Right of Refusal was made limited to the bona fide lessees/licensees, which could not extend any benefit to the illegal occupants. 6. It is discernable from the letter dated 16.5.2020 that the addressees were simply required to deposit outstanding occupancy charges from 01.7.2019 to 30.6.2020. Bare reading of the letter does not give even remote impression or warrant inference of any unfair treatment to the claimants of First Right of Refusal which would, of course, be limited to the bona fide lessees. The respondent-department having already declared the policy in the earlier response and committed to follow the rules and policy, there does not appear to be any reason to infer that the order was untenable, as in principal no one has been given any exception and rather in a fair manner and following the rules, the department agreed to allow everyone a fair opportunity to participate in the auction of the leased rights; while committing to entertain the First Right of Refusal of the bona fide lessees only. The said decision does not suffer from any error of law. 7. As to the claim of the occupancy rights, the occupants of expired lease cannot escape their legal responsibility to pay for the use and occupation of the property till their eviction. Being so, the impugned letter requiring the payment of occupancy charges was lawfully issued. The petitioners' plea of having made certain payments cannot possibly be settled in the present summary proceedings. They shall, however, be at liberty to claim adjustment of the payment, if earlier made, by providing all supporting material before the authorities concerned. The matter being factual can be properly resolved by the concerned authorities after consulting the record and duly considering the material, if any, as may be made available by the petitioners. The petitioners, if so advised, can approach the respondents for the settlement of their claims of alleged earlier payment and also in respect of the quantum of the amount due. 8. It is observed that petitioners claim in these petitions of having submitted certain applications to the respondents already in this regard, which if pending, will be disposed of by the authorities concerned in accordance with law and on their own merits and also keeping in view the policy and rules in vogue. 9. With these observations the writ petitions are disposed of. UN/I-11/L Order accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: A decree/order can be altered by Review or Appeal or Revision but neither S.148 nor section 151 of CPC can be used as a tool for the Alternation of Decree.

Summary: The alleged gift was denied by the contesting respondents i.e. respondent No.2 to 7, the onus was upon petitioner to prove the validity, correctness, and genuineness of the deeds, as alleged by her. With respect to the first objection regarding the transfer of property by respondent No.1 in her favour, petitioner has not placed on record even an iota of evidence as to whether her husband had become the owner of house in question on the basis of Ex: PW 2/1. It was to be proved by her that Mst. Pukhraj Begum being the owner of house had transferred her share through gift in favour ofrespondent No.1. The entire evidence produced by the petitioner is silent with respect to the proprietorship / title of house in question. The contents of Ex: PW 2/1 further reveals that the disputed house was shown to have been constructed in abadi-deh, description of which was properly given in the said deed. with respect to the ownership of disputed house neither any documentary nor oral evidence was ever produced by the petitioner to support her claim next objection that petitioner hasbecome the owner of the agricultural property on the basis of deeds (Ex: PW 2/1 and Ex: PW 2/2), the revenue papers have cleared the situation that Mst. Pukhraj Begum had become the owner of the property, but the factum of gift by her in favour of respondent No.1 was requiring concrete, tangible and solid proof. Both the deeds were required to be proved by the petitioner regarding which when she appeared in the witness box as PW-2, in cross-examination she deposed that besides her the deeds were signed by respondent No1. Record further suggests that PW-03 namely, Syed Jamal Shah, who happened to be the brother of petitioner, in his cross-examination has stated that deeds in question were signed by him and his father, besides petitioner. The intriguing aspect of the matter,while exploring the deeds, led to the conclusion that none of the aforementioned deeds was signed by petitioner. It appears that Ex: PW 2/1 was allegedly thumb impressed by executor Mst. Pukhraj Begum whereas Syed Farooq Shah and his son Syed Jamal Shah were the attesting witnesses of the same.Ex: PW 2/2 was allegedly executed by respondent No.1, marginal witnesses of which were Syed Farooq Shah and his son Syed Jamal Shah. Neither the petitioner nor PW-03 Syed Jamal Shah had been able to prove the validity of gift. Apart from above, gift in question was required to be proved within the parameters as provided in Muhammadan law and Islamic jurisprudence by proving the basic ingredients such as offer, acceptance and delivery of possession. Interestingly, respondent No.1, the husband of petitioner, though has submitted his cognovits, but has not bothered to appear in the witness box in order to prove the factum of gift, being beneficiary of deeds and executants of Ex: PW 2/2. When the deeds were categorically denied then ultimately petitioner was required to prove not only execution of deed but also the factum of gift. Respondent No1 being beneficiary of the alleged gift was an important person who could have deposed in petitioner s favour, subject to the cross-examination by contesting respondents. Record transpires that petitioner and respondent No.1 are still tied with marriage bond living in one and the same house, in such circumstances petitioner No.1 was in a better position even to produce respondent No.1 as her witness or he himself could appear as DW in support of his cognovits statement. It is well settled principle of law that when best available evidence is not produced then in accordance with Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 adverse inference would be drawn against the party, who withheld such evidence

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.173---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S.9(c)---Possession ofnarcotics---Report of police officer---Discharge of accused---Scope---Petitioners assailed theorder passed by Magistrate whereby the accused was discharged from the charges after theInvestigating Officer had found him innocent---Accused was alleged to have been found inpossession of 60 kilograms of charas and 20 kilograms of opium---Report of InvestigatingOfficer revealed that the signature of first witness of recovery memo were not available onthe recovery memo; that the said witness had also denied recovery of contraband in hispresence; that the earlier Investigating Officer of the case had stated that he was neitherappointed as the Investigating Officer nor had he gone to the place of occurrence; that neitherthe contraband was sealed nor any parcel was made and it was found to be laying open in thepolice station and that one of the petitioner had arranged the charas and opium just to savehimself and others from the consequences of the FIR which was registered against themunder Ss. 365-A, 342, 416 & 34, P.P.C., by the brother of accused---Two of the petitionerswere DSPs and one of them was SP at CID police station at the relevant time and afterdepartmental inquiry they were dismissed from service on the basis of said allegations---Noillegality or irregularity was committed by the Magistrate in discharging the accused---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 173---Report of police officer---Scope---Investigating Officer is not bound to base hisconclusion on version of informant or defence but on 'actual facts', discovered during thecourse of investigation---Such conclusion shall be submitted in shape of prescribed form, asrequired by S. 173, Cr.P.C.Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595 rel.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 173---Report of police officer---Scope---Section 173, Cr.P.C., nowhere describes as tohow the Magistrate shall deal with such report, it, however, empowers the Magistrate toagree or disagree with the act of Investigating Officer in releasing an accused duringinvestigation under S.173, Cr.P.C. which too, to the extent of discharge of bonds.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 173---Report of police officer---Powers of Magistrate---Scope---Magistrate incancelling a registered criminal case is required to act judicially, in that he has to act fairly,justly and honestly, a duty common to the exercise of all state powers, there is no lis beforehim, there is no duty to hear the parties, there is no decision given, no finality orirrevocability attaching to the order---Party is left free to institute a complaint on the samefacts and the same Magistrate does not even after passing such an order render himself to befuntcus officio---Magistrate, on the contrary, is quite competent to entertain and deal withsuch a complaint on material presented to him---Such peculiarities establish beyond doubtthat in so concurring with a report submitted under S. 173, Cr.P.C. Magistrate does notfunction as a criminal court.Bahadur v. State PLD 1985 SC 62 ref.(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 173, 561-A, 435 & 439---Report of police officer---Inherent powers of High Court---Scope---Magistrate while concurring with a police report submitted under S.173, Cr.P.C.does not act as a criminal court inferior to the Court of Session and the High Court, his ordercannot be revised and modified under the provisions of Ss.435 & 439, Cr.P.C. but in thatcase it is amenable to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.,provided the order amounts to abuse of process of court.Arif Ali Khan v. State 1993 SCMR 187; Muhammad Sharif v. State 1997 SCMR 304and Hussain Ahmed v. Irshad Bibi 1997 SCMR 1503 ref.(f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 173 & 190---Report of police officer---Cognizance of offence by Magistrates---Discharge of accused---Scope---Discharge of accused by a Magistrate is not legally possibleafter taking cognizance of the case---After taking cognizance by the Trial Court only threeresults are possible in a criminal case, firstly conviction of the accused either upon admissionof guilt by him or on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution; secondly, acquittal ofthe accused either under S. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. or on the basis of failure of theprosecution to prove its case on merits beyond reasonable doubt and thirdly, withdrawal fromprosecution by a Public Prosecutor under S.494, Cr.P.C.Muhammad Alam and another v. Additional Secretary to Government of NWFPHome and Tribal Affairs Department and 4 others PLD 1987 SC 103 and Nasira Surriya v.Muhammad Aslam and 7 others 1990 SCMR 12 ref.(g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 173 & 190---Report of police officer---Cognizance of offence by Magistrate---Scope---Even in cases triable exclusively by a Court of Sessions, the Magistrate's power under theCode of Criminal Procedure, 1898 remains intact till such time the case is formally sent byhim to the Court of Sessions for trial.Mehar Khan v. Yaqub Khan and another 1981 SCMR 267 ref.