Summary: (Bail Allowed) Javed Iqbal was arrested in connection with a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. He had applied for bail before the Special Court established under the PECA, 2016, but his application was dismissed. Subsequently, he filed a bail application before the High Court, which granted him bail subject to certain conditions, including the deposit of Rs. 3.5 million in the trial court. The petitioner contended that the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million was not permissible under the law, as he denied the liability and the High Court had acknowledged that the matter could only be resolved during the trial. The petitioner argued that the imposition of such a condition was illegal and relied on various judgments of the Supreme Court to support his case. The Deputy Attorney General representing the State acknowledged that imposing such a condition while granting bail was not legally permissible. However, he argued that the petitioner had admitted his liability, justifying the imposition of the condition. The Supreme Court, after hearing the arguments and examining the relevant legal provisions and precedents, concluded that while granting bail, the court can require an accused to execute a bond or provide sureties, but it cannot impose any other conditions, such as depositing money. The court cited previous judgments to support its position and emphasized that bail should not be subjected to riders and conditions when a case for bail has been made out. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million imposed by the High Court. The order granting bail to the petitioner, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 500,000 with one surety, was upheld.

Summary: (Bail Allowed) Javed Iqbal was arrested in connection with a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. He had applied for bail before the Special Court established under the PECA, 2016, but his application was dismissed. Subsequently, he filed a bail application before the High Court, which granted him bail subject to certain conditions, including the deposit of Rs. 3.5 million in the trial court. The petitioner contended that the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million was not permissible under the law, as he denied the liability and the High Court had acknowledged that the matter could only be resolved during the trial. The petitioner argued that the imposition of such a condition was illegal and relied on various judgments of the Supreme Court to support his case. The Deputy Attorney General representing the State acknowledged that imposing such a condition while granting bail was not legally permissible. However, he argued that the petitioner had admitted his liability, justifying the imposition of the condition. The Supreme Court, after hearing the arguments and examining the relevant legal provisions and precedents, concluded that while granting bail, the court can require an accused to execute a bond or provide sureties, but it cannot impose any other conditions, such as depositing money. The court cited previous judgments to support its position and emphasized that bail should not be subjected to riders and conditions when a case for bail has been made out. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million imposed by the High Court. The order granting bail to the petitioner, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 500,000 with one surety, was upheld.

Summary: (Bail Allowed) Javed Iqbal was arrested in connection with a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. He had applied for bail before the Special Court established under the PECA, 2016, but his application was dismissed. Subsequently, he filed a bail application before the High Court, which granted him bail subject to certain conditions, including the deposit of Rs. 3.5 million in the trial court. The petitioner contended that the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million was not permissible under the law, as he denied the liability and the High Court had acknowledged that the matter could only be resolved during the trial. The petitioner argued that the imposition of such a condition was illegal and relied on various judgments of the Supreme Court to support his case. The Deputy Attorney General representing the State acknowledged that imposing such a condition while granting bail was not legally permissible. However, he argued that the petitioner had admitted his liability, justifying the imposition of the condition. The Supreme Court, after hearing the arguments and examining the relevant legal provisions and precedents, concluded that while granting bail, the court can require an accused to execute a bond or provide sureties, but it cannot impose any other conditions, such as depositing money. The court cited previous judgments to support its position and emphasized that bail should not be subjected to riders and conditions when a case for bail has been made out. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million imposed by the High Court. The order granting bail to the petitioner, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 500,000 with one surety, was upheld.

Summary: (Bail Allowed) Javed Iqbal was arrested in connection with a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. He had applied for bail before the Special Court established under the PECA, 2016, but his application was dismissed. Subsequently, he filed a bail application before the High Court, which granted him bail subject to certain conditions, including the deposit of Rs. 3.5 million in the trial court. The petitioner contended that the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million was not permissible under the law, as he denied the liability and the High Court had acknowledged that the matter could only be resolved during the trial. The petitioner argued that the imposition of such a condition was illegal and relied on various judgments of the Supreme Court to support his case. The Deputy Attorney General representing the State acknowledged that imposing such a condition while granting bail was not legally permissible. However, he argued that the petitioner had admitted his liability, justifying the imposition of the condition. The Supreme Court, after hearing the arguments and examining the relevant legal provisions and precedents, concluded that while granting bail, the court can require an accused to execute a bond or provide sureties, but it cannot impose any other conditions, such as depositing money. The court cited previous judgments to support its position and emphasized that bail should not be subjected to riders and conditions when a case for bail has been made out. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the condition of depositing Rs. 3.5 million imposed by the High Court. The order granting bail to the petitioner, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 500,000 with one surety, was upheld.

Summary: Background:The case before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involves a petitioner, Meera Shafi, who accused respondent No. 5 of sexual harassment via a tweet on April 19, 2018. Following the tweet, Shafi filed a complaint under the Punjab Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2012. The complaint was dismissed by the Ombudsperson for lack of jurisdiction, a decision upheld by the appellate authority and the High Court. Shafi then escalated the matter to the Supreme Court. Respondent No. 5 filed a defamation suit against Shafi, which is still pending. Furthermore, to allegedly pressure Shafi and her witnesses, respondent No. 5 filed a criminal case against them under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA), challenging the constitutionality of criminalizing defamation and its compatibility with fundamental rights.-----Issues:Does Section 20 of PECA, which criminalizes defamation, violate Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression?Is the defense of truth compromised by PECA's criminalization of defamation?Does criminalizing defamation undermine the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression?Is there a conflict between pursuing a civil case for defamation and a criminal prosecution for the same, potentially affecting the right to a fair trial and due process as per Article 10A of the Constitution?Does applying PECA to victims of sexual harassment or other crimes silence them and perpetuate injustice?Does Section 20 of PECA deter individuals from accusing wrongdoers, contrary to Islamic teachings as stated in the Quran?Can the petitioners seek redress from the Supreme Court without filing an intra-court appeal against the High Court's decision?Is there an exception to the requirement of filing an intra-court appeal when fundamental rights are at stake, necessitating an expedited constitutional review?-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address the issues raised, particularly the constitutionality of Section 20 of PECA in light of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The court issued notices to the respondents and stayed the proceedings of the criminal case filed under FIR No. 72/20 until the next hearing, highlighting the court's consideration of the potential impact of criminal proceedings on the pending complaint and defamation suit.-----Citations/Precedents:The Punjab Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2012.The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA).Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Freedom of Speech and Expression).Article 10A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Right to Fair Trial and Due Process).Al-Qur'an, Surah An-Nisa (4) verse 148, regarding the right of the wronged to speak out.

Summary: The FIR accused them of propagating the Quadiani faith by forwarding proscribed material and translations of the Holy Quran through a WhatsApp group. The complainant alleged that the accused added him to the group with ulterior motives. The petitioners argued that the complainant had a history of involvement in cases against individuals belonging to the Ahmadi community. They claimed that the sections invoked in the FIR were not applicable to their case and that they were targeted based on their religious beliefs. The complainant and the Deputy Attorney General opposed the bail plea, stating that there was incriminating material connecting the petitioners to the alleged offence. They argued that the Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) Act, 2011, did not cover the petitioners' case, and the charges against them were valid. After hearing the arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient incriminating material connecting the petitioners to the offence and denied their bail. The court emphasised that the merits of the case should be determined by the trial court and cautioned against being influenced by any observations made in the impugned order. The criminal petitions were dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

Summary: The case involves offences under section ii of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and sections 295W, 298C, 1208, 34, 109 PPC, registered at P.S. FIA, Cyber Crime Reporting Centre, Lahore. The allegations against the petitioners include their involvement in disseminating blasphemous material through WhatsApp messages and organising quiz competitions with banned books. The complainant, Muhammad Shakeel, Advocate, received a message from an unknown number inviting him to a quiz contest. Upon investigation, the FIA team recovered banned books and material from the petitioner Rohan's house. The petitioners' counsel argued that the case is fabricated, and the complainant has a history of filing similar complaints due to his hatred of the religious beliefs of the petitioners. They contended that the charges against the petitioners do not warrant the sections invoked and suggested alternative provisions under which the case should be registered. The counsel for the complainant and the Deputy Attorney General opposed the bail, emphasising the forensic evidence connecting the petitioners to the offense. They argued that the banned material and books were shared by the petitioners and had blasphemous content. After hearing the arguments, the court concluded that the prosecution has sufficient material to connect the petitioners with the alleged crime. The court refrained from commenting on the merits of the case, as it should be determined during the trial. The petitions were dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The court also noted certain observations in the impugned order that may prejudice the case of the petitioners before the trial court. It directed the trial court to conduct the proceedings strictly in accordance with the law and without being influenced by those observations.

Summary: The case involves offences under section ii of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and sections 295W, 298C, 1208, 34, 109 PPC, registered at P.S. FIA, Cyber Crime Reporting Centre, Lahore. The allegations against the petitioners include their involvement in disseminating blasphemous material through WhatsApp messages and organising quiz competitions with banned books. The complainant, Muhammad Shakeel, Advocate, received a message from an unknown number inviting him to a quiz contest. Upon investigation, the FIA team recovered banned books and material from the petitioner Rohan's house. The petitioners' counsel argued that the case is fabricated, and the complainant has a history of filing similar complaints due to his hatred of the religious beliefs of the petitioners. They contended that the charges against the petitioners do not warrant the sections invoked and suggested alternative provisions under which the case should be registered. The counsel for the complainant and the Deputy Attorney General opposed the bail, emphasising the forensic evidence connecting the petitioners to the offense. They argued that the banned material and books were shared by the petitioners and had blasphemous content. After hearing the arguments, the court concluded that the prosecution has sufficient material to connect the petitioners with the alleged crime. The court refrained from commenting on the merits of the case, as it should be determined during the trial. The petitions were dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The court also noted certain observations in the impugned order that may prejudice the case of the petitioners before the trial court. It directed the trial court to conduct the proceedings strictly in accordance with the law and without being influenced by those observations.

Summary: The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Section 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA) under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The case arises from a tweet by the petitioner in 2018, accusing Ali Zafar of sexual harassment. Subsequently, Respondent No. 5 (Ali Zafar) filed a defamation suit, and an FIR (First Information Report) was registered under Section 20 of PECA in 2020. The petitioner argues that Section 20 violates the right to free speech under Article 19 and overlaps with the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner also claims that the FIR was registered improperly.The key issues include the constitutionality of Section 20 of PECA, the alleged violation of free speech rights, the overlap with the Penal Code, and procedural irregularities in registering the FIR. The petitioner contends that the FIR is malicious and aims to weaken her defense in the defamation suit. The court is tasked with determining the maintainability of the petition, the constitutionality of Section 20, and the validity of the FIR. The case involves a nuanced exploration of the balance between freedom of speech and the regulation of electronic crimes in Pakistan. --- the court addresses a constitutional petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA). Section 20 encompasses a broad range of objectionable acts, and the petitioners argue that it stifles free speech. The judge disagrees, asserting that the section is not limited to defamation but also covers offensive and derisive language.The judge draws parallels with the "fighting words doctrine" articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, emphasizing that certain categories of speech, including insulting or 'fighting' words, may fall outside constitutional protection. Section 20 of PECA, according to the judge, sanctions attacks on the dignity of a person, and defamation is just one of the violations it addresses.The judgment refers to John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle, stating that state interference is justified when harm is caused to others. The judge asserts that Section 20 is not unconstitutional and aligns with Article 14 of the Constitution, promoting the right to dignity.The judgment delves into the relationship between PECA and the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), emphasizing that Section 20 does not override the PPC but works in conjunction with it. The judge rejects the argument that Section 20 is vague, asserting that the Explanations and Exceptions in the PPC regarding defamation can be read into Section 20 of PECA.Addressing procedural matters, the judgment discusses the powers of judicial review and principles guiding the courts when challenging the constitutionality of a law. It concludes that Section 20 of PECA does not violate Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution.The judgment also scrutinizes the investigation procedures under PECA, specifically the role of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). It clarifies that PECA does not override the PPC and that both can coexist to address different aspects of cybercrimes.Furthermore, the judge examines the issue of simultaneous criminal and civil proceedings. The judgment concludes by dismissing the constitutional petition, allowing the petitioners to raise specific issues during the trial.

Summary: [Scope of statutory bail under third proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.]---The petitioner was involved in a matter related to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 ("PECA") and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 ("PPC"). The case involved allegations of creating a fake Facebook account and posting blasphemous material. The petitioner was arrested on 23.11.2017, and since then, his trial had not concluded.The petitioner had previously filed a bail petition on the grounds of statutory delay under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) on 27.02.2020, which was dismissed by the trial court on 10.06.2020. The petitioner then approached the High Court, which directed the trial court to conclude the trial within three months. However, as the trial did not conclude within the specified period, the petitioner filed a fresh bail petition mainly based on the ground of statutory delay. The High Court dismissed this petition on 08.06.2021, considering the petitioner's conduct during the direction period, where he failed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.The petitioner argued that the first bail petition had not been argued on merits and had been withdrawn to seek a direction for expeditious trial. Therefore, the second bail petition should be considered on its merits. The petitioner's counsel contended that the delay in trial had exceeded two years from the date of detention and, as per the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) CrPC, the petitioner had a statutory right to be released on bail.The Deputy Attorney General argued that the delay was not a fresh ground for the second bail petition since it was available to the petitioner during the first bail petition. The Supreme Court analyzed the scope of the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) CrPC based on previous judgments. It noted that the purpose of the provision was to ensure expeditious trials and that an accused had a right to be released on bail if the trial exceeded certain time limits. Exceptions to this right included delays caused by the accused or if the accused was a hardened criminal.The Court found that the petitioner had a prima facie right to be released on bail due to the delay in concluding the trial. It determined that there was no evidence of the petitioner intentionally causing delay and that his right to be released on bail was not barred by the previous direction issued by the High Court.In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and granted the petitioner post-arrest bail on the grounds of statutory delay.