Summary: Defamation Ordinance, 2002,---S.15---Khyber PakhtunkhwaGovernment Servants (conduct) rules, 1987-Rule 31-Government Servant, acting in official capacity, in case ofrecourse to a court of law to vindicate himself / herself for actsdone in official capacity, shall not do so without previoussanction / approval of the government----Government servantthough successfully contested suit for being blamed forcorruption / corrupt practices during the performance ofofficial duties as Head Teacher- suit filed without priorsanction of the government was against Rule 31 of the KhyberPakhtunkhwa Government Servants (conduct) Rules, 1987,hence appeal was allowed and suit filed by respondent wasdismissed. Relied-PLD 2019 Peshawar 135.

Summary: The petitioner, Muhammad Iltaf Khan, had filed a criminal complaint under section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, against the respondents, alleging defamation. The respondents were summoned to face indictment by the Court of Session at Mardan.The petitioner argued that the Court of Session had the jurisdiction to directly take cognizance of the defamation offense due to the introduction of section 502-A in the Pakistan Penal Code by Act IX of 2004. This section allowed the Court of Session to try offenses under Chapter XXI of the Code, including defamation, and decide them within ninety days. The petitioner contended that this provision excluded the conventional magisterial route for defamation cases, and therefore, the Court of Session could take direct cognizance without following the regular procedure under section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (the Code).On the other hand, the respondents argued that the non-obstante clause in section 502-A did not sweep away the entire mechanism provided under the Code. They contended that the Court of Session could not assume cognizance directly, as the Code explicitly placed a bar on such action unless the case was sent up by a Magistrate under section 190(2) of the Code.The Court analyzed the issue and held that the non-obstante clause in section 502-A was meant to achieve a limited statutory purpose, allowing the Court of Session to try defamation cases expeditiously. However, this did not change the regular procedure for the institution of complaints. The Court emphasized that the offense under section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code was punishable with imprisonment and, as such, was triable by a Magistrate. The insertion of section 502-A aimed to expedite the trial process without affecting the procedure for filing a complaint.The Court acknowledged that the High Court should have preferred to return the complaint for proper institution. Nonetheless, the complainant/respondent could still present the complaint before the Area Magistrate, who would forward it to the Court of Session for redressal if necessary.Ultimately, the Court dismissed the petition, and leave was declined.

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)-------Ss. 3 & 8---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11 & O.XXIII, R. 1---Defamation---Notice of action---Rejection of plaint---Withdrawal of earlier suit---Limitation---Scope---Appellant assailed the rejection of his plaint in a suit filed by him fordefamation and damages---Respondent had filed an application for rejection of plaint underO. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. stating therein that the plaintiff had filed a suit for damages anddefamation against him on similar grounds before the Court of Additional District Judge andthe same was simply withdrawn and that the appellant had also instituted a second suit in theCourt of Civil Judge against him for damages and defamation on similar cause of action, inwhich plaint was rejected by the Court---Validity---Appellant had not mentioned such factsin his plaint and it was clear that he had approached the Trial Court with unclean hands---Appellant having withdrawn the earlier suit unconditionally was precluded from re-agitatingthe same cause of action before the Trial Court on the basis of same subject matter---Subsequent suit was barred under O. XXIII, R. 1(3) of C.P.C.---Suit was also barred by S.3,read with Ss. 8 & 12 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Appellant had given legal notice tothe respondent with a delay of eight years---Trial Court had rightly rejected the plaint---Appeal was dismissed.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Only plaint and its accompaniments can beexamined for deciding the question of rejection of plaint.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Scope---If from the statement of the plaintiff, the suitappears to be barred by limitation, the plaint shall have to be rejected under O. VII, R. 11,C.P.C.

Summary: (Defamation----Damages and Apology allowed) The petitioners had published a news item in the newspaper Daily Sama, making derogatory allegations against the respondent. As a result, the respondent filed a suit claiming damages of Rs. 15 million for injury to his body and soul, injury to his career and reputation, and loss to his reputation, prestige, and esteem. The petitioners failed to file their defense despite several opportunities, and their right to file the defense was struck off. The suit was ultimately decreed in favor of the respondent. The petitioners later filed an application seeking to set aside the ex parte judgment and decree, but it was dismissed. They then filed an appeal before the Islamabad High Court, which was also dismissed. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioners had failed to avail themselves of the opportunities to file their defense, justifying the striking off of their defense and the ex parte proceedings. However, the Court found that the lower courts had mechanically decreed the suit without assessing the quantum of damages according to the evidence and settled principles. The Court pointed out that the respondent had failed to provide evidence of bodily injury or injury to his career, for which substantial damages had been claimed. The Court explained that special damages, which refer to actual losses, should be proven with reference to the evidence. In this case, the respondent failed to demonstrate the evidence supporting his claim of special damages. The Court further emphasized that even in cases of ex parte decrees, the courts must exercise their discretion judiciously and examine the credibility of each claim. In this case, the courts had failed to do so. While the Court recognized that the respondent had suffered mental torture and inconvenience due to the defamatory statement, it found that the decree passed by the lower courts without assessing damages and applying judicial principles could not be sustained. Instead of remanding the case, the Court accepted the respondent's proposal to award the minimum amount of general damages provided under Section 9 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, which was Rs. 300,000. The Court also ordered the petitioners to publish an apology in a similar manner and with the same prominence as the defamatory statement. In conclusion, the Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, modifying the decree and reducing the compensatory damages awarded to the respondent to Rs. 300,000. The case highlights the importance of properly assessing damages and applying judicial discretion in defamation cases.

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)-------Ss.3, 8 & 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit fordefamation/damages against Police Officer for circulation of false statement/representation---Essentials---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Suit was dismissed by Trial Court---Validity---Noestimation and clear calculation had been given by the appellant as to how and which act ofthe defendant caused financial loss, mental agony and defamation to the appellant which wasnot clear by the appellant in his plaint/suit---Report submitted by the police officials beforethe competent court of law did not come within the definition of "defamation"---Nodisclosure in plaint as to on which words/actions of the respondents petitioner/plaintiffreceived mental agony and defamation which disrepute him in public at large or to hisfriends and relatives---Appellant/plaintiff had not complied with the mandatory requirementsof Rr. 2 & 4 of O.VI of C.P.C.---Legal notice was given to the SHO of police station with adelay of more than eleven months---Plaint did not disclose any cause of action---Nodate/month had been mentioned in plaint as to where/when the respondents caused financialloss and before whom reputation was disrepute and damaged---Suit appeared to be barred bylimitation, so plaint should have to be rejected under O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C---Impugnedjudgment of the Trial Court had rightly been passed---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.Raja Ali Shan v. Messrs Essem Hotel Limited and others 2007 SCMR 741 ref.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.VII, R.11---Rejection of Plaint---Scope---For deciding the question of rejection ofplaint, only the plaint and its accompaniments could be examined.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.VII, R.11---Rejection of Plaint---Scope---Object of R.11 of O.VII, C.P.C. wasprimarily to save the parties from rigours of frivolous litigation at the very inception of theproceedings, and if the Court on the basis of averments made in the plaint and documents available, concluded that even if all the allegations made in the plaint were proved, theplaintiff would not be entitled to the relief claimed, the Court would be justified in rejectingthe plaint in the exercise of powers available under R.11 of O.VII, C.P.C.Pakistan Agriculture Storage and Services Corporation Ltd. v. Mian Abdul Latif andothers PLD 2008 SC 371 rel.(d) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)-------S.12---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.3---Special law---Applicability---Scope---Defamation Ordinance, 2002 is a special law which has prescribed limitation (six monthssince publication of the documentary material/matter) for filing suit for defamation andLimitation Act, 1908 does not apply in defamation cases.

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)----Ss. 8, 12 & 15---Suit for compensatory damages on account of defamation---Mandatory notice and limitation---Computation of period---Effect of pleadings and notice---Appellant instituted a suit for damages of Rs.25,00,000/- under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 alleging that defamatory remarks were made against him by the respondent---Respondent, after service of summons, moved an application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. for rejection of plaint on the ground that the claim was barred by limitation, which application was allowed and the plaint rejected---In appeal under S.15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, it was admitted on record that the appellant had issued the mandatory statutory notice under S.8 of the Ordinance on 16.04.2009, which was replied on 09.06.2009, whereas the suit was filed on 16.11.2009---From the plaint and notice it was evident that the appellant himself pleaded the origin of cause of action to be in May 2006 (as stated in para 24 of the plaint) and at the very least had knowledge of the alleged defamatory remarks by the time the notice dated 16.04.2009 was dispatched---Held, that under S.12 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, an action for defamation must be brought within six months after the publication of the defamatory matter came to the notice or knowledge of the person defamed; therefore, even reckoning limitation from the more favourable date of the statutory notice (16.04.2009), the suit filed on 16.11.2009 was clearly beyond the prescribed six-month period---Appellant neither averred any reasonable ground in the plaint explaining delay nor sought any relief for condonation of delay; the suit was thus ex facie time-barred and rightly held so by the trial Court. (b) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)----S. 8---Statutory notice---Contents and purpose---Defective notice---Effect---Appellant’s statutory notice under S.8 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 did not disclose the specific date on which the appellant acquired knowledge of the defamatory remarks, the precise source or the full content of the alleged defamation, nor did it clearly state the explicit monetary claim sought to be recovered---Held, that the rationale of the notice requirement is to provide meaningful information to the alleged defamer about the complained-of act, the nature of infringement, and the quantum of damages, so as to afford him an opportunity to reconsider, withdraw or abandon the offending remarks and, if so advised, to settle the dispute without recourse to litigation---A notice dispatched in a purely mechanical manner, without disclosing the essential ingredients of date of knowledge, particulars of defamatory matter and clear claim, cannot be treated as a true and beneficial compliance with S.8; however, even if the notice in the present case were assumed to be valid for argument’s sake, the suit would still remain barred as it was instituted more than six months after the date from which limitation clearly commenced. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VII, R.11(d)---Rejection of plaint---Bar of limitation apparent on the face of plaint---Whether limitation a mixed question of law and fact---Scope---Appellant contended that limitation was a mixed question of law and fact, which could only be determined after recording evidence and that the trial Court erred in rejecting the plaint without affording opportunity to lead evidence---Held, that the question whether limitation is a pure question of law or a mixed question of law and fact depends upon the pleadings in each case; where the plaint sets up disputed facts about the date of knowledge or origin of cause of action, which require proof, the Court may treat limitation as a mixed question and frame issues for evidence---However, where, as in the present case, the plaint and the statutory notice themselves disclose the commencement of cause of action and show that the suit has been filed beyond the statutory period, and no facts are pleaded to explain or extend limitation, then limitation becomes a pure question of law discernible from the pleadings alone---In such circumstances, the Court is neither obliged to frame an issue nor to record evidence and can exercise its power under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. to reject the plaint as being barred by law---Trial Court rightly exercised this jurisdiction when the fate of the suit was “tangibly perceptible” from the bare reading of the plaint and notice. (d) Law of pleadings and evidence---Evidence beyond pleadings---Not permissible---Limitation and pleadings---Appellant argued that he should have been allowed to lead evidence to bring his suit within limitation---Held, that it is settled law that no party can be allowed to improve its case beyond what is originally set out in the pleadings and that no amount of evidence can be considered on a plea of fact not raised in the plaint or written statement; evidence led beyond the scope of pleadings is liable to be excluded from consideration---Where the plaint does not contain any averment explaining delay, asserting a different date of knowledge, or raising any factual controversy on which limitation could depend, the plaintiff cannot later, through evidence, introduce new facts to overcome limitation---High Court, relying on the dicta of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others (PLD 2020 SC 338), Moiz Abbas v. Mrs. Latifa and others (2019 SCMR 74), Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhai and others (PLD 2016 SC 730), Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam (2015 SCMR 21), Sardar Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Returning Officer, PP-12 and others (2015 SCMR 1698), Abrar Ahmed and another v. Irshad Ahmed (PLD 2014 SC 331), Messrs Essa Engineering Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited and another (2014 SCMR 922), Wasi-ud-Din v. Fakhra Akhter and others (2011 SCMR 1550) and Abdul Haque and others v. Shaukat Ali and others (2003 SCMR 74), reiterated that a party is bound by its pleadings and cannot set up a new case or seek to cure a time-barred action by adducing evidence on facts never pleaded. (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.3---Court’s duty to consider limitation suo motu---Limitation as pure question of law or mixed question of law and fact---Principles restated---High Court, after referring to authoritative precedents including Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad and others (PLD 1985 SC 153), Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Amin and others (2008 SCMR 913), Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Khadim Hussain and others (2006 SCMR 1761), Nazar Gul v. Islam and others (1998 SCMR 1223), Jan Muhammad and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others (PLD 2017 SC 158), Mrs. Akram Yaseen and others v. Asif Yaseen and others (2013 SCMR 1099), Shahid Israr v. Mst. Maryam Bibi (PLD 2009 Lahore 119) and Muhammad Akram v. Aurangzeb and another (1989 CLC 1405), reaffirmed that limitation is a matter of statute; the Court is under an obligation, by virtue of S.3 of the Limitation Act, to dismiss any action instituted, appeal preferred or application made after the prescribed period even if limitation is not pleaded by the parties and even if waived by them---Where limitation is apparent on the face of the record and does not depend upon determination of any disputed facts, it is a pure question of law and can be decided without framing issues or recording evidence; only where the starting point of limitation or the date of knowledge is itself in dispute, requiring factual inquiry, can limitation be regarded as a mixed question of law and fact---In the present case, as no factual controversy existed about dates and no explanation for delay was pleaded, the bar of limitation was apparent and the Courts below were bound to give effect to it. (f) Administration of justice----Avoiding futile trials---Rejection of plaint where suit is hopelessly time-barred---High Court held that the trial Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. to reject the plaint for being barred by limitation so that the parties may not undergo the rigours, trouble and cost of a full trial when the fate of the litigation is already clear from the admissions in the plaint---Appeal under S.15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, having no force, was dismissed and the judgment dated 23.05.2011 of the trial Court/Addl. District Judge, Lahore, was upheld---No order as to costs. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Asif and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another (2018 CLD 239) • Agha Syed Mushtaque Ali Shah v. Mst. Bibi Gul Jan and others (2016 SCMR 910) • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others (PLD 2020 SC 338) • Moiz Abbas v. Mrs. Latifa and others (2019 SCMR 74) • Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhai and others (PLD 2016 SC 730) • Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam (2015 SCMR 21) • Sardar Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Returning Officer, PP-12 and others (2015 SCMR 1698) • Abrar Ahmed and another v. Irshad Ahmed (PLD 2014 SC 331) • Messrs Essa Engineering Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited and another (2014 SCMR 922) • Wasi-ud-Din v. Fakhra Akhter and others (2011 SCMR 1550) • Abdul Haque and others v. Shaukat Ali and 2 others (2003 SCMR 74) • Jan Muhammad and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others (PLD 2017 SC 158) • Mrs. Akram Yaseen and others v. Asif Yaseen and others (2013 SCMR 1099) • Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Amin and others (2008 SCMR 913) • Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Khadim Hussain and others (2006 SCMR 1761) • Nazar Gul v. Islam and 3 others (1998 SCMR 1223) • Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad and others (PLD 1985 SC 153) • Shahid Israr v. Mst. Maryam Bibi (PLD 2009 Lahore 119) • Muhammad Akram v. Aurangzeb and another (1989 CLC 1405)

Summary: General damaged claimed for mental torture, agony , defamation and financial loss are to be assessed following the Rule of Thumband said exercise fell in the discreationary jurisdiction of the Court, which must be decided in accordance with the facts & circumstances of each case.

Summary: The appellant filed a suit claiming damages for defamation based on the registration of a FIR against them. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's claims, and this judgment is the result of the appellant appealing that decision. The High Court analyzed the case and found that the appellant's plaint lacked sufficient allegations of published or distributed material that could damage the appellant's reputation. The court held that the FIR itself, which was the basis of the case, did not amount to defamation. The court referenced legal principles regarding immunity for statements made in the context of criminal proceedings, stating that the registration of an FIR is not an actionable cause for defamation. Additionally, the court observed that the appellant had the option to file a fresh plaint according to the relevant legal provisions if they wished to pursue their case further. However, the court concluded that the appellant had not established a valid case for appeal and dismissed the appeal accordingly.

Summary: Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (LVI of 2002)------S. 3--Civil Procedure Code, (V of 1908), O.XVII & IX, Rr. 2, 3 & 13--Suit for recovery ofdamages--Dismissed--Allegation of corruption and running of terrorist camps--Application forrecalling of order--Dismissed--Filling of civil miscellaneous appeal--Allowed and case wasremanded--Issuance of notices and publication in newspaper for appearance of respondent--Exparte decreed--Application for execution--Application for sitting aside ex-parte decree duringpendency of execution proceedings--Rejected--Report of process server--Non-affixation ofnotices at outer door of appellant--Limitation--Perusal of record reveals that appellant wasresiding at Turbat City and running business by name of Mekran Petroleum Service at mainRoad Turbat but there is no report of process server as to whether summons were served or unserved upon appellant--Record further reveals that trial Court did not order for affixation ofnotice at outer door of house of appellant or at his business address nor same was sent throughcourier service--It seems that trial Court has failed to follow procedures as provided under Rule20 of Order V, CPC, therefore publication in Daily Intekhab cannot be considered as effectiveservice of notice upon appellants/defendants--Publication was made in Daily Intekhab Hub fordate of 23.04.2012 but appellant was not proceeded against ex-parte on said date and matter wasadjourned by Court for 27.04.2012--Without issuing any notice for appellant for 27.04.2012 andwithout making any publication for 27.04.2012, appellant was proceeded ex-parte by trial Courton basis of publication made for date of 23.04.2012 which is a grave illegality--On gettingknowledge of impugned ex-parte judgment and decree, appellant filed application for settingaside same--In circumstances of instant case limitation will run from date of knowledge ofappellant--It is settled principle law that matters should be decided on merits and not ontechnicalities--Appeal was allowed. [Pp. 57 & 58] A, B, C & D

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. IX, R. 13 & O. V, R. 20---Setting aside of ex-parte decree---Substituted service---Failure to order for affixation of notice on the house of defendant---Effect---Nonavailability of report of process-server---Effect---Appellant was aggrieved of the order ofthe Trial Court whereby his application for setting aside of ex-parte decree was dismissed---Respondent had filed a suit for recovery of damages which in early round of litigationwas remanded by High Court to the Trial Court whereby it was registered and notices wereissued to the parties for appearance---Respondent appeared before the Trial Court, whereasappellant remained absent---Trial Court directed the respondent to submit publication on23.04.2012 but he submitted the same on 24.04.2012---Court had power to adopt procedureof substituted service only when all efforts to effect the service upon the defendant in theordinary course were exhausted---No report of the process server was available as towhether summons were served or unserved upon the appellant---Trial Court had not orderedfor affixation of the notice at the outer door of the house of appellant or at his businessaddress nor the same was sent through courier service---Trial Court had failed to follow theprocedure as provided under R. 20 of O.V, C.P.C. therefore, the publication could not beconsidered as effective service of notice upon the appellant---Publication was made for thedate of 24.04.2012 but the appellant was not proceeded against ex-parte on the said dateand the matter was adjourned by the Trial Court for 27.04.2012--Appellant was proceededagainst ex-parte on 27.04.2012 without any publication for 27.04.2012, which was a graveillegality---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.