Summary: Bail granted----(a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860: --- Ss. 420, 468, 471, 467, 419, 34 Post-arrest bail—Forgery, fraud, and preparation of bogus documents—Prosecution allegations and procedural irregularities—The petitioner was accused of preparing forged documents related to property allotments during a raid conducted without prior permission from a Magistrate. The Court noted that all alleged offenses except Section 467 PPC fall under the non-prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., requiring favorable consideration for bail. The Court observed that the petitioner had no prior criminal record, the investigation was complete, and further custody would serve no beneficial purpose. Procedural irregularities in the raid and FIR registration raised additional questions requiring further inquiry. -----Cited Cases: Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar, 2009 SCMR 1488 Tariq Bashir v. The State, PLD 1995 SC 34 (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898: --- S. 497(1) Grant of bail in non-prohibitory clause offenses—Legal principles and exceptional cases—The Court reiterated that bail in non-prohibitory clause cases should generally be granted unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as the likelihood of abscondence, tampering with evidence, repeat offenses, or prior convictions. The absence of these factors in the petitioner's case supported the granting of bail. -----Cited Cases: Subhan Khan v. The State, 2002 SCMR 1797 Riaz Jafar Natiq v. Muhammad Nadeem Dar, 2011 SCMR 1708 (c) Procedural Irregularities: --- Jurisdictional questions and validity of raid The Court noted procedural lapses in the raid and FIR registration, including the lack of prior Magistrate permission before conducting the raid and registering the FIR. These procedural questions warranted further examination during the trial and did not justify the petitioner's continued detention. (d) Court Directions: Grant of bail—The Court granted bail to the petitioner subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 200,000 with one surety in the same amount. The Court emphasized that its findings were based on tentative assessment and would not influence the trial proceedings.

Summary: S.494 Cr.P.C., Ss.409/420/467/468 Penal Code , S.S(2) Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947). Appeal does not abate on the death of accused. --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 431---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.409/420/467/468---Prevention of Corruption Act(II of 1947), S.5(2)---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating, forgery,corruption---Death of accused, a government employee---Abatement of appeal---Scope---Ordinarily, a criminal appeal would abate on the death of appellant/accused, but S.431,Cr.P.C. had provided an exception to that general rule---Under S.431, Cr.P.C. an appealagainst sentence of fine would not abate by reason of death of accused, because it was not amatter, which would affect his person, but would affect his estate---Upon death of accused,his appeal to the extent of a portion of sentence of an imprisonment, would abate, whereas theappeal to the extent of sentence of fine, affecting the property of accused, would not abate---Sentence awarded to a government officer or employee would certainly affect his service; insuch an eventuality, his conviction would also affect his pensionary benefits---On that scoreas well, appeal would not abate---In the present case, the amount of fine had been ordered tobe recovered from the properties of accused---Accused being a government employee, hisconviction and sentence, would certainly have an impact not only upon his estate, but alsoupon his pensionary benefits---Appeal to the extent, in circumstances would not abate ondeath of accused.Anwar Hussain Khan v. The State 1970 PCr.LJ 279; AIR 1957 All. 20=58 Cr.LJ 16 and AIR1962 Mys. 275 ref.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.494---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409/420/467/468--Prevention of Corruption Act(II of 1947), S.S(2)---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating, forgery,corruption---Withdrawal from prosecution---Scope---Allegations levelled against accused formisappropriation had not been supported by any witness---To the contrary, the reportsexhibited by the prosecution favoured accused, which had shown that whatever amount wasallocated to him, was properly spent---Evidence available on record, was not sufficient toconnect accused with the commission of alleged offence---Even otherwise, the Trial Courtwas also requested by the Prosecutor, through application for withdrawal of case againstaccused---Trial Court declined such request without assigning any reason--Section 494, Cr. P.C. empowered a Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case on ground of insufficient evidence---Court had a supervisory jurisdiction to see that said power could not be used by an authorityarbitrarily or contrary to the public interest-Court must satisfy itself about the request forwithdrawal by assigning its reasons for the acceptance or rejection of an appeal---For thepurpose of allowing or disallowing a request for withdrawal and assigning the reasons, thecourt must not necessarily record evidence and such discretion could also be exercised on thebasis of material available on record--Prosecution had not been able to prove its case againstaccused---Trial Court had not only failed to properly appreciate the evidence, but had alsofailed to exercise its jurisdiction for not granting permission for withdrawal of the case on theground of meagre evidence---Trial Court had not advanced any reason while rejecting theapplication for withdrawal, which would mean that court had not considered the evidence andmaterial available before it---Act of Trial Court not only amounted to misreading and nonreading of the evidence, but also amounted to non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in it, whichwas an illegality and irregularity---Impugned judgment was not sustainable, in circumstanceswhich was set aside.Mir Hassan v. Tariq Saeed and 2 others PLD 1977 SC 451 ref.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- - 0. 1, R.10-Constitution: of Pakistan (1973), Art.185 - Appeal before Supreme Court - Respondent No.1 in the case was Additional Sessions Judge, who had disposed of revision application and that judgment was the Constitutional petition in the High Court - Supreme Court observed and it was considered fit and proper to implead Additional Session Judge as party, in spite of the fact that he was pro forma party, then 'good and scrupulous draftsmanship demanded that he should not have been impleaded by name but by designation or office and in all fairness such pro forma respondent should have been mentioned at the end after naming of necessary respondents who contested proceedings as active parties - Such lapses were desired to be avoided in future. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 98)-. S. 249-A - Scope and application 'of 249-A, Cr.P.C.- -Words "at any stage of the case"occurring in S.249-A,.P.C. -Connotation - Order of acquittal can be passed by the Court without recording of evidence provided the Court is satisfied that peculiar facts of that case justify such order. Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. clearly shows that trial Magistrate is given power of acquitting an accused person at any stage of the case, if after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that charge' is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. Use of words"at any stage of the case" indicates intention that such order can be passed even before recording of evidence. If facts of the case are such and the Court is satisfied that no useful purpose would be served by proceeding further in the matter. Facts in each criminal case are different from the other and if the trial Court is given power to acquit at any stage of the proceedings-if satisfied, then it can be said that order of acquittal can be passed by the Court without recording of evidence provided the Court is satisfied that peculiar facts of that case justify such order. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) - Ss. 420, 406, 467 & 468 - Ingredients of criminal offences such as under Ss-420, 406, 467 & 468, P.P.C. and other cogent offences are similar as would appear in most cases of breach of contract - Civil Courts be given preference and allowed to decide such disputed facts - Duty of Criminal Court to employ its process for compelling attendance stated. Ingredients of criminal offences such as, under sections 420, 406, 467 and 468, P.P.C. and other cognate offences are similar as would appear in most cases of beach of contract. No doubt in such cases both remedies on criminal as well as civil sides arc available and can be pressed into service but Civil Courts be given preference and allowed to decide such disputed facts. In such circumstances it is the duty of the Criminal Court to act with circumspection and exercise power with utmost care and caution before it is persuaded to employ its process for compelling attendance. Jamot Ghulam Muhammad and others v. The State and another 1972 PCr.LJ 130 and Khan alias Kbanu and others v. The State 1989 PCr.LJ 1883 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)- - Art. 199 - Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S 439 - When there is finding by the Court of competent jurisdiction on the revisional side then it has attained finality and Constitutional petition would be non-maintainable on the same question. Powers of the High Court for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 439, Cr.P.C. are wider in scope than powers in the writ jurisdiction. By amendment in the law now Sessions Court and High Court have concurrent revisional jurisdiction which is allowed in the normal course to be exercised first by lower forum but that does not decrease the scope of jurisdiction as mentioned above. In such circumstances it is said that if there is finding by the Court of competent jurisdiction on the revisional side then it has attained finality. On the same question writ petition would be non-maintainable because otherwise it would amount to allowing question finally decided in one set.-of forums to be agitated afresh in.another set of forums and that way there will be no end to the finality. Abdul Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and others PLD 1981 SC 522 and Javaid Iqbal v. Muhammad Din and another 1990 SCMR 1309 ref.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 364-Examination of accused how recorded. Section 364, Cr. P. C. provides firstly, that the whole examination of the accused shall be recorded in full in the language in which he is examined or if that is not practicable, in the language of the Court or in English, secondly, that such record shall be shown or read to him (accused), thirdly, that it shall be signed by the accused and the Magistrate and such Magistrate shall certify in his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and hearing and that the record contained full and true account of the statement; and finally, that if the examination is not recorded by Magistrate himself, he shall be bound to make memorandum thereof. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 364-Mere omission to append a certificate required under S. 364, Cr. P. C. would not mean that it had occasioned any failure of justice or that it had prejudiced accused in his defence on merits-Question whether omission in procedure of a trial had occasioned a failure of justice, being a question of fact, must be determined before any finding about nature of irregularity could be given. Muhammad Inayat v. The State 1.985 P Cr. L 1 469; Munshi v. The State 1985 P Cr. L 1 1677; Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 1985 P Cr. L J 877; Muhammad Rafiq v. The State 1985 P Cr. L J 1985 and Speed Ahmad Khan v. The State 1985 P Cr. L J 2489 distinguished. (c) Criminal trial- - Omission to append a certificate under S. 364, Cr. P. C. cannot affect merits of case if it has not injured accused as to his defence on merits or has not occasioned a failure of justice. Hazrat Jamal v. The State P L D 1958 S C 383 and Rehmat Ali v. The State 1986 S C M R 446 ref. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss. 364, 439 & 537-Magistrate signed statements of accused-Statements were also signed by accused-Signature of accused proved the fact that examination of accused was recorded by Magistrate in his presence and hearing and that said examination was full and true account of statements by accused-Trial was trot held in a mode prohibited by law but was held in accordance with prescribed procedure-Absence/omission of certificate required under S. 364, Cr. P C.-No misreading of evidence by Courts below pointed out No prejudice or failure of justice was shown to have been caused to accused due to absence/omission of such certificate Absence or omission of certificate under S. 364, Cr. P. C., held, was an irregularity curable under S. 537, Cr. P. C.-High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, would not interfere unless there had been in fact a failure of justice or accused was prejudiced in his defence on merits. (e) Alibi- - Plea of-Accused was known to eye-witnesses who had no enmity to falsely implicate accused-Such witnesses had no other enemy-Nothing was available to show that accused was substituted for some other assailant-Plea of alibi an afterthought seemed to have been fabricated by accused who was arrested after some days of occurrence and was not inspiring confidence-Such plea, held, was rightly rejected in circumstances. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - S. 340(2) [as substituted by Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance (XII of 1985)]-Provision of S. 340(2), Cr. P. C. (as introduced by Ordinance 1985), being an unjust provision of law, is detrimental to interest of accused and not a beneficial legislation-Reasons illustrated. If the accused declines to give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges or allegation made against him or if he refuses to answer a question put to him in cross-examination, he can be subjected to prosecution under sections 178 and 179 of P. P. C. However, the amendment made by Ordinance XII of 1985 did not give valuable right to the accuses to give evidence in disproof of allegation against him. The option gives to the accused by Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 was a substantive right which was taken away by a procedural provision brought by the amending Ordinance of 1985 to the detriment of accused. The refusal by. al accused to make statement on oath under section 340(2), Cr. P. C. or hi refusal to answer any question to cross-examination can make him liable to punishment under sections 178, 179, P. P. C. He can be punished for purgery under section 193, P. P. C. He can be cross-examined like an3 other witness to any extent as provided by Articles 44, 132 and 133 o1 Qanun-e-Shahadat. The only limit to cross-examination is provided it three clauses of proviso of subsection (2). As such subsection (2) o1 section 340, Cr. P. C. to say the least, is unjust provision of law. Secondly, the accepted principle of law according to English as well as Islamic jurisprudence is that it is for the prosecution to prove its case against the accused in a criminal trial and he is never asked to rebut the charge on oath. Presumption is attached to his innocence. The accused is not required to prove his innocence in Court. He has only to show that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against him beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof in criminal trial lies on the prosecution under Articles 117, 118, 119, 120 of Qanun-e-Shahadat (sections 101 to 104, Evidence Act). The accused is burdened of proving the existence of circumstances only if he pleads general or special exceptions or provisos contained in the Pakistan Penal Code or in any law defining the offence. One can visualize some cases in which the statement of accused on oath during a criminal trial may be considered necessary as for example cases under sections 107, 133, 144, 145, 488, 552, Cr. P. C. or cases under section 379/411, P. P. C. if the accused claims the stolen property or cases under sections 420, 467, 478, 506, P. P. C. or in cases where be pleads general or special exceptions. But even in such like cases it should be his option to give or not to give evidence on oath. Therefore, the provision of subsection (2).of, section 340, Cr. P. C., as introduced by Ordinance XII of 1985 is detrimental to the interest of accused and not a beneficial legislation. Faqir Hussain v. The State P L D 1985 Lah. 434 ref. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - S. 340 (2) fns substituted by Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance (XII of 1985)]-Provisions of S. 340 (2) (as introduced by Ordinance, 1985) being detrimental to the interest of accused, held, could not be given retrospective effect-Reasons detailed-[Interpretation of statutes]. The option/choice of the accused to give statement on oath in rebuttal to the prosecution evidence given in the Law Reforms Ordinance was a vested and substantive right which could not be taken away by procedural provisions enforced by amending Ordinance (XII of 1985). The provisions of subsection (2) of section 340, Cr. P. C. as amended by Ordinance XII of 19b5, though a procedural law but being detrimental to the interest of the accused could not be given retrospective effect. These provisions were not beneficial legislation. Subsection (2) does not prescribe limits of cross-examination on merits of the case during the trial. The limits of cross examination given in the proviso of this subsection do not protect an accused from the mischief of lengthy cross-examination to which he can be subjected if he appears to make statement on oath as an accused. Article 44 read with Articles 132 and 133 of Qanun-e-Shahadat permits unlimited cross-examination of an accused, Article 165 of Qanun-e-Shahadat provides that the Order called Qanun-e-Shahadat shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. As such the limited limits provided in the proviso of subsection (2) of section 340, Cr. P. C. which was a later legislation will have no effect. and the.accused, therefore, would be subjected to lengthy cross-examination which may prejudice his defence. There is another contradiction in the two legislations. The Law Reforms Ordinance gave protection to the accused that his failure to give evidence shall not be made subject of any comment nor would it give rise to any presumption against him. This provision of law was deleted by the amending Ordinance XII of 1985. This means that his failure to give evidence on oath could give rise to presumption against him under Article 129, Qanun-e-Shahadat (section 114, Evidence Act). This was in conflict with the provisions of section 163, Qanun-e-Shahadat which provides for decision of a case on the basis of oath but it was specifically stated that "nothing in this Article applies to law relating to the Enforcement of Hudood or other criminal cases. An accused of a criminal charge is not required to prove his innocence. He can also not be called upon to disprove the charges or allegations made against him. He is only to show that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against him beyond reasonable doubt. The provisions of section 340 (2), Cr. P. C. as amended by Ordinance XII of 1985 could not be given retrospective effect. In the amendment introduced by Law Reforms Ordinance the accused was given option to be or not to be a witness in his own defence. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - Ss. 342 (4) & 340 (2) read with Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984), Art. 44-No contradiction/conflict, held, existed between the two provisions of Cr. P. C. (i) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)- - Art. 13 (b)-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 340 (2)Provisions of S. 340 (2), Cr. P. C., held; were not ultra vires of, Art. 13 (b), Constitution of Pakistan (1973).-[Vires of legislation]. (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - S. 439-Revisional jurisdiction of High Court-Vires of a legislation, held, could not be challenged collaterally or incidentally before High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.-[Vires of legislation-Revision (criminal)]. (k) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - S. 340(2) [as substituted by Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance (XII of 1985)] & S. 537-Provisions of S. 340(2), Cr. P. C. are mandatory-Omission to record statement of accused on oath would be an illegality and not an irregularity curable under S. 537, Cr. P. C. -Accused is not bound to request Court during trial that his statement should be recorded-Court itself has to record statement of accused under S. 340(2), Cr. P. C. (l) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - S. 439-Question as to administering oath to witnesses on Holy Qur'an or special oath according to local custom-Question raised though not directly or indirectly involved in case, but being of public importance was examined by High Court in detail at request of all counsel appearing in case. (m) High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders- -Vol. IV, Chap. 12-Oaths Act (X of 1873), Ss. 5 & 7-Courts, held, were not permitted to administer oath to a witness in any trial or case on Holy Qur'an or special oath according to customs of the area-Witnesses are required to be administered oath in the form of oath and affirmation prescribed by High Court Rules and Orders. Both, the Code of Criminal Procedure and Qanun-e-Shahadat do not prescribe any form of oath and affirmation to be administered to witnesses during the trial or hearing of a case. The oath to a witness is administered under sections 5 and 7 of Oaths Act, 1873. The form of the oath is prescribed in Chapter 12 of Volume IV of High Court Rules and Orders. The Courts are, therefore, not permitted to administer oath to a witness in any trial or case on Holy Qur'an or special oath according to customs of the Illaqa. The witnesses are required to be administered oath in the form of oath and affirmation prescribed by the High Court Rules and Orders. (n) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - S. 382-B-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 307-Accused inflicted sharp-edged weapon injuries on person of victim, injury on abdomen and two injuries on chest were found dangerous to life-Injured person remained in hospital for two months-Trial Court awarded sentence to accused after taking into consideration his detention in custody during trial of case-Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr. P. C. declined to accused in circumstances. Tasaddaq Hussain Jillani, A. A.-G. for the State. Dates of hearing: 26th February: 11th March and 15th April, 1986

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 235 (1)- Same transaction-Difference of time and place between commission of two offences not necessarily fatal to continuity-Two charges under Ss. 467 & 193, P. P. C., forging a patta and thus fabricating false evidence for being used in judicial proceeding-May be tries together. Under section 235 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, there must be one continuous thread of a common purpose running through the acts to support a joinder of charges in respect thereof. Mere difference in time or place between the commission of one offence and another will not necessarily import want of such continuity. The offences may yet be linked together by a community or continuity of purpose, and thus form the same transaction. Where the accused forged a patta and thus committed two ffences, one under section 467 and the other under section 193, P. P. C., with both of which he was charged and it was contended by the defence that there was a misjoinder of charges. Held, that the two offences were committed in the course of the same transaction and, therefore, subsection (1) of section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be applicable and, as such, there being no misjoinder of charges the trial was legal. Kamala Kanta Roy Choudhury v.. Emperor 41 C W N 1112 fol. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 537-Misjoinder of charges-Not curable under S. 537. Babulal Choukhani v. The King-Emperor 42 C W N 621 land Qadar Dad v. Sultanbibi P L D 1956 F C 129 ref. Salahudin Ahmad, Deputy Legal Remembrancer for the State.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIX of 1948) (as amended) - Not applicable in territory covered by former Bahawalpur State. Held, that the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIX of 1948) (as amended in 1953) being in conflict with the law as it prevailed in the Bahawalpur territory before the integration of West Pakistan, could not be deemed to be in force because of saving provisions, contained in section 10 of the establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955. The position did not alter when the new Constitution was enforced because similar saving provisions were enacted in Article 224 of the Constitution. State v. Said Ahmad P L D 1957 B J 1 ref. (b) Bahawalpur Prevention of Corruption Act (V of 1950), S. 6-Sanction to prosecute-Offence under S. 409, P. P. C. coupled with forging of accounts-Provision as to necessity of sanction cannot be defeated by confining the complaint to offence under S. 467, P. P. C., for which no sanction was required-Test for determining when sanction was necessary in such cases. Held, that without the sanction of the authority mentioned in section 6 of the Bahawalpur Prevention of Corruption Act the case could not be proceeded with. The test in such cases was whether primarily and essentially the allegations made would pertain to an offence which cannot be tried without sanction of the prescribed authority. The allegations really amounted to charging the accused with misappropriation of money and to facilitate that crime they were being also accused of falsifying the records. Sweeing v. Koonhan and others 36 Cr. L J 970; In re. Chilukuri Antarvedi Sharma and others 47 Cr. L J 1034, Bajaji Appaji Kote v. Emperor 47 Cr. L J 321; In re Ravanappa Reddi 33 Cr. L J 361, Sadhuram Chimandas v. Chimandas Budhuram 38 Cr. L J 742; Perianna Muthirian v. M. Vengu Ayyer 30 Cr. L J 322; Ram Nath v. Emperor 26 Cr. L J 362; In re Appadurai Nainar and others 37 Cr. L J 159; Bhimomal and others v. Jalo 37 L J 1007 and Tikaram v. Emperor A I R 1945 Nag. 210 (S. B.) ref. Nallappa Goundan v. Chinnamal A I R 1942 Mad. 19 Muhammad Isa v. Nizim Husain A I R 1940 All. 246; U. Aung Pe v. The King A I R 1938 Rang. 232; Hari Ram Singh's case A I R 1939 F C 43 and Ghulam Muhammad v. Emperor A I R 1937 Lah. 802 distinguished. M. Anwar, A. A. G. for the State.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 420, 468, 471, 406 & 467 — Cheque forgery — Valuable security — Financial fraud — Post-arrest bail — Refusal. Accused/petitioner Muhammad Uzair Bin Rafi, owner of a brokerage shop (K.K. Traders), was alleged to have issued five cheques totaling Rs. 37.79 lakhs towards discharge of liability for the purchase of paddy crops, which were dishonoured with the endorsement “signature unauthorized.” It was found during investigation that Uzair signed two of the cheques in a style differing from the remaining three, indicating prima facie forgery. The cheque, being an instrument that creates or purports to create a legal liability or right, was held to fall within the scope of “valuable security” under S.30 of the Penal Code, thereby attracting the provisions of S.467, PPC — an offence punishable with life imprisonment or up to 10 years — bringing the case within the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C. The bail plea was thus refused. Sachidanand Prasad v. Emperor AIR 1993 Patna 488 relied upon. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497 — Prohibitory clause — Financial fraud involving forged cheques — Applicability. Petitioner argued that the offences under Ss. 420, 468, 471, and 406 PPC did not attract the prohibitory clause. However, the court noted that the forgery of cheques constituted an offence under S. 467 PPC which carries punishment up to life imprisonment. Given the serious nature of the alleged financial mischief, the case was not one of further inquiry. No mala fide was alleged in the registration of FIR, and the court refused to exercise discretion under the bail jurisdiction. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 498, 497(5) — Pre-arrest bail — Cancellation — Business partnership denied — Deeper appreciation — Not permissible at bail stage. Co-accused Raja Danish had been granted pre-arrest bail by the trial court. He denied being a partner of the main accused, claiming to have been defrauded himself and having lodged a separate complaint. However, the High Court found that such plea required deeper appreciation of evidence and could not be accepted at the bail stage. The record suggested his participation in a joint business venture involving purchase of paddy crops. His pre-arrest bail was thus cancelled. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 498 & 497 — Pre-arrest bail — Broker — Further inquiry — Relief maintained. With respect to Muhammad Asif (broker), the court noted that he was not directly connected with the issuance of cheques. His role was limited to facilitating the transaction. Possibility of false implication was not ruled out. The trial court’s order granting him pre-arrest bail was maintained. (e) Bail — Discretion — Judicial restraint — Economic offences — Duty of court. The court remarked that the modus operandi of the main accused amounted to “financial murder” and the circumstances presented a “dreadful picture” necessitating denial of bail. Discretionary relief could not be extended in cases where serious financial fraud was apparent. ---- Disposition: Crl. Misc. No. 32072-B/2025 (Post-arrest bail of Muhammad Uzair Bin Rafi): Dismissed. Crl. Misc. No. 2425-BC/2025 (Cancellation plea by complainant): Allowed to the extent of Raja Danish; bail cancelled. Pre-arrest bail of Muhammad Asif maintained.

Summary: Bail denied ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 420, 468, 471, 467, 419 & 109—Forgery of valuable security—Sale deed—Nature and effect Accused allegedly forged a sale deed to unlawfully transfer property belonging to a deceased individual into his own name—Court held that a sale deed qualifies as a "valuable security" under S.30, PPC, as it purports to create or transfer legal rights—Although offence under S.467, PPC was not initially applied by investigating agency, court observed that forgery of a valuable security attracted S.467, PPC, which carries a sentence of life imprisonment—Consequently, bar under S.497, Cr.P.C., on grant of bail in non-bailable offences punishable with death or life imprisonment was held applicable—Bail declined. Cited Cases: • Jainul Abdin v. Mulchand Budur AIR 1955 NUC (Assam) 2829 • AIR 1926 Allahabad 57 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 497—Post-arrest bail—Scope—Offence of forgery involving valuable security—Prima facie evidence and gravity of offence Bail sought on ground that offences did not fall within prohibitory clause—Court held that S.467, PPC was prima facie attracted, making the offence fall within prohibitory clause of S.497—Petitioner allegedly masterminded transfer of immovable property of a deceased through forged documentation in collusion with revenue officials—Allegations supported by documentary evidence discovered during investigation—Held, gravity of offence and mode of commission precluded grant of bail. (c) Locus standi—Criminal prosecution—Initiation by interested but not aggrieved party ----S. 154, Cr.P.C.—FIR—Maintainability of complaint by relative of deceased Accused objected to FIR on ground that complainant was not a legal heir and thus lacked locus standi—Court held that fraud and forgery are crimes against society at large and can be reported by any member of the public—Real nephew of the deceased, being closely related and interested in protection of the deceased's estate, was competent to lodge FIR—Held, complaint was legally valid. Cited Case: • Muhammad Rasheed v. The State PLD 1959 (WP) Lahore 372 (d) Bail ----Fraud and forgery—Public trust—Abuse of official process—Relevance of petitioner’s role Court observed that petitioner, though not a public official, acted in collusion with revenue staff including Patwari and Naib Tehsildar and was the principal beneficiary of forged transfer—Petitioner’s role depicted him as mastermind of fraud—Held, grant of bail would amount to condoning abuse of public process and undermine public trust—Bail application rightly rejected. Disposition: Bail petition dismissed.