Summary: To sum up and conclude the scheme governing the election and allocation of reserved seats to political parties that have secured general seats in the National or Provincial Assemblies, it is evident that such reserved seats are allocated to political parties in proportion to the general seats won, following the declaration of final results by ECP under Section 98 of the Act of 2017. Furthermore, in view of the proviso to Article 106 of the Constitution and sub-rule (6) of Rule 92 of the Rules of 2017, any independent candidate who has won a general seat and whose name has been notified as such under Section 98, but joins a political party within three days of such notification, shall be counted towards the credit of that political party for the purpose of allocation of reserved seats. If the assertion of the ECP regarding the imposition of a cut-off date of 22.02.2024 is accepted, despite the absence of any legal or rational foundation, it would not only be inconsistent with the statutory and constitutional scheme governing the allocation of reserved seats for women and non-Muslims, but would also render nugatory the express mandate of the proviso to Article 106 of the Constitution and sub-rule (6) of Rule 92 of the Rules of 2017. It is by now well-established that the Constitution is a living and evolving document; its provisions must be interpreted dynamically and purposively so as to give effect to the constitutional intent. An interpretation that renders any part of the Constitution otiose or redundant cannot be presumed to have been the intention of its framers.Aam Log Itehad and another vs. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others (PLD 2022 SC 39) and Suo Motu Case No.8 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No.649-L of 2018 (PLD 2019 SC 201). The only legally relevant date for determining a party's strength for the purpose of allocation of reserved seats is the date on which such allocation or election actually takes place. Therefore, any independent candidate who has joined a political party within the prescribed time prior to that date must be counted towards the total number of general seats held by that party. A cut-off date fixed earlier than this point of reference not only lacks legal foundation, butalso disrupts the proportional representation framework laid down in the Constitution and the Act of 2017. Such administrative action by the ECP is, therefore, contrary to the law and cannot be sustained.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Art. 199; Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2; O. XLIII, R.1(r) Constitutional petition --- Maintainability --- Interlocutory orders --- Refusal of ad interim injunction --- Scope and bar under constitutional jurisdiction --- Petitioner challenged concurrent orders of civil and appellate courts whereby request for ad interim injunction was declined --- Held, constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 cannot be invoked to assail interlocutory orders which are not final or conclusive in nature --- Application under O. XXXIX Rr. 1 & 2 CPC for temporary injunction still pending before trial court --- Refusal of ad interim relief does not preclude adjudication on merits --- High Court observed that allowing constitutional petitions against such interim refusals would open floodgates and undermine hierarchy of legal remedies --- Petition dismissed in limine for being premature and not maintainable. Cited Cases: • Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha 2024 SCMR 1385 • Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel 2024 SCMR 298 (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Art. 199(1)(c) Extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction --- Scope and limitations --- Where alternate efficacious remedy exists or trial is pending, High Court must exercise restraint --- Held, High Court’s power under Art.199 is supervisory and not appellate in nature --- Interim orders passed with lawful discretion by subordinate courts are not to be interfered with unless shown to be passed without jurisdiction or involving gross miscarriage of justice --- Petition failed to establish such infirmities --- Expression “adequate” remedy under Art.199 interpreted in line with dictionary and judicial meanings as legally sufficient and minimally satisfactory --- Petition dismissed accordingly. Cited Cases: • Special Secretary-II (Law & Order) v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 • Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Intizar Ali 2022 SCMR 472 • Province of Punjab v. Yasir Majeed Sheikh 2021 SCMR 624 • Messrs Fateh Yarn Pvt. Ltd. v. CIR Faisalabad 2021 SCMR 1133 (c) Easements Act (V of 1882); Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Art. 9 Easement rights v. Ownership rights --- Registered sale deed excluded ownership of rooftop --- Petitioner claimed easement by necessity to prevent construction on rooftop --- Held, no easement rights established; right to easement cannot override ownership rights expressly excluded in sale deed --- Court found petitioner's claim amounted to interference with lawful property rights rather than enforcement of any easement --- Fundamental rights under Art. 9 of Constitution invoked by petitioner (right to quality life) found inapplicable where no legal entitlement to rooftop existed.----- "Invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be termed to be an "adequate remedy" to challenge grant or refusal of ad interim injunction being not final and conclusive in nature."

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 363---Kidnapping---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of three days in lodging the FIR---Consequential---Accused was charged for kidnapping the minor son of complainant---Perusal of record revealed that regarding the occurrence which took place on 04.05.2010, FIR was got registered on 07.05.2010 i.e. with the delay of three days---Complainant during cross-examination had himself admitted that distance between the place of occurrence and Police Station was of 03-kilometers---Therefore, immediately after the incident the matter could conveniently be reported to the police by the complainant but no such effort was made in that regard---Even from the date of occurrence i.e. 04.05.2010 to 07.10.2010 neither complainant appeared before the Investigating Officer nor made any application for the registration of FIR---Moreover, it was not proved from record that Investigating Officer received any information about the occurrence from wireless or any source---Information regarding the incident was imparted to the police by the complainant after a considerable delay and that too after due consultation and deliberation---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Jahangir and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1741 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 363---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused was charged for kidnapping the minor son of complainant---Complainant had implicated as many as sixteen individuals in the case, however, all of them, except the appellant, were either discharged during the police investigation or acquitted by the Trial Court and despite naming numerous individuals, the complainant had not attributed any specific roles to any of them or clearly identified the actions performed by each accused during the incident---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 363---Kidnapping---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Kidnapping---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Withholding material witness---Effect---Accused was charged for kidnapping the minor son of complainant---Record showed that the only incriminating material put-forth by the prosecution to connect present appellant with the commission of offence was the statement of wife of co-accused incorporated by Investigating Officer in his case diary who deposed that her husband and appellant brought the minor in her house and handed over it to Mst. "K"--- Significantly, wife of co-accused would have been the best witness for the prosecution to strengthen their case, however, she was not called as a witness to give evidence for the prosecution nor any statement under S.161, Cr.P.C., was got recorded by the Investigating Officer---Non-associating of said female in investigation process was intentional, apparently to suppress the actual facts of the incident and had she appeared before the police or Court, she would not have supported the case of prosecution, thus adverse inference could be drawn as per Art.129, illustration (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Rafique and others v. State and others 2010 SCMR 385 rel. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 363---Kidnapping---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Extra-judicial confession---Scope---Accused was charged for kidnapping the minor son of complainant---Appellant made extra-judicial confession about the commission of offence---However, the evidence of extra judicial confession is always regarded as weak in nature and is generally fabricated in cases where requisite incriminating evidence is lacking---For this good reason, the evidence of extra judicial confession is not considered sufficient for awarding conviction---Court was aware of the fact that the whereabouts of minor were still unknown and he was still missing but since the Courts were creation of law, hence, had to decide the fate of cases in accordance with available evidence and not being driven through sentiments and emotions---No doubt conviction could be awarded to an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence but if the incriminating circumstances are knitted with each other, then failure of one link destroys the entire chain---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Malik Muhammad Riaz Awan for Appellant. Ms. Sumara Shafi, DDPP and Ch. Najam-ul-Hassan, Assistant Attorney General (on Court's call) for the State. Syed Ghazanfar Ali and Syed Salman Ali for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 7th July, 2025. Judgment Abher Gul Khan, J .--- Zahid Hussain (accused/appellant) along with his co-accused namely Mafia Bibi, Razia Bibi, Asia Bibi, Kaneez Fatima, Talib Hussain, Nazir Ahmad alias Baba Neela and Adnan was tried by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore in case FIR No.186 dated 07.05.2010, under section 363 P.P.C., Police Station Manawan, District Lahore and on conclusion of trial vide judgment dated 09.07.2019 was convicted and sentenced in following terms:- "Under section 363 P.P.C. to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the period of four years along with fine of Rs.200,000/- and in default whereof to further undergo two months S.I. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C was also extended to him. Challenging his conviction and sentence, Zahid Hussain (appellant) preferred Criminal Appeal No.43770 of 2019, whereas Faqeer Hussain (since deceased and represented by Mst. Nasreen Bibi) preferred Criminal Appeal No.53561 of 2019 against the acquittal of co-accused. I propose to dispose of both the matters together through this single judgment. 2. Precisely stated the case of prosecution, as unveiled by Faqeer Hussain (PW-1) in FIR (Exh.PA/3) is to the effect that on 03.05.2007 when he was sleeping in his house, his minor son namely Muhammad Kareem was abducted from his house. He stated that Mst. Mafia (accused), his sister in law, got developed illicit relations with Zahid Hussain (appellant) and when he forbade her from doing so, she along with other co-accused abducted his minor son for the purpose of obtaining ransom. 3. During trial the prosecution, in order to prove its case against the appellant produced eight PWs including Faqeer Hussain (PW.1), as complainant, Muhammad Nawaz, S.I. (PW.2), Haider Ali (PW.4), Muhammad Aslam, S.I. (PW.5, Saif Ullah, S.I. (PW.6), Muhammad Afzal, A.S.I. (PW.7) and Captain Liaqat Ali Malik/PSP (PW.8), who investigated the case. 4. After the conclusion of prosecution evidence, the learned trial court also examined the appellant under section 342, Cr.P.C. during which questions were asked arising out of the prosecution evidence but he denied almost all such questions while pleading his innocence and false involvement in the case. Appellant neither opt to appear as of his own witness under section 340 (2) of Cr.P.C, nor produced evidence in defence. On the conclusion of trial, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as afore -stated, hence, the instant appeal. 5. Arguments heard and record perused. 6. Perusal of record reveals that regarding the occurrence which took place on 04.05.2010, FIR was got registered on 07.05.2010 i.e. with the delay of three days. It is noted that complainant during cross-examination has himself admitted that distance between the place of occurrence and Police Station Manawan is of 03-kilometers. Therefore, immediately after the incident the matter could conveniently be reported to the police by the complainant but no such effort was made in this regard. Even from the date of occurrence i.e. 04.05.2010 to 07.10.2010 neither complainant appeared before the investigating officer nor made any application for the registration of FIR. It is also not proved from record that investigating officer received any information about the occurrence from wireless or any source. I feel no hesitation in holding that the information regarding the incident was imparted to the police by the complainant after a considerable delay and that too after due consultation and deliberation. Thus, a cautious approach ought to be adopted by the Courts for evaluating the evidence. Reliance is placed upon the case reported as Muhammad Jahangir and another v. The State and others (2024 SCMR 1741), wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under: - "??..perusal of record reveals that FIR was lodged after an unexplainable delay of 3 hours despite the fact that the distance of the police station from the place of occurrence was 5 km. The time of occurrence is around 05:00/05:30 pm and the matter is reported at 08:30 p.m. The complainant had a bike that he used to go to the police station. This delay has not been encountered through plausible explanation by the prosecution. 7. It is discernible from the record that initially the case was registered against Mafia Bibi, Razia Bibi, Asia Bibi and their brother namely Mithu, however, during the course of investigation, Faqeer Hussain (complainant) through supplementary statement implicated present appellant with the allegation that Mafia Bibi after kidnaping his son handed it over to Zahid Hussain and who shifted his son on motorbike into the house of Sharafat Ali (co-accused). Besides that, he also implicated accused namely Talib Hussain, Nazar Hussain son of Wazir Hussain, Haji Fayyaz, Imran, Adnan, Ramzan and Nazeer alias Baba Neela. It is important to mention here that though complainant has implicated as many as sixteen individuals in this case, however, all of them, except the appellant, were either discharged during the police investigation or acquitted by the trial court and despite naming numerous individuals, the complainant has not attributed any specific roles to any of them or clearly identified the actions performed by each accused during the incident. In this regard, the admission made by the complainant during cross-examination is very much relevant who himself admitted that:- I cannot narrate the name of accused who actually abducted my child. Similarly, Muhammad Nawaz, S.I. (PW.2) during his examination in chief has deposed about the innocence of the accused persons in the following manner:- No evidence could come on the record during the course of investigation against the above said accused persons. The complainant submitted the written application for the registration of FIR, beside the complainant, no independent witness was produced before me. 8. It is important to note here that only incriminating material put-forth by the prosecution to connect present appellant with the commission of offence is the statement of Mst. Bushra Bibi wife of Sharafat Ali (co-acccused) incorporated by investigating officer in his case diary who deposed that her husband Sharafat Ali and Zahid Hussain brought the minor in her house and handed over it to Mst. Kausar Bibi. Significantly, Mst. Bushra Bibi would have been the best witness for the prosecution to strengthen their case, however, she was not called as a witness to give evidence for the prosecution and nor her any statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. was got recorded by the investigating officer. I have no doubt in my mind that non-associating of Bushra Bibi in investigation process was intentional, apparently to suppress the actual facts of the incident and had she appeared before the police or court, she would not have supported the case of prosecution. While drawing such inference, we are derived by Article 129 illustration (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, which reads as under:- "129. Court may presume existence of certain facts. The Court may presume the existence of any fact, which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and the public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations The court may presume: (g) that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it." The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Rafique and others v. State and others (2010 SCMR 385) held as under:- "that if any party withholds the best piece of evidence then it can fairly be presumed that the party had some sinister motive behind it. The presumption under Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order can fairly be drawn that if PW would have been examined, his evidence would have been unfavourable to the prosecution". 9. So far as the evidence of extra judicial confession made by Zahid Hussain (appellant) is concerned, the evidence of extra judicial confession is always regarded as weak in nature and is generally fabricated in cases where requisite incriminating evidence is lacking. For this good reason, the evidence of extra judicial confession is not considered sufficient for awarding conviction. The Court is also aware of the fact that the whereabouts of minor are still unknown and he is still missing but since the courts are creation of law, hence, have to decide the fate of cases in accordance with available evidence and not being driven through sentiments and emotions. No doubt conviction can be awarded to an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence but if the incriminating circumstances are so knitted with each other and failure of one link apt to destroy the entire chain. In this case numerous shortcomings and lacunas are noticed which give rise to a reasonable doubt, the benefit of which cannot be withheld from the appellant. Resultantly, while allowing Criminal Appeal No.43770 of 2019, the conviction and sentence of Zahid Hussain (appellant) is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charge. He is on bail, his surety stands discharged from liability. 10. In view of my findings recorded above, Criminal Appeal No.53561 of 2019 against the acquittal of co-accused has become infructuous which is accordingly dismissed. JK/Z-5/L Order accordingly.

Summary: (a) It is a well-settled principle of law that in matters relating to the custody of a minor, the paramount consideration is always the welfare of the child. A mother is naturally endowed with love and affection for her children, whether male or female, and this affection has no substitute. Particularly in the case of a daughter, the mother’s company and guidance play a vital role in preparing her to shoulder future responsibilities. For this reason, Muhammadan Law recognizes the mother’s preferential right of custody of infant children, as reflected in Para 352 of Mulla’s Principles of Muhammadan Law. It is true that a mother ordinarily loses this preferential right upon contracting a second marriage with a person not related to the child within the prohibited degree, thereby making him a stranger to the child. In such circumstances, the right of custody (Hizanat) generally vests in the father. However, this is not an absolute rule. The courts in Pakistan have consistently held that departure from this principle is permissible where exceptional circumstances justify it. Ultimately, the controlling factor is not the technical right of either parent but the welfare of the minor. Thus, even in cases of the mother’s remarriage, if the court finds that the welfare of the child still lies in her custody, preference may rightly be given to the mother. (b) Where a subordinate court commits an error of law in deciding a matter, such error assumes the character of a jurisdictional defect, for a court is vested only with the authority to decide a case in accordance with law. A decision rendered contrary to law is therefore liable to be quashed under the constitutional jurisdiction, being an act in excess of lawful authority, as contemplated by Article 4 of the Constitution. In such circumstances, the case becomes proper for interference by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.

Summary: Court granted bail to Aftab-ud-Din in case FIR No. 31 dated 20.02.2022. The complainant, Shahab-ud-Din, reported that unknown accused fired upon his sister-in-law (Mst. Naureen Bibi) and brother (Aftab-ud-Din), with Aftab-ud-Din having had a love marriage with Mst. Naureen. Aftab-ud-Din was arrested on 07.3.2022 and has been in jail for over 3 years and 7 months. He was initially convicted but appealed, leading to a de-novo trial. Bail was granted due to detention beyond the 2-year period for trial conclusion as per section 497 Cr.P.C., no delay attributed to the petitioner, and Aftab-ud-Din not being a hardened criminal. Aftab-ud-Din will be released on bail with bonds of Rs. 100,000 and two sureties of the same amount, with sureties being local, reliable, and men of means.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 — S. 5 & Schedule-I — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3) Maintenance allowance and claim for future marriage expenses by unmarried daughters — Judicial enforceability of prospective claims — Scope and limitations — Petitioners instituted a suit seeking (i) monthly maintenance from their father and (ii) anticipatory marriage expenses, asserting they were unmarried and their marriages were to be arranged — Family Court decreed the suit partially: maintenance at Rs.5,000/- per month retrospectively and Rs.10,000/- per month prospectively with annual increase; and Rs.1,000,000/- each as marriage expenses — Appeal dismissed; however, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution allowed respondent’s writ petition to the extent of marriage expenses, holding the claim to be premature and speculative — Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that while a father has moral obligations, no statutory duty exists under the Family Courts Act to bear indefinite or future marriage expenses absent a concrete, present, and enforceable cause — Courts are to decide actual infringements of existing rights, not speculative or hypothetical grievances — In the absence of any fixed marriage date, engagement, or denied customary obligations, the claim was held non-maintainable — Premature claims were found to undermine judicial discipline and open floodgates of uncertain litigation — Petition dismissed, however liberty preserved for petitioners to file afresh if and when actual cause arises. Held, speculative claims for marriage expenses not legally enforceable until crystallized by a definite cause of action. - Faiz Bakhsh and others v. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Bahawalpur and others (2006 SCMR 219)