Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ----S. 316 (qatl by rash/culpable conduct)—Custodial death—Standard of proof on circumstantial evidence—Deceased was brought to Police Station City Mastung and remained in the custody of the appellant (then SHO); PW-6 (santri) and PW-7 (gunman) placed the deceased in the appellant’s control shortly before he was found unconscious; PW-1 (father) and PW-2 heard the deceased’s cries from inside the station; medical evidence (multiple widespread bruises and scalp hematomas) was incompatible with a mere fall while scaling a wall—Chain of circumstances complete and consistent only with guilt—Conviction under S.316 maintained; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. noted. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 122—Fact especially within knowledge—Where death occurs in police custody, the officer-in-charge bears a special burden to furnish a plausible explanation; a false or absent explanation can furnish an additional incriminating link—Appellant’s plea that the deceased fell while attempting escape was found absurd and unconvincing in light of medical findings; burden not discharged. (c) Criminal trial—Circumstantial evidence—Caution and tests ----Principles restated—Each link must form an unbroken chain from the dead body to the accused; where links are proven (custody, cries, immediate collapse in SHO’s room, medical injuries, and subsequent conduct), conviction can safely rest on circumstantial evidence. (d) Parity with co-accused—Effect ----Discharge/acquittal of other police officials and co-accused on same occurrence does not ipso facto entitle the SHO to acquittal—Distinct role and exclusive custody furnish differentiating circumstances; “cherry-picking” argument repelled on appraisal of record. (e) Sentencing ----S. 316, P.P.C.—Where motive is not proved and case rests on circumstantial evidence (albeit strong), sentence of 20 years R.I. held harsh—Sentence reduced to 10 years R.I.; direction to pay diyat and other components of the trial court’s judgment maintained; S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to apply. Disposition --- Criminal Appeal partly allowed to the extent of reduction of sentence (20 → 10 years R.I. under S.316, with diyat maintained and S.382-B benefit intact). Criminal Revision for enhancement to death penalty dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Balochistan Development Authority Act, 1974 ----S. 18(2)(d),(e); S. 30—Balochistan Ship-Breaking Industry Rules, 1979, R. 15(2)—Levy of “tonnage fee/charges”—Scope and pre-conditions—BDA may impose tonnage charges/royalty only with the *previous sanction of Government*; rule-making under S.30 operates within the statute and cannot bypass the sanction requirement—Cabinet approval of Rs.800 per ton (with escalation) validly authorized the levy; any unilateral departure by BDA without such approval lacked legal efficacy. (b) Executive approval & cabinet doctrine ----Mustafa Impex principle—Notification dated 23-02-2018 initially issued with Chief Minister’s approval was later cured by Provincial Cabinet approval on 29-05-2018; second Notification dated 24-07-2018 implemented cabinet decision—Challenge to competence on this score misconceived. (c) Settlement/administrative order inter se BDA and industry ----Chairman BDA order dated 29-03-2019 fixing Rs.350/LDT pursuant to “amicable settlement”—Legal effect—Absent *prior Government sanction*, such reduction created no crystallized right in favour of ship breakers; internal correspondence (27-06-2022) admitted lack of endorsement; settlement could not override cabinet-approved rate under the statutory scheme. (d) Construction of prior litigation history ----C.P. No. 411/2018, order dated 14-12-2018; C.P. Nos. 195/2020 etc., judgment dated 04-05-2023; C.P. No. 121/2023, judgment dated 20-12-2023; Review dismissed 16-05-2024—Courts recorded the cabinet-approved Rs.800 rate and noted that BDA was, by mutual arrangement, charging less; however, no judicial direction either mandated an increase to Rs.800 or validated Rs.350—Reliance by Director (Finance) in letter dated 27-02-2024 on the 04-05-2023 judgment as *source* of authority was out of context. (e) Administrative communication—Validity & directions ----Director (Finance) letter dated 27-02-2024 withdrawing the 29-03-2019 order and demanding Rs.800/ton “from the date of judgment 04-05-2023”—Misplaced reliance on court judgment identified; nevertheless, BDA is bound to act strictly under the BDA Act/Rules and cabinet-approved framework—Chairman BDA directed to charge tonnage fee strictly per statute/rules (i.e., with requisite Government sanction), uninfluenced by stray observations in earlier judgments. (f) Contract/estoppel against statute ----Claim that BDA’s Rs.350 rate created vested rights rejected—No estoppel where arrangement conflicts with the Act’s requirement of prior Government sanction; private settlements cannot dilute statutory/cabinet decisions. (g) Disposition — Petitions disposed of with directions: Chairman BDA to levy tonnage fee strictly under the BDA Act and Rules as sanctioned by Government; interim orders dated 15-03-2024, 03-04-2024 and 17-04-2024 recalled. No costs.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background: The appellant filed nomination papers to contest elections from three constituencies, NA-59, PP-22, and PP-23, in Talagang-cum-Chakwal. During scrutiny, the Returning Officers rejected the appellant's nomination papers through separate orders dated 30.12.2023, citing several discrepancies and procedural violations. The appellant challenged the rejection orders in three election appeals before the Tribunal, arguing that the rejections were based on trivial and incorrect grounds. -----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant’s status as a proclaimed offender in a criminal case disqualifies him under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. -----2- Whether failure to open separate election accounts for each constituency justifies the rejection of nomination papers. -----3- Whether the signatures on the nomination papers were fictitious and improperly attested. -----4- Whether there was concealment of assets in the appellant’s nomination papers. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Status as Proclaimed Offender: The appellant was declared an absconder in FIR No. 157/23, and the court held that his failure to surrender to the legal process disqualifies him under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, which requires candidates to be "sagacious, righteous, and morally upright." The court reasoned that a proclaimed offender cannot be considered morally upright or clean-handed, making the appellant ineligible for public office. The court relied on precedents such as Muzaffar Abbas v. Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi (PLD 2017 Lahore 394). --Failure to Open Separate Election Accounts: The appellant failed to open separate accounts for election expenses for each of the three constituencies, as required under Sections 132 and 133 of the Elections Act, 2017. The court held that the requirement of separate accounts is crucial for monitoring election expenditures and ensuring compliance with legal spending limits. The appellant's failure to comply was a legitimate ground for rejecting the nomination papers. --Fictitious Signatures and Improper Attestation: The court noted inconsistencies in the appellant's claim regarding his nomination papers. The appellant’s nomination papers were allegedly signed in Saudi Arabia, but the timeline presented was contradictory, as the nomination papers were issued after the appellant had left for Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the attestation of the appellant’s affidavit by an Oath Commissioner in Pakistan was invalid since the appellant was not present in Pakistan at the time. This defect violated Section 60 of the Elections Act, 2017, and led to the rejection of the nomination papers. --Concealment of Assets: Although there were allegations of concealment of assets, the court did not find substantive evidence on this point and did not dwell deeply on this issue. All three election appeals were dismissed. The court upheld the rejection of the nomination papers, finding that the appellant’s status as a proclaimed offender, failure to open separate accounts, and improper attestation of the nomination papers justified the rejection. -----Citations/Precedents: Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 1089) Muzaffar Abbas v. Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi (PLD 2017 Lahore 394) Mian Shafique Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (2017 MLD 1975) Speaker, National Assembly of Pakistan v. Habib Akram (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 678) Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. Election Commission of Pakistan (PLD 2003 Lahore 646) Nadeem Sultan v. Hamza Shamim (PLD 2023 Lahore 334)

Summary: The Returning Officer (RO) had rejected the papers based on outstanding amounts of Rs.6,688,750/- to FBR and Rs.476,448/- as arrears of token tax for vehicles in the record of the Excise and Taxation Department.During the appeal, the appellant's counsel, Mr. Arshad Jahangir Jhoja, argued that the Excise and Taxation arrears had been paid, supported by corresponding receipts. Regarding the FBR dues, reliance was placed on the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-III)'s order dated 12.4.2019, contending that the entire liability was part of an appeal set aside.Upon the Election Commission's input, notice was issued to the respective heads of FBR and Excise & Taxation Department. The Excise Department confirmed the discharge of arrears, while FBR claimed an outstanding liability of Rs.466,250/- based on an order dated 23.8.2023.The appellant's counsel expressed surprise at the FBR order and stated that the stay application filed in response to it was pending. However, the appellant offered to deposit the amount under protest, emphasizing his compliance with the law.In response to the appellant's commitment, the RO and FBR Legal Advisor affirmed the payment, and the FBR representative clarified that the liability remained subject to final adjudication.As both instances of default were addressed, the court set aside the RO's order, accepted the appeal, and directed the inclusion of the appellant's name in the revised list of validly nominated candidates for PP-138, Sheikhupura-III, in accordance with the Elections Act, 2017.

Summary: The grounds for rejection were based on the allegation that Rauf held dual nationality. The case delves into the interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutory requirements, and precedents.The Elections Act, 2017, governs electoral procedures, allowing voters to propose or second a nomination under Section 60. Section 62 outlines the scrutiny process conducted by the R.O., empowering them to reject a nomination if the candidate is deemed unqualified. In this case, the R.O. relied on information from the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), asserting that Rauf possessed British citizenship without providing evidence of its renunciation.The constitutional dimension of the case revolves around Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. Article 63(1)(c) stipulates disqualification if a person acquires the citizenship of a foreign state or ceases to be a citizen of Pakistan. The interpretation of this provision was addressed in the case of Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 1089), emphasizing the disjunctive use of "or."Furthermore, the appellant's eligibility is intricately linked to the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. Section 14 of the Act prohibits dual citizenship unless the individual renounces the foreign citizenship. The appeal contends that Rauf must renounce his UK citizenship to avoid disqualification.A relevant precedent is cited where the Supreme Court held that a person holding dual nationality is disqualified. The case underscores the importance of adherence to statutory requirements and constitutional provisions in ensuring the integrity of the electoral process. The appeal seeks a reconsideration of the rejection, arguing for a more nuanced interpretation of the citizenship issue and providing the necessary evidence of renunciation to support Rauf's eligibility.

Summary: The wakalatnama in favour of the counsel signed by the brother of the appellant who was not the attorney, and the signatures of the appellant on the nomination papers along with the annexures is a question mark on the validity of the nomination papers and once the Returning Officer has reached to the conclusion that the candidate has not signed the nomination papers and that the nomination papers could not be rectified through an valid nomination of the candidate, then the Returning Officer had got no other option but to reject the nomination paper being invalid. The learned Returning Officer, after analyzing the documents during summary inquiry as required under the law on the subject for non-appearance of the appellant and for invalid nomination papers, has rightly rejected the nomination papers of the appellant through impugned order, to which, neither learned counsel for the appellant or brother of the appellant could point out any illegality, jurisdictional defect or exercise of jurisdiction by the Returning Officer beyond the legal scope.