Summary: In principle cases in Courts are decided on the preponderance of evidence led in the case by the parties, and to reach a just and proper conclusion, the oral as well as the documentary evidence needs to be taken into consideration. But at the same time, when the matter comes to this Court in Constitutional Jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, it is not the domain of this Court to re-weigh or interpret the evidence and /or material produced before the forums below as this Court is not Appellate Court and under the Constitutional jurisdiction, this Court has limited jurisdiction until and unless the findings are shown to be perverse with jurisdictional defect.

Summary: (For review of the judgment of this Court dated 08.09.2023). (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI, R. 1---Review petition before the Supreme Court---Principles upon which a judgment may be reviewed stated. A petition for review is neither an appeal nor a revision petition to a superior court but rather a request made to the same court to reconsider its decision on the limited grounds prescribed for review. It does not entail a rehearing or re-argument of the case adjudicated in the judgment under review. For purposes of a review petition the settled principles governing the ground of "error apparent on the face of the record" are that the error, whether of fact or law, must be self-evident and readily discernible on the face of the record. It should not require meticulous examination or detailed analysis to uncover, nor should it need to be demonstrated through extensive or intricate arguments, or established through a lengthy process of reasoning on points where reasonable divergence of opinion may exist. Established instances falling within the scope of "error apparent on the face of the record" include judgments passed on an erroneous assumption of material facts or by overlooking a material question of fact or law or an important aspect of the matter, which, if noticed and considered earlier, would have direct bearing on the conclusions reached by the Court. Abdul Ghaffar v. Asghar Ali PLD 1998 SC 363; Pakistan v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Ltd PLD 2002 SC 208; Muhammad Boota v. Member, BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421 and Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 ref. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) --- ----Ss. 107 & 133(1)---Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) (since repealed), Ss. 163 & 136(1)---Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 1982, Arts. 7, 12, paras. 3(a), 3(b), 22, 23 & 24---Concept of "Royalties"---Scope---Business profits---Non-resident foreign company---Exemption from income tax---Income/royalties earned by the non-resident company in Pakistan for the lease of certain software---Whether such income was business profits and thus exempt from payment of income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income ('the Convention'), or the same constituted "royalties" as defined in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Convention and was liable to tax. Petitioner (foreign incorporated company), in its tax returns, declared the receipts under the software lease agreements ('Agreements') as "business profits" and sought exemption from income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 1982 ("the Convention"). However, the tax department treated these receipts as "royalties" under Article 12 of the Convention and subjected them to income tax at the rate of fifteen percent. The Income Tax Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal concluded that the payments received by the petitioner fell within the definition of "royalties" under paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 12 of the Convention and were therefore liable to income tax in Pakistan. The petitioner challenged the assessment orders, appellate orders and Tribunal judgments before the High Court through references. The High Court ruled in favour of the petitioner, holding that the amounts received by the petitioner for leasing FLIC tapes (software programs) under the Agreements did not qualify as "royalties" under the Convention and were not subject to income tax in Pakistan. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court and the majority judgment under review allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgments and restoring the Tribunal's judgments as well as the original and appellate orders of the Income Tax Officers. By the majority judgment under review the Court decided the matter against the petitioner mainly for the following reasons: (i) it would not really matter to the petitioner if, under Article 12 of the Convention, it had to pay income tax in Pakistan, because the petitioner could, with the tax authority of the Netherlands, claim an adjustment of the tax amount paid in Pakistan; (ii) the High Court did not note that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Article 24 of the Convention to present its case to the competent authority of its own country, the Netherlands, which, if agreed with the respondent's stance, could take up the matter with the competent authority of Pakistan; (iii) the petitioner did not explain and prove the nature of the receipts for which it claims tax exemption before the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal- the fact-finding forums-and it was unwarranted for the High Court to have delved into the nature of the receipts; (iv) the High Court incorrectly assumed the applicability of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Convention' ('OECD MC'), as Article 12 of the Convention adheres to Article 12 of the 'United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries' ('UN MC') and not to Article 12 of the OECD MC; and (v) the full definition of "royalties" in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention included payments for "information concerning industrial, commercial, or scientific experience". As to grounds (i) and (ii), in the majority judgment under review there is an error which is apparent on the face of the record. The possibility of adjustment of tax paid by the petitioner in Pakistan by the competent authority in the Netherlands or the availability of an alternate remedy before the competent authority in the Netherlands, was no ground for the High Court to decline to answer the questions of law referred to it in the reference application filed by the petitioner. In this regard, the Supreme Court mistakenly regarded the two different jurisdictions of the High Court to be interchangeable: one under Article 199 of the Constitution and the other exercised in the present case, the reference jurisdiction under the Income Tax Ordinance. Under Article 199, the High Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds that the petitioner has an alternate adequate remedy. However, it escaped notice of the Supreme Court that a reference application is akin to an appeal and the reference jurisdiction is similar to appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, neither a reference application can be dismissed, nor can the exercise of reference jurisdiction be declined, on the ground of availability of some alternate remedy. Messrs Squibb Pakistan v. CIT 2017 SCMR 1006 and CIR v. Rafeh Limited PLD 2020 SC 518 ref. So far as ground (iii) is concerned, the petitioner contended that this is the result of an erroneous assumption of a material fact. There was substance in this contention, as the error in this regard is also apparent on the face of the record. The nature of the receipts was explained by the petitioner in its tax returns, and there was no dispute regarding this fact before the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal. It was, and remains, an admitted fact that the receipts were rentals received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs. The nature of the receipts was an admitted fact, and the questions referred were questions of law. Therefore, the observations made by the Supreme Court in the majority judgment, that it was unwarranted for the High Court to have delved into the nature of the receipts, appear to have overlooked the said orders of the Tribunal. The High Court only dealt with and answered the questions of law and did not determine the nature of the receipts, which was an admitted fact. As for ground (iv), it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that, in the majority judgment, it escaped the notice of the Supreme Court that there is no significant difference in the definition of "royalties" provided in Article 12 of the UN MC and Article 12 of the OECD MC; therefore, the reference to Article 12 of the OECD MC, instead of Article 12 of the UN MC, by the High Court was inconsequential. This contention is supported by a plain reading of the two definitions. The only material difference between the definitions of "royalties" in the UN MC and the OECD MC is that the former includes payments received as consideration "for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment" in its definition. However, since neither the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals), the Tribunal, nor the respondent before the Supreme Court relied upon this clause of the definition of "royalties" as FLIC tapes containing computer software programs are admittedly not "equipment", this difference was immaterial to the decision of the case. As to ground (v), it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that, in the majority judgment, the Supreme Court totally overlooked the question of law that was referred by the Tribunal to the High Court and decided in favour of the petitioner; that, instead, the majority judgment only cursorily observed that the full definition of "royalties" in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention included payments for "information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience", but did not clearly and decisively hold that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs involved in the present case are covered by that clause of the definition of "royalties". The majority judgment cursorily observed that the full definition of "royalties" in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention includes payments for "information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience". However, it did not clearly or decisively hold that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs, as involved in the present case, are covered by that clause of the definition of "royalties". If a payment is in respect of rights to use the copyrights in a program, (e.g. by reproducing it and distributing it) then such a payment would be considered as a royalty. Other payments, however, only give a user the right to operate the program, where a consumer pays for a copy of computer program to use, this is not royalty payment. The Tribunal was not correct, and the High Court was correct, in determining that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs were not income from "royalties" but were "business profits", as claimed by the petitioner in its tax returns. Lynne Oats and Emer Mulligaan-Principles of International Taxation, 7th edition. Bloomsbury Professional Tax. P.141 ref. The majority judgment under review suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record. It proceeded on an erroneous assumption of a material fact and overlooked the material question of law and important aspects of the matter involved. The majority judgment under review was recalled and the appeals of the respondent were dismissed, upholding the judgments of the High Court. Review petitions were accepted accordingly with the observations that Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) provide a crucial framework for fostering international economic cooperation, facilitating cross-border investments, and avoiding the dual taxation of income that can impede global commerce; that these treaties serve as "bridges between nations," designed to encourage economic collaboration while preventing conflicts over taxing rights; that they achieve this by allocating taxing authority between the source and resident states, promoting predictability for businesses and individuals engaged in international activities; that Courts in developing countries must interpret these treaties as dynamic instruments that balance the need for economic growth with the protection of their tax base, and that treaties should not be interpreted rigidly but should reflect their "object and purpose," ensuring they serve the broader goal of equitable economic development globally. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions -5th edition. Wolters Kluwer ref. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (through video link). Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court, Fayyaz Hussain Abro, Addl.Comm.FBR (through video link from Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG Law, FBR for the Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10A & Art. 199---Promotion of civil servant---Denial of due process---Consideration of intelligence reports without opportunity of rebuttal---Petitioner, a BS-20 officer of the Information Group, was superseded by the Central Selection Board (CSB) on the basis of intelligence reports alleging questionable integrity, despite having an outstanding service record and strong recommendations from his Secretary---Court held that reliance on undisclosed, unverified, and untested intelligence reports without confronting the petitioner violated the fundamental right to due process under Art. 10A of the Constitution---Promotion decisions must be based on tangible, credible material subject to rebuttal by the affected officer---Such reports, when not lawfully commissioned or procedurally vetted, cannot override a consistent professional service record. (b) Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2019 (CSPR) ----Rr. 2(p), 4(5), 18(3)(b), 18(3)(d) & Schedule IV---Intelligence reports---Marking criteria---Scope---Court observed that the 2022 amendment introducing Special Vetting Agencies (SVAs) and authorizing the CSB to consider intelligence reports lacked clear procedural safeguards and failed to define weightage in the scoring scheme under CSPR---The CSB’s award of only 10 out of 30 discretionary marks under “collective judgment” was not explained in light of Schedule IV, which allows a maximum deduction of 3 marks for integrity concerns---Such arbitrary deductions, without evidentiary basis or procedural opportunity to rebut, render the evaluation flawed and unlawful. **(c) Service Law---Promotion---Right to fair consideration---Maintainability of writ petition---Court reaffirmed that while no vested right to promotion exists, a civil servant has a constitutional and statutory right to fair consideration for promotion under law---Constitutional petition was held maintainable under Art. 199 as the supersession, based on extraneous and procedurally flawed considerations, constituted a violation of fundamental rights---Relied on Orya Maqbool Jan v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 817), Secretary Establishment v. Aftab Ahmad Maneka (2015 SCMR 1006), and I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041). (d) Principles of Natural Justice ----Quasi-judicial forums---Application---CSB, while exercising promotion functions, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and is bound to follow principles of natural justice---Reports introduced at the last moment without prior disclosure to the affected civil servant and without granting a hearing amount to a serious procedural irregularity---Court criticized the manner in which the intelligence reports were accepted uncritically despite lacking credibility or substantiation, and without affording petitioner any opportunity to counter them. (e) Observations on Administrative Governance ----Court strongly condemned the practice of allowing unverified intelligence reports to dictate promotion outcomes---Lack of procedural framework to govern use of such reports poses serious risks to administrative integrity and undermines morale within civil services---Promotion decisions must be merit-based and consistent with record, not influenced by fear or manipulation through anonymous allegations. (f) Disposition Petition was allowed. CSB decision dated 01.08.2023 superseding the petitioner was set aside. CSB was directed to reconsider the petitioner’s promotion to BPS-21 in its next meeting from the date of supersession, strictly in accordance with CSPR criteria and without reliance on intelligence reports not subjected to due process or rebuttal.

Summary: Pakistan Engineering Council impugns decision by Board of HEC wherein degree of Bachelor in Engineering was declared as equivalent to BTECH, A degree of non-engineers. (a) Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 (Ordinance LIII of 2002): ----S. 10(a), (e), (o), (q) & 20---Scope of authority of Higher Education Commission (HEC)---Equivalence of degrees---Jurisdiction of HEC vis-à-vis recruitment and promotion criteria---HEC issued a notification declaring B.Sc. Engineering and B-Tech (Honors) as equivalent for purposes of grade determination and promotion---Validity---HEC, under its statutory mandate, was empowered to grant equivalence to academic and educational qualifications, but such equivalence was limited to academic comparability and did not extend to recruitment or promotion matters within public or private sector employment---HEC lacked authority to impose its equivalence determinations on employers regarding hiring or promotion criteria---HEC's role was restricted to granting academic equivalence, and any notification directing employers to treat two qualifications as interchangeable for employment purposes was ultra vires---Impugned notification issued by HEC was beyond its statutory jurisdiction and was therefore set aside. (b) Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975 (V of 1976): ----Ss. 2(xii), 2(xxv), 8, 10, 11, 14 & 27---Jurisdiction of Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) vis-à-vis professional accreditation and employment criteria---PEC was vested with authority to accredit engineering qualifications for registration as Professional Engineers and to regulate the engineering profession---However, PEC had no jurisdiction to dictate employment or promotion criteria within public or private sector organizations---Professional Engineering Work, as defined in the PEC Act, could only be undertaken by registered Professional Engineers, but the determination of whether a specific job required such work was a factual inquiry to be assessed by the employer, not PEC---Employers retained discretion to determine recruitment and promotion policies independent of PEC's accreditation functions---HEC and PEC both lacked authority to mandate employment conditions beyond their respective statutory roles. (c) Employment & Service Law: ----Scope of employer discretion in recruitment and promotion policies---Competence of government and private employers to determine qualification criteria---Neither HEC nor PEC had the authority to prescribe which qualifications were suitable for employment or promotion---Recruitment and promotion policies were quintessential policy matters to be determined by the employer in accordance with its human resource considerations---HEC's notification purporting to impose an equivalence standard for employment purposes was beyond its statutory authority and unenforceable. ----Cited Cases: • Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar v. Farasatullah (2020 PLC (CS) 1423) • Maula Bux Shaikh v. Chief Minister Sindh (2018 SCMR 2098) • Muhammad Siddique Nasim v. Secretary, Government of Punjab (1987 SCMR 302) • Fida Hussain v. Secretary, Kashmir Affairs (PLD 1995 SC 701) • Nazir-ul-Hasan v. Syed Anwar Iqbal (2014 SCMR 1827) • Mohammad Uneeb Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2022 SC 345) ----Disposition: Petition allowed---Impugned notification dated 08.12.2021 set aside---HEC had no jurisdiction to determine employment or promotion criteria---Employers remained competent to allow B.Sc. Engineering and B-Tech degree holders to compete for jobs and promotions on a level playing field.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 (Article 199) – Quashing of FIR – Investigation initiated with malafide intention or without jurisdiction. The High Court, under its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction, has the power to quash an FIR if it is found to be registered with malafide intent, beyond the jurisdiction of investigating authorities, or where no likelihood of conviction exists. This principle has been consistently upheld by the superior courts. (See: Anwar Ahmad Khan v. The State (1996 SCMR 24), Raja Rustam Ali Khan v. Muhammad Hanif (1997 SCMR 2008)) ------- 2. Penal provisions – Section 16 of Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 – Requirements of fear or public disorder. To attract Section 16 of the Ordinance, it must be established that the accused made a speech, statement, or act likely to cause fear, alarm, or a breach of public safety or order. Mere participation in chanting slogans, without specifics of words used or their impact, does not meet the legal threshold. (See: The Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad Khan (PLD 1974 SC 151)) ------- 3. Penal provisions – Section 341 PPC – Wrongful restraint – Human obstruction necessary. Section 341 PPC requires that the accused voluntarily obstructed a human being to prevent their movement. Mere disruption of traffic flow does not constitute wrongful restraint unless specific individuals are identified as being obstructed. (See: Mst. Riaz Bibi v. SHO Police Station Zahirpir (2002 P Cr.LJ 530)) ------- 4. Mens rea – Absence of intent – Essential element of crime. For an act to constitute a crime, the accused must have the requisite intent (mens rea). In this case, the petitioner was participating in a peaceful rally celebrating Independence Day without evidence of intent to disrupt public peace or order. Absence of mens rea negates the charges. (See: Sir Matthew Hale’s Principles on Mens Rea, R v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396) ------- 5. Fundamental rights – Right to peaceful assembly – Article 16 of the Constitution. Every citizen has the right to peaceful assembly without arms, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law for public order. In the absence of Section 144 Cr.P.C. or evidence of violence or disruption, exercising this right cannot be curtailed. The impugned FIR disregarded this constitutional guarantee. (See: Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416)) ------- 6. Quashing of FIR – Judicial oversight over investigative process. While the courts typically avoid interfering in ongoing investigations, they are empowered to intervene in cases of clear malafide intent or where the FIR lacks legal foundation. Judicial oversight ensures the protection of fundamental rights and the prevention of misuse of authority. (See: Muhammad Irshad Khan v. NAB Chairman (2007 P Cr.LJ 1957), Muhammad Bashir v. The State (PLD 1972 SC 139)) ------- Outcome: The petition was allowed, and the impugned FIR registered under Section 16 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, and Section 341 PPC was quashed. The court held that the FIR was based on political victimization, lacked the essential elements of the alleged offences, and violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to peaceful assembly.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---Art. 25; Establishment Division Office Memorandum (“OM”) dated 20.01.2001--- Equal treatment and non-discrimination in employment---Upgradation of posts---Employees serving as Control Assistants (BS-12) and Machine Supervisors/Data Control Supervisors (BS-14) in the Naval Headquarters filed a writ petition seeking upgradation of their posts to Data Control Officer (BS-16) to ensure parity with similar posts in other federal departments---High Court allowed the writ petition, directing the upgradation based on the OM dated 20.01.2001, which aimed to rationalize administrative structures and bring uniformity in pay scales across departments. Held, the upgradation policy is designed to mitigate stagnation and ensure equal treatment for employees in similar roles across organizations---Discrimination in the workplace undermines employee harmony and breaches Article 25 of the Constitution, which ensures equal protection of the law---Upgradation cannot be equated with promotion, as it pertains solely to structural and financial adjustments without altering job responsibilities. (b) Civil service law ---Policy on upgradation of posts--- Grant of upgradation is a policy matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the relevant Ministry or Division, subject to the concurrence of the Finance Division and approval of the Establishment Division---High Court held competent to issue directions where administrative policies are not implemented uniformly or create disparities---Once an upgradation policy is approved, it must be implemented in letter and spirit to avoid discrimination and achieve the policy’s objectives. (c) Judicial review ---Scope of judicial intervention in service matters--- Court observed that judicial review is warranted where administrative authorities fail to implement approved policies fairly or equitably---Held, directions for upgradation were necessary to remedy discrimination and ensure equal treatment for employees in identical posts across government departments. (d) Discrimination ---Concept and scope--- Discrimination arises when employees of the same category are treated differently without an intelligible basis, violating the principles of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution---Equal opportunity and uniform implementation of policies are essential for fostering a harmonious and egalitarian workplace environment. ------- Cited Cases: Civil Appeal Nos. 101 and 102-P of 2011 Muhammad Imtiyaz v. Ch. Muhammad Naeem (PLD 2023 SC 306) ------ Disposition: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court’s directions to upgrade the respondents' posts from BS-12 and BS-14 to BS-16 in light of the upgradation policy, ensuring parity with similar posts in other federal departments.

Summary: it is now well settled that if a person during the pendency of constitutional petition fulfilled the requisite qualification to hold such a post then writ of quo warranto could not be issued against such person as such Employees no more suffered disqualification to hold the post in question. On the aforesaid proposition the Supreme Court in the case of Asif Hussain and others v. Sabir Hussain and others

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitutional Jurisdiction – Oversight of Shelter Homes and Protection Centres Articles 9, 14, 25, 38(d), and 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Punjab Protection of Women Against Violence Act, 2016 – Punjab Women Protection Authority Act, 2017 – Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004 --- Right to life, dignity, and shelter are integral constitutional guarantees. The Court emphasized the State's duty, under the doctrine of parens patriae, to protect vulnerable groups, including women and children, through adequate shelter and protective mechanisms. --- The provincial government failed to effectively implement laws governing shelter homes and protection centres, resulting in systemic administrative failures, lack of transparency, and insufficient monitoring mechanisms. (b) Administrative Lapses and Lack of Regulatory Oversight Punjab Protection of Women Against Violence Act, 2016 – Punjab Women Protection Authority Act, 2017 – Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004 – CMIT Report – NCHR Report --- Absence of standardized operating procedures (SOPs), inadequate record-keeping, and poor monitoring structures were highlighted by multiple investigative reports (CMIT and NCHR). --- The Punjab Women Protection Authority failed to establish District Women Protection Committees in all districts, contrary to Section 11 of the Women Protection Act. --- Staff vacancies, inadequate training, poor psychological support, and lack of oversight over resident marriages raised serious concerns regarding institutional transparency and functionality. (c) Legislative Directives – Framing of Rules and Regulations Section 29 of the Punjab Protection of Women Against Violence Act, 2016 – Section 22 of the Punjab Women Protection Authority Act, 2017 – Section 49 of the Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004 --- The Court directed the Punjab Government to frame and notify rules under the aforementioned statutes within six months to ensure uniformity, transparency, and accountability in the administration of shelter homes and protection centres. --- The Court emphasized that reliance on SOPs and internal guidelines cannot substitute for formal regulations. (d) Establishment of District Women Protection Committees Section 11 of the Punjab Protection of Women Against Violence Act, 2016 --- The Punjab Government was directed to constitute and notify District Women Protection Committees in all districts within three months. These committees are tasked with oversight, monitoring, and ensuring proper implementation of legal frameworks governing shelter homes and protection centres. (e) Monitoring Mechanisms and Training of Staff Section 27 of the Punjab Protection of Women Against Violence Act, 2016 – NCHR Report – Punjab Destitute and Neglected Children Act, 2004 --- Regular training sessions must be conducted for District Women Protection Officers and shelter home staff to address gaps in gender sensitivity, trauma counseling, and administrative skills. --- District & Sessions Judges were directed to inspect shelter homes every two months to ensure adherence to regulations and address complaints. --- Installation of CCTV cameras, enhanced safety protocols, and removal of unnecessary male staff from shelter homes were mandated. (f) Forced Marriages and Regulatory Safeguards Section 498B PPC – Guidelines for Dar-ul-Amans 2015 – SOPs for Kashana Institutions --- The regulatory framework for marriages within shelter homes and Kashana institutions was deemed inadequate. --- Advisory Committees must have explicit oversight functions concerning marriage arrangements, ensuring free and informed consent of residents and their guardians. --- The Child Protection & Welfare Bureau (CPWB) was designated as the oversight body for orphan girls' marriages in Kashana institutions. (g) Regulation of Privately Run Shelter Homes Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control) Ordinance, 1961 – Charities Act, 2018 --- The government was directed to formulate clear regulatory measures for privately run shelter homes, ensuring transparency, safety, and alignment with national and international standards. --- Public-private partnerships were encouraged to enhance shelter services while retaining state responsibility for oversight and protection. (h) Access to Information and Public Accountability Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013 --- Relevant departments were directed to ensure proactive disclosure of information under Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2013. --- Updated websites must provide accessible information about shelter homes, their operations, and available services. (i) Continuing Mandamus – Long-term Judicial Oversight Doctrine of Continuing Mandamus – Structural Interdict --- The Court invoked the doctrine of continuing mandamus, keeping the petitions pending and scheduling follow-up hearings to monitor compliance with its directives. --- The Chief Secretary, Punjab, was ordered to submit a comprehensive progress report by the fourth week of May 2025. Key Citations: Shehla Zia v. WAPDA (PLD 1994 SC 693) – Scope of the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution. Employees of the Pakistan Law Commission v. Ministry of Works (1994 SCMR 1548) – Right to housing as an integral component of the right to life. Mst. Zubadia Khatoon v. Chief Secretary, Punjab (PLD 2003 Lahore 53) – State responsibility for shelter homes. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (AIR 1984 SC 802) – Concept of structural injunctions. Asghar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2018 Lahore 364) – Application of continuing mandamus in environmental law. Outcome: --- The Court issued comprehensive directives for legislative reforms, enhanced monitoring mechanisms, and administrative improvements in shelter homes and protection centres across Punjab. --- Regular oversight hearings under the doctrine of continuing mandamus were scheduled to ensure compliance with judicial directives.