Summary: Since bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial is granted as a "right", therefore, merely due to registration of some other cases also, which are not regarding act of terrorism, same cannot be withheld. 1015Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 124-23 SAJJAD AHMED VS THE STATE Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 27- 06- 2024 2024 LHC 6159

Summary: Scope of Executive powers of the Federal Cabinet 1014Crl. Misc. 16105/24 Muhammad Rauf Vs The State etc Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 28- 06- 2024 2024 LHC 3281 PLJ 2024 Cr.C. 1219 (Lahore High Court, Lahore), 2025 MLD 132 (Lahore), 2025 MLD 610 (Lahore)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1), third proviso---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Bail, grant of---Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial---In the present case, the petitioner (accused) was arrested in the case on 30.07.2022 and sent to jail on the same day where he was confined till now i.e. for more than a period of one year and 10 months and trial of the case had not concluded---Case had been registered against the petitioner under S.489-F, P.P.C, and same was not punishable with death---Statutory period for grant of bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case was continuous detention exceeding one year as per 3rd proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---It was not disputed by the prosecutor and the complainant that petitioner was behind the bars for a continuous period exceeding one year and ten months---Perusal of the record revealed that challan report under S.173, Cr.P.C., was received in the Court on 19.11.2022, charge was framed against the accused on 20.01.2023 and prosecution witnesses were summoned for 03.02.2023, however, prosecution witnesses did not appear before the Court till 17.10.2023 inspite of summoning them through warrants of their arrest---Meaning thereby that after arrest of the petitioner on 30.07.2022, continuous period of detention of the petitioner exceeding one year lapsed without conclusion of the trial and said delay was not caused due to any act or omission of the petitioner or any other person acting on his behalf---Prosecutor and the complainant could not refer to any material to show that petitioner was a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to opine at this stage petitioner was a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or was accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life---Moreover, after completion of statutory period, if any adjournment had been obtained by the accused, it did not disentitle him for grant of bail on ground of delay in conclusion of trial rather he was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right---Therefore, a right to be released on post-arrest bail had accrued to the petitioner due to delay in conclusion of trial of the case under 3rd proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---If case for grant of post-arrest bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial has been made out then bail is granted as a "right" under 3rd proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Petition for grant of post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 1450 and Nadeem Samson v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 112 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 497 & 498---Bail---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail order are just tentative in nature, strictly confined to the disposal of bail petition and have no bearing upon trial of the case. Ms. Asifa Riasat for Petitioner. Rana Muhammad Shafique, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State along with Muhammad Maalik, ASI and record of the case. Mian Shaukat Ali for Respondent No.2/Complainant of the case. Order Farooq Haider, J .- --Through instant petition, Muhammad Rauf (petitioner/ accused) has sought post-arrest bail in case arising out of FIR No.565/2021 dated: 28.05.2021 registered under Section: 489-F, P.P.C. at Police Station: City Jaranwala, District: Faisalabad. This is second petition filed by the petitioner for grant of post-arrest bail in the case before this Court whereas first petition filed by the petitioner for post-arrest bail in the case before this Court bearing Crl. Misc. No.13294-B of 2023 was dismissed on merits vide order dated: 16.03.2023 passed by this Court (copy of the order is available at Page Nos.13-14 of the petition). Thereafter, petitioner filed Crl. Petition No.866-L of 2023 before Supreme Court of Pakistan against aforementioned order dated: 16.03.2023 passed by this Court in Crl. Misc. 13294-B of 2023, which came up for hearing on 06.12.2023 and learned counsel for the petitioner contended there that right of bail on statutory ground has been accrued in favour of the petitioner, therefore, in order to file application before the trial court on this fresh ground i.e. statutory ground, he wants to withdraw the petition for the time being and same was dismissed as withdrawn (copy of the order is available at Page No.19 of this petition) and relevant portion of the order is hereby reproduced:- "Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that during the pendency of this petition a right of bail on statutory ground has been accrued in favour of the petitioner and in order to file an application before the trial court, on this fresh ground i.e. statutory ground, he wants to withdraw this petition for the time being. He may do so. This petition is dismissed as withdrawn." Then petitioner filed application for post arrest bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case before trial court and then before learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaranwala but same have been dismissed and now instant petition has been filed for post-arrest bail before this Court on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case. 2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, learned Deputy Prosecutor General and going through the available record with their able assistance, it has been noticed that briefly, as per Crime Report (FIR) got recorded by Mirza Shabbir Haider (complainant of the case/respondent No.2 in the petition), petitioner issued cheque of Rs.30,00,000/- to the complainant which was dishonoured on presentation by the bank. Petitioner was arrested in this case on 30.07.2022 and sent to jail on the same day where he is confined till now i.e. for more than period of one year and 10 months and trial of the case has not been concluded. Case has been registered against the petitioner under Section: 489-F, P.P.C. and same is not punishable with death, therefore, statutory period for grant of bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case is continuous detention exceeding one year as per 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. It is not disputed by the learned Deputy Prosecutor General and learned counsel for the complainant that petitioner is behind the bars for a continuous period exceeding one year and ten months so now question does arise that whether after his arrest, petitioner has caused any delay during the period exceeding one year in conclusion of trial of the case and in order to examine the same, attested copy of order sheet annexed with this petition from Page No.32-40 has been perused and perusal of the same reveals that challan report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. was received in the Court on 19.11.2022, charge was framed against the accused on 20.01.2023 and prosecution witnesses were summoned for 03.02.2023, however, prosecution witnesses did not appear before the court till 17.10.2023 inspite of summoning them through warrants of their arrest. Meaning thereby that after arrest of the petitioner on 30.07.2022, continuous period of detention of the petitioner exceeding one year lapsed without conclusion of the trial and said delay was not caused due to any act or omission of the petitioner or any other person acting on his behalf. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General and learned counsel for the complainant could not refer any material to show that petitioner is previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to opine at this stage that petitioner is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is also relevant to mention here that after completion of statutory period, if any adjournment has been obtained by the accused, it does not disentitle him for grant of bail on ground of delay in conclusion of trial rather he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right and in this regard cases of "Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others" (2023 SCMR 1450) and "Nadeem Samson v. The State and others" (PLD 2022 SC 112) can be referred and relevant portions from latter case law from its Paragraphs Nos. 8 to 10 are reproduced:- "8. The scope of the 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. has recently been expounded by this Court in the Shakeel Shah case, cited by the counsel for the petitioner, by examining and interpreting provisions as well as the provisions of the related 4th proviso, in detail. We, therefore, think it unnecessary to re-examine the scope of those provisos again in this case, especially when we find ourselves in agreement with what has been held in that case. What we consider appropriate to do is to recapitulate the main principles enunciated therein, as to the meaning, extent and scope of the 3rd proviso, for clear understanding of, and compliance by, all the other courts in the country in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. They are: (i) The purpose and object of the 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. is to ensure that the trial of an accused is conducted and concluded expeditiously, and that the pre-conviction detention of an accused does not extend beyond the period of two years in cases involving an offence punishable with death, or one year in other cases; (ii) The period of one year or two years, as the case may be, for the conclusion of the trial begins from the date of the detention of the accused in the case, not from the date when the charge is framed and trial commenced: (iii) A statutory right to be released on bail accrues in favour of the accused if his trial is not concluded within the specified period, i.e., exceeding one year or two years as the case may be, from the date of his detention; (iv) This statutory right of the accused to be released on bail is, however, subject to exceptions: one is embodied in the 3rd proviso itself and the second is provided in the 4th proviso, which are: (a) the delay in conclusion of the trial is occasioned by an act or omission of the accused or by any other person acting on his behalf, and (b) the accused is a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or is in the opinion of the court a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. (v) The act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the timely conclusion of the trial must be the result of a visible concerted effort orchestrated by the accused. Merely some adjournments sought by the counsel for the accused cannot be counted as an act or omission on behalf of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial, unless the adjournments are sought without any sufficient cause on crucial hearings, i.e., the hearings fixed for examination or cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or the adjournments are repetitive reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial; and (vi) The phrase "a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" denotes an accused who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act and will pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. Such tentative finding as to character of the accused must be based upon careful examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, supported by sufficient incriminating material. In the light of the above principles, we proceed to appreciate the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial pleaded by the counsel for the petitioner, for grant of bail to the petitioner. 9. The petitioner was arrested and detained, in this case, on 24.11.2017. The charge against the petitioner was framed on 03.04.2018. Two prosecution witnesses were recorded on 27.02.2020. Till that date, a continuous period of exceeding two years since the detention of the petitioner in the case had lapsed without conclusion of the trial: therefore, a right to be released on bail had prima facie accrued to the petitioner, which could have been denied to the petition of the above-stated two exceptions: only this conclusion of the trial had her person on demission of the petitioner or by any other person acting on his behalf and (b) if the petitioner was found to be a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or was in the opinion of the court a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or was accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 10. We have examined the record of the case and found that there is no delay in conclusion of the trial till expiry of the two year period of detention of the petitioner on 25.11.2019, which can be attributed to the petitioner or to any person acting on his behalf reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial. Any delay attributable to the petitioner after the expiry of the said period is not relevant for determining his right to be released on bail on the statutory ground provided in the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Nor he appears, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act and will thus pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, not as a concession. The delay in conclusion of the trial, noted by the High Court, attributable to the counsel for the petitioner representing him before the trial court, relates to the period after expiry of the continuous two year period since detention of the petitioner in the case; therefore, it could not have been considered by the High Court for determining the right of the petitioner to be released on bail under the 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C." (emphasis added) Therefore, a right to be released on post-arrest bail has accrued to the petitioner due to delay in conclusion of trial of the case under 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. So far as abscondence of the petitioner is concerned, suffice it to say that if case for grant of post-arrest bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial has been made out then bail is granted as a "right" under 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. and in this regard, guidance has been sought from the supra case of "Nadeem Samson v. The State and others" (PLD 2022 SC 112); relevant portion whereof is hereby reproduced: - "10. We have examined the record of the case and found that there is no delay in conclusion of the trial till expiry of the two year period of detention of the petitioner on 25.11.2019, which can be attributed to the petitioner or to any person acting on his behalf reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial. Any delay attributable to the petitioner after the expiry of the said period is not relevant for determining his right to be released on bail on the statutory ground provided in the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Nor he appears, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act and will thus pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, not as a concession." (emphasis added) and case of "Shakeel Shah v. The State and others" (2022 SCMR 1) can also be advantageously referred on the subject and relevant portion from the same is hereby reproduced: - "9. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the delay in concluding the trial of the petitioner beyond the period of one year from the date of his arrest/detention has not been occasioned by an act or omission of the petitioner or any other person acting on his behalf, and that in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused does not appear to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal. The petitioner has, thus, made out a case for grant of bail as a matter of right under the third proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. (emphasis added) It is by now well settled that when accused becomes entitled for grant of bail as a matter of right, then he cannot be declined such relief due to abscondance which is matter of propriety and in this regard case of "Riaz Shah v. The State" (2024 YLR 1369) can be referred. So now bail cannot be declined to the petitioner due to abscondence. As far as registration of some other cases against the petitioner is concerned, it is relevant to mention here that none of them is regarding any act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life as apprised by learned Deputy Prosecutor General after going through the record, therefore, bar contained in 4th proviso of Section: 497(1), Cr.P.C. does not apply to the case of petitioner; furthermore, since bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial is to be granted as a "right" hence if petitioner is not accused of act of terrorism as mentioned in the 4th proviso of Section: 497(1), Cr.P.C. then merely due to registration of some other cases against him which are not regarding act of terrorism, bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial cannot be withheld. 3. In view of what has been discussed above, instant petition for grant of post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case is allowed and Muhammad Rauf (petitioner) is admitted to post-arrest bail in the case subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.500,000/- (Rupees five hundred thousand only) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial Court. 4. It goes without saying that observations mentioned above are just tentative in nature, strictly confined to the disposal of instant bail petition and will have no bearing upon trial of the case which will be concluded by the trial court within a period of three months after receipt of attested copy of this order. Needless to add that if petitioner or anybody else acting on his behalf will create any hurdle in the way of conclusion of trial, then complainant as well as the State would be at liberty to move for recalling of this order. JK/M-102/L Bail granted.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1), third proviso---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Bail, grant of---Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial---In the present case, the petitioner (accused) was arrested in the case on 30.07.2022 and sent to jail on the same day where he was confined till now i.e. for more than a period of one year and 10 months and trial of the case had not concluded---Case had been registered against the petitioner under S.489-F, P.P.C and same was not punishable with death---Statutory period for grant of bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case was continuous detention exceeding one year as per 3rd proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---It was not disputed by the prosecutor and the complainant that petitioner was behind the bars for a continuous period exceeding one year and ten months---Perusal of the record revealed that challan report under S.173, Cr.P.C., was received in the Court on 19.11.2022, charge was framed against the accused on 20.01.2023 and prosecution witnesses were summoned for 03.02.2023, however, prosecution witnesses did not appear before the Court till 17.10.2023 inspite of summoning them through warrants of their arrest---Meaning thereby that after arrest of the petitioner on 30.07.2022, continuous period of detention of the petitioner exceeding one year lapsed without conclusion of the trial and said delay was not caused due to any act or omission of the petitioner or any other person acting on his behalf---Prosecutor and the complainant could not refer to any material to show that petitioner was a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to opine at this stage that petitioner was a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or was accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life---Moreover, after completion of statutory period, if any adjournment had been obtained by the accused, it did not disentitle him for grant of bail on ground of delay in conclusion of trial rather he was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right---Therefore, a right to be released on post-arrest bail had accrued to the petitioner due to delay in conclusion of trial of the case under 3rd proviso to S.497 (1), Cr.P.C.---If case for grant of post-arrest bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial has been made out then bail is granted as a "right" under 3rd proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Petition for grant of post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Umer Shahzad versus The State and others 2023 SCMR 1450; Nadeem Samson v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 112; Nadeem Samson v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 112 and Riaz Shah v. The State 2024 YLR 1369 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 497 & 498---Bail---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail order are just tentative in nature, strictly confined to the disposal of bail petition and have no bearing upon trial of the case. Ms. Asifa Riasat for the Petitioner. Rana Muhammad Shafique, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State along with Muhammad Malik, A.S.I and record of the case. Mian Shaukat Ali for Respondent No. 2/Complainant of the case. Order Farooq Haider, J .--- Through instant petition, Muhammad Rauf (petitioner/ accused) has sought post-arrest bail in case arising out of FIR No.565/2021 dated 28.05.2021 registered under Section 489-F P.P.C. at Police Station: City Jaranwala, District: Faisalabad. This is second petition filed by the petitioner for grant of post-arrest bail in the case before this Court whereas first petition filed by the petitioner for post-arrest bail in the case before this Court bearing Crl. Misc. No.13294-B of 2023 was dismissed on merits vide order dated: 16.03.2023 passed by this Court (copy of the order is available at Pages Nos.13-14 of the petition). Thereafter, petitioner filed Crl. Petition No.866-L of 2023 before Supreme Court of Pakistan against aforementioned order dated 16.03.2023 passed by this Court in Crl. Misc. 13294-B of 2023, which came up for hearing on 06.12.2023 and learned counsel for the petitioner contended there that right of bail on statutory ground has been accrued in favour of the petitioner, therefore, in order to file application before the trial court on this fresh ground i.e. statutory ground, he wants to withdraw the petition for the time being and same was dismissed as withdrawn (copy of the order is available at Page No.19 of this petition) and relevant portion of the order is hereby reproduced:- "Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that during the pendency of this petition a right of bail on statutory ground has been accrued in favour of the petitioner and in order to file an application before the trial court, on this fresh ground i.e. statutory ground, he wants to withdraw this petition for the time being. He may do so. This petition is dismissed as withdrawn." Then petitioner filed application for post arrest bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case before trial court and then before learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaranwala but same have been dismissed and now instant petition has been filed for post-arrest bail before this Court on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case. 2. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, learned Deputy Prosecutor General and going through the available record with their able assistance, it has been noticed that briefly, as per Crime Report (FIR) got recorded by Mirza Shabbir Haider (complainant of the case/respondent No.2 in the petition), petitioner issued cheque of Rs.30,00,000/- to the complainant which was dishonoured on presentation by the bank. Petitioner was arrested in this case on 30.07.2022 and sent to jail on the same day where he is confined till now i.e. for more than period of one year and 10 months and trial of the case has not been concluded. Case has been registered against the petitioner under Section 489-F, P.P.C. and same is not punishable with death, therefore, statutory period for grant of bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case is continuous detention exceeding one year as per 3rd proviso to Section: 497(1) Cr.P.C. It is not disputed by the learned Deputy Prosecutor General and learned counsel for the complainant that petitioner is behind the bars for a continuous period exceeding one year and ten months so now question does arise that whether after his arrest, petitioner has caused any delay during the period exceeding one year in conclusion of trial of the case and in order to examine the same, attested copy of order sheet annexed with this petition from Page Nos.32-40 has been perused and perusal of the same reveals that challan report under Section 173, Cr.P.C. was received in the Court on 19.11.2022, charge was framed against the accused on 20.01.2023 and prosecution witnesses were summoned for 03.02.2023, however, prosecution witnesses did not appear before the court till 17.10.2023 inspite of summoning them through warrants of their arrest. Meaning thereby that after arrest of the petitioner on 30.07.2022, continuous period of detention of the petitioner exceeding one year lapsed without conclusion of the trial and said delay was not caused due to any act or omission of the petitioner or any other person acting on his behalf. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General and learned counsel for the complainant could not refer any material to show that petitioner is previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or to opine at this stage that petitioner is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is also relevant to mention here that after completion of statutory period, if any adjournment has been obtained by the accused, it does not disentitle him for grant of bail on ground of delay in conclusion of trial rather he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right and in this regard cases of "Muhammad Umer Shahzad v. The State and others" (2023 SCMR 1450) and "Nadeem Samson v. The State and others" (PLD 2022 SC 112) can be referred and relevant portions from latter case law from its paragraphs Nos.8 to 10 are reproduced:- "8. The scope of the 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. has recently been expounded by this Court in the Shakeel Shah case, cited by the counsel for the petitioner, by examining and interpreting provisions as well as the provisions of the related 4th proviso, in detail. We, therefore, think it unnecessary to re-examine the scope of those provisos again in this case, especially when we find ourselves in agreement with what has been held in that case. What we consider appropriate to do is to recapitulate the main principles enunciated therein, as to the meaning, extent and scope of the 3rd proviso, for clear understanding of, and compliance by, all the other courts in the country in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. They are: (i) The purpose and object of the 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. is to ensure that the trial of an accused is conducted and concluded expeditiously, and that the pre-conviction detention of an accused does not extend beyond the period of two years in cases involving an offence punishable with death, or one year in other cases; (ii) The period of one year or two years, as the case may be, for the conclusion of the trial begins from the date of the detention of the accused in the case, not from the date when the charge is framed and trial commenced: (iii) A statutory right to be released on bail accrues in favour of the accused if his trial is not concluded within the specified period, i.e., exceeding one year or two years as the case may be, from the date of his detention; (iv) This statutory right of the accused to be released on bail is however, subject to exceptions: one is embodied in the 3rd proviso itself and the second is provided in the 4th proviso, which are: (a) the delay in conclusion of the trial is occasioned by an act or omission of the accused or by any other person acting on his behalf, and (b) the accused is a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or is in the opinion of the court a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. (v) The act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the timely conclusion of the trial must be the result of a visible concerted effort orchestrated by the accused. Merely some adjournments sought by the counsel for the accused cannot be counted as an act or omission on behalf of the accused to delay the conclusion of the trial, unless the adjournments are sought without any sufficient cause on crucial hearings, i.e., the hearings fixed for examination or cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or the adjournments are repetitive reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial; and (vi) The phrase "a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" denotes an accused who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act and will pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. Such tentative finding as to character of the accused must be based upon careful examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, supported by sufficient incriminating material. In the light of the above principles, we proceed to appreciate the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial pleaded by the counsel for the petitioner, for grant of bail to the petitioner. 9. The petitioner was arrested and detained, in this case, on 24.11.2017. The charge against the petitioner was framed on 03.04.2018. Two prosecution witnesses were recorded on 27.02.2020. Till that date, a continuous period of exceeding two years since the detention of the petitioner in the case had lapsed without conclusion of the trial: therefore, a right to be released on bail had prima facie accrued to the petitioner, which could have been denied to the petition of the above-stated two exceptions: only this conclusion of the trial had her person on demission of the petitioner or by any other person acting on his behalf and (b) if the petitioner was found to be a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or was in the opinion of the court a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or was accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 10. We have examined the record of the case and found that there is no delay in conclusion of the trial till expiry of the two year period of detention of the petitioner on 25.11.2019, which can be attributed to the petitioner or to any person acting on his behalf reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial. Any delay attributable to the petitioner after the expiry of the said period is not relevant for determining his right to be released on bail on the statutory ground provided in the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Nor he appears, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act and will thus pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, not as a concession. The delay in conclusion of the trial, noted by the High Court, attributable to the counsel for the petitioner representing him before the trial court, relates to the period after expiry of the continuous two year period since detention of the petitioner in the case; therefore, it could not have been considered by the High Court for determining the right of the petitioner to be released on bail under the 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C." (emphasis added) Therefore, a right to be released on post-arrest bail has accrued to the petitioner due to delay in conclusion of trial of the case under 3rd proviso to Section: 497(1), Cr.P.C. So far as abscondence of the petitioner is concerned, suffice it to say that if case for grant of post-arrest bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial has been made out then bail is granted as a "right" under 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. and in this regard, guidance has been sought from the supra case of "Nadeem Samson v. The State and others" (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 112); relevant portion whereof is hereby reproduced: - "10. We have examined the record of the case and found that there is no delay in conclusion of the trial till expiry of the two year period of detention of the petitioner on 25.11.2019, which can be attributed to the petitioner or to any person acting on his behalf reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial. Any delay attributable to the petitioner after the expiry of the said period is not relevant for determining his right to be released on bail on the statutory ground provided in the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Nor he appears, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring for the consequences of his violent act and will thus pose a serious threat to the society if set free on bail. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, not as a concession." (emphasis added) and case of "Shakeel Shah versus The State and others" (2022 SCMR 1) can also be advantageously referred on the subject and relevant portion from the same is hereby reproduced: - "9. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the delay in concluding the trial of the petitioner beyond the period of one year from the date of his arrest/detention has not been occasioned by an act or omission of the petitioner or any other person acting on his behalf, and that in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused does not appear to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal. The petitioner has, thus, made out a case for grant of bail as a matter of right under the third proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. (emphasis added) It is by now well settled that when accused becomes entitled for grant of bail as a matter of right, then he cannot be declined such relief due to abscondance which is matter of propriety and in this regard case of "Riaz Shah v. The State" (2024 YLR 1369) can be referred. So now bail cannot be declined to the petitioner due to abscondence. As far as registration of some other cases against the petitioner is concerned, it is relevant to mention here that none of them is regarding any act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life as apprised by learned Deputy Prosecutor General after going through the record, therefore, bar contained in 4th proviso of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. does not apply to the case of petitioner; furthermore, since bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial is to be granted as a "right" hence if petitioner is not accused of act of terrorism as mentioned in the 4th proviso of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. then merely due to registration of some other cases against him which are not regarding act of terrorism, bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial cannot be withheld. 3. In view of what has been discussed above, instant petition for grant of post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial of the case is allowed and Muhammad Rauf (petitioner) is admitted to post-arrest bail in the case subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.500,000/- (Rupees five hundred thousand only) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial Court. 4. It goes without saying that observations mentioned above are just tentative in nature, strictly confined to the disposal of instant bail petition and will have no bearing upon trial of the case which will be concluded by the trial court within a period of three months after receipt of attested copy of this order. Needless to add that if petitioner or anybody else acting on his behalf will create any hurdle in the way of conclusion of trial, then complainant as well as the State would be at liberty to move for recalling of this order. JK/M-102/L Bail granted.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 2A, 19, 19A, 204—Contempt of Court—Freedom of Speech and Expression—Reasonable Restrictions—Accountability—Scope and Limitations. The freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 and the right to access information under Article 19A are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, morality, security, and prevention of contempt of court. The right to free speech is not unfettered and cannot be used to undermine judicial dignity or integrity. In the present case, Senator Faisal Vawda and Mustafa Kamal made contemptuous remarks in public press conferences, violating Article 204 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003. However, both individuals later tendered unconditional apologies, which the Court accepted, while cautioning them against any future misconduct. ----Cited Laws: Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 2A, 19, 19A, 204 Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 (b) Contempt of Court—Freedom of Speech—Accountability of Public Figures—Tendering of Unconditional Apology—Acceptance and Judicial Discretion: While public figures are entitled to freedom of speech, their statements must not cross the boundaries set by Article 19 of the Constitution or amount to contempt of court under Article 204. Both Senator Faisal Vawda and Mustafa Kamal initially defended their remarks but later tendered unconditional written and verbal apologies to the Supreme Court, acknowledging their mistake. The Court accepted their apologies, noting their sincere remorse and reiterating that repeated transgressions in the future would not be tolerated. ----Cited Laws: Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 19, 204 Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 (c) Media Responsibility—Live Broadcast of Contemptuous Remarks—Accountability of News Channels—Commercial Interests vs Public Interest: The Court highlighted the responsibility of media outlets under Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution, emphasizing that broadcasting contemptuous material cannot be justified under the pretext of free speech or public interest. The Supreme Court issued show-cause notices to 34 television channels for airing the press conferences live, rebroadcasting them, and monetizing them through advertisements. Media houses were directed to provide: Details of advertisements aired during and after the press conferences. Amounts received for such advertisements. Whether any retraction or apology was broadcast subsequently. Failure to act responsibly and verify content before broadcasting was deemed a breach of journalistic ethics and constitutional obligations. ----Cited Laws: Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 19, 19A Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 (d) Religious Injunctions—Backbiting, Slander, and Harmful Speech—Accountability and Repentance. The Court emphasized that Islamic principles forbid slander, backbiting, and spreading false accusations. It cited Quranic verses and Hadith, underscoring the importance of verifying information before dissemination and avoiding speech that harms others or spreads discord. Both Senator Faisal Vawda and Mustafa Kamal were reminded of their duty to exercise caution in public discourse and uphold principles of truthfulness and responsibility in their statements. ----Cited References: Surah Al-Hujurat (49:12) Surah Al-Isra (17:44) Imam Ghazali's teachings on slander and accountability (e) Judicial Dignity—Accountability of Public Officials and Media—Safeguarding Institutional Integrity. The Court emphasized the dignity of judicial institutions and the necessity to protect them from unwarranted public attacks, particularly those aimed at undermining public confidence in the judiciary. While free speech is protected, it cannot extend to ridicule, hate speech, or contemptuous commentary aimed at judicial officers or ongoing proceedings. The unfettered dissemination of unverified and contemptuous remarks by media houses compromises institutional integrity and undermines public trust in the justice system. ----Cited Laws: Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 2A, 19, 204 Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 ----Disposition: Unconditional apologies of Senator Faisal Vawda and Mustafa Kamal accepted. Show-cause notices issued to 34 television channels for broadcasting contemptuous content without editorial checks and for commercial gain. Media houses directed to provide detailed explanations and financial records related to the broadcasts.

Summary: Background: The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) filed a petition challenging the legality of the "Policy for Local NGOs/NPOs Receiving Foreign Contributions-2022," enacted by the Federal Cabinet. The policy sought to regulate foreign funding of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) by imposing stringent conditions, including approval from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and security clearance by unidentified security agencies. The petitioners argued that the policy violated their constitutional rights under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, which guarantees the right to lawful business or profession, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. ----Issues: 1) Whether the Federal Cabinet had the legal authority to enact the policy without legislative authorization under Article 18 of the Constitution. ---2) Whether the policy's provisions, particularly the involvement of security agencies in approving foreign funding, were valid under the existing legal framework. ----3) Whether the policy imposed unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners' rights to receive and utilize foreign contributions. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court declared the policy unlawful and without legal effect. The Federal Cabinet lacked the legislative authority to impose restrictions on NGOs/NPOs through policy alone, as no enabling law backed the policy. The court referred to the previous decision in the "Marie Stopes Society" case, which had struck down a similar policy for lacking legal authority and violating the constitutional principles of governance. The court found that the current policy faced the same deficiencies. The court emphasized that the Federal Government cannot bypass the legislative process to impose restrictions on fundamental rights, such as the right to conduct lawful business or receive foreign contributions. For such restrictions, the Federal Cabinet would require statutory backing. The policy's delegation of a gatekeeping role to security agencies, without specifying their identity or legal authority, was also deemed unlawful. The court ruled that no executive authority can impose such restrictions without the backing of law. Article 18 of the Constitution allows for the regulation of professions and trade through a licensing system, but such regulations must have legal backing, which the policy lacked. -----Outcome: The policy was struck down as invalid and unenforceable, and the court ruled that the executive must adhere to constitutional and legislative mandates when framing such policies. ----Citations/Precedents: Marie Stopes Society vs. Federation of Pakistan (2022 CLC 880) Messrs Mustafa Impex Karachi and others vs. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808) Pakistan Muslim League (N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA and others vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642) Province of Punjab through its Home Secretary and others vs. Gulzar Hassan, Advocate and others (PLD 1978 Lahore 1298) Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others vs. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others (PLD 2016 SC 692) Arshad Mehmood and others vs. Government of Punjab (PLD 2005 SC 193) Shoukat Ali vs. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior (PLD 2024 Islamabad 135)

Summary: Background: The petitioners, Town Administration and another, filed Civil Petitions challenging the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed their writ petitions. The respondents, Muhammad Khalid and Muhammad Iqbal Javed, were both employed by Town Administration on a temporary basis but served for extended periods. Both employees were terminated via oral orders. The Labour Court reinstated both employees with back benefits, recognizing their status as permanent workers due to their long service. The petitioners filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which was dismissed as time-barred. The petitioners then filed writ petitions before the Lahore High Court, which were also dismissed. ----Issues: 1) Whether the respondents, having served for extended periods, attained the status of permanent employees. ----2) Whether the petitioners’ appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal was correctly dismissed as time-barred. ---3) Whether the oral termination of the respondents' services was lawful. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. The Court held that the respondents were employed for extended periods beyond the nine-month threshold, which qualified them as permanent workers under the Punjab Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The oral termination of the respondents' services was found to be unlawful as it violated the requirement for written termination notices stating reasons for termination. Furthermore, the petitioners failed to justify the delay in filing their appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and no valid grounds were presented for condonation of the delay. The Court reiterated that the law favors the vigilant, and condonation of delay should not be granted without valid reasons. ----Citations/Precedents: Chairman Agriculture Policy Institute, Ministry of National Food Security & Research, Government of Pakistan vs. Zulqarnain Ali (2022 SCMR 636) Muhammad Yaqoob vs. The Punjab Labour Court No. 1 and 5 others (1990 SCMR 1539) Executive Engineer, Central Civil Division Pak. P.W.D. Quetta vs. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1996 SC 610) Government of Punjab and others vs. Punjab Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others (2002 SCMR 878) Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region vs. Riaz Hussain Bukhari (2024 SCMR 1021)

Summary: Background: Senator Fesal Vawda held a press conference on 15 May 2024, at the National Press Club, Islamabad, where he made serious and malicious allegations against the Judiciary and commented on ongoing cases. This led to contempt proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. A similar press conference was held by Mr. Mustafa Kamal on 16 May 2024, which was also broadcast live on several television channels. ----Issues: 1)Whether the statements made by Fesal Vawda and Mustafa Kamal during their press conferences constituted contempt of court. ---2) Whether the television channels that broadcast the press conferences should be held accountable for contempt of court. ---3) Whether the constitutional rights to freedom of speech, expression, and press, as provided under Articles 19 and 19A, protect the actions of the individuals and the media. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Contempt by Individuals: The Court found that the statements made by Fesal Vawda and Mustafa Kamal were contemptuous as they scandalized the judiciary and commented on sub judice matters, violating Article 204 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003. However, both individuals tendered unconditional apologies, expressing remorse for their actions. The Court accepted their apologies and withdrew the show cause notices but warned of consequences for any future transgressions. ----Accountability of Television Channels: The television channels were initially issued notices to explain their actions. During the proceedings, it was revealed that the channels continued to broadcast and even re-broadcast the contemptuous statements without any retraction or apology. The preliminary replies submitted by the channels' counsel, Mr. Faisal Siddiqui, claimed that broadcasting the press conferences was in the public interest and that the channels were not responsible for the content. The Court found these explanations unsatisfactory and issued show cause notices to 34 channels to provide detailed replies, including information about advertisements aired during the broadcasts and the revenue generated. ----Freedom of Speech and Press: The Court reiterated that while Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution protect freedom of speech, expression, and press, these rights are subject to reasonable restrictions, including those related to contempt of court. The right to freedom of speech does not permit slandering judges or the judiciary. ----Citations/Precedents: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 2A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19(2). Muhammad Hashim v. The State, PLD 2004 SC 856 Said Wazir v. The State, 2023 SCMR 1144 Muhammad Shoaib v. The State, 2022 SCMR 1006 Ishaq v. The State, 2022 SCMR 1422 Zahir Shah v. The State, 2019 SCMR 2004 Summary: The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the contempt proceedings against Senator Fesal Vawda and Mr. Mustafa Kamal for their derogatory statements against the judiciary. Both individuals tendered apologies, which were accepted by the Court, but with a warning for future conduct. The television channels that broadcasted the press conferences were found to have acted irresponsibly and were issued show cause notices to explain their actions and the financial benefits obtained from the broadcasts. The Court emphasized that the freedom of speech and press, while fundamental, does not override the need to respect the judiciary and maintain the dignity of the courts.