Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 122(5)---Amendment of assessment---‘Definite information’---Scope and interpretation---Reassessment initiated solely on the basis of a bank statement---Whether such statement constitutes ‘definite information’ within the meaning of S. 122(5) of the Ordinance, 2001---Principles laid down. The Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Special Zone for Builders and Developers) Regional Tax Office, Islamabad, initiated reassessment proceedings against the taxpayer, M/s Khudadad Heights, Islamabad, under S. 122(1), (5), and (9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, based solely on the bank statement of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's income was reassessed, and being aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals-I), Islamabad, who partially ruled in favor of the taxpayer on 28.12.2011. Both the department and the taxpayer then filed cross-appeals before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad Bench-I, which allowed the taxpayer’s appeal and dismissed the department’s appeal on 13.11.2014. The Islamabad High Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, leading the department to file a civil petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether a bank statement alone could constitute ‘definite information’ required for reassessment under S. 122(5) of the Ordinance, 2001. The Court relied on the precedents set in Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I RTO, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi (2017 SCMR 1414) and Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. M/s Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through L.Rs (2021 SCMR 1290), distinguishing the present case from these rulings. In Khan CNG Filling Station case, reassessment was upheld as it was based on a measurable volume of natural gas, whereas in Bashir Ahmed case, reassessment was deemed invalid since it lacked substantive evidence beyond an unexplained asset purchase. The Court ruled that a mere bank statement, without further corroborative evidence, does not amount to ‘definite information’ as required under S. 122(5) of the Ordinance, 2001. The Court held that neither the Commissioner, the Tribunal, nor the High Court had found that the credit entries in the bank statement necessarily represented taxable income, and therefore, the reassessment proceedings initiated on such a basis were legally invalid. (b) Tax Law---Definite Information---Distinction between repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Finality of Tribunal findings. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the concept of ‘definite information’ must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and its validity depends on the source, reliability, and conclusiveness of the information. The Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, unlike the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, provides a specific scheme for reassessment, requiring that ‘definite information’ must directly indicate that: (i) income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, (ii) total income has been under-assessed, excessively relieved, or misclassified. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority, and unless there is a clear legal error, its findings cannot be reopened in reference jurisdiction or before the Supreme Court. Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I RTO, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi (2017 SCMR 1414) • Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. M/s Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through L.Rs (2021 SCMR 1290)

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ---- O. VII, R. 11—Rejection of plaint—Jurisdictional bar under special law—Effect—Petitioner sought declaration that he ceased to be a director of the company and challenged SECP’s treatment of him as a director, along with the auction of his property by Customs authorities—Trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, holding that the civil suit was barred by law—Appellate court upheld the rejection—Held, under Section 197(5) of the Companies Act, 2017, disputes regarding the inclusion or exclusion of a director in the company register fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Company Bench of the High Court—Further, Section 5(2) of the Companies Act, 2017 expressly ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts—Where a special law provides a specific remedy, the jurisdiction of general civil courts is excluded—Reliance placed on Muhammad Iqbal v. Nasrullah (2023 SCMR 273)—Petition dismissed. (b) Companies Act, 2017 ---- Ss. 197(5), 5(2), 466—Exclusive jurisdiction of Company Bench—Exclusion of civil court jurisdiction—Petitioner’s challenge to SECP’s records regarding his directorship should have been raised before the Company Bench of the High Court—Companies Act provides a special mechanism for rectification of company records—Held, where a special statute prescribes a forum for adjudication, recourse to civil courts is impermissible—Reliance placed on Mst. Zahida Sattar v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2002 SC 408). (c) Customs Act, 1969 ---- S. 217—Challenging customs liability—Proper forum—Petitioner contended that Customs authorities wrongly auctioned his property without first exhausting remedies against the company’s assets—Held, where an assessment order is passed under the Customs Act, 1969, the appropriate remedy is an appeal before the competent forum, not a civil suit—Petitioner failed to challenge the assessment order through statutory remedies, allowing it to attain finality. (d) Civil Courts—Jurisdictional Limitations ---- S. 9 CPC—Jurisdiction of civil courts—Express and implied bar—Jurisdiction of civil courts is barred where special laws provide exclusive adjudicatory mechanisms—Held, civil courts cannot assume jurisdiction in matters where statutory tribunals or regulatory authorities are designated as the competent forum—Reliance placed on S.M. Sham Ahmad Zaidi v. Malik Hassan Ali Khan (2002 SCMR 338). ---- Disposition: Civil revision dismissed. Findings of lower courts affirmed. Petitioner directed to seek relief before the appropriate forum.

Summary: (a) Constitutional Law—Retrospective Taxation & Vested Rights ----Imposition of Capital Gain Tax through Finance Act, 2022—Appellant acquired securities in 2011, which were exempt from Capital Gain Tax if held for more than one year, per Section 37A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Finance Act, 2022 retrospectively imposed 12.5% tax on disposal of securities acquired before 30.06.2022, irrespective of holding period—Held, taxation statutes cannot retrospectively take away vested rights unless the legislative intent is expressed with irresistible clarity—Reliance placed on Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2024 SC 1168). (b) Invalidity of Proviso in Division VII of First Schedule: ----Conflict Between Charging Provision & Schedule—Section 37A is the main charging provision for Capital Gain Tax, while Division VII of First Schedule merely specifies tax rates—Finance Act, 2022 introduced a proviso in Division VII, overriding tax rates and imposing a uniform 12.5% tax, thereby nullifying the tax exemption for securities held over six years—Held, a proviso cannot override or nullify the main charging provision—Proviso must be read harmoniously with the main provision and cannot independently introduce new tax liabilities—Reliance placed on Excise & Taxation Officer v. Burmah Shell (1993 SCMR 338) and Enmay Zed Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (2001 SCMR 564). (c) Discrimination & Violation of Article 25 of Constitution: ----Differential Tax Treatment Without Rational Basis—Finance Act, 2022 imposed 12.5% tax on securities acquired before 30.06.2022 but reintroduced 0% tax for securities acquired before 01.07.2013 through Finance Act, 2024—Held, such differential treatment lacked rational justification and violated Article 25 of the Constitution—Where the same category of assets is taxed differently in different tax periods without valid reasoning, such classification is discriminatory and unconstitutional—Reliance placed on Province of Punjab v. Ahmad Hussain (2013 SCMR 1547). (d) Disposition: ----Finance Act, 2022 Proviso Declared Inoperative—Intra Court Appeal allowed—Impugned judgment of Single Judge set aside—Proviso added to Division VII through Finance Act, 2022 declared inoperative—Appellant entitled to 0% tax on capital gain from disposal of securities between 01.07.2022 and January 2023.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Preliminary investigation conducted before the registration of FIR---Accused-appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Eye-witnesses besides were related to the deceased and inter se were residents of the place, situated at a distance of four kilometers from the place of occurrence hence, their deposition required strict scrutiny---Though, as per prosecution's case, the crime report was registered by the complainant within two hours of the occurrence at 07.00 p.m. through a written application yet the fact remained that during cross-examination, complainant maintained that the police recorded the statements of the witnesses before the FIR---Complainant volunteered that she did not know about the investigation---Eye-witness also endorsed that statement by stating that his statement was recorded before the registration of FIR---Prima facie the Investigation Officer held preliminary inquiry before registration of the FIR that created doubt about the veracity of the contents as well as timing of registration of crime report---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to substantiate the charge against the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Inordinate delay in conducting postmortem examination upon the dead body of the deceased---Accused-appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Postmortem examination on the dead body of deceased was conducted at 07.00 a.m. on 27.10.2016 though as per Medical Officer, the dead body was received in the hospital at 09.30p.m. on 26.10.2016---Medical Officer conceded that he was on duty from 08.00p.m. on 26.10.2016 to 08.00 a.m., the next morning---Neither the said Medical Officer nor any of the witnesses gave any explanation with regard to the delay in conducting autopsy---According to relevant column in postmortem examination report, the police papers were received in the hospital at 03.00 a.m. i.e. with the delay of ten hours after the occurrence and eight hours after the registration of case and no explanation in that regard was available on record---If the FIR was registered at 07.00 p.m. on 26.10.2016 and the Investigation Officer after collection of evidence at the spot dispatched the dead body received in the hospital at 09.30 p.m. then why the police papers were sent at 03.00 a.m. on 27.10.2016---This was a question that also remained unanswered---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to substantiate the charge against the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---No reason for the availability of the witnesses at the spot at the relevant time---Accused-appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---According to prosecution's case, the witnesses went to the town for grocery shopping which took about seven hours---Complainant also stated, during her cross-examination, that the grocery items were lying at the place of occurrence when the Investigation Officer reached there but admittedly, the grocery was never taken into possession and even availability of the same at the spot was not mentioned in the site inspection note as well as the marginal notes at scaled site plan---Moreover, during cross-examination, complainant also stated that she had no knowledge regarding the articles purchased by deceased---Said fact reflected that the reason for the availability of the witnesses at the relevant time did not find support from any other evidence/the record---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to substantiate the charge against the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Ocular account not supported by medical evidence---Accused-appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Both the eye-witnesses, in their statements under Ss. 154 & 161 Cr.P.C, respectively and even in their examinations in chief claimed that appellant made two fires with his rifle which hit on the back of right shoulder and head of deceased---Similarly, the eye-witnesses also claimed that two fire shots by co-accused hit on the back of left shoulder and head of deceased but perusal of medical evidence rendered by Medical Officer made it clear that the deceased was not having any firearm injury on his head---Said Medical Officer also affirmed the possibility of sustaining injuries on head by the deceased by fall on the ground and he very clearly mentioned that those injuries could be caused by any blunt weapon---According to site plan, the distance between appellant and the deceased at the relevant time was 33 feet and similarly, between the deceased and co-accused, was more than 34 feet but when going through the description of two bullet entry wounds reflected in the postmortem examination report as injuries Nos. 2 and 3, it became clear that injury No.3 was having blackening around the inverted margins that was not possible by a fire shot from the distance of 33 feet---According to statement of the complainant, she was at a distance of 5/6 karams' from the deceased at the relevant time but marginal point No.6 of the scaled site plan revealed that the distance between the two was about 165 feet, about 30 'karams'---Being inconsistent with the medical evidence, the complainant also stated that the accused persons were standing close to the deceased at a distance of less than one feet---Said fact also controverted the distance given in the scaled site plan and the distance claimed by the other eye-witness---Said discrepancies of the ocular account with the medical evidence available on record made the same doubtful---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to substantiate the charge against the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties---Inconsequential---Accused-appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Record showed that the crime empties and blood stained earth were taken by the Investigation Officer on the night of occurrence but admittedly, the blood stained earth was sent to the Forensic Science Agency on 17.11.2016 while the crime empties were sent to the said Agency on 09.12.2016---Appellant was arrested on 14.12.2016---Prosecution was not equipped with any justification with regard to the belated dispatch of crime empties to Forensic Science Agency and the reason for not sending the same along with blood stained earth on 17.11.2016---It was notable that the date of receiving crime empties was not given in the report of Forensic Science Agency---Such aspects of the case in hand made the credibility of report of the Forensic Science Agency doubtful---In that view of the matter, alleged recovery of rifle along with two live bullets and positive report of the Forensic Science Agency became inconsequential to the prosecution case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to substantiate the charge against the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Motive---Scope---Motive is always considered a double edged weapon---Motive could be a reason to commit an offence, and the same can also be a reason for false implication of an accused. Rana Muhammad Nadeem Kanjoo for Appellant. Waheed Rafique, Deputy District Public Prosecutor for the State. Malik Nazar Hussain Ponta and Malik Ghulam Sarwar Langrial for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 26th February, 2025.

Summary: Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit in the light of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) as amended by Punjab Amendment Act No.XIV of 2018 in the light of provisions contained in the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976 as well as the rules and regulations made thereunder?

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending