Latest Judgments (All Jurisdictions within Pakistan)
FAUJI CEMENT COMPANY LTD VS GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB ETC
Summary: Summary pending
Bilal Muzaffar Heera etc Vs The State etc
Summary: The intention of legislature behind Article 150 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is to pure the evidence from impurities. Therefore, court can allow parties calling the witness to put question to him which might be put in the cross-examination by the adverse parties and said exercise can be undertaken at any stage i.e. during examination-in-chief, cross-examination as well as re-examination. 676Writ Petition- Tax and duties- Sales Tax 2838-24 FAUJI CEMENT COMPANY LTD. VS GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB ETC Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan 04- 03- 2025 2025 LHC
MST MISBAH FAROOQ ETC VS MS DAEWOO PAKISTAN EXPRESS BUS SEVICE LTD ETC
Summary: Summary pending
Daulat Khan ---Appellant Versus Ibne Amin and 3 others---Respondents
Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.417(2-A)--- Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing mutalahima, ghairjaifahhashimah, munaqqilah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Infirmities in prosecution evidence---Accused-appellants were charged for committing murder of the nephew and son of complainant and causing injuries to complainant and his brother through firing---Allegedly, the occurrence took place on 31.08.2014 at 12:00 hours, however, the report was made to the local police at 14:00 hours with two hours delay but such delay had not been properly explained on the record with valid and logical reasons---Similarly, the eye-witnesses including the complainant as well as the injured had recorded their statements under S.164, Cr.P.C, on 06.09.2014, with delay of 06 days and in that regard too there was no plausible explanation on the part of prosecution---Besides, one "S" was charged in the FIR for causing injury allegedly inflicted to an eye-witnesses of the occurrence, but subsequently, his name was replaced with "B", by alleging that his name was inadvertently mentioned in the first information report and his name was deleted from the instant case---Said evidence would depict that the circumstantial evidence in shape of blood-stained articles coupled with postmortem/medical reports of the deceased and the injured were not sufficient to record conviction of the accused/respondents---When substantive evidence fails to connect the accused person with the commission of offence or is disbelieved, corroborative evidence is of no help to the prosecution case as the corroborative evidence can not by itself prove the prosecution's case---Two co-accused, who were arrested in the case, had been acquitted on the same set of evidence and appeal there-against preferred by the complainant was also dismissed---Testimonies of witnesses of ocular account were based on material contradictions and discrepancies, fatal to the case of prosecution---Prosecution alone was under heavy duty to prove the charge against the accused beyond any shadow of doubts---Even a single reasonable doubt is sufficient to record acquittal---Evidence of the prosecution was contradictory regarding the fact of forming of unlawful assembly and its joining by the accused-respondents, therefore, the principle enshrined in S.149, P.P.C., could not be applied to the instant case---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Afzal alias Abdullah and others v. The State and others 2009 SCMR 639; Imran Ashraf and 7 others v. The State 2001 SCMR 424; Ulfat Hussain v. The State 2018 SCMR 313; Hazrat Ali v. Muhammad Ali 2018 PLR 319; Shaban Akhter and another v. The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab 2021 SCMR 395; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2012 SCMR 440; Umar v. The State 2009 PCr.LJ 1110; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736; The State through P.G Sindh and others v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh and others 2021 SCMR 873; Muhammad Altaf and 5 others v. The State 2002 SCMR 189 and Akhtar Hussain and others v. The State 1969 PCr.LJ 753 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.417(2-A)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing mutalahima, ghairjaifah-hashimah, munaq-qilah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly--- Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Medical evidence---Scope---Ocular account disbelieved---Accused-appellants were charged for committing murder of the nephew and son of complainant and caused injuries to complainant and his brother through firing---Medical evidence mayconfirm the direct or ocular account, if any, with regard to the set of injuries, kind of weapon allegedly used in the commission of offence and at least the nature of injuries---However, in the instant case when the ocular evidence was disbelieved then evidentiary value of medical evidence qua the guilt of the accused/respondents as a sole piece of corroboratory evidence could not be given much weight---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdul Rashid v. The State 2019 PCr.LJ 1456 rel. (c) Appeal against acquittal--- ----Double presumption of innocence---Scope---Accused person, as a matter of right, is presumed to be innocent before trial unless the charge is proved against him/her---Acquittal at trial gives rise to double presumption of innocence for an accused---An appellate Court is needed to be cautious while considering the evidence and should avoid reversal of an acquittal, unless it finds that the acquittal is perverse, conjectural, arbitrary, jurisdictionally defective and prompted by mis-reading or non-reading of evidence---Even if a contrary view is formed on re-appraisal of evidence, it should not be used to disturb an acquittal, provided convincing evidence is available on the record to reverse acquittal. Jehangir v. Aminullah and others 2010 SCMR 491 rel. Nemo on behalf of Appellant. Nemo for Respondent (motion case). Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.
MUHAMMAD FAISAL Prop., F.A.Traders, Lahore Versus COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO-II, LAHORE
Summary: (Against
the order dated 27.02.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.R. No.
41034 of 2017).
Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---
----Ss. 114 & 133---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 &
5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Reference to High
Court---Limitation---Office objection---Condonation of
delay---Petitioner/tax-payer was aggrieved of order passed by High Court on tax
reference of authorities, which was filed beyond the time frame given by office
of High Court---Validity---If objections raised by office of High Court were
not removed within the time specified by the office and in the meantime
limitation for filing appeal stood expired, such appeal would be rendered as
time barred---Limitation is not a mere technicality, as once limitation expires
a vested right is created in favour of other side by operation of law which
cannot be taken away lightly---High Court had passed the order on merits of the
case but failed to discuss averments of application with regard to limitation
by specifying whether the same was allowed or rejected---High Court should have
decided such objection of limitation as a preliminary issue---Supreme Court set
aside the order passed by High Court and remanded the matter for decision
afresh on application for condonation of delay---Petition for leave to appeal
was disposed of.
Asad
Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Abdul Jabbar
Shahid and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Lahore 76;
Abdul Hafeez Abbasi and others v. Managing Director, Pakistan International
Airlines Corporation, Karachi and others 2002 SCMR 1034 and Collectors of
Customs E & S.T. and Sales Tax v. Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd 2005 SCMR
1636 rel.
Hassan
Kamran Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.
Mrs.
Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG (Law) FBR
for Respondent.
Date
of hearing: 4th March, 2025.
MUHAMMAD QASIM and others Versus The STATE and others
Summary: (Against
the judgment dated 24.05.2016, passed by the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore
in Criminal Appeal No. 290-J of 2013).
(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 154---First Information Report---Scope---Prosecution's story is
foundation on which entire edifice of case is built and occupies a crucial
status---Such story should stand to reason and must be natural, convincing and
free from any inherent improbability---It is neither safe to believe such story
of prosecution which does not meet such requirements nor prosecution's case
based on improbable story can sustain conviction of accused.
(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e)---Qanun-e-Shahadat
(10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Abduction for ransom---Re-appraisal
of evidence---Payment of ransom---Proof---Description and denominations of
currency notes---Withholding of evidence---Presumption---Accused persons were
convicted and sentenced for abduction for ransom and sentenced to imprisonment
for life---Validity---Complainant did not furnish detailed description of
currency notes and their denominations which had raised questions regarding
authenticity of payment of ransom as claimed by the complainant---Failure to
provide specific details about ransom money, such as denomination and serial
numbers, diminishes reliability of entire ransom allegation---Prosecution's
failure to identify the place where
ransom money was paid had created doubt in prosecution's case---Prosecution witnesses in whose presence ransom amount were
paid to abductors were abandoned---Persons from whom complainant allegedly
managed/collected ransom amount were neither cited as prosecution's witnesses
nor produced in witness box---Testimony of witnesses who were present at
critical moments of crime, such as payment of ransom, was inevitable for
corroborating complainant's narrative---Failure to produce such witnesses had
cast doubt on veracity of complainant's version and raised reasonable suspicion
about nature of the incident---Non-production of such material witnesses also
amounted to withholding of best available evidence, therefore, adverse
inference within the meaning of Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was
drawn against prosecution that had those witnesses been produced they would not
have supported prosecution's case---Supreme Court set aside conviction and
sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the
charge---Appeal was allowed.
Mst.
Saima Noreen v. The State 2024 SCMR 1310 rel.
(b) Criminal trial---
----Benefit of doubt---Scope---When case of the prosecution is found to
be doubtful, then every doubt, even the slightest one, is to be resolved in
favour of accused.
Muhammad
Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Abdul Jabbar v. The State and another
2019 SCMR 129 rel.
Basharatullah
Khan and Muhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for appellants.
Nemo
for the Complainant.
Ms.
Memoona Ihsan ul Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.
Date
of hearing: 4th March, 2025.
ABDUL HAQ Versus The STATE
Summary: (Against
the judgment dated 03.06.2023 passed by Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench
(Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat in Cr.Appeal No. 159-M of 2022).
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXXI of 2019)---
----S. 9(1)(d)---Recovery of narcotic substance---Re-appraisal of
evidence---Chain of custody---Scope---Opium weighing 16215 grams was allegedly
recovered from accused while transporting the same in a car---Trial Court
convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for
life---Validity---For justifying conviction of accused, prosecution had to
establish that chain of custody was safe, secure and indispensable in order to
place reliance on the report of Chemical Examiner---Prosecution failed to
establish such chain of safe custody and transmission of samples of narcotic
from place of seizure to police station and thereafter to Chemical
Examiner---Sanctity of chain of transmission stands as the cornerstone for
maintaining integrity and evidentiary credibility, particularly in narcotics
cases where law imposes severe and inexorable punishments---Any rupture or
inconsistency in chain of custody strikes at the root of prosecution's case
rendering evidence susceptible to doubt and challenge---Prosecution bears
burden of ensuring unbroken, meticulously documented chain of custody so as to
preclude any possibility of tampering, substitution or contamination---If
prosecution fails to establish an unbroken chain of transmission of narcotic
sample and any breakage or discrepancy is observed in custody of removed
substance, the benefit of such lapse must necessarily be extended to
accused---When prosecution's evidence is tainted with doubt, scales of justice
must tilt in favor of accused---Any failure to prove safe and continuous
handling of narcotic sample from seizure to forensic analysis, not only weakens
prosecution's case, but also vitiates reliability of evidence entitling accused
to benefit of doubt---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded
to accused and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.
Javed
Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139; Qaiser Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 363; Mst.
Sakina Ramzan v. The State 2021 SCMR 451; Zubair Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR
492 and Asif Ali and another v. The State 2024 SCMR 1408 ref.
Arshad
Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.
Zahid
Yousaf Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the
State.
Date
of hearing: 4th March, 2025.
Mst Nusrat Bibi Versus Defence Housing Authority through Secretary and 7 others
Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. IX, R. 9 & O. XVII, R. 3---Trial proceedings---Right of cross-examination by adverse party, closing of---Propriety---Petitioner/plaintiff challenged the legality of judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court whereby appeal filed by one of the eight defendants (respondent) was accepted and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court giving permission to the respondent to cross-examine upon the seven witnesses produced by her (petitioner)---Validity---Record revealed that after framing of the issues the statement of three witnesses of the plaintiff were recorded, thereafter, right of one defendant to cross-examine the said witnesses was closed whereas ex-parte proceedings were initiated against five defendants, all the said six defendants were other than the respondent---On next date of hearing, in the presence of the counsel for petitioner/plaintiff, the respondent and another defendant, the case was adjourned for recording of remaining evidence of the plaintiff---On the date fixed, counsel of respondent /defendant was present but the case was adjourned; on the next date, in presence of the counsel for respondent /defendant the statements of three witnesses of the petitioner / plaintiff were recorded but no opportunity was given to respondent for cross- examination upon the witnesses of the plaintiff whereas neither any ex-parte order was passed against it nor penal provision under O.XVII, R.3 of C.P.C was invoked against respondent /defendant and case was adjourned---Trial court had not passed any order for closing the right of respondent for cross-examination, whereas the Trial Court was under obligation to require the adverse party to cross-examine the witness which shows existence of a serious flaw in trial proceeding as the right of cross-examination on the witnesses of adverse party is a kind of fundamental right which can not be frustrated on the basis of mere technicalities rather fair opportunity should have been afforded but this fundamental right had been circumvented without any justiciable reason which renders the order of the Trial Court as illegal and erroneous in nature, which has rightly be reversed by the Appellate / District Court---No illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional defect had been identified /noticed in the impugned remanding order passed by the Appellate / District Court---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Remand order passed by Appellate /District Court, assailing of---Revisional jurisdictional of High Court---Scope---Petitioner/plaintiff challenged the legality of judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court whereby appeal filedby one of the eight defendants (respondents) was accepted and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court giving permission to the respondent to cross-examine upon the seven witnesses produced by her (petitioner)---Validity---Present civil revision is instituted against a remand judgment whereas, ordinarily, civil revision is not maintainable against a remand order---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Naeem Sadiq for Petitioner. Tariq Masood, Saad Tariq and Hassan Tariq for Respondent No. 1. Muhammad Rashid Tabassum for Respondent No. 6. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025. Judgment Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J .--- Through this civil revision, the petitioner has challenged the legality of judgment dated 27.01.2020, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore who accepted the appeal of respondent No.1/DHA and remanded the matter to the trial court and gave permission to DHA to cross-examine upon the witnesses PW1 to PW7. 2. Brief facts of the case as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that the petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, cancellation of documents, possession, mandatory and permanent injunction contending therein that plaintiff purchased agricultural land measuring 22-Kanals 03-Marlas comprising Khasra Nos.764, 765/2, 771/2, 774, Khewat No.23/1, Khatooni No.72 situated in village Jalalabad, Tehsil Cantt. District Lahore from defendant No.6 through registered sale deed No.94 dated 26.11.1999 against consideration of Rs.5,00,000/- and obtained possession of this land from Muhammad Tariq-respondent/defendant No.6. The sale deed was finalized between the parties 26.11.1999 but it was entered on 06.01.2003. In the month of February, 2003, plaintiff approached the concerned revenue officials from where it revealed that respondent No.5 being attorney of respondent No.6 had sold out the property through sale deeds No.14140 dated 09.09.2000 and also got sanctioned mutation No.266 dated 26.09.2000 in favour of defendants Nos.1 and 2, who further alienated the land through sale deed No.16027 dated 14.10.2000 and mutation No.276 dated 19.10.2000 in favour of defendant No.3, who also alienated the said land through sale deed No.13177 dated 17.09.2002 and mutation No.458 in favour of defendant No.4. That plaintiff became absolute owner in possession of the suit property after payment of consideration amount to defendant No.6. The general power of attorney executed by defendant No.6 in favour of defendant No.5 was of no legal effect as with the alienation of suit property the general power of attorney issued by the ex-owner stand automatically terminated. The subsequent sale deeds allegedly executed by defendant No.5 in favour of defendants Nos.1 and 2 and sale deed executed by defendants Nos.1 and 2 in favour of defendant No.3 and sale deed executed by defendant No.3 in favour of respondent No.1/defendant No.4/DHA have no legal footing in the eyes of law. Respondents Nos.2, 3,4 and 5 filed separate contesting written statements whereas respondent/defendant No.6 filed consenting written statement while remaining defendants were proceeded against ex-parte. Out of divergent pleadings of the parties, issues were framed, pro and contra evidence was recorded. The trial court vide judgment and decree dated 08.05.2018 decreed the suit of the petitioner. Respondent No.1/DHA challenged the said judgment and decree through an appeal which was accepted by the appellate court vide impugned judgment dated 27.01.2020 and remanded the matter to the trial court and gave permission to DHA to cross-examine upon the witnesses PWI to PW7. Hence, this civil revision. 3. Arguments heard. Record perused. 4. As per available record after framing of the issues the statement of three witness P.W1 to P.W3 of the plaintiff were recorded on 14.07.2011 and right of defendant No.8 to cross-examine the said witness was closed whereas ex-parte proceedings were initiated against defendants Nos.2,3,5,6 and 7. Thereafter, on 07.09.2011 in the presence of learned counsel for plaintiff and respondent No.1/defendant No.4/DHA as well as 6 the case was adjourned for 17.09.2011 for recording of remaining evidence of the plaintiff. On the date fixed, counsel of defendant No.4/DHA was present and the case was adjourned for 15.10.2011. On the said date, in presence of the counsel for respondent No.1/defendant No.4 the statements of three PWs were recorded but no opportunity was given to respondent No.1/DHA for cross-examination upon the witness of the plaintiff whereas neither any ex-parte order was passed against it nor penal provision under Order XVII Rule 3 of C.P.C was invoked against respondent No.1/DHA and case was adjourned for 24.10.2011. The trial court has not passed any order for closing the right for cross-examination on PW1 to PW7 of DHA rather the trial Court was under obligation to require the adverse party to cross-examine the witness but this was not done which show existence of a serious flaw in trial proceeding as the right of cross-examination on the witnesses of adverse party is a kind of fundamental right which could not be frustrated on the basis of mere technicalities rather fair opportunity should have been afforded but this fundamental right have been circumvented without any justiciable reason which render the order of this trial court as illegal and erroneous in nature, which has rightly be reversed by the lower appellate court. 5. Even otherwise, the instant Civil Revision is instituted against a remand judgment whereas ordinarily, civil revision is not maintainable against a remand order. Reliance in this regard is placed on the cases titled as Abdul Majid and another v. Muhammad Hanif (2008 SCMR 335), Noor Ahmad through L.Rs and others v. Province of Punjab and others (2016 SCMR 2174) and Phool Zeb Khan and another v. Additional Deputy Commissioner/Collector Mansehra and others (2017 YER Note 152). 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has neither pointed out any illegality or material irregularity, in the impugned judgment passed by the lower appellate Court nor identified any jurisdictional defect. 7. In view of above, this civil revision is dismissed being devoid of any force with no order as to cost. MQ/N-6/L Revision dismissed.
REhan and another Versus The State
Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 397 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, common intention---Bail, cancellation of---Allegation against the applicants pertained to a violent robbery that resulted in the loss of life of the cousin of complainant by firing---Record indicated that separate identification parades were conducted before the Judicial Magistrate, during which the complainant correctly identified both applicants as the actual culprits---Additionally, it had been established that one of the applicants was identified through CCTV footage and geo-fencing analysis---When said applicant learnt that Investigating Officer planned to apprehend him, he fled to his hometown---However, said accused was later arrested in a separate case registered under S.23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013---Consequently, the Investigating Officer took him into custody in connection with the present case as well---Other applicant, who had been evading authorities, was apprehended in two distinct cases---Record indicated that the charges in the case fell under Ss.302 (murder) and 397 (armed robbery),P.P.C, both of which entailed severe punishments, such as the death penalty or life imprisonment---Severity of those legal consequences, combined with the substantial evidence implicating the accused, significantly diminished the likelihood of bail being granted in this matter---Prosecution had presented substantial incriminating material to establish a prima facie case against the applicants---Complainant's statement, the identification proceedings and other circumstantial evidence strongly linked the applicants to the present offence---At this stage, the objections raised concerning the identification parade and the delay in lodging the FIR did not appear to be of such significance as to warrant the granting of bail---Upon thorough examination of the case's factual matrix and evidentiary record, it was evident that the applicants were prima facie linked to the present offenses---Evidence presented sufficiently implicated them in offences falling under the restrictions of S.497(1),Cr.P.C., which barred bail in such instances---Bail petition was dismissed, in circumstances. 2012 PCr.LJ 1022; 2012 YLR 1603; PLD 2012 Sindh 218 and 2024 SCMR 28 ref. Hilal Khattak v. The State and another 2023 SCMR 1182 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in thebail order are solely for the purpose of deciding bail application and should not influence the merits of the case during the trial proceedings. Arshad Ahmed Metlo for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 1651 of 2024). Barrister Ahmer Jamil Khan along with Muhammad Arif Khan for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Application No. 370 of 2025). Muhammad Munsif Jan and Muhammad Imran for the Complainant. Muhammad Raza, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025. Order Jan Ali Junejo, J .--- The present Criminal Bail Applications have been filed on behalf of the Applicants/Accused, who are seeking post-arrest bail in connection with a case stemming from FIR No.172 of 2022, registered at P.S. Gabol Town, Karachi, under Sections 302/397/34, P.P.C. The Applicants/Accused initially approached the Court of Sessions by filing Bail Applications Nos.373 of 2023 (Applicant Faizan) and 801 of 2023 (Applicant Rehan Khan), which were subsequently dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide Order dated: 08-03-2023 and Order dated: 04-03-2024. 2. The facts relevant to the present criminal bail application are as follows: "On 17/10/22 at 1815 hours, Muhammad Ahmed and his cousin, Muhammad Hanif, were returning from Meezan Bank, Nagan Chowrangi, after withdrawing 10 lakh rupees (intended for family use). While near Shaheen Bakery, Sector 15B, Buffer Zone, two unidentified men (30-35 years old, dark complexion, Urdu-speaking, on an unregistered motorcycle) attempted to rob them. The assailants fired a shot, kicked their motorcycle (No.KFX-5686), causing a crash. Hanif sustained fatal head and jaw fractures, leading to his death at Abbasi Shaheed Hospital. During the attack, 350,000 rupees (scattered during the fall) were stolen, while 650,000 rupees (retained in a cloth) were recovered". 3. The learned counsel for the Applicant Rehan Khan has argued that the applicant/accused has been falsely implicated in the present case with no connection to the alleged incident, as the police have acted with mala fide intention and ulterior motives. He further contends that no recovery has been made from the applicant, and the alleged murder weapon has been falsely planted. He asserts that the co-accused has already been granted bail, making the applicant entitled to the same benefit on grounds of consistency. He maintains that the FIR was lodged with an unexplained delay, casting serious doubt on the prosecution's case. Additionally, he highlights that the applicant's name and description are absent from the FIR, further weakening the allegations. He submits that the applicant has been wrongly involved in a blind murder case to create an impression of efficiency by the police. He argues that the co-accused allegedly fired in the air, demonstrating no intent to kill, while the FIR suggests the deceased succumbed to road injuries, making Section 302 P.P.C inapplicable. He further states that the applicant, a real estate businessman, has been falsely framed due to his refusal to pay a bribe. He contends that statements made in police custody hold no legal value under Articles 38 and 39 of Qanun-e-Shahadat. Moreover, he asserts that the identification parade is tainted as the IO improperly exposed the applicant's face to the complainant beforehand. He also argues that the complainant failed to describe the currency notes allegedly involved, adding to the doubts, which should benefit the accused. Lastly, he pleads that the applicant has been in custody for one and a half years, causing financial distress to his family, warranting bail on humanitarian grounds. Lastly, the learned counsel prayed for grant of bail to the Applicant. 4. The learned counsel for the Applicant Faizan Habib has argued that the Applicant/Accused is a law-abiding citizen with no prior criminal record and has been falsely implicated in the present case out of malice and ulterior motives. He further contends that the Applicant was not named in the FIR, no overt act has been attributed to him, nor was any description or huliya mentioned at any stage of the prosecution's case. He submits that there are glaring contradictions in the FIR and the prosecution's story, as the complainant initially failed to recall the looks and description of the alleged culprits, yet, after four months, suddenly claimed to recognize the accused, rendering the identification parade highly doubtful. He states that while the complainant alleged that two Urdu-speaking individuals committed the offense, the charge sheet implicates four non-Urdu-speaking persons, making this a case of further inquiry. He asserts that the Applicant has been implicated by the SHO due to personal grudge and greed and has no connection to the alleged crime except for having a bank account at the same branch. He maintains that mere heinousness of an offense is insufficient to deny bail and that the fundamental right to a fair trial under Articles 4, 9, and 10A of the Constitution must be upheld. He emphasizes that no incriminating recovery has been made from the Applicant, who has been languishing in jail since 11/2/2023 without any witness examination. He further contends that there is no risk of absconding or tampering with evidence, and prolonged incarceration without trial amounts to punishment before conviction. He submits that until proven guilty, the Applicant must be presumed innocent, and any doubt must benefit the accused. He concludes that in light of these circumstances, the Applicant is entitled to the concession of bail as per the established principle that "bail, not jail" is the norm. Lastly the learned counsel has prayed for grant of bail to the Applicant. The learned counsel has relied upon the case laws reported in 1.2012 PCr.LJ 1022; 2.2012 YLR 1603; 3.PLD 2012 Sindh 218; and 4.2024 SCMR 28. 5. The learned counsel for the Complainant has argued that bail must be denied as the prosecution has established a prima facie case under Sections 302 (murder) and 397 (armed robbery) of the P.P.C, backed by irrefutable evidence including CCTV footage, geofencing data, and CDR records placing the Applicants at the crime scene (Meezan Bank, North Karachi), coupled with the recovery of police uniforms, counterfeit IDs, weapons-related documents, and a motorcycle from Faizan Habib's residence. He further contends that the Complainant's identification of the Applicants during court-supervised identification parades-conducted in the presence of a Judicial Magistrate-leaves no doubt about their involvement, while Faizan's deliberate shifting to Balakot to evade arrest underscores his high risk of absconding. He argues that the severity of the charges, punishable by death or life imprisonment, and the Applicants' potential to intimidate witnesses or endanger public safety-given their use of police disguises to commit crimes-render bail unjustifiable. Additionally, he asserts that procedural objections, such as delays in FIR registration, hold no merit at this stage, as the prosecution has met the threshold of demonstrating guilt. He concludes that societal interest in preventing grave crimes, ensuring trial integrity, and deterring fugitive behavior necessitates the refusal of bail to keep the Applicants in custody until trial. Lastly, the learned counsel for the Complainant prayed for dismissal of bail of the Applicants. 6. The learned Deputy Prosecutor General opposes the bail application, advancing the following contra arguments: He argues that the Applicants are accused of committing heinous offenses under Sections 302, 397, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which involve murder and robbery with grievous consequences, warranting strict judicial scrutiny. He further contends that substantial evidence, including witness statements and forensic findings, establishes their involvement in the crime, making their bail unjustifiable. He asserts that the identification of the Applicants was conducted lawfully and supports their connection to the offense. He maintains that the brutal nature of the act, resulting in the victim's death, demonstrates a clear common intention to commit robbery and violence. He emphasizes that granting bail poses a serious risk of absconding, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses, which could compromise the trial process. He submits that mere delay in trial proceedings does not justify bail, especially in a case of such grave nature. He highlights that in similar cases, courts have consistently denied bail to prevent setting a precedent that undermines the justice system. Lastly, he prays for the dismissal of the bail applications of both Applicants in the interest of justice. 7. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant/accused as well as the learned Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Furthermore, I have meticulously examined the material available on record with utmost care and judicial prudence. An examination of the case record reveals that the allegations against the Applicants pertain to a violent robbery that resulted in the loss of life. The record further indicates that separate identification parades were conducted before the learned Judicial Magistrate, during which the Complainant correctly identified both Applicants as the actual culprits. Additionally, it has been established that Applicant Faizan Habib was identified through CCTV footage and geofencing analysis. When Faizan Habib learned that Investigating Officer PI Muhammad Ashraf Dahri planned to apprehend him, he fled to his hometown, Balakot. However, he was later arrested in a separate case registered under Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013. Consequently, the Investigating Officer took him into custody in connection with the present case as well. It is also crucial to emphasize that Applicant Rehan Khan, who had been evading authorities, was apprehended in two distinct cases: 1. FIR No. 535 of 2022 under Section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C), and 2. FIR No. 636 of 2022 under Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013. Both cases were registered at the Bilal Colony Police Station in Karachi. Following these arrests, the Investigating Officer (I.O.) handling the current case subsequently arrested him in connection with the present matter as well. During the course of the investigation, it emerged that Applicant Faizan Habib had been impersonating a police officer while committing offenses. A subsequent police search led to the recovery of two police uniforms, two police identity cards-one for an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) of PQR and another for a Police Constable of KPK-a photocopy of an arms license from KPK, and a motorcycle bearing registration number SBD-2911 from his residence. Furthermore, photographs of Faizan Habib in police uniform have been placed on record. The Investigating Officer gathered the Call Detail Record (CDR) data of the accused individuals, which confirmed their location near Meezan Bank's North Karachi Branch during the incident and revealed their ongoing communication with an individual named Muhammad Asif Son of Muhammad Ali (Co-accused). Furthermore, the I.O. obtained CCTV footage from the same bank branch, which played a pivotal role in identifying the true perpetrators. Although the case initially lacked clear suspects (termed a "blind murder"), the Investigating Officer's persistent efforts led to its resolution and the uncovering of critical facts. The records indicate that the charges in this case fall under Sections 302 (murder) and 397 (armed robbery) of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C), both of which entail severe punishments, such as the death penalty or life imprisonment. The severity of these legal consequences, combined with the substantial evidence implicating the accused, significantly diminishes the likelihood of bail being granted in this matter. The prosecution has presented substantial incriminating material to establish a prima facie case against the Applicants. The Complainant's statement, the identification proceedings, and other circumstantial evidence strongly link the Applicants to the present offence. At this stage, the objections raised concerning the identification parade and the delay in lodging the FIR do not appear to be of such significance as to warrant the granting of bail. Regarding the argument advanced by counsel for the Applicants concerning undue delays in the trial process, this contention holds no legal weight under the present circumstances. The severity of the charges-which involve the gravest conceivable harm, namely the unlawful deprivation of human life-necessitates rigorous adherence to due process over expediency. Moreover, the Applicants have failed to provide documented evidence supporting their allegations of undue prosecutorial delay, rendering their claims unsubstantiated in both fact and law. Additionally, they have not met the requisite threshold for provisional release, as no evidence has been presented to indicate extraordinary or irreversible hardship arising from their continued detention. In the absence of such justification, the court finds no basis to deviate from established judicial protocols governing cases of this magnitude. Upon thorough examination of the case's factual matrix and evidentiary record, it is evident that the Applicants, Rehan Khan and Faizan Habib, are prima facie linked to the present offenses. The evidence presented sufficiently implicates them in offences falling under the restrictions of Section 497(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which bars bail in such instances. The trial Court's Orders to deny bail, being meticulously reasoned and legally sound, warrants no judicial intervention. This aligns with the precedent set in Hilal Khattak v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 1182), wherein the Apex Court observed that: "The incident is further supported by the footage recorded on the CCTV camera of a neighbouring house. Sufficient incriminating material is thus available on the record of the case to connect the petitioner with the commission of the alleged offences. The findings of the courts below in this regard are not perverse or arbitrary, which could have justified interference by this Court. The petitioner, therefore, has no case for grant of bail under subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C." 8. In view of the preceding legal analysis and rationale, the bail applications filed on behalf of the Applicants (accused) are dismissed, as they lack substantive grounds to warrant judicial relief. It is further emphasized that the observations made in this order are solely for the purpose of deciding this bail application and shall not influence the merits of the case during the trial proceedings. JK/R-12/Sindh Bail declined.
FAUJI CEMENT COMPANY LIMITED Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others
Summary: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)--- ----Ss. 52, 14 & 14A [as inserted through Punjab Finance Act, 2017]---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4 & 10-A---Withholding agent---Show-Cause Notice issued under S. 52 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012---Stance of the petitioner-company was that since it was a withholding agent and not covered within the definition of a taxpayer, therefore, it should first be dealt with under the provisions of S. 14 of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act ('the Act, 2012'), thus, the impugned show-cause notice was liable to be set-aside---Held, that in the present case, the Authority had straightway invoked the provisions of S. 52(3) of Act, 2012 before fulfilling the mandatory requirement of issuing a notice in terms of S.52(1) of the Act, 2012---Moreover, relevant paragraph (No.3) of the impugned show-cause notice only mentioned that "various services were obtained which were taxable as per provisions of Second Schedule of the Act, 2012 and scrutiny of the petitioner's taxpayer profile shows that it failed to clear its due tax liability" which was not a valid reason to bind the petitioner to deposit the due amounts of Punjab Sales Tax in lieu of the taxable services---Provisions of S. 14 of the Act, 2012 as well as S. 14A of the Act, 2012 clarify that subsection (2) of S. 14 of the Act, 2012 discusses the powers of the Authority in connection with a withholding agent whereas S. 14A(2) of the Act, 2012 describes a special procedure for collection and payment of tax in respect of any service(s)---However, in the present case, without first meeting the mandatory requirements of said provisions, straightway notice under S. 52 of the Act, 2012 had been issued to the petitioner---A taxpayer has certain rights while the Federal Board of Revenue functions under provisions of the fiscal laws prevailing in Pakistan---The concerned authority, while issuing the impugned show-cause notice, had ignored the principle of fair trial and due process as envisaged under Art. 10-A of the Constitution---Article 4 of the Constitution clearly states that it is an inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to his/her life, liberty, reputation or property shall be taken except as per law---No public functionary/authority is allowed, under the Constitution, to act in a manner infringing upon fundamental rights or exceeding statutory limits---A statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning and not as per the intent of the legislature, the statutory purpose or the legislative history---Thus, the notice under S.52 of the Act, 2012 was not maintainable when clear provisions of S. 14 of the Act, 2012 had been provided---Section 14 and S. 14A [which was inserted on 15.06.2017 through Punjab Finance Act, 2017, to provide further clarification] were given under Chapter II (Scope of Tax) as such, these two sections, being special provisions, were to be first invoked by concerned authority because the same were main sections of the law/Act, and not ancillary or auxiliary sections---But when compared to S. 52 of the Act, 2012, it comes under Chapter VIII of the Act (Offences and Penalties), which was not a direct provision to issue the impugned show-cause notice, thus, the same could not be straightaway invoked---Thus, stance of the petitioner had some legal force---High Court set-aside the impugned show-cause notice and remitted the matter to the Respondent /Additional Commissioner, Punjab Revenue Authority, Rawalpindi, who would consider it as a representation of the petitioner and decide the same, after providing proper hearing to all concerned including the petitioner, strictly as per relevant provisions of the Act [specifically Ss. 14 & 14A], through a speaking order---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Rahat Caf?, Rawalpindi v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Finance and others 2024 PTD 898; Reliance Commodities (Private) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2020 Lah. 632 = 2020 PTD 1464; Chenab Flour and General Mills v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343; Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others PLD 2025 SC 11 and Service Global Footwear Limited and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2023 Lah. 471 ref. Hafiz Muhammad Idris, Advocate Supreme Court with Hassan Askari Kazmi and Hafiz Muhammad Tanveer Nasir for Petitioners. Barrister Raja Hashim Javaid with Ms. Rahat Farooq Raja, Assistant Advocates General. Zeeshan Zafar Hashmi on behalf of the Punjab Revenue Authority with Ms. Nadia Murad, Legal Officer. Arshad Mahmood Malik, Assistant Attorney General along with Barrister Zoopash Khan for Respondents. Mujtaba-ul-Hussan, Civil Judge / Research Officer for Research Assistance. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.