Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The concealment of registration of F.I.R in Police recruitment by a candidate against the specific terms and conditions of recruitment will lead to his disqualification for deliberately and willfully concealing or withholding of solicited information. 591Writ Petition- Criminal proceedings- N.A.B 1027-25 AAMIR NAWAZ MINHAS ETC VS NAB ETC Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan 08- 04- 2025 2025 LHC 2125 PLD 2025 Lahore 563

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 27.03.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Criminal Appeal No. 180-J of 2019 and M.R. No. 05 of 2015). Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery of weapon---Substantive evidence, absence of---Inconsistency regarding injuries---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death on two counts---Validity---In matters where prosecution case contains doubts and mysteries, benefit of the same has to be given to accused who is considered to be the favourite child of law---Recovery of blood stained bat, which was weapon of offence was only corroborative piece of evidence---In absence of substantive evidence, recovery of weapon of offence was not considered sufficient to hold accused guilty of offence charged---When substantive evidence failed to connect accused with commission of offence or was disbelieved, then corroborative evidence was of no help to prosecution---Corrobo rative evidence could not by itself prove prosecution's case---In the present case given the doubtfulness of direct substantive ocular evidence, the corroborative effect of recovery of weapon of offence was insufficient---Testimony of prosecution witnesses was doubtful, there were inconsistencies between description of injuries of deceased in crime report and post mortem report; recovery of crime weapon was also doubtful and DNA analysis was absent---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge by extending benefit of doubt---Appeal was allowed. Muhammad Hassan v. State 2024 SCMR 1427; Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCMR 639; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 and Naveed Asghar and others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 rel. Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Sajjad H. Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Ms. Rabia Afzal daughter of M. Afzal, Complainant. Date of hearing: 8th April, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 154 & 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 353 & 324---Quashing of FIR---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioner/ accused sought quashing of FIR by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Allegation against the petitioner/accused was that he made an assault on police---Undoubtedly, under the Constitutional jurisdiction conferred under Art.199 of the Constitution, a High Court could quash FIR but such power cannot be unstintingly and frequently exercised in the constitutional or inherent jurisdictions by the High Court to quash FIR and must be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases---Mere statement of petitioner or assertion alone that a false case or FIR was registered against him was insufficient to establish constitutional jurisdiction and to adjudicate the lis under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Judicial propriety did not permit to quash the FIR of cases which were not squarely falling within defined parameters of the rules and which involved disputed facts or controversial facts required a full probe, inquiry or investigation and such procedure culminated in the shape of police report under S.173, Cr.P.C.--- Involvement of disputed facts or factual controversies could not be adjudicated in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution---Other contraceptive barrier for the petitioner to establish the constitutional jurisdiction was an alternative remedy---Constitutional jurisdiction could only be invoked if the petitioner had no other efficacious and effective remedy available under the statutory provisions---Operative statutes and sub-ordinate legislation provided alternative avenues for the reliefs that had been urged before the Court---Under the scheme of criminal jurisprudence in every criminal case, a criminal investigation terminated into a police report or charge sheet or reference or confidential final report or challan, which solely depended upon formation of independent views by a Judicial Magistrate as required under S.190(3), Cr.P.C., or by an Anti-Terrorism Court while accepting or rejecting challan on evaluation of investigation report and material collected---Comparatively, the alternate remedy could conveniently accomplish the purpose of petitioner and was equally effective and efficacious---In such situation it again effectively barred the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---In the presence of adequate remedy which is more efficacious, speedy and effective, present petition was not entertainable--- Petitioner had failed to point out any of the ingredients for the quasing of FIR--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others PLD 2009 SC 102; Gulam Mustufa v. State 2008 SCMR 76; FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others PLD 2023 SC 265; Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others 2006 SCMR 276; Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246; Amir Jamal and others v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq and others 2011 SCMR 1023; Fida Hussain v. Mst. Saiqa and others 2011 SCMR 1990; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. PLD 1983 SC 280; Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs Appraisement 1990 MLD 126; Pak Metal Industries v. Assistant Collector 1990 CLC 1022; Allah Wasaya v. Tehsildar/AC 1st Grade 1981 CLC 1202; Syed Riaz Hussain Zaidi v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1981 Lah. 215; Abdul Hafeez v. Chairman Municipal Corporation PLD 1967 Lah. 1251; Dr. Sher Afghan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813 and Zeeshan Shani v. The State 2012 SCMR 428 rel. Ghulam Mustafa Abbasi for Petitioner. Judgment Syed Fiaz-ul-Hassan Shah, J .---1. Urgent application is disposed of. 2to5. Through this petition, the petitioner has prayed as under: "(a) That this Honorable Court may be pleased to quash the impugned FIR bearing Crime No.05 of 2025, under section 353, 324 P.P.C., of PS Manjhand lodged by the Respondent No.3 being false, fabricated, concocted and manipulated story. (b) That this Honorable Court may be pleased to suspend/stay the impugned FIR bearing Crime No.05 of 2025, under section 353, 324 P.P.C., of PS Manjhand lodged by the Respondent No.3 till the final disposal of the main petition. (c) That this Honorable Court may be pleased to issue direction to the Respondent No.2 to provide legal protection to the petitioner and her family members as at the hands of Respondent No.3 and other unknown police officials. (d) That this Honorable Court may be pleased to issue direction to the respondent No.3 to not lodged any false FIR against the petitioner and her family members at the hands of private respondent No.6 and further give direction to the official respondents not to arrest the petitioner and her family members. (e) Any other relief which the Honorable Court deems fit and proper in view of the above fact for protection of Petitioners and in the interest of justice." The Counsel for the petitioner has mainly argued that a false case has been registered by the police, therefore, it may be quashed. We have noticed that FIR No.05 of 2025 PS Manjhand District Jamshoro was registered for offence under Sections 353, 324 P.P.C. Since, the FIR has been registered having statutory backing under Section 154 Cr.P.C, For the sake of convenience, the same is reproduced hereunder: "154. Information in cognizable cases. Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer in-charge of a police-station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant, and every such information whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf." Undoubtedly, the constitutional jurisdiction conferred under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, a High Court can quash an FIR but such power cannot unstintingly and frequently exercise in the Constitutional or inherent jurisdictions by this Court to quash an FIR and it can exercise sparingly in exceptional cases within parameters settled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case "Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others" (PLD 2009 SC 102) held: "6. Needless to emphasis, that functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function. If a criminal liability is spelt out from facts and circumstances of a particular case, accused can be tried upon a criminal charge. Quashment of FIR during investigation tantamount to throttling the investigation which is not permissible in law. However, FIR can be quashed by High Court in its writ jurisdiction when its registration appears to be misuse of process of law or without any legal justification. The police are under a statutory duty under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and have a statutory right under Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate a cognizable offence whenever a report is made to it disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence. To quash the police investigation on the ground that the case is false would be to act on treacherous grounds and would tantamount to an uncalled for interference by the Court with the duties of the police." [Emphasis added] In another case "Gulam Mustufa v. State" (2008 SCMR 76) the Supreme Court held that: "High Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to take the role of the investigating agency and to quash the FIR, while exercising constitutional power under Article 199 of the Constitution or under section 561-A Cr.P.C. unless and until very exceptional circumstances existed." These exceptional grounds have been rendered down by the apex Court, for instance in case "FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others" (PLD 2023 SC 265), the Supreme Court of Pakistan highlighted that High Court can quash FIR under its writ jurisdiction when FIR is patently illegal or contrary to law or it did not constitute a cognizable offence. Although, there is no restriction has put on the High Court to invoke the provision of writ jurisdiction for quashment of FIR, however, the said obstruction or rampart thrown up across a way or relief to check the balance and importance of provision of section 154 Cr.P.C and recognized principles that no disputed facts can be resolved in the constitutional jurisdiction and it must proceed within the operative statutes. Notably, the intent of legislatures is clearly understandable as various provisions are available under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 with the Investigation Officers or Prosecutor or even Judicial Magistrate of area while supervising investigation or even during the trial by the Court of Judicial Magistrate or Court of Sessions under the provisions of Sections 63, 249-A or 265-K and in the presence of such alternate remedies, the quashment of FIR in writ jurisdiction for the grievance which can conveniently be attributed under the statutory provision, cannot be invoked or this Court does not appreciate as per the settled legal principles of power and scope under the Constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has highlighted the fundamental points; "exceptional circumstances" and "alternate remedy" or "disputed facts", where a High Court ought not to not interfere with the FIR and prefer to proceed the investigation or trial to its logical way, in a landmark case "Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others" (2006 SCMR 276) "7. It is also a settled proposition of law that if prima facie an offence has been committed, ordinary course of trial before the Court should not be allowed to be deflected by resorting to constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. By accepting the constitutional petition, the High Court erred in law to short circuit the normal procedure of law as provided under Cr.P.C. and police rules while exercising equitable jurisdiction which is not in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A. Habib Ahmad v. M.K.G. Scott Christian PLD 1992 SC 353. The learned High Court had quashed the FIR. in such a manner as if the respondent had filed an appeal before the High Court against order passed by trial Court. The learned High Court had no jurisdiction to quash the impugned FIR by appreciation of the documents produced by the parties without providing chance to cross-examine or confronting the documents in question. Respondents had alternative 'remedy to raise objection at the time of framing the charge against them by the trial Court or at the time of final disposal of the trial after recording the evidence. Even otherwise, respondents have more than one alternative remedies before the trial Court under the Cr.P.C. i.e. section 265-K, 249-A or to approach the concerned Magistrate for cancellation of the case under provisions of Cr.P.C. The respondents have following alternative remedies under Cr.P.C.:- (a) To appear before the Investigating Officer to prove their innocence. (b) To approach the competent higher authorities of the Investigating Officer having powers vide section 551 of Cr.P.C. (c) After completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer has to submit case to the concerned Magistrate and the Magistrate concerned has power to discharge them under section 63 of the Cr.P.C. in case of their innocence. (d) In case he finds the respondents innocent, he would refuse to take cognizance of the matter. (e) Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules of 1934 makes a provision for cancellation of cases during the course of investigation under the orders of the concerned Magistrate. (f) There are then remedies which are available to accused persons who claim to be innocent and who can seek relief without going through the entire length of investigations. 8. The learned High Court erred in law in accepting constitutional petition by quashing the FIR at the initial stage which was not in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in the following judgments:- (i) Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan and 3 others PLD 1967 SC 317; (ii) Mohsin Ali and another v. The State 1992 SCMR 229; (iii) Abdul Rehman v. Muhammad Hayat Khan and others 1980 SCMR 311; (iv) Marghoob Alam and another v. Shamas Din and another 1986 SCMR 303; (v) Sheikh Muhammad Yameen v. The State 1973 SCMR 622; (vi) Bashir Ahmad v. Zafar-ul-Islaam and others PLD 2004 SC 298; (vii) Kh. Nazir Ahmad's case AIR 1945 PC p.18; (viii) Shahnaz Begum v. The Honourable Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD 1971 SC 677; (ix) Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior Division, Islamabad and 2 others 1994 SCMR 2142. 9. According to provisions of Cr.P.C. it is for the Investigating Officer to collect all the facts connected with the commission of offence and if he finds that no offence is committed, he may submit a report under section 173, Cr.P.C. to the Allaqa Magistrate. On the other hand, if on the basis of his investigation he is of the opinion that the offence has in fact been committed, he has to submit report accordingly. However, the report of the Investigating Officer cannot be the evidence in the case. The investigation is held with a view to ascertaining whether or not an offence has been committed. The inquiry, or trial, as the case may be has to be conducted by the Magistrate. If the police is restrained from investigating the matter, their statutory duty, it will in our opinion be tantamount to acting against the law as held in Kh. Nazir Ahmad's case AIR 1945 PC. p.18. The relevant observation is as follows: "Just as it is essential that everyone accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in the matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as W.P No. 1976-Q of 2022. It has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police under sections 154 and 156 to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under section 561-A. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to give direction in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then." The mere statement of petitioner or assertion alone that a false case or FIR is registered against him is insufficient to establish constitutional jurisdiction and to adjudicate the lis under the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. The judicial propriety does not permit to quash the FIR of cases which are not squarely fall within defined parameters of the rules laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and which involve disputed facts or controversial facts requires a full probe, inquiry or investigation and such procedure culminated in the shape of police report under section 173 Cr.P.C. The involvement of disputed facts or factual controversies cannot be adjudicated in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 as held by this court in the cases of "Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another (2023 SCMR 246), "Amir Jamal and others v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq and others" (2011 SCMR 1023) and "Fida Hussain v. Mst Saiqa and others" (2011 SCMR 1990), "State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd." (PLD 1983 SC 280). The other contraceptive barrier for the petitioner to establish the constitutional jurisdiction is alternative remedy. The constitutional jurisdiction can only be invoked if the petitioner has no other efficacious and effective remedy available under the statutory provisions. The operative statutes and sub-ordinated legislation provide alternative avenues for the reliefs what have urged before us. Under the scheme of criminal jurisprudence in every criminal case, a criminal investigation terminated into a police report or charge sheet or reference or confidential final report or challan solely depends upon formation of independent views by a Judicial Magistrate as required under section 190(3) Cr.P.C. or by a Anti-Terrorism Court while accepting or rejecting challan on evaluation of investigation report and material together collected thereto. Comparatively, the alternate remedy can conveniently accomplish the purpose of petitioner and is equally effective and efficacious and in this situation it again effectively bars the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance can be placed on cases entitled a "Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd v. Collector of Customs Appraisement", (1990 MLD 126), "Pak. Metal Industries v. Assistant Collector", (1990 CLC 1022), "Allah Wasaya v. Tehsildar/AC 1st Grade", (1981 CLC 1202), "Syed Riaz Hussain Zaidi v. Muhammad Iqbal", (PLD 1981 Lah. 215) and "Abdul Hafeez v. Chairman, Municipal Corporation" (PLD 1967 Lah. 1251). The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is envisioned predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness and impropriety of the action of an executive or police or Investigation Officer could be substantiated with the very action when it is patently illegal, unlawful or ultra vires or done or performed in colorable exercise of jurisdiction vested in such authority or officer or propriety demands or permit that it is without any convoluted inquiry or in other words when it does not involve disputed or controversial facts which may without any question assuredly avoid necessitation of adoption of normal course of trial or adjudication by a Court of law. The expression "adequate remedy" signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy which obviously must have statutory adherence with or requirement of such statutory mandate which is generally called as "jurisdiction". Since the statutes provides more adequate remedy remedium juris and expressive adequate remedy and ways are more efficacious, beneficial, convenient, effective, speedy and appropriate within criminal jurisdiction of the inferior courts, for instance the trial Court would have to reach at certain conclusion after recording of evidence, testimonies of prosecution witnesses together with record, material or documents, if any, produce by prosecution side and during the course of trial, the statutes permit the court to grant bail as per recognized judicial principles or exemption from personal appearance, or discharge when charge is groundless or release as a case of further inquiry under section 497(2) Cr.P.C. or acquit under section 249-A or 265-K of the Cr.P.C., therefore, in the presence of adequate remedy which is more efficacious, speedy and effective, the petition is not entertainable. Reference can be placed on the case "Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others" (2011 SCMR 1813). To sum up the discussion, the petitioner has failed to point out any of the ingredients for the quashment that may modify this Court to quash the FIR. Therefore, the constitution petition stands dismissed in limine. We are very well aware that in the cases of alleged police encounter and ineffective firing, the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan while hearing case of "Zeeshan Shani v. The State" (2012 SCMR 428) has ruled that standard of proof should be far higher in the case of police encounter and ineffective firing as compared to any other criminal case as well as the same police cannot be allowed to investigate the offences with obvious reason of impartiality. The Relevant para is re-produced hereunder: "11. The standard of proof in this case should have been far higher as compared to any other criminal case when according to the prosecution it was a case of police encounter. It was, thus, desirable and even imperative that it should have been investigated by some other agency. Police, in this case, could not have been investigators of their own cause. Such investigation which is woefully lacking independent character cannot be made basis for conviction in a charge involving capital sentence, that too when it is riddled with many lacunas and loopholes listed above, quite apart from the after thoughts and improvements. It would not be in accord of safe administration of justice to maintain the conviction and sentence of the appellant in the circumstances of the case." Keeping into consideration the doctrine of "conflict of interest" and dictum, the Inspector General of Police being Head of Police has already framed a policy that the cases of police encounter with ineffective firing are to be investigated by the police of other district and police officers of same District when an alleged incident is taken place are barred to investigate the alleged offence(s). While dismissing the above-said petition, we direct the Deputy Inspector General of Police to depute the investigation constituting a JIT comprising officers other than the District Jamshoro where the instant FIR No.05 of 2025 has been registered. The Constitution petition is dismissed with above observations. JK/S-40/Sindh Petition dismissed.

Summary: ----S. 302(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 537---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Procedural lapses---Fair trial---Scope---Right to a competent and adequately prepared counsel---Accused was charged for committing murder of his wife by strangulating her---Record showed that the matter was transferred to the Trial Court on 23-01-2020---On the same day, the Trial Court recorded the depositions of the complainant and an eye-witness, however, their cross-examinations were deferred due to the absence of the appellant's original defence counsel, who had cited health concerns---Case was then adjourned to 01-02-2020, but on that date, defence counsel remained absent---Instead, an advocate assigned to represent the pauper accused appeared before the Court---Record did not confirm whether said advocate was appointed or provided with the case documents or granted sufficient time to prepare for the defense---Despite that, the Trial Court proceeded to conduct cross-examinations of complainant and an eye-witness, and record the depositions of the remaining five prosecution witnesses---All the said witnesses were cross-examined by the said advocate on the same day---Notably, the case diary indicated that original defence counsel later submitted a statement withdrawing his Vakalatnama---Sudden assumption of defense responsibilities by an advocate without documented access to the case files or adequate preparation time, rendered the cross-examinations ineffective and merely perfunctory---Said failure directly compromised the appellant's right to effective legal representation, particularly in a capital punishment case---Withdrawal of Vakalatnama of original defence counsel and the subsequent appointment of an advocate were executed without judicial scrutiny or the appellant's explicit consent, thereby violating the right to counsel of choice under Article 10-A of the Constitution---Right to a fair trial entailed not only access to legal representation but also the right to competent and adequately prepared counsel---Procedural lapses in the case reduced the trial to a mere formality, depriving the appellant of a meaningful defence---Absence of proper preparation in cross-examinations resulted in miscarriage of justice---It was a fundamental right of every accused to be represented by legal counsel of their own choice---In cases involving capital punishment, the law mandated that the accused must be provided with legal representation and in situations where the accused could not afford a lawyer, the State bore the responsibility of covering the legal expenses---Accordingly, the Sessions Court or Special Court was duty-bound to appoint a legal practitioner at the State's expense to defend the accused---Procedure adopted by the Trial Court was irregular and unlawful and such defects could not be cured under S. 537, Cr.P.C.---No evidence was on record to indicate that the cross- examinations of the prosecution witnesses were conducted by a duly authorized counsel representing the appellant---Instead, the record merely reflected that an advocate, whose formal appointment was not documented anywhere in the case files, undertook the cross-examinations---Such fact raised a strong presumption that the cross-examinations were either not conducted properly or not conducted at all, especially given the fact that on 01-02-2020, the court recorded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and also conducted the cross-examinations of seven prosecution witnesses on the same day---Furthermore, there was no mention in the record of whether the subsequent appearance of appointed advocate was properly appointment or was provided with the necessary case documents or given adequate time to prepare---Such concern was particularly critical since his appointment coincided with the same day on which the prosecution evidence was recorded---Defense counsel played a pivotal role in safeguarding an accused's rights, including raising objections to improper questions, challenging the admissibility of evidence and ensuring that the accused received a fair trial---When an accused is deprived of competent legal representation or when a defence counsel is appointed without proper preparation, it severely undermines the fairness of the trial---Said issue becomes even more critical in cases where capital punishment is at stake, as the right to effective legal representation is a fundamental constitutional and legal safeguard---In the light of said deficiencies, the appellant's conviction and sentence could not be sustained, which was set aside and case was remanded for de novo trial and decision afresh---Appeal was partly allowed. Shafique Ahmed alias Shahjee v. The State PLD 2006 Kar. 377 and Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2011 SCMR 23 rel. Akbar Ali Dahar for Appellant. Aitbar Ali Bullo, D.P.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 8th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- ----Ss.42 & 54 --- Qanun-e-Shahdat (10 of 1984), Art.117 --- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115 & O.VI, R.4 --- Suit for declaration along with possession through partition ---Claiming inheritance right in suit property --- Inheritance and succession matters --- Lineage/successive chain of relationship with original owner, proof of --- Scope --- Legatee must prove heirship as well as complete chain of hereditary relationship with original owner --- The petitioner along with respondents Nos. 30 to 32, filed a suit for declaration, along with possession through partition, and permanent as well as mandatory injunction claiming inheritance rights in the suit property --- Through the said suit, registered sale deeds in favour of respondents Nos. 26 to 28 were challenged as fraudulent --- Suit was dismissed and appeal also met the same fate ---Held: Petitioner failed to substantiate his basic claim of being a legal heir of the deceased--- Similarly, he was unable to provide credible evidence to establish the complete chain of hereditary relationship with the original owner --- Courts below could now proceed on mere unsubstantiated assertions without corroborative evidence, particularly in matters related to inheritance and succession where clear proof of lineage was essential for establishing rightful claims --- Moreover, no credible documentary evidence was produced by the petitioner to establish original owner's ownership over the suit property ---Moreover, no serious effort was made by the petitioner to prove any illegality in the registered sale deeds --- Besides all of the above, during cross- examination, the petitioner admitted that the sellers had transferred their shares through registered sale deeds in favour of respondents Nos. 26 to 28 --- He also acknowledged that the property described in the said sale deeds was distinct from the suit property and the disputed construction work was made by the respondents/defendants without any objection or resistance from anyone ---No cogent explanation or legal justification for the prolonged silence and inaction on the part of the petitioner was provided --- Even otherwise, the principles of acquiescence and waiver were applicable to bar him from obtaining any relief, as his inaction and implicit acceptance of the respondents' activities had effectively extinguished any remedies that might otherwise would have been available --- Unsubstantiated claims presented in pleadings hold no weight unless those are reinforced by compelling evidentiary support --- Revision petition, being devoid of any merits, was dismissed in limine. Bashir Ahmed through Legal Representative and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others PLD 2019 SC 504; Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore PLD 2020 SC 324; Taj Wali Khan v. Hukam Khan (decd.) through L.Rs. 2025 SCMR 231 and Muhammad Hanif Qureshi v. Muhammad Ayub and another 2024 CLC 1838 rel. Mariyappa K.S. v. K.T. Siddalinga Setty 1989(1) KantLJ 150 = 1989 CivCC 183; S. Kaliyammal v. K. Palaniammal 1999 AIR (Madras) 40; Kisan Ramji Khandare v. Kausalyabai Gangaram 2007(3) BCR 118 and Cambridge Solutions Ltd., Bangalore v. Global Software Ltd. 2009 AIR (Madras) 74 ref (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----O.VI, R.4 --- Fraud, allegation of --- Essential particulars --- When a party alleges fraud, it must provide specific particulars detailing the nature and manner in which it was practiced, enabling the opposing party to prepare an adequate defense --- General allegations without specific details do not constitute a proper plea of fraud --- Essential particulars, including when, how, by whom, in what manner, and for what purpose the fraud was committed, as well as who colluded with whom and for what objective, must be clearly averred. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----S.115 --- Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court ---Scope---Concurrent findings of courts below --- High Court's revisional authority under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, exists to ensure proper judicial oversight and correction, unimpeded by procedural formalities ---Such power is limited to addressing substantive errors such as misinterpretation of evidence, jurisdictional overreach, or significant legal flaws that materially affect merits of the case or result in conclusions that contradict established legal principles --- Revisional powers cannot be used to interfere in the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts merely because of the reason that another view of the evidence could also be possible ---Even if the findings of the courts below are erroneous, the High Court, in exercise of its revisional powers, cannot interfere unless such findings suffer from a jurisdictional defect, illegality, or material irregularity affecting the merits of the case. Khudadad v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah alias S. Inaam Hussain and others 2022 SCMR 933; Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Elementary and Secondary Education, Peshawar and others v. Latif Ullah Khan 2021 SCMR 829; Abdul Khaliq (Deceased) through L.Rs. v. Ch. Rehmat Ali (Deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2012 SCMR 508; Ahmad Nawaz Khan v. Muhammad Jaffar Khan and others 2010 SCMR 984; Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb and others 2024 SCMR 916; Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21; Abdul Aziz v. Sheikh Fateh Muhammad 2007 SCMR 336; Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469; Hakim-ud-Din through L.Rs. and others v. Faiz Bakhsh and others 2007 SCMR 870; Rashid Ahmad v. Said Ahmad 2007 SCMR 926 and Muhammad Feroze and others v. Muhammad Jamaat Ali 2006 SCMR 1304 rel. Malik Falaksher through LRs v. Muhammad Baran and another 2024 YLR 2578; Imtiaz Ali v. Muhammad Sadiq 2023 MLD 1819; Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Aslam through Legal Heirs and 7 others 2008 CLC 1055 and The Chairman, Wapda and 4 others v. Messrs Sitara Marbles Industry through Managing Director 2016 YLR 205 ref. Syed Salman Haider Jafri for Petitioner. Muhammad Saad Bin Ghazi and Ch. Fiza Ullah, Assistant Advocates General on Court's call for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th April, 2025. Judgment Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi, J .--- Through instant revision petition, petitioner has challenged judgments and decrees dated 28.03.2022 and 03.10.2022, passed by learned Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, Sialkot, respectively, whereby petitioner's suit for declaration along with possession through partition and permanent as well as mandatory injunction was concurrently dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioner, along with respondents Nos.30 to 32, instituted the aforementioned suit, which was contested by respondents Nos. 27 to 29 through a written statement. The learned Trial Court, after framing issues, recording evidence, and hearing arguments from both sides, dismissed the suit through judgment and decree dated 28.03.2022. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioner filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, which was also dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 03.10.2022. Hence, the present revision petition. 3. The petitioner, along with respondents Nos. 30 to 32, asserted in the plaint that the suit property was originally owned by Arora, son of Dilbahar, who passed away in the year 1955. Upon his death, his estate was inherited by his three sons-Muhammad Yousaf, Muhammad Bashir, and Muhammad Aslam-who collectively received a 6/8 share, while his two daughters-Taj Begum and Pukhraj Begum-received the remaining 2/8 share. After the death of Taj Begum, her share devolved upon her aforementioned brothers and sister. Accordingly, the inheritance of both Arora and Taj Begum was distributed among their legal heirs, with Muhammad Yousaf, Muhammad Bashir, and Muhammad Aslam receiving a 6/7 share, and Pukhraj Begum entitled to a 1/7 share of the legacy. Upon the subsequent deaths of Arora's sons, the respondents Nos. 1 to 24, being their legal heirs, inherited their respective shares. Following the death of Pukhraj Begum, her share was transferred to the petitioner along with the respondents Nos. 30 to 32. Consequently, the petitioner, along with the respondents Nos.30 to 32, are entitled to separate possession of their 1/7 share in the suit property. It was further alleged that the registered sale deeds Nos.1045 and 1046, dated 16.02.1994 (Exh.D2 and Exh.D3), purportedly executed in favour of respondents Nos. 26 to 28, were obtained through fraud and were false, frivolous, and void, and therefore inoperative upon the rights of the plaintiffs. 4. The record clearly reflects that the petitioner has failed to substantiate his basic claim of being a legal heir of Mst. Pukhraj Begum. Similarly, he has been unable to provide credible evidence to establish that Mst. Pukhraj Begum was indeed the daughter of deceased Arora. Meaning thereby the petitioner's assertions regarding said relationships have remained unsupported by any evidence. Indubitably, the Court cannot proceed on mere unsubstantiated assertions without corroborative evidence, particularly in matters related to inheritance and succession where clear proof of lineage is essential for establishing rightful claims. Moreover, no credible documentary evidence has been produced by the petitioner to establish Arora's ownership over the suit property. Similarly, no serious effort has been made by the petitioner to prove any illegality in the registered sale deeds (Exh.D2 and Exh.D3). Besides all of the above, during cross-examination, the petitioner/PW-1 admitted that the sellers had transferred their shares through registered sale deeds, Exh.D2 and Exh.D3, in favour of respondents Nos. 26 to 28. He also acknowledged that the property described in the said sale deeds was distinct from the suit property and the disputed construction work was made by the respondents/defendants without any objection or resistance from anyone. When confronted with these critical admissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner failed to provide any cogent explanation or legal justification for this prolonged silence and inaction on the part of the petitioner. Even otherwise, the principles of acquiescence and waiver would also operate to bar him from obtaining any relief, as his inaction and implicit acceptance of the respondents' activities have effectively extinguished any remedies that might otherwise have been available. 5. Needless to say, when a party alleges fraud, it must provide specific particulars detailing the nature and manner in which it was practiced, enabling the opposing party to prepare an adequate defense. General allegations without specific details do not constitute a proper plea of fraud. Essential particulars-including when, how, by whom, in what manner, and for what purpose the fraud was committed, as well as who colluded with whom and for what objective-must be clearly averred. In this case, the petitioner neither properly pleaded these allegations in the plaint nor established them through evidence. Similarly, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any malice by the respondents in executing the registered sale deeds (Exh.D2 and Exh.D3). It is reiterated that unsubstantiated claims presented in pleadings hold no weight unless those are reinforced by compelling evidentiary support. Reliance is placed upon Bashir Ahmed through Legal Representative and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others (PLD 2019 SC 504), Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore (PLD 2020 SC 324), Taj Wali Khan v. Hukam Khan (decd.) through L.Rs. (2025 SCMR 231) and Muhammad Hanif Qureshi v. Muhammad Ayub and another (2024 CLC 1838). Reference can also be made to Indian judgments reported as Mariyappa K.S. v. K.T. Siddalinga Setty [1989(1) KantLJ 150 = 1989 CivCC 183], S. Kaliyammal v. K. Palaniammal [1999 AIR (Madras) 40], Kisan Ramji Khandare v. Kausalyabai Gangaram [2007(3) BCR 118], Cambridge Solutions Ltd., Bangalore v. Global Software Ltd. [2009 AIR (Madras) 74]. 6. It has been consistently held by the superior Courts that High Court's revisional authority under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, exists to ensure proper judicial oversight and correction, unimpeded by procedural formalities. This power is limited to addressing substantive errors such as misinterpretation of evidence, jurisdictional overreach, or significant legal flaws that materially affect merits of the case or result in conclusions that contradict established legal principles. Revisional powers cannot be used to interfere in the concurrent findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts merely because of the reason that another view of the evidence could also be possible. The law is also well-settled that even if the findings of the Courts below are erroneous, the High Court, in exercise of its revisional powers, cannot interfere unless such findings suffer from a jurisdictional defect, illegality, or material irregularity affecting the merits of the case. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner has remained unable to point out any illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional defect in the concurrent decisions of learned Courts below, which are based on correct appreciation of law, facts and evidence brought on record; hence, no interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, is warranted. 8. Resultantly, instant revision petition, being devoid of any merits, is dismissed in limine. No order as to costs. UN/M-74/L Revision dismissed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 420, 467, 468, 471; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ---- S. 5(2); Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ---- Ss. 435 & 439 Simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings --- Alleged fabrication of Nikah Nama to claim inheritance --- Request for stay of criminal trial --- Scope and judicial discretion --- FIR was lodged alleging that petitioner forged a fictitious Nikah Nama to pose as wife of the deceased father of the complainant in order to fraudulently claim property --- Petitioner sought stay of criminal proceedings during pendency of civil/family litigation regarding validity of said Nikah Nama --- Held, there is no legal bar on the parallel institution of criminal and civil cases --- However, where determination of criminal liability is intrinsically linked to outcome of pending civil litigation, the criminal court must exercise judicial discretion to avoid conflicting decisions and possible prejudice to the accused --- Genuineness of Nikah Nama being a central issue in the civil court, propriety required that criminal trial not be concluded before civil proceedings are finalized --- Order refusing stay of trial was unsustainable --- Petition partially allowed; trial may proceed, but final judgment to be withheld until civil/family court decision. Cited Cases: • Salman Ashraf v. Addl. District Judge Lahore (2023 SCMR 1292) • Muhammad Aslam v. The State (2017 SCMR 390) • Abdul Ahad v. Amjad Ali and others (PLD 2006 SC 771)