Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001—S. 9—Restructuring Agreement—Scope and Enforceability—Admitted liability: Where finance facilities initially obtained were later restructured through mutual agreement between the bank and borrower, acknowledgment of liability in the annual audited report and execution of a Restructuring Agreement, along with supplementary addendums and personal guarantees, amounted to unconditional admission of debt. Restructured obligations fall within the ambit of "finance" under S. 2(d) and "obligation" under S. 2(e) of the Ordinance. The plaintiff bank was entitled to enforce the restructuring contract as a valid financial arrangement. —Relied on: Habib Bank Ltd. v. Taj Textile Mills Ltd. (2009 CLD 1143) (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001—S. 2(d)(iii), (ix); S. 3—Mutual consent—Cost of funds—Markup beyond 8% per annum—Adjustment: Court held that the parties could mutually agree on cost of funds post-restructuring; however, imposition of markup in excess of the agreed 8% during the restructured period was disallowed. Amounts claimed beyond the agreed cap were adjusted accordingly. Defaulted amount was to be computed only up to 30.06.2021—the date of default—rather than 30.06.2022. (c) Civil Procedure—Summary judgment—Leave to defend—Bald allegations—No triable issues raised: Leave to defend application (PLA) filed by defendants was rejected where no substantial questions of law or fact were raised. General allegations regarding fake documents and unauthorized institution of the suit were unsupported by material evidence and contradicted by public admissions in corporate financial statements. —Held: No recording of evidence required; suit decreed in summary manner. (d) Execution—Conversion of decree—Non-payment—Section 19(1) of Ordinance: In the event of failure to pay the decretal amount within 30 days, decree would automatically be converted into execution proceedings under S. 19(1) of the Ordinance. ----Cited Case: Chairman NAB v. Nisar Ahmed Pathan (PLD 2022 SC 475) — bail jurisprudence cited for legal principle, though unrelated to finance law. ----Disposition: Suit decreed in the sum of Rs. 256,687,153/- against Defendants No. 1 to 4 jointly and severally, with costs and cost of funds from 30.06.2021 till realization. PLA of Proforma Defendants disposed of. Decree to convert into execution proceedings if not satisfied within 30 days.

Summary: When a party is impleaded at the appellate stage under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, principles of natural justice necessitate remanding the matter to the trial court to afford the newly added party the opportunity to file pleadings, adduce evidence, and fully contest the matter.

Summary: "The Tribunal is vested with the powers to remand the case to the Commissioner for making such enquiry or taking such action as the Tribunal may direct or make such order as it deems fit" --- (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Ss. 111, 122(9), 132(4)(b) & 133—Reference jurisdiction—Remand by Appellate Tribunal—Scope—Maintainability of reference against remand order—Tribunal’s power to remand case to Commissioner—Effect. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR) had remanded the case to the Assessing Officer for de novo proceedings while adjudicating appeal against inclusion of undeclared property and foreign remittances in taxable income—Petitioner challenged remand order through reference application under S.133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, arguing that the Tribunal failed to follow specific directions of the High Court issued in earlier proceedings (I.T.R. No.01 of 2024), which required a conclusive finding on the issuance of notice under S.111 prior to S.122(9) of the Ordinance—Held, Tribunal’s power to remand under S.132(4)(b) is independent and not curtailed by observations of the High Court in prior proceedings; remand does not amount to abdication of duty or evasion of legal obligation—Court reiterated settled law that no reference lies against a remand order, as it does not contain a conclusive finding or determination of law—Reference found not maintainable and dismissed accordingly. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Bank Al-Habib Ltd. (2016 PTD 2548) • Chairman WAPDA v. Gulbat Khan (1996 SCMR 230) — distinguished • Millat Tractors Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2024 PTD 483) • Haji Muhammad Yousaf v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2006 PTD 72) • E.M. Oil Mills and Industries Ltd. v. CIT (2011 PTD 2708) • Electronic Industries Ltd. v. CIT (1988 PTD 111) • Islamuddin v. ITO (2000 PTD 306) • Bostan International v. CIT (2010 PTD 1275) • CIT v. Maqsood Ahmad Gill (2007 PTD 1757) • CIT v. Bihar Alloy Steels Ltd. (1995 PTD 1189) Disposition: Reference dismissed; Tribunal’s remand order upheld.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 435, 439 & 196--- Sanction for prosecution under S. 295-A, Penal Code, 1860—Scope—Petitioner's application for obtaining sanction under S. 196, Cr.P.C. for prosecution under S. 295-A, Penal Code, 1860, was dismissed by the trial court—Challenge to said dismissal—Held, S. 196, Cr.P.C. does not apply where the court is constituted under a special statute inconsistent with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.—Provisions of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA, 2016), being special law, override the Cr.P.C. to the extent of inconsistency—Section 50(2) of PECA, 2016 explicitly provides that the Act has overriding effect over any contrary law—Offences under Ss. 295-A, 295-B, 295-C & 298-C, Penal Code, 1860, when coupled with S. 11 of PECA, 2016, are interlinked and not inconsistent inter se—Such offences fall within the jurisdiction of the special court established under S. 44(1) of PECA, 2016—Hence, sanction under S. 196, Cr.P.C., is not required—Petition was devoid of merit and dismissed. (b) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (XL of 2016): ----Ss. 11, 28, 29, 44(1), 50 & 51--- Jurisdiction—Overlap with Penal Code—Nature of offences under PECA, 2016 and Penal Code—Interrelation—Provisions of PECA, 2016 are to be read in conjunction with the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 to the extent they are not inconsistent—Section 50(1) of PECA, 2016 clarifies the Act is not in derogation of existing penal laws, but S. 50(2) provides overriding effect in case of conflict—FIA designated as the investigating agency under PECA by virtue of Rules notified under S. 29 & 51 of the Act—Special courts under PECA have exclusive jurisdiction to try offences falling within its domain, including those overlapping with Penal Code provisions such as Ss. 295-A to 298-C—Thus, trial for such offences lies before the PECA court without recourse to Cr.P.C. procedural requirements for sanction. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973): ----Art. 203 & Interpretation of Special Laws--- Special law v. general law—Principle of statutory interpretation—When a special law provides a self-contained mechanism for prosecution, investigation, and trial, its provisions take precedence over general laws like Cr.P.C.—Held, the purpose of PECA, 2016, as a special enactment, is to address electronic crimes comprehensively—Sanction under general law (S. 196, Cr.P.C.) is not needed where proceedings are under a special statute with its own procedure—Court found no procedural irregularity or illegality in rejection of sanction application—Petition was dismissed. ---Cited Case: • Sheraz Ahmad v. The State, Crl. Rev. No. 69407 of 2022 (Lahore High Court), upheld by Supreme Court in Crl. Petition No. 168-L/2023 (dismissed as withdrawn on 20.04.2023).

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 353--- Recording of prosecution evidence—Presence of counsel—Scope—Petitioner challenged the order whereby examination-in-chief of seven prosecution witnesses was recorded in absence of defence counsel—Petitioner contended that counsel was engaged before the Supreme Court and had submitted a written request—Held, S. 353 Cr.P.C. mandates that evidence must be recorded in the presence of the accused or his pleader where personal attendance is dispensed with—In the present case, petitioner and co-accused were present during examination-in-chief—Counsel submitted power of attorney and had been appearing throughout trial—No leading questions were alleged, and no specific prejudice was demonstrated—Cross-examination of said witnesses was later conducted by the defence—Held, no illegality or irregularity occurred; petition dismissed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973): ----Art. 10(1)--- Right to counsel—Misapplication of constitutional right—Petitioner argued violation of Art. 10(1) of the Constitution due to absence of counsel during examination-in-chief—Held, right to fair trial and legal representation was not infringed where accused was present, counsel had consistently represented petitioner, and cross-examination was subsequently conducted—Petitioner failed to establish any denial of fair trial or resulting prejudice—Petition dismissed accordingly. (c) Administration of justice: ----Fair trial--- Role of trial court—Recording of evidence not to be treated as ritual—Trial court under duty to ensure presence of accused or their counsel—Where absence of counsel was explained post-facto and no actual harm or unfairness was shown to have resulted, interference by revisional court not warranted—Court directed trial court to conclude proceedings expeditiously within one month—Petition dismissed without costs.

Summary: (a) Review Jurisdiction – Consent Order – Presumption of Validity: —Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 114 & O. XLVII, R. 1—Review of consent order—Scope—Held: A judicial order passed with recorded consent of parties carries a presumption of correctness—Courts are not to lightly entertain factual allegations seeking to challenge such consent without unimpeachable and credible evidence—Statements recorded by Judges in court proceedings are conclusive unless rebutted by strong evidence—Simple denial or unsupported allegation by party or counsel does not displace this presumption. 2004 SCMR 964, 2025 SCMR 361, PLD 1983 SC 68, PLD 2004 Lahore 21 relied upon. (b) Judicial Record – Sanctity and Finality: —Judicial proceedings—Held: The statement of a presiding Judge regarding what transpired during court proceedings is final and cannot be rebutted by affidavits or statements of parties or bystanders—Allowing otherwise would subject judicial proceedings to arbitrary contest and undermine confidence in the administration of justice. PLD 2003 Peshawar 179; PLD 2023 SC 211 cited. (c) Review vs. Appeal – Distinction in Scope: —Held: Review is not a substitute for appeal—Cannot be invoked to re-argue the case or revisit factual conclusions already settled after full consideration—Review is maintainable only for error apparent on the face of record and not for reappraisal of facts or law. 2010 SCMR 1036; 2007 SCMR 755; 2017 SCMR 118; 2018 SCMR 997 followed. (d) Cross-Examination – Limits and Abuse: —Cross-examination—Purpose and boundaries—Held: Prolonged or excessive cross-examination used to confuse or fatigue a witness amounts to abuse of process and undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings—Courts must regulate such practice and may impose costs for irrelevant or harassing questioning. PLD 1967 SC 167; PLD 2023 SC 211; 1996 SCMR 3; 1999 SCMR 1418 referred. (e) Procedural Conduct – Estoppel and Abuse of Process: —Held: Where a party has participated in proceedings in terms of a consent order (including cross-examining witnesses), and then challenges the same order the next day via review petition, such conduct is dishonest and constitutes abuse of court process—Petitioner estopped from denying consent post-compliance with order. ----Disposition: Review Petition dismissed. No error apparent on record or valid ground to disturb the consent-based judgment of 09.04.2025. Petitioner’s conduct found vexatious and lacking merit.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 189 Binding effect of Supreme Court decisions—Larger Bench re-examined the correctness of the principles laid down in Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Mohammad Din 2017 SCMR 1427 concerning time limits under indirect tax statutes—Court affirmed that findings in Super Asia applied not only to the Sales Tax Act, 1990 but also to similar provisions in the Customs Act, 1969 and Federal Excise Act, 2005, in view of their virtually identical language—Held, principles laid down in Super Asia have broader binding effect under Art. 189 of the Constitution. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 11(5) [pre-2024], S. 11G(2) [post-2024] Assessment—Time limitation for passing adjudication order—Mandatory nature—Show cause notice under S. 11 must culminate in an adjudication order within 120 days or extended period not exceeding 90 days—Larger Bench held that both the original 120-day and the 90-day extended periods were mandatory—Failure to comply renders the adjudication order invalid—Statutory phrase “shall… in no case exceed ninety days” was held to convey a conclusive and unbreachable limit. (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 74 Condonation of delay—Scope and limitation—Held, S. 74 grants discretionary power to FBR to condone delay in “appropriate” cases—However, the term “appropriate” must be interpreted objectively and not open-ended—Super Asia rightly imposed a 6-month ceiling to ensure clarity and avoid arbitrary or prolonged extensions—Court reaffirmed that any extension beyond 6 months is impermissible. (d) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 36 (repealed) Historical legislative context—Court observed that insertion of time-bound adjudication clauses in 2000 through amendment of S. 36 indicated legislative intent to restrict discretion and avoid prolonged proceedings—Held, the use of “shall” coupled with negative phrasing “in no case” indicated a mandatory character—Court rejected arguments that absence of penal consequences implied a directory provision. (e) Interpretation of Statutes ----Mandatory vs. Directory provisions—Test—Court reaffirmed that ascertainment of legislative intent is key in determining whether a provision is mandatory—Use of “shall” may be read as “may” in limited cases, but only when context allows—Where legislative language contains hard prohibitory terms (“in no case”), interpretation as mandatory is justified—Court concluded that allowing directory reading would render Commissioner’s power to grant extension redundant. (f) Statutory Adjudication and Fiscal Due Process ----Protection of taxpayers—Larger Bench emphasized that layered statutory deadlines serve to protect taxpayers from harassment or indefinite proceedings—Held, adjudicating officers are bound by strict timelines to ensure transparency and fairness—State functionaries must conclude proceedings expeditiously or lose the legal authority to decide the matter—Prolonged pendency of adjudication beyond statutory deadlines defeats due process. (g) Judicial Precedent ----Super Asia case (2017 SCMR 1427)—Reaffirmed—Court held that observations in later referral order (Wak Ltd. v. Collector Central Excise, 2018 SCMR 1474) were misconceived—No contradiction found in Super Asia regarding S. 74—Appeals and review petitions seeking reconsideration of Super Asia principles were dismissed. Cited Cases: • Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Mohammad Din 2017 SCMR 1427 • Abbasi Enterprises v. Collector of Sales Tax 2019 SCMR 1989 • Commissioner IR v. Sarwaq Traders 2025 SCMR 341 • A.J. Traders v. Collector of Customs PLD 2022 SC 817 • Mujahid Soap Industries v. Customs Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735 • Federal Land Commission v. Rais Habib Ahmed PLD 2011 SC 842 • Commissioner IR v. Yasmeen Bano 2020 SCMR 1120 Disposition: Super Asia principles declared correct; all connected appeals and review petitions were remitted for decision in light of this judgment. Review petitions dismissed.

Summary: (On appeal against the order/judgment dated 10.02.2025 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Cr.M. B.A. No. 349-P of 2025). (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 392 & 411---Robbery, dishonestly receiving stolen property---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the accused-petitioner were that he along with his co-accused trespassed into the house of complainant and committed robbery and took away Rs. 27,00,000/- in cash, some foreign currency, gold ornaments, three laptop, etc---Petitioner was arrested on 16.11.2024, however, he was nominated by the complainant on 28.11.2024---Record showed that no identification parade was arranged for---No plausible explanation had been given by complainant as to why the identification parade was not arranged for when in the FIR, it was specifically mentioned that the inmates of the house could identify the culprits if brought before them---High Court declined the bail on the ground that the statement of some jewellers was recorded who claimed that the petitioner and the other co-accused had sold gold ornaments to them but surprisingly said jewellers had received stolen articles but were not made accused in this case for offence under Section 411, P.P.C.---Record showed that one USB was given to the Police Officer showing CCTV footage but surprisingly even the said footage was not shown to the complainant and the eye-witnesses to identify the persons mentioned in the said video footage---It was alleged by complainant that two other FIRs had been registered against the petitioner but in the said FIRs unknown persons were shown to be robbers and the petitioner had not been convicted in any case---In such eventuality, the case of the petitioner called for further inquiry falling under Subsection (2) of Section 497,Cr.P.C.---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances, and petitioner was enlarged on bail. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail orders are tentative in nature and have no bearing upon any subsequent proceedings before the Trial Court. Shan Asghar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (Through Video Link Peshawar). Altaf Khan, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Dilawar Shah, Inspector and Ijaz, ASI for the State. Altaf Samad, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (Through Video Link Peshawar). Date of hearing: 13th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 295-B---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Willfully defiling, damaging, or desecrating a copy of the Holy Quran---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Case property not presented as evidence---Effect---Accused was charged for tearing the pages of Holy Quran and using derogatory words about it---Record showed that primary evidence i.e. Holy Quran from which pages were torn allegedly by the appellant, was not taken into possession by the Investigating Officer; such damaging defect demolished the entire superstructure of the case---Necessary incriminating articles, which requires proper identification, must be exhibited as case property during the trial---Failure to do so attracted the presumption under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which implied that such material had gone against the prosecution or that no such material existed at all---No doubt that if the case property was not produced in Court, the concerned authority/ prosecution was required to furnish plausible explanation based upon concrete material and not mere lame excuses, which was not the case in hand---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Qamar Zaman v. Waseem Iqbal and 5 others 2004 SCMR 1209; State of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan v. Kenneth Marshal and 2 others 2005 SCMR 594; Gul Dast Khan v. The State 2009 SCMR 431 and Ahmed Ali v. The State 2023 SCMR 781 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 295-B---Willfully defiling, damaging, or desecrating a copy of the Holy Quran---Appreciation of evidence---Mental condition of the accused---Scope---Accused was charged for tearing the pages of Holy Quran and using derogatory words about it---Fundamental aspect of the case was the mental condition of the accused, who was apprehended on the same date i.e. 30.05.2022 and he remained under treatment with Medical Officer, who while appearing as a witness in the Court stated that she was posted at PIMS Psychiatry Department and patient (appellant) aged 25 years was brought by police in handcuffs with the complaints of hearing multiple voices and suspiciousness---Appellant also had history of substance misuse, and violent and disruptive behavior---Final conclusion given by the said medical witness was that appellant was diagnosed as a case of paranoid schizophrenia plus substance addict by consultant doctor---After detail examination, it was concluded that patient/appellant was case of paranoid schizophrenia and illicit substance induced psychosis---Act of blasphemy was done in psychotic state of mind with no insight into the process---Primarily, Court was unable to understand why the said Medical Officer was called as Court witness in the Court, especially when she treated the patient at the initial stage and the Investigating Officer brought the appellant to the hospital for his psychotic evaluation---As per the statement of Investigating Officer, the appellant remained under treatment from 30.05.2022 till 18.06.2022, and the opinion rendered by medical witness had been referred in the final report under S.173, Cr.P.C., which had been taken judicial notice of---When no explanation had been rendered by the prosecution as to why this prosecution witness was designated as Court Witness, it appeared she was intentionally not called as a prosecution witness, especially when she had rendered a clear opinion regarding the mental illness of the appellant, in which no criminal liability could be imposed---However, this aspect was not taken into account by the Trial Court, rather the Court allowed the State as well as the complainant to cross-examine the said Court Witness---Nevertheless, despite extensive cross-examination of Court Witness, prosecution could not make any dent that the appellant was not treated for mental illness or that the opinion rendered by said witness, being a Medical Officer in the Psychiatry Department of PIMS, was contrary to the record---During the cross-examination, it had also been confirmed that the disease paranoid schizophrenia was an extreme form of schizophrenia---Patient of paranoid schizophrenia must be kept in isolation and under care instead of keeping him free in public---Paranoid schizophrenia was the last/highest degree of the said disease and as per Medical Officer’s investigation, the patient was ill---In this case, no specific plea of illness was taken by the appellant under S.342, Cr.P.C., but the prosecution presented evidence of mental illness through Medical Officer and the report remained un-rebutted throughout the cross-examination---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Mst. Safia Bano v. Home Department PLD 2021 SC 488; Khizar Hayat v. The State 2006 SCMR 1755; The State v. Balahari Das Sutradhar PLD 1962 Dacca 467; Lal Khan v. The Crown PLD 1952 Lah. 502; Gholam Yousaf v. The Crown PLD 1953 Lah. 213; The State v. Saifullah Khan PLD 2006 Pesh. 140; Hazrat Ali Shah v. The State and others PLD 2014 Pesh. 122; The State v. Muhammad Arshad Javed 1995 MLD 667 and Shahbaz Masih alias Kaba v. The State 2007 MLD 1040 rel. Manzoor Ahmed Rehmani for Appellant. Ms. Saadia Shehzadi, State Counsel and Muhammad Iqbal, Inspector for the State. Complainant in person. Assisted by: Ms. Aymen Azeem, Law Clerk, I.H.C. Date of hearing: 2nd May, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending