Summary: Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenging therein the amendment in Rule 66 of the Punjab Mining Concessions Rules, 2002 and fixation of enhanced rate of Royalty--- Section 2 of the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act of 1948 empowers the Government to make Rules--- Rule 66(1)(2) of Punjab Mining Concessions Rules, 2002 fixation of Rate of Royalty--- The Government has jurisdiction under Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 to amend the Punjab Mining Concessions Rules, 2002 and to fix or enhance the amount of royalty on Limestone & Argillaceous Clay. The Provincial Government is also empowered to frame Rules, describing the conditions for Mining Lease and royalties as well as to fix or enhance rate of royalty which (royalty) is not legally considered as a ?tax'. Further as a policy matter the fixing, modifying or enhancing the rate of royalty there is no need to hear the petitioners-companies and the same does not offend the principle of audi alteram partem. --- Writ Petitions dismissed. 384Service 13336/22 Province of Punjab through its Chief Secretary GOP Lahore etc. Vs Chand Iqbal Deputy Accountant etc Mr. Justice Ch. Muhammad Iqbal 16- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 3999 2026 PLC (CS) 36 (Lahore High Court)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4, 9, 18, 25 & 199 --- Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982 ---- S. 21(1) --- CAA Service Regulations, 2000 --- Contract Employment --- Regularization --- Ultra Vires --- Maintainability --- Aforesaid Civil Petitions for leave to appeal are directed against judgment dated 12.01.2021, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Constitutional Petitions No. D-2576 and D-3167 of 2020 --- Short-lived facts of case are that respondent No. 2 is statutory body incorporated under Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982 ("Ordinance") --- CAA Service Regulations, 2000 ("Regulations") was framed pursuant to provisions of Ordinance --- Regulations were revised first in year 2014 and then in year 2019 --- Respondent No.2 advertised certain vacancies in newspapers and petitioners applied against vacant posts on merit, and after qualifying written test and interview, they were appointed on contract basis for two years --- Contract period was subsequently extended, and after being granted extension of their last contract, Departmental Head recommended their case for further extension --- However, vide letter dated 20.05.2020, petitioners were informed that they will not be allowed further extension --- According to revised Regulations in 2019, maximum time limit for contract service was fixed as five years --- Petitioners, in serious apprehension that their period of contract service will not be extended, filed CP No. D-3167/2020 for relief that their appointment may be declared regular appointment and that Regulation 21(1) of Regulations is ultra vires Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("Constitution") and fundamental rights guaranteed under it --- High Court clubbed CP No. D-2576/2020 and CP No. D-3167/2020 together and dismissed both petitions vide consolidated judgment dated 12.01.2021 on ground that Civil Aviation Authority ("CAA") has no statutory rules --- However, High Court failed to consider that vires of Regulations were also under challenge, on which there was no discussion --- Learned counsel for petitioners argued that under rules and statutes of CAA, there is no mention of Contract or Project post, and no procedure laid down to fill such post --- It was further contended that contract appointments, without any backing of law, are not only unlawful but also amount to exploitation --- He further argued that neither plea of vires of regulations was considered nor any other crucial questions raised were taken into consideration, and though case law was noted in impugned judgment, but without appreciating same, High Court found it distinguishable --- It was further averred that if contract appointment is made against permanent post involving duties/work of permanent nature through transparent selection process, then it would be considered regular appointment --- According to learned counsel, revised Regulation 21(1) of Regulations are ultra vires fundamental rights guaranteed under Constitution, but High Court had dismissed petitions without considering or giving any findings on whether aforesaid Regulation is ultra vires or intra vires --- Learned counsel for CAA argued that petitions were not maintainable before High Court and fully supported impugned judgment --- He further argued that this Court, in various dicta, already held that contract employees cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction for their regularization or otherwise, and proper remedy for contract employee, if there is any breach of contract, is to file civil suit --- However, when we confronted learned counsel on whether question of vires raised by petitioners was decided by High Court, learned counsel frankly conceded that no such issue was dealt with or decided in impugned judgment --- Heard arguments --- According to facts narrated in CPLA No.407-K of 2021 (CP.No.D-3167/2020 before High Court), petitioner No.1 (Syed Saad Ali) applied against one vacancy of Assistant Director (IT) (Data Base Administrator -EG-01), while petitioner No.2 (Syed Zia-ul-Haq) applied against vacancy of Assistant Director (IT) (Oracle Functional Consultant -EG-01) --- Both petitioners, in their writ petition, sought declaration that their appointment by way of direct recruitment in EG-01 is regular appointment and they further challenged vires of Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, same being ultra vires their fundamental rights, and prayed to High Court to strike it down as unreasonable --- Moreover, Office Memorandum dated 20.05.2020, issued pursuant to Regulation 21(1) of Regulations, was also challenged, with prayer that since they were performing their duties against permanent post for last 5 years, hence directions be issued against respondents to regularize their services --- Whereas, in CP No. 449-K of 2021 (CP No.D-2576 of 2020 before High Court), claim of petitioner (Javed Iqbal) was that he was commissioned in Pakistan Air Force in year 1993 and having more than 17 years of service at his credit, he was sent on deputation to CAA on 29.08.2001 and was posted as ADC to Deputy DG (Ops. CAA) --- He remained on deputation till 16.12.2005 and also submitted application, as per Regulations, for his permanent absorption, which was processed and he was consequently asked to seek retirement from his parent organization --- It is further stated by said petitioner that he was appointed as Airworthiness Safety Inspector, Ex-Cadre "B" (PG-10), on 25.01.2008 after fulfilling all codal formalities for regular appointment in CAA, but he was appointed on contract basis --- He had also prayed to High Court for declaration that he is regular employee and is entitled to serve till age of superannuation, and that respondents may be directed to issue his notification as regular employee --- Bone of contention before High Court in CP No.D-3167/2020 was challenge to alleged vires of revised Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, whereby it was articulated that "subject to upper age limit criteria, authority may fill regular post or temporary post, or project post on contract basis for specified period, initially for two years to be renewed, upon satisfactory performance --- Provided that fresh yearly contract to be executed up to maximum of five years" --- Learned counsel for petitioners collectively argued that plea of ultra vires was not taken into consideration by learned High Court and impugned judgment, in this regard, is silent --- It is translucent from impugned judgment that while jotting down other relevant facts in CP No.D-3167/2020, learned High Court also mentioned that petitioner has prayed for declaration to effect that revised Regulation 21(1) of Regulations is ultra vires fundamental rights of petitioners and same be struck down being unreasonable --- It is further reflected from arguments of Mr. M. M. Aqil Awan, Sr. ASC (mentioned in impugned judgment) that he strongly objected to decision of respondent (CAA) of introducing Regulation 21(1) of revised Regulations --- Learned Division Bench of High Court acknowledged and noted that petitioners also attacked revised Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, under which time limit was provided for contractual appointment, but learned High Court, in paragraph 10 of impugned judgment, without adverting to plea of vires raised by petitioners and argued by their learned counsel, confined judgment to question of regularization in service of CAA alone, and in same scenario, held that contractual employees have no vested right to be regularized unless it has specifically been provided for under terms and conditions of appointment and law --- Ultimately, writ petitions were not found maintainable either on facts or in law --- Terms "intra vires" and "ultra vires" are both Latin phrases, and diametrical opposites --- Expression ultra vires means "beyond powers" --- If act entails legal authority and it is done with such authority, it is symbolized as intra vires, that is, within precincts of powers, but if it is carried out shorn of authority, it is ultra vires --- It is well-settled that constitutionality of any law, rules, or regulations, can be scrutinized and surveyed, and law can be struck down if it is found to be offending Constitution due to absence of law-making and jurisdictive competence, or found in violation of fundamental rights enshrined therein --- At same time, it is established precept of interpretation of laws, one backed by judicial sagacity and prudence in form of numerous precedents of superior courts, that law should be saved rather than be destroyed and court must lean in favour of upholding constitutionality of legislation unless it is ex facie violative of constitutional provision --- Function of judiciary is not to legislate or question wisdom of legislature in making particular law, nor can it refuse to enforce law --- Doctrine of severability permits court to sever unconstitutional portion of partially unconstitutional statute in order to preserve operation of any uncontested or valid remainder --- Words contained in statutes, rules, or regulations, are first to be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in context, or in object of statute, to suggest contrary --- Vires of law, rules, or regulations can be challenged if its provisions are ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not required to be shown, but there is also presumption in favour of constitutionality of enactments, unless it is ex facie violative of constitutional provision --- Reference can be made to judgment of this Court rendered in case of Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others (2015 SCMR 1739), wherein this Court summarized applicable rules while determining constitutionality of statute and also referred to various other judicial precedents --- It is well settled exposition of law that each case has to be decided on its own facts --- Every litigant deserves fair chance of being heard and decision of court must be founded and structured on facts of case --- It is admitted position that learned High Court neither considered plea of vires of Regulation under challenge nor discussed anything in this regard in impugned judgment which completely ignored and overlooked same --- Doctrine of "sub-silentio" accentuates legal principle where judgment is rendered without specifically and precisely avowing or attending to exact question of law raised for determination --- In fact, sub silentio, Latin term, literally translates to "under silence" or "in silence" --- In legal milieus, it points towards incidence where Court decides lis without appreciating or deliberating particular point of law raised before it, which disturbs precedential value of judgment --- This doctrine often denotes that if court, in its judgment, overlooked or dispensed with crucial point of law raised before it, then precedential value of such decision is seriously disturbed --- Decision is not binding if it was reached at without argument, without reference to critical terms of law, and without citation of authority --- Such decision, taken as sub silentio, lacks authoritative weight --- This Court, in case of Uch Power (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (2010 PTD 1809), explained that decisions sub silentio have no precedential value --- Such decisions are defined as "those which are given on point of law not perceived by Court or present to its mind" --- Whereas, in case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ((1989) 1 SCC 101), Supreme Court of India, while quoting Salmond on Jurisprudence, explained that decision passed sub silentio in technical sense is when particular point of law involved in decision is not perceived by court or present to its mind --- Aforesaid Civil Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed vide our Short Order dated 12.06.2025 --- As consequence thereof, impugned consolidated judgment dated 12.01.2021, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Constitutional Petitions No.D-2576 and D-3167/2020, was set aside and matter was remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication, expeditiously, preferably within period of three months, excluding period of summer vacations --- Above are reasons assigned in support of our Short Order --- Petitions were allowed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199, Art. 10-A, & Art. 2010 --- High Court’s disposal of service-related Constitution Petitions by applying earlier decision mutatis mutandis without affording opportunity of hearing to the Government—Maintainability—Petitioners (Province of Sindh and others) assailed the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Sukkur Bench, which had disposed of multiple Constitution Petitions by extending the benefit of an earlier order passed in C.P. No.D-1435 of 2023 without hearing the petitioners or allowing them to file comments—Petitioners contended that the recruitment processes were based on different advertisements with distinct terms and conditions issued by various departments across different time periods and could not be treated identically—Supreme Court held that before applying the doctrine of mutatis mutandis, the Court must examine whether the earlier order is factually and legally compatible with the case in hand—Observed that each case must be decided on its own merits and the impugned order, based solely on factual grounds of an earlier decision and devoid of legal enunciation, was not binding under Art. 201 of the Constitution—Violation of due process and fair hearing as envisaged under Art. 10-A was also noted—High Court had failed to appreciate the differences in advertisements, departmental procedures, and lack of codal formalities, and passed the order in a “slipshod” manner. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction ---- Art. 199---- Limitations of High Court under writ jurisdiction in adjudicating disputed factual controversies in recruitment matters—Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction is not mandated to conduct an elaborate inquiry into disputed facts or record evidence—However, a just decision can be reached where admitted or available documents suffice to assess legality of executive actions—Court referred to principle laid down in Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Home & Tribal Affairs Department v. Fayyaz Dawar (2023 SCMR 1442) and Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib (2011 SCMR 1813), emphasizing that writ remedy is reserved for situations where illegality of executive action is demonstrable without complex fact-finding—High Court, in the present case, overstepped its bounds by conclusively determining the respondents’ entitlement without examining competing documentary evidence or giving a chance for rebuttal. (c) Service Law ---- Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 ---- R. 5(1) ---- Recommendations of District Recruitment Committee (DRC)—Whether confer vested right of appointment—Held, recommendation or issuance of offer letter by DRC does not in itself create a legally enforceable or vested right in favour of applicants unless codal formalities are completed and recruitment is duly approved by competent authority—Legitimate expectancy cannot override statutory requirements—Contention that appointments were made based on DRC recommendations and subsequently terminated without due process, to be examined by High Court on merits. (d) Latin Legal Maxims ---- Meaning, application, and scope of “mutatis mutandis” ---- Expression “mutatis mutandis”—Scope and applicability—Held, expression denotes “with necessary changes having been made”—Refers to application of a legal rule or judicial decision to a different factual matrix after suitable modifications—Court explained that it is not to be confused with “ceteris paribus” and requires case-by-case evaluation—Relied on definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, Jowitt’s Dictionary, Oxford Law Dictionary, Bouvier’s Dictionary, Cambridge Dictionary, and Collins Dictionary—Reiterated Pakistani and foreign case law on the term including Muhammad Sharif v. The State (PLD 1999 SC 1063), Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer (1995 ACJ 97), Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa (1983 2 SCR 363), and R. v. Gauthier ([1977] 1 SCR 441)—Held that High Court erred in applying earlier order blindly without determining its contextual fit with the facts of each petition. (e) Practice and Procedure ---- Remand for decision on merits ---- Remand of petitions for fresh adjudication—Supreme Court converted all Civil Petitions into appeals and set aside the impugned orders—Directed High Court to decide all Constitution Petitions afresh on merits, after affording full opportunity of hearing to both sides—Ordered parties to exchange documents and file necessary pleadings in advance—High Court to consider, inter alia, differences in advertisements, departments, recruitment procedures, and compliance with codal formalities without being influenced by the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023. (f) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 184(3) ---- Effect of absence of legal principle in earlier High Court ruling on its binding nature—Held, the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 was fact-specific, contained no principle of law or ratio decidendi, and thus could not operate as a binding precedent—Mere administrative convenience or factual similarity does not justify universal application of a past order—Judicial comity under Art. 201 applies only where legal principles have been laid down. (g) Disposition ---- Petitions barred by limitation—Condonation allowed—Delay in certain petitions condoned in view of connected matters being within time. Petition in CPLA No. 182-K/2025 dismissed as not pressed—Province of Sindh had no grievance against order in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 regarding recruitment in Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. All remaining Civil Petitions converted into appeals, allowed, and remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. Cited Cases: Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Govt. of KPK v. Fayyaz Dawar, 2023 SCMR 1442 = 2023 SCP 199 Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib & others, 2011 SCMR 1813 Muhammad Sharif v. The State, PLD 1999 SC 1063 Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer, 1995 ACJ 97 (India) Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa, 1983 2 SCR 363 (India) R. v. Gauthier, [1977] 1 SCR 441 (Canada)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 10-A & 191A Judicial conduct—Due process—Natural justice—Right to fair hearing—High Court passed adverse remarks against Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) without affording any opportunity to respond or be heard—Remarks based solely on oral assertions of Acting Prosecutor General that father of accused remained in chamber of judge before remand order was changed—No written complaint or affidavit filed—Held, adverse remarks passed without notice or inquiry were in breach of fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution—Principles of natural justice apply equally to judicial officers—Remarks expunged—Constitutional Bench jurisdiction under Art. 191A was held not to be attracted as matter did not involve interpretation of Constitution, constitutionality of law, or Article 184/185/186 jurisdiction—Transfer applications to Constitutional Bench dismissed as frivolous. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997): ----Ss. 13(2), 14(2), 19(1) & 21-E Presiding Officer and Administrative Judge of ATC—Jurisdiction and powers—Appointment—Petitioner was appointed as Presiding Officer and designated as Administrative Judge, ATC, Karachi Division—Orders passed by him refusing physical remand and directing judicial custody based on accused’s complaint of maltreatment, and directing constitution of Joint Investigation Team (JIT)—High Court set aside these orders and observed that constitution of JIT was beyond authority of Administrative Judge under S.19(1), which vests such power in Government—Held, powers under S.13(2) and S.21-E must be exercised within statutory boundaries—However, procedural irregularities alone did not justify passing strictures without hearing the judge. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898: ----Ss. 435 & 439 Revision jurisdiction—Scope—High Court may call for records and examine correctness, legality or propriety of orders passed by inferior criminal courts—However, findings regarding impropriety or misconduct must be based on verifiable evidence and due process—High Court acted beyond jurisdiction by issuing directions and passing adverse remarks without due inquiry—Expungement of remarks directed. (d) Judicial Accountability and Conduct—Strictures against judicial officers—Scope and limitations: High Court’s directions in Paragraph No.14 of impugned order inviting administrative action against ATC judge held unjustified and in disregard of binding precedents—Judicial condemnation without notice creates irreparable stigma on judicial officer’s reputation—Condemnation without affording opportunity violates settled law—Superior Courts must act as mentors, not censors—Ref: Miss Nusrat Yasmin v. Registrar, PHC (PLD 2019 SC 719), Aijaz Ahmed Tunio v. State (PLD 2021 SC 752), Hasnain Raza v. LHC (PLD 2022 SC 7)—Doctrine of stare decisis re-emphasized—Deviation from binding precedent undermines uniformity and legal certainty—Ref: Federation v. Muhammad Hamid Mughal (PLD 2024 SC 515), Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation (PLD 2010 SC 483). (e) Administrative Remedy—Judicial strictures—Proper recourse: In case of perceived misconduct or error by a judicial officer, proper course is to refer matter to Chief Justice on administrative side via confidential note—Open-court adverse remarks should be avoided—Even if expunged later, they leave permanent reputational harm—High Court failed to follow Supreme Court’s guidelines on discipline and comity. ---Disposition: Criminal Petitions converted into appeals—Transfer applications dismissed—Without disturbing Notifications dated 26.02.2025 and 27.02.2025 (regarding change of Administrative Judge), the directions and adverse remarks contained in Paragraph No.14 of the High Court’s impugned order dated 18.02.2025 were expunged.

Summary: The petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") based, inter alia, on the ground that the suit of the respondent was barred under Order II Rule 2, CPC was dismissed and the said finding was maintained by the Revisional Court below. This Court held that pattern of electing one remedy, abandoning it after adverse consequences, then shifting to the arbitration without proper recourse, and finally returning to file a third suit without compliance with the mandatory legal provisions is precisely what the doctrine of election, the bar contained in Order II Rule 2 CPC, and the scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1940 aim to prevent. If such litigation is allowed to proceed without scrutiny under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, it would set a dangerous precedent whereby a litigant could perpetually avoid finality by alternating between forums and/or remedies, without accountability. The law does not permit a party to keep the adversary entangled in an unending chain of litigation by withholding material facts, disowning procedural consequences, and reviving stale claims under the guise of a fresh suit. The respondent, having exhausted his remedies and failed to pursue them diligently, cannot now be allowed to relitigate the same dispute under a new garb. 402Writ Petition- Educational Institution- Admission 401-22 JHELUM HOMEOPATHIC MEDICAL COLLEGE VS FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC. Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf 04- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4022 2026 MLD 1 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 3, 4, 9, 10A, 14, 18 & 25 ---- Government employment in BPS-01 to BPS-04 ---- Appointment letters issued after completion of codal formalities ---- Non-payment of salaries without cancellation of appointments ---- Held, violative of fundamental rights Petitioners, appointed as Driver, Chowkidar, and Ward Boy in the Health Department, District Tharparkar, after due process including advertisement, interview, verification, and medical fitness, were denied salary payments despite joining duties. Their names were excluded from the salary processing list without cancellation of appointment letters or show cause notice. Held, non-payment of salaries in the absence of any lawful withdrawal of appointments constitutes a violation of fundamental rights under Arts. 3, 4, 9, 10A, 14, 18 and 25 of the Constitution. Appointment letters vested legal rights, and deprivation of salary without due process was unlawful. (b) Constitutional petition under Art. 199 ---- Scope ---- Disputed facts as a bar to writ jurisdiction ---- When not applicable ---- Duty of High Court to direct verification instead of non-suiting poor employees High Court dismissed petition on the ground of disputed facts, holding that petitioners' names were not in the final list of DRC-approved appointments. Supreme Court held that no factual controversy existed requiring elaborate inquiry, as appointment letters were admitted and not denied by department in comments. Held, when the right asserted is complete and supported by official documents, the constitutional jurisdiction is not ousted merely by raising belated factual objections. The High Court erred by not directing departmental verification and remedying administrative injustice. Dismissal of petition without such inquiry amounts to non-performance of constitutional duty. (c) Civil service ---- Recruitment irregularity ---- Appointments not revoked through lawful process ---- Employees cannot be penalized without inquiry ---- Departmental malfeasance must be addressed Held, if the appointment letters were issued without compliance of codal formalities, the Department was obligated to (i) conduct proper inquiry, (ii) identify responsible officials, and (iii) take appropriate action. Without such inquiry, recalling appointments or withholding salaries of low-paid employees constitutes administrative highhandedness. Poor appointees often become scapegoats, while departmental wrongdoers escape accountability. Held further, any withdrawal of appointments without show cause or hearing is void ab initio. (d) Administrative law ---- Direction for inquiry and verification ---- Supreme Court remand to Secretary Health Sindh ---- Time-bound compliance Supreme Court remanded matter to Secretary Health, Government of Sindh, directing that a hearing be granted to petitioners and the record examined. If the appointments were made on DRC/Selection Committee recommendation, petitioners must be allowed to resume service with prompt release of salaries. Exercise to be concluded within two months of receipt of judgment. Disposition: Civil Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; judgment of High Court set aside; matter remanded for verification and regularization of petitioners upon fulfillment of codal formalities.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 18 & 25 --- Civil Servants Act, 1973 --- Fundamental Rule 17 --- Promotion to BPS-22 --- Supersession without reasons --- Denial of fair consideration --- Proforma promotion --- Doctrine of legitimate expectation --- Remand to High-Powered Selection Board. Petitioner, a BS-21 officer of the Police Service of Pakistan, challenged his repeated supersession for promotion to BS-22 without being afforded any reasons or fair opportunity. Despite having an unblemished service record with outstanding Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) from 2013 to 2018 and being senior to others who were promoted, the petitioner was overlooked by the High-Powered Selection Board (HPSB) in multiple meetings. No adverse material was found in the official record, yet the HPSB minutes included negative remarks not grounded in any documented performance review. The Supreme Court held that while promotion is not a vested right, the right to fair and lawful consideration for promotion is enforceable. Where a civil servant attains the age of superannuation without being justly considered for promotion, the case must be assessed under the framework of proforma promotion as envisaged in Fundamental Rule 17. The Court observed that delay or omission in considering eligible officers due to administrative lapses entitles them to proforma promotion with consequential benefits. The High Court’s dismissal was found to have overlooked the factual record and was influenced by unverified notings in HPSB proceedings. The judgment was set aside and the matter remanded to the HPSB to re-evaluate the petitioner’s case for proforma promotion in a fair, impartial, and timely manner, with specific instructions for decision within two months. Cited Cases: • Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb 2022 SCMR 2020 • Alam Chand v. Jamil Ahmad 2008 SCMR 980 • Abid Hussain Sherazi v. Secretary, M/O Industries & Production 2005 SCMR 1742 • Secretary Health Department, Punjab v. Dr. Abida Iqbal 2009 SCMR 61 • Federal Public Service Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087 ----Disposition: Appeal allowed; High Court judgment set aside; matter remanded to HPSB for fresh consideration within two months.

Summary: Juridical/Artificial person operates through delegate(s) and assigns, where permitted by law. 414Writ Petition- Educational Institution- Affilliation 9961-24 (T.L.C) INSTITUTE OF NURSING VS HIGHER EDUCATION COMMISSION ETC Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Awais Khalid 02- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4837